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Introductory Note 
;\ MONG the multitude of conflicts principles that, fi according to various claims, should determine the 
law applicable to all contracts, only two have re-
sisted the test of critical analysis. These, indeed, form an 
adequate groundwork. First, the freedom of parties to 
choose the law applicable to their contract must be recog-
nized as a general rule without petty restraint. Second, in 
the absence of such agreement, a contract should be gov-
erned by the law most closely connected with its character-
istic feature. 
The first proposition is essential to the second. To deny 
party autonomy means rigid conflicts rules created by some 
superior authority. A scholastic doctrine may invest the 
law of the place of contracting with ineluctable force; a 
state may forbid stipulations for a foreign law. However, 
our modest task requires but a reasonable choice of law 
advisable for average use by courts and legislatures. This 
cannot aspire to ascertain more than subsidiary rules. It 
is not possible to achieve anything practical by attempting 
to coerce the parties into an inexorable law of our crea-
tion. This conception is perfectly consistent with a con-
sidered regard to the large significance of public law at the 
present time. It even allows and facilitates a line of thought 
leading to the subsidiary application of the private law of 
that state which, by its administrative law, preponderantly 
regulates certain kinds of business. This will appear in such 
contracts as maritime carriage of goods, employment, and 
msurance. 
It has been further explained, in virtual agreement with 
a growing volume of authority, that, for our purpose, more 
vii 
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specific conflicts rules should be devised with local connec-
tions corresponding to the different types of transactions. 
The usual types, especially of business contracts, therefore, 
must be studied one by one. The characteristics of these 
contracts should be ascertained by comparative investiga-
tion of their economic and legal structure in the various 
countries and of their function in international life. 
Part Nine is an attempt to demonstrate that this method 
leads to some definite and many suggestive conclusions. 
In a few matters such as money obligations, sales of goods, 
and workmen's compensation, excellent work has been ac-
complished by treatises, drafts, and even treaties, estab-
lishing a new range of observation on the international 
level. In others, much confusion must be cleared up, and 
some topics are full of difficulty. It may be well to re-
emphasize that merely partial research is submitted here. 
The method followed in this work requires strict avoidance 
of the generalizations which are all too familiar in this 
branch of law. In the very first topic of this volume, it will 
only be possible to state that no sure conflicts rule can be 
formulated. 
In such and in atypical cases, the courts must refer back 
to the general principle and weigh the individual circum-
stances and stipulations of the contract. Categories of 
transactions insufficiently treated here ought to find more 
competent and detailed consideration than I have been able 
to devote to them. 
Whether localizing an individual contract or a type of 
contract, we do, of course, survey the multiple territorial 
connections involved (domicil, place of contracting, place 
or places of performance, etc.) and decide which is the 
most important. But, as said before/ scarcely any of these 
"criteria" from which courts have deduced in particular 
1 Vol. II p. 432. 
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cases specific choices of law, command respect in themselves, 
and no general evaluation of them, hence, will be under-
taken. 
But should not one exception be advisable with respect 
to a criterion almost unchallenged in the civil law countries? 
I am referring to the contracts baptized by Saleilles2 as 
"contrats d' adhesion." Carriers, banks, insurance companies, 
warehouses, manufacturers, traders, buying departments 
and many other enterprises establish standard forms or use 
forms drafted by organizations, for contracting with an 
indefinite number of persons. In these cases, the enterprise 
offers a ready-made contract, which the other party simply 
accepts by "accession." 
The customer has little opportunity to bargain for con-
ditions anu none at all when the enterprise, by its own 
resources or through a cartel, enjoys a monopoly. This well-
known fact of modern commercial life, the object of many 
discussions, leads in conflicts law to the conclusion that the 
customer who simply "adheres" to the offer, ought to 
understand that the contract has to serve its purpose on a 
single legal basis, irrespective of nationality and domicil of 
the customer. Hence, the law of the domicil of the enter-
prise, or of the branch concluding the transaction, is re-
garded as tacitly agreed upon, or at least presumably in-
tended. The German courts have constantly argued to this 
effect, the French courts often, and the C6digo Bustamante 
has formally adopted this as the rule. 3 
2 SALEILLES, De Ia declaration de volonte (Paris 1901) 229. For a survey 
of the rich French and Italian literature on the nature and interpretation of 
these transactions, see DI PACE, "II negozio di adesione nel diritto private," 
39 Riv. Dir. Com. (1941) 34-47. For a comprehensive theory, LUDWIG RAISER, 
Das Recht der allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen (Hamburg 1935). 
3 Germany: For a list of cases, see NussBAUM, D. IPR. 23 I n. 2; BATIFFOL 
102 §§ II5-II9 adopts the German view. Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 2, 1945) 71 
BGE. II 287. Codigo Bustamante, art. 185: in the absence of an express or 
tacit intention, in contracts of adhesion the law of the party offering or 
preparing them is presumed to be accepted. 
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No such rule, however, exists in the United States. 
American courts rather seem inclined to react against the 
preponderance of one party by protecting the other and 
granting him the privilege of his own domiciliary law, 
directly or in the guise of the law of the place of contract-
ing. On the subject of carrier's liability and life insurance, 
this phenomenon is particularly strong. We are thus warned 
not to presume generally that the law of the party issuing 
a form should govern. 
Of course, the Continental argument is not valueless. 
Obviously, an enterprise of the kind mentioned is vitally 
interested in a secure, uniform basis on which to deal with 
an international public, and the latter profits by the more 
favorable conditions offered on such basis. 
Also, the Supreme Court of the United States has recog-
nized that a finance corporation in Pennsylvania lending 
funds in other states on standard terms at a rate of interest 
permitted at its place of business was not guilty of usury. 4 
Precisely for small loans issued in mass, the argument has 
an inevitable bearing. A good case may further be made out 
for the law of the business place where a bank provides 
professional services of all kinds to private customers, and 
an especially strong case for the law of the business place 
from which an insurance company delivers its policies. But 
in contrast to the sweeping statements in Europe and Latin 
America, we should not acknowledge an automatic subjec-
tion of mass contracts to the domiciliary law of the 
enterprise. 
In Part Ten, the questions concerning modification and 
discharge of obligations are selected with regard to the 
interest they enjoy in conflicts law. Accordingly, the problems 
of performance do not appear in this Part, their relevant 
topics having been treated in Chapters 30 and 35. 
4 Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. ( 1927) 274 U. S. 403; see Vol. II 
p. 409. 
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On the other hand, the conflicts of law respecting nego-
tiable instruments are too complex and important to be 
investigated before property law will be examined in Volume 
Four. 
In sending out the present volume, I do not ignore the 
fact, emphatically stressed by some writers, that in this 
postwar period the organization in which international busi-
ness thrived before and even after the First World War, 
has undergone very conspicuous changes. No one knows 
how much of the transformation is unrepealable, and where 
it will end. But after as much inquiry of American trade 
experts as was feasible, I am fairly satisfied that at this time 
our critical survey of past and present conflicts doctrines and 
the outlook for their reasonable progress ought not to be 
disturbed by the fear that it may shortly become obsolete. 
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PART NINE 
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
CHAPTER 34 
Money Loans and Deposits 
I. MoNEY LoANs 
I. Municipal Differences1 
I N THE systems of private law, rather by historical accident than on rational grounds, certain contrasts 
in construing a loan contract have survived. Thus, the 
Roman requirement of actual delivery of the res, that is, 
coins or their equivalent, persists in laws still considering 
loan to be a "real contract," the mere promise being only 
a preliminary agreement (pactum de mutua dando) .2 At 
common law, the promise to pay money in consideration of 
the borrower's return promise forms a perfect contract.8 
This result agrees with the modern construction of loan as 
a contract by mere consent.4 
The common law doctrine that the creditor of a fixed 
sum of money cannot claim damages beyond the amount 
of the loan and interest, is followed by few foreign codes ;5 
1 VoN SCHWARTZKOPPEN, 2 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 640. 
2 France: C. C. art. I892. 
Germany: BGB. §§ 607 par. I, 6Io. 
Italy: C. C. (I865) art. I8I9. 
Spain: C. C. art. I753· 
And most other eodes. 
s JENKS, I Digest § 462. 
4 Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 3IZ; nevertheless the pact preliminary to loan 
has some role, C. Obi. art. 3I5. 
5 England: JENKS, I Digest §§ 284, 465. 
Brazil: C. C. art. 106 I ; C. Com. art. 249. 
Denmark: Law of April 6, I855, § 3, see Die Handelsgesetze des Erdballs, 
Vol. IO, Das Handelsrecht und Konkursrecht Danemarks, p. 67. 
The Netherlands: C. C. art. u86. 
3 
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modern laws allow recovery of special damage. 6 The main 
field for choice of law is furnished by the immense variety 
of usury laws. But time of repayment, burden of giving 
notice of termination, and the amount of interest due by 
force of law are also variously regulated. 
Contracts involved. Conflicts rules concerning loans in-
clude ordinary agreements for opening of credit and prin-
cipal debts secured by suretyship or pledge. 
Rights involved. The usual problem raised in this subject 
matter deals with the law under which the duties of pay-
ment of interest and of repayment arise and are perform-
able. Of course, the obligation, assumed by the potential 
creditor in a pactum de mutua dando or consensual loan, 
of delivering the promised value likewise needs determina-
tion. But the conclusion will become obvious after the main 
discussion. 
2. Connecting Factors 
(a) Place of contracting. Many American decisions have 
determined the validity of loan contracts according to the 
law of the place of contracting. In most cases, however, 
no other localization was in question.7 A similar practice 
is observed in France.8 The only conclusion to be drawn 
is that the law of the forum has no imperative force. 9 
Again, where both parties are domiciled in the state of 
contracting, this state, of course, determines the law.10 
(b) The debtor's domicil. In a view that has found 
6 Germany: BGB. § 288 par. 2. 
Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 1224 par. 2 replacing old art. 1231 which was 
disputed, see DE CuPrs, II danno {Milano 1946) 189, 217. 
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 106. 
7 For closer analysis, see BATIFFOL 203 §§ 229, 230. 
8 Cass. req. (June 10, 1857) D. 1859·1.194, S. 1859.1.751; lower courts, see 
BATIFFOL 210 § 236. 
9 BATIFFOL id. n. 3· 
1° Canada: Stuart & Stuart, Ltd. v. Boswell (1916) 26 D. L. R. 7II {English 
Money Lenders Act applied). 
MONEY LOANS AND DEPOSITS 5 
expression in the Polish law, unilateral contracts are gov-
erned by the law of the domicil of the debtor.11 
The same rule has been adopted by the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal in a case where the sum of money was expressed 
in the currency of the debtor's state.12 Likewise, the French 
Court of Cassation applied the law of Ecuador to deter-
mine the rate of interest due from a borrowing company 
domiciled there; the loan was to be utilized in the company's 
operation in the same country, although the lender was 
domiciled in Paris and made the funds available there.13 
(c) Place of repayment. Many American decisions have 
resorted to the law of the place where repayment is due14 
because the creditor's claim is deemed to be centered in this 
place. In some cases, the court presumed a corresponding 
intention of the parties/5 or the place coincided with the 
debtor's domicil and the place of his use of the money.16 
As a result, the place held decisive has sometimes been 
the domicil of the debtor, but in the great majority of cases 
the business place of the lender.11 It is scarcely feasible to 
explain all these decisions on one ground. But we may sug-
gest that, whether the decisions say so or not, preferably 
the loan was localized with the lender when the lender was 
a credit institution operating from a central place of busi-
ness on a uniform basis in several states. 
11 Proposals by WALKER 406 § 5 (r) and (2), though with some qualifi-
cation. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 No. r; applied in Polish S. Ct. (Nov. r8, 
1936) 4 Z. osteurop. R. \r937) 380, though the money had been sent to another 
country. 
Same proposal, NIBOYET, 33 Annuaire (1927) III 222. 
12 BG. (Oct. 8, 1935) 6r BGE. II 242, 2+4. In this suit, the parties invoked 
the German law, but this is only an auxiliary instance following the prevail-
ing practice. 
13 Cass. req. (Feb. 19, r89o) Gaz. Pal. r890.r.46o, Clunet r89o, 495· 
14 List of cases: BATIFFOL 199 n. r. 
15 Nakdimen v. Brazil (1917) 131 Ark. 144, 198 S.W. 524. 
16 Potter v. Tallman (r86r) 35 Barb. S.C. r82; Lyon v. Ewing (r863) 
17 Wis. 6r; 2 BEALE II70 n. 3; BATIFFOL 200 n. I. 
17 See BATIFFOL 201 n. 2. 
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In the German practice, the place of repayment is em-
phasized on the general principle of lex loci solutionis.18 
But before any choice of law, the lex fori states for the 
purpose of this choice where the money should be repaid.19 
This means normally the domicil of the debtor.20 By the 
same method, the domicil of the creditor should be decisive 
in Switzerland.21 
Recent advocates of lex loci solutionis recommend it as 
respects repayment of the loan22 and the payment of 
interest.23 
(d) The creditor's domicil. Some writers have urged 
the law of the lender.24 A rational attempt has also been 
made to infer this approach from the situation of the 
parties. The creditor is menaced by specific dangers, such 
as the debtor's insolvency, money depreciation, and diffi-
culty of legal enforcement, whereas the borrower may use 
the funds at his pleasure and should mitigate possible 
damage; the risk of the creditor should at least be measured 
under his law. 25 However, this is scarcely a consideration 
within the contemplation of the parties. 
(e) Place of using the money. Certain French decisions 
have applied the law of the place where the loan should be 
urialise.1126 The writers question what this means, viz., 
18 RG. (Sept. 30, 1920) 100 RGZ. 79; (March 12, 1928) JW. 1928, II96. 
19 See Vol. II p. 471. 
20 RG. (Feb. 16, 1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. 35; (Jan. 14, 1931) id. 1931 No. 
30. 
21 BG. (Nov. 7, 1933) 59 BGE. II 397, 398; but see Vol. II p. 471 n. 168. 
22 BATIFFOL § 238. 
23 HAMEL, 2 Banques 452 n. z § 920. 
24 2 MElLI 55; NOLDE, Draft, 33 Annuaire ( 1927) II 9+0; OsER-SCHOENEN-
BERGER Nos. II7, II8. 
25 HERZFELD, Kauf und Darlehen 75· 
26 Cass. civ. (Dec. 21, 1874) D. 1876.1.107, S. 1875.1.78, Clunet 1875, 353; 
Cass. req. (Feb. 19, 1890) Clunet 1890, 495; see supra n. 13; Cour Paris (May 
23, 1912) S. 1913.2.21, Gaz. Pal. 1912.2.13 commented upon by BATIFFOL 212. 
As an additional element for applying German law to a loan granted by 
a Swiss institution to a German brewery, the Swiss Federal Tribunal stressed 
the purpose of the loan, viz., for installations in the factory. BG. (Sept. 18, 
1934) 6o BGE. II 294, 301. 
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whether the courts point to the place of utilization or con-
sumption of the loan or to the place where the money is 
delivered. 27 The latter opinion emphasizing the place where 
the money is in fact delivered to the borrower has been 
explained by the technical construction of loan in French 
law as a real contract; the contract is completed only by 
delivery. But the point is obscure. It should be noted in 
addition that the cases dealt only with the scope of a French 
Law of September 3, 1807, on the legal rate of interest 
and reached the result that it was confined to "civil," i.e., 
noncommercial, loans contracted and consumed in France. 
Hence, the ordinary conflicts rule was not necessarily 
concerned. 
3· Rationale 
Loans may be granted either by financial institutions on 
a large scale to an indefinite number of customers or in 
isolated cases on individual terms. Each of these types 
requires separate discussion, although perhaps not different 
conflict rules. 
(a) Individually determined loans. It may be taken for 
granted that no one objects to the law of a place at which 
both parties have their domicils and make the contract. 
Furthermore, the place where the loan is to be repaid, 
according to express stipulation or an unequivocal business 
usage, may be rega-rded as a characteristic localization of 
the only obligation flowing from a completed loan. 
The same cannot be said of a place of repayment solely 
determined by law, since this very law ought to be selected 
and the municipal laws are far from agreeing where the 
payment is "performable." · 
In the civil law codes, with some difficulty, a common 
21 For the first interpretation, BATIFFOL 211 § 237 n. 2 against SAVATIER in 
Planiol et Ripert, II Traite Pratique 431 § 114-9 and authors cited by the 
latter. 
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denominator may be found. The money is either to be paid 
to the creditor at his residence as of the time of contract-
ing, 28 or it is to be sent to him at the debtor's risk and 
charge, although the "place of performance" may remain 
at the debtor's domicil.29 It may therefore be suggested that 
the creditor's country should prevail.30 This conclusion 
appears weak, however, if confronted with the common 
law. The principle that the debtor must seek the creditor, 
strong as it has remained, has no bearing since it is 
limited to places within the realm, or in the United States, 
within the debtor's state. If a contract has been made 
outside this state, American courts consider payment 
due at the place of contracting, unless the creditor desig-
nates an authorized agent in the state of the debtor.31 In 
interstate and international contracts this conception seems 
to exclude the law of the creditor's place. 
In conclusion, there is no general conflicts rule for a 
loan individually contracted between private parties. 
(b) Mass operation by financial institutions. The opera-
tion of banks and loan or savings associations necessarily 
involves central organization and conditions in which busi-
ness is conducted and planned substantially for all the 
territory to be embraced. Despite concessions that may have 
to be made to the diverse state laws, it is vital for such 
institutions to base calculations and forms on one given 
law. Commonly, the borrower not only does not care what 
law may apply, but he does not expect his own domicil to 
28 The Netherlands: C. C. art. 1429 par. 2. 
Switzerland: Rev. C. Obi. art. 74· 
Japan: C. C. art. 574, cf. 484. 
29 Austria: A1lg. BGB. § 905; A1lg. HGB. art. 325· 
Germany: BGB. § 270. 
30 The result would agree with the writings cited supra ns. 24, 25, but is 
opposed to the prevailing German doctrine regarding§ 269 BGB., see Vol. II 
p. 471 n. 166. 
31 United States: Chase, J., in Weyand v. Park Terrace Co. (1911) 202 
N. Y. 231, 241, 95 N. E. 723; WILLISTON, 6 Contracts § 1812; 40 Am. Jur., 
Payment§§ 16-19. 
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be taken into account in this connection. This is manifest 
if he sends his application for credit to the address of the 
company in another state or deals with a company repre-
sentative who only solicits applications, action on which is 
understood to be left to the central office. Not because the 
last act of concluding the contract occurs in the state of the 
company, but because this locality is prominent in the 
contemplation of the parties, does it determine the law 
applicable. The result agrees with the bulk of the cases, 
which stress either the place where the transaction is con-
cluded by the company's consent, or the place of repay-
ment, or in Europe and under the C6digo Bustamante the 
mass character of the operation.32 
It follows, however, that this approach has definite 
limits. A significant divergence occurs when the foreign cor-
poration operates through a permanent agency in the state 
of the borrower, which issues loans in the name of the com-
pany. In this case, the contract has a local center. It should 
not make any difference that the agent may have to ask for 
the assent of the central office, where this appears as a 
matter of internal administration. Nor should the fact in 
itself that the company is considered to do business in the 
state be decisive, although many legislators think other-
wise. State supervision over loans cannot be compared in 
intensity and importance with state intervention in such 
matters as insurance or utilities. The vague and inclusive 
concept of what the states mean by doing business does 
not present a sound basis for choice of law. It should be 
noted, moreover, that even in the case where the customer 
32 Germany: ROHG. (Jan. 13, 1877) 21 ROHGE. 288; Bay. ObLG. 
(March 17, 1928) 28 Bay. ObLGZ. 259; OLG. Konigsberg (Feb. 14, 1902) 
57 Seuff. Arch. 345 (bank deposit). 
Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 22, 1918) 44 BGE. II 489; HERZFELD, Kauf und 
Darlehen 61. 
C6digo Bustamante, art. 185. 
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deals with an agency or branch, it is this and not his own 
residence that is significant. 
As a result, it is always the place of business of the lender 
that localizes a loan of money to be repaid in kind. If a 
branch or agency of the lender negotiates the contract, the 
question to be asked is not where, but by which office, 
functioning as a party to the contract, the loan is issued. 
This fact may at times be doubtful, but no more than in 
other cases of agency. A presumption would be helpful in 
the case of foreign corporations advertising offers of small 
loans with reference to their local agencies, that the agent 
is authorized to contract, and therefore the local law is 
implied. 
4· The Obligation to Give the Loan 
Whenever a loan or credit is promised by a finance cor-
poration, the place of its establishment has a double func-
tion: it figures as the domicil of the promisor and as the 
center of the obligation of repayment. It does not seem 
doubtful that a bank credit is governed by the local law of 
the bank. For isolated contracts between private parties, 
again, no general rule is needed or possible. 
II. BoNDS (DEBENTUREs) 
International credits are created by the most varied 
methods.33 We are not dealing here with credit operations 
between sovereign states, nor with state guarantees for 
bolstering the credit of other governments or of individual 
borrowers, lately much discussed in public international 
law.34 The loans expressed in partial obligations, however, 
33 For a general survey, unfortunately little documented, see LEON MARTIN, 
"Les emprunts internationaux," Nouv. Revue 1943, 229-276, 525-571. 
34 J. FISCHER WILLIAMS, 34 RecueiJ ( 1930) 81, 137; LAUTERPACHT 5; MANN, 
"The Law Governing State Contracts," 21 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1944) 
II If. 
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which form our subject matter may be contracted by states 
or other public entities as well as by private persons. 
(a) American loans of the 1920's. After the First World 
War, during the great wave of private American loans to 
European states, municipalities, and corporations, the usual 
type of loan conformed perfectly to the technique used in 
large domestic loans by New York banks. It has been said 
that most debentures and bonds of this group contained 
an express submission to the law obtaining in the state of 
New York. Such a clause, more or less clearly drafted, at 
any rate, 35 was frequently inserted in the "Trust Deed," 
if not in the text of the bond. But even without stipulation, 
the transaction was commonly impregnated by the unmis-
takable style of New York. As a German court described 
such a loan, 36 the bonds were issued by a New York bank; 
the sums expressed in the currency of the United States; 
the external appearance, form, and text of the securities 
as well as the concepts and stipulations of the debenture 
conformed to the habits, views, and needs of the American 
finance and monetary market; everything was calculated 
for admission to the stock exchange of New York. Also, 
the trust deed was usually agreeable to the American stand-
ard and modified only with respect to foreign mortgages 
to meet local exigencies. 
This characterization corresponded with the distribution 
of economic power : 
"When the post-war loans were floated, the American 
bankers were largely in a position to dictate the terms; and 
the loan agreements were usually drafted in New York and 
merely passed upon or modified abroad." 37 
(b) Decisive connection. This transaction as well as the 
ensuing negotiable instruments were· doubtless centered in 
35 HAUDEK 105 n. 3· 
36 OLG. Kiiln, Senate of Saarlouis, JW. 1936, 203. 
37 QUINDRY and FEILCHENFELD1 2 Bonds and Bondholders (1934) § 634. 
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New York. The purely American character of the contract 
created obligations, naturally governed by American law, 
between the parties and their successors deriving rights 
from the original transaction. 
The law of the place of contracting, in such cases, can 
certainly not govern on its own merits. Nor has the debtor's 
domicil any importance. Also, the places of payment avail-
able to bondholders should not be overemphasized. It is 
true that in the loan contract, during the period between 
the two world wars, the debtor, whether a private or 
municipal corporation or a state, usually undertook to place 
all sums due for principal, premium, or interest on deposit 
with the bank in Manhattan charged with the service of 
payment, in immediately available funds, several days be-
fore the respective date. Thus, the debtor is significantly 
bound to the main place where payments are due. But this 
is only characteristic of the market at which the bank is 
located. 
The lessons of experience point to two conclusions. In 
the first place, the most vital principle for every sound 
treatment of debenture rights is the economic and legal 
equality to be enjoyed by all holders of the same bond issue. 
Bonds are not so much characterized by the individual posi-
tion of the particular creditor in relation to the debtor, as 
by the conditions appearing in the fundamental contract, 
defining the total claim of which the bondholder possesses 
a part. The serial number indicates this part of the debt; 
conditions of payment, redemption, conversion, and notice 
are agreed upon in the debenture. The total debt is also 
affected by such events as moratorium, mortgage fore-
closure, consolidation, amortization, and premature repay-
ment.38 The modern laws for the protection of bondholders 
as Swiss BG. {Nov. 10, 1923) 49 BGE. III 185. 
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contemplate associations or trustees acting in their common 
interest, et cetera. 
In the second place, if the creditors of a bond issue are 
to be treated on the same footing, the applicable law can be 
chosen only once and for all on the basis of the original 
contract. This conclusion is probably universally recognized, 
but exactly what local contact it indicates has scarcely been 
discussed. 
It has been correctly stated in France, however, that 
where the place of issue, the currency, an,d the place of 
payment coincide, neither the debtor's nationality nor 
domicil-as once was claimed39-nor the purpose or place 
of use of the money is material.40 Likewise we may agree 
with a Canadian decision that where a bond issue was made 
in British Columbia, the debtor being there at the time, the 
mortgage being there situated, and the bulk of the pro-
visions performable there, it did not matter that the three 
trustees named in the deed were residents of Oregon.41 In 
a typical case of an internal American bond indenture, an 
Ohio corporation was the borrower, the mortgaged prop-
erty was in Ohio, and the deal for the sale of the bonds was 
closed in New Y o'~k, whereas an Ohio bank was named the 
trustee for the security of the loan and the service for 
payment was stipulated simultaneously through the par-
ticipating banks of New York and Ohio.42 Clearly in that 
case, the New York market was looked to, if not for the 
volume of trade, at least for the leading significance of its 
quotations. Indeed, if similar combinations appear in in-
ternational finance, it would seem that the main emphasis, 
39 2 BAR 135; 2 MEILI 274; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 354· 
40 LAPRADELLE, Note, Nouv. Revue 1941, 204. ' 
41 British Columbia: Harris Investments, Ltd. v. Smith [ 1934] 1 D. L. R. 
748, 48 B.C. 274. 
42 Republic Steel Corporation to Central United National Bank of Cleve-
land and H. R. Harris Trustees, Purchase and Improvement Mortgage, 
Nov. r, 1934. 
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despite multiple connections, always rests on the market 
on which the issue principally relies. This market should be 
selected as the decisive factor if a neat rule is desiredY 
Hence, special rules are needed if the issue is distinctly 
divided into partial u tranches" to be placed on several in-
ternational markets and the creditors are granted choice of 
currency (to be discussed in the next chapter). That issues 
of bonds may be subject to protective administrative regu-
lation at any place involved,44 is important but should not 
affect choice of law. 
III. LOANS TO STATES 
Practice and discussions of the difficult border line be-
tween international public law and the private law, in the 
writer's opinion, converge in the result that loans made to 
a state by a private money lender in another country are 
subject to private law. This law, in the case of a private 
lender, moreover, is a particular state's law; it is not inter-
national law as ascertained by consulting the general prin-
ciples of the civilized nations.45 Whether the debtor state 
nevertheless enjoys exemption from suit is another, and a 
jurisdictional, question. 
The main question is whether the governing law is regu-
larly that of the debtor state, a view generally assumed 
and the one adopted by the World Court.46 The difficulties 
that this court immediately encountered and failed to mas-
ter47 show that the rule is no longer tenable. It is likewise 
confusing to believe that, because one party to the contract 
43 Possibly, NussBAUM, D. IPR. 331, referring in an undefined manner to 
the "issue" or the placing of securities on public sale, has the same result in 
view. 
44 FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 473 f. No. 9· 
45 See LAUTERPACHT 5· 
4 6 Brazilian and Serbian loans, Publications Permanent Court (1929) 
Series A, Nos. 20/21; German RG. (Nov. 14, 1929) 126 RGZ. 196. 
4 7 Cf. the literature referred to supra n. 34· 
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is an international person, the contract loses its national 
character and becomes delocalized and internationalized.48 
The Supreme Courts of Austria, Denmark, England, 
Norway, and Sweden had no hesitation in subjecting the 
American loans to their respective governments to the 
abrogation of the gold clause by the Joint Resolution of 
Congress of June 6, 1933 ;49 a national law of the debtor 
country, on the contrary, would not have had the power to 
reduce the debt with international force. The Swedish 
tranche of the international Young Loan to Germany was 
determined under Swiss law by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. 5° 
In the future, of course, a fair protection of an invest-
ment may be accomplished by treaty through the efforts 
started before the last war,51 and if high hopes are fulfilled, 
by an international judicial forum. "Some day," it has been 
said, "we shall be led to create a veritable international 
law of business but this will be a future very remote." 52 
48 Thus, MANN, "The Law Governing State Contracts," 21 Brit. Year 
Book Int. Law ( 1944) II, 31, whose tendency seems to be approved by 
JESSUP, A Modern Law of Nations (1948) 139 n. 39, 141. 
49 Austria: OGH., Opinion de pleno (Nov. 26, 1935) 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 
891. .. 
Denmark: S. Ct. (Jan. 1, 1939) Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel a 
Amsterdam v. Ministre des Finances, 40 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 284. 
England: Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders 
A. G. fr937l A. C. 5oo-H. L. 
Norway: S. Ct. (Dec. 8, 1937) Norwegian Government (Ministere des 
Finances) v. Stavanger Sparekasse etc., 38 Bull. Inst. Int. ( 1938) 71. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. 30, 1937) Skandia Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Swedish 
National Debt Office, 18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1937) 215, Clunet 1937, 
925, 4 Nouv. Revue ( 1937) 402. 
5 0 BG. (May 26, 1936) 62 BGE. II 140, Revue Crit. 1937, 138; (Sept. 28, 
1937) Clunet 1939, 192. 
51 See Int. Law Association, 40th Report (1939) 192 ff.; Report of the 
Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts (Geneva 1939) 
League of Nations C.145.M·93·1939 II A 10; Draft of Uniform Preliminary 
Rules Applicable to International Loans, Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law in Rome ("L'Unification du droit") published by this Institute 
(1948) 223· 
52 CASSIN, in r Travaux du comite fran~ais de droit international prive 
(1934) 97· 
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IV. MoNEY DEPOSITS 
The old controversy whether or to what extent a deposit 
of fungible things, to be acquired by the depositary and 
to be returned by him in unascertained equivalents of the 
same class (depositum irregulare) should follow the mu-
nicipal rules of loan, 53 has produced a contrast among the 
national laws. However, a money deposit with a bank ought 
to be considered a loan everywhere.54 Moreover, there is 
no reason to establish different rules for the choice of law 
because of such variations. 
A deposit of money, whether as a sum or in specie, is 
naturally bound to the place of the bank or savings institu-
tion to which it is entrusted,55 on the double ground that 
the money is brought to that place to be conserved and 
repaid there and that the transaction is one of a mass of 
similar deals by the institution. Storage or warehouse con-
tracts and agreements for the custody of valuable objects 
by innkeepers are similarly localized. 
Even though, exceptionally, a deposited object may be 
recoverable at a place different from that of the domicil 
of the depositee or bailee, the contract will be most con-
veniently determined by the law of the latter place. 
In general, it seems settled that the customer of a branch 
of a bank is to be treated under the law of the branch rather 
than that of the principal establishment situated in another 
country. In English decisions, repeatedly a bank debt has 
been regarded as tied primarily to the branch where the 
account is kept, for the purposes of legal representation, 
collection, administration, and redelivery.56 
53 See VON SCHEY, Die Obligationsverhiiltnisse des osterr. allg. Privatrechts 
(1890) 55, (1895) 351. 
54 See HAMEL, 2 Banques 95 ff. §§ 752, 753 on the contrast between French 
and German construction. 
55 3 FIORE § 1204; NoLDE, Draft, 33 Annuaire (1927) II 941 No. 14; 
FEDOZZI-CERETI 748 shuns any rule. 
56 Rex v. Lovitt [ 1912] A. C. 212, 219; Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit 
Bank [ 1948] 2 All E. R. 1025, 1030, C. A., per Lord Goddard, C. J. 
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A question different from that of the applicable law is 
whether the customer may or must sue the bank at the 
place of its branch; he has been required to do so as a 
measure of convenience for the administration of bank 
business, so long as he has no prevailing contrary interest.57 
57 England: Clare & Co. v. Dresdner Bank [ I9I5] 2 K. B. 576; see N. 
Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corp. [ I92I] 3 K. B. no, I27; only in the case 
of nonpayment has the customer the right to sue the bank at its head office, 
apparently for damages rather than debt, see Hill, J., in Richardson v. 
Richardson [ I927] P. 228, 232, 234· From Maude v. Commissioners of Inland 
Rev. [I940] I K. B. 548, KAHN-FREUND in Annual Survey of English Law 
I940, 255 concludes that the customer may pay at the bank's headquarters, 
but the bank owes him at the place of the branch. 
United States: Note, "Branch Banks," so A. L. R. I340, I357· 
Germany: RG. (June 25, I9I9) 96 RGZ. I6I (semble). 
For details, see RABEL, "Situs Problems," II Law & Cont. Probl. (1945) 
at 130. 
CHAPTER 35 
Special Problems of Money Obligations1 
T HE extreme instability of the monetary systems in the entire world has caused a great number of difficulties 
involving conflicts law. Recent writers have felt com-
pelled to devote a separate chapter to money obligations. 
Fortunately, one principle may be claimed to prevail 
over occasional objections: the law of the contract governs 
the amount due. The special law of the place of payment 
has influence only on the "mode of performance," while 
exceptions to the principle may be made for the sake of 
public policy. 
I. MUNICIPAL LAWS 
A. NOMINALISM 
1. Devaluation 
A monetary sign has the value printed on its face. This 
is the nominalistic principle. In the discharge of obligations, 
1 Selected literature, including comparative research: United States: 
NusSBAUM, Money in the Law (1939); WEIGERT, "The Abrogation of Gold-
Clauses in International Loans, and the Conflict of Laws," Contemporary 
Law Pamphlets, Ser. 4 No. 4 (1940); FREUTEL, "Exchange Control, Freezing 
Orders and the Conflict of Laws," 56 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1942) 30; RASHBA, 
"Foreign Exchange Restrictions and Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws," 
41 Mich. L. Rev. (1943) 777, 1089. 
England: F. A. MANN, The Legal Aspect of Money (1938). 
Continental laws: NussBAUM, "La clause-or dans les contrats interna-
tionaux," 43 Recueil ( 1933) I 559; RABEL, "Golddollar-Anleihen mit Verein-
barung des New Yorker Rechts," 10 Z. ausl. PR. (1936) 492; HAMEL, "L'appli-
cation des lois monetaires annulant les clauses-or et les principes des con-
flits des lois," Nouv. Revue 1937, 499; BAGGE, "L'effet international de Ia 
legislation americaine clause-or," 64 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1937) 457, 
786; DOMKE, "Die Amerikanische Goldklauselgesetzgebung," 13 Annuario 
Dir. Comp. ( 1938) I 209; id., "Les efforts legislatifs tend ant a restreindre Ia 
validite de Ia clause-or," Revue Crit. 1938, 22. 
18 
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no heed is given to the oscillations of monetary value that 
continually accompany international financial intercourse. 
In periods where a currency is stable, fluctuating within a 
small margin in a free exchange market, nominalism has 
a sound inner foundation. Throughout history, however, 
innumerable embarrassed rulers have enforced the principle 
in the wildest crises by manipulating the weight and metal 
composition of their stamped coins and, in more recent 
times, under the modern pattern by releasing floods of 
paper money from their printing presses. A quite different 
devaluation in the United States has accomplished the same 
result by making a dollar of IS sfzr grains of nine-tenth 
fine gold the same legal tender as the former dollar of 
2 5 8 j I o grains, and by legally equalizing a dollar bill to a 
gold dollar coin. " 
When in November, I92J, the German "mark" was 
degraded to one billionth of its former value, the German 
Supreme Court could no longer restrain its rebellion against 
the rule that "mark" is equal to "mark." The Second World 
War has left all of Europe in the clutches of inflation, which 
in the case of Hungary for a time reached the proportions 
of quintillions. 
Inflation and its opposite, deflation, when carried to such 
extremes, are sooner or later adjusted by stabilization of 
the nominal money values or ended outright by a new cur-
rency. The rules that in such cases determine the relation 
between the old and new monetary units pertain to domestic 
public law, but imply a change in the rules of domestic 
private law. Consequently, the conflicts problem arises: 
to what persons and obligations do the latter rules apply? 
Some old codes, 2 reflecting the sentiment of natural jus-
tice, have expressly put the losses suffered through debase-
ment or alteration of coined money on the borrower. The 
2 E.g., Austria: Allg. BGB. § 988 in fine. 
3 
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creditor should receive exactly the value represented by 
the indicated sum of coins of a certain standard, weight, 
and fineness. Thus, nominalism has been partly replaced by 
a "metallistic" doctrine. In the United States, since the 
monetary catastrophes of the Civil War, a highly stereo-
typed stipulation has served in place of such a rule. In 
present legislation, the nominalistic doctrine is firmly and 
universally settled. In a vain effort to draw an analogy, a 
few writers, in the desperation of inflation, invoked the old 
rules regarding the loan of coined money. 
2. Protective Stipulations8 
Gold coin clause. Customary usage has produced various 
formulas. In the United States, the clause generally em-
ployed before 1933 read: "to pay X dollars in gold coin 
of the United States of, or equal to, the standard of weight 
and fineness existing on (the day of contracting)." The 
analogous clause in France and Germany more briefly stipu-
lated for X francs in gold or X marks in gold or in Reichs-
Goldwiihrung, or the like. 
Thus, in the "gold coin clause," clause especes-or, clausula 
curso-oro, Goldmiinz-Klausel, the debtor promises to pay 
gold coins of the currency specified. But although this suffices 
so long as gold coins are available in addition to depreciated 
bills, a crisis usually tends precisely to chase the precious 
metal out of circulation, often causes prohibitions of gold 
exportation and trade, and sometimes leads to seizure by 
the state, as happened in the Roosevelt era. 
In one opinion, the doctrine of impossibility was em-
ployed; the requirement of paying in gold coins was con-
sidered a frustrated specification of the modality of per-
8 For literature, see NussBAUM, Vertraglicher Schutz gegen Schwankungen 
des Geldwertes (Beitrlige zum ausllindischen und internationalen Privatrecht, 
Heft I) (I928); NUSSBAUM, Money 30I n. I. 
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formance; hence, the debtor could simply discharge his 
obligation in bills of the stipulated currency.4 This leaves 
the clause ineffective in the very case where it is most needed 
and makes it almost senseless. In the words of the World 
Court, "The treatment of the gold clause as indicating a 
mere modality of payment without reference to a gold stand-
ard of value, would be, not to construe but to destroy it." 5 
The highest courts of almost all countries6 have finally 
rallied to the view that gold coin clauses induce a tacit addi-
tional agreement that in any event the creditor should 
receive in actual currency the value embodied in the original 
amount, or, in other words, imply a gold value clause, as 
described hereafter. 
The House of Lords, then, construed a promise to pay 
100 pounds "in sterling in gold coin of the United Kingdom 
4 United States: Irving' Trust Co. v. Hazlewood (I933) I48 Misc. 456, 265 
N. Y. Supp. 57· 
Australia: Jolley v. Mainka (I933) 49 Commw. L. R. 242. 
Belgium: Cass. (June 12, I930) Pasicrisie 1930.I.245; (April 27, I933) 
Clunet I933, 739· 
England: Feist v. Societe Intercommunale Beige d'Electricite [I9331 
Ch. 684-C.A. (reversed). 
Germany: RG. (Jan. 11, I922) I03 RGZ. 384; (March I, I927) I07 RGZ. 
370; (May 24, I924) Io8 RGZ. I76 (overruled}. 
Switzerland: Fed. Council (Jan. IS, I924) 20 SJZ. 309. 
5 Publications Permanent Court ( I929) Series A, Nos. 2o/2I at 32; Clunet 
I929, at 996. 
6 Most decisions, it is true, wind up by declaring the clause invalidated by 
the Joint Resolution of Congress. 
England: Feist v. Societe Intercommunale Beige d'Electricite [ I9341 A. C. 
I6I-H. L.; New Brunswick Ry. Co. v. British· and French Trust Corp. 
[ I9391 A. c. I-H. L. 
Austria: OGH. plenary decision of the "large senate" (Nov. 26, I93S) 
Clunet I936, 442, 7I7; OGH. (June I, I937) 37 Bull. Inst. Int. (I937) 245· 
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. {Dec. IO, 1936) Prager Archiv I937, I067; (June 
II, I937) id. I937, 2088. 
Denmark: S. Ct. (June 2I and Oct. 6, 1933) Ugeskr. Retsv. I933, 703, 1028, 
7 Z.ausl. PR. (I933) 960, 962. 
Germany: RG. (May 28, I936) JW. I936, 2058. 
The Netherlands: H. R. (March 13, I936) two decisions, W. I936 Nos. 280, 
28I, 34 Bull. In st. Int. ( I936) 304, one of which, the Royal Dutch case, applies 
Dutch Jaw, see infra n. 49· 
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. 30, 1937) Scandia Ins. Co., Ltd. v. The Swedish 
National Dept Off., 64 NJA. (1937) I, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 286. 
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of or equal to the standard of weight and fineness extstmg 
on September I, 1928," as though the clause ran thus: "pay 
in sterling a sum equal to the value of 100 pounds if paid 
in gold coin of the United Kingdom of or equal to the 
standard, etc.m 
Gold value clause (clause valeur-or, Goldwert-Klausel). 
Earlier American contracts expressly provided for payment 
alternatively of gold coins or of the amount in paper neces-
sary to purchase the gold at the place of payment.8 In 
modern practice, the same result, thus reached directly, is 
generally obtained by a promise to pay a quantity of money 
determinable according to the value of gold coins of a cer-
tain currency: gold pounds, gold dollars, etc. These ex-
pressions and the implied meaning of gold coin clauses just 
mentioned have dominated the documents of loans and in-
surance in recent decades. Hence, the often emphasized 
difficulty of discerning the exact nature of a gold clause has 
no longer any considerable practical importance. 
Commonly the unit referred to in the first place belongs 
to a certain currency, English pound, Argentine peso, etc., 
but during the German crisis of 1923 the clause was usually 
based on a purely imaginary unit, the "gold mark," equal to 
I0/42 United States dollars. It was held that this clause 
was not linked with the American currency and that there-
fore after as well as before the devaluation in the United 
States, it meant an obligation to pay a sum of German money 
equivalent to the value of the original gold dollar. 9 
Analogous decisions were rendered in other countries.10 
7 Feist Case, supra n. 6, per Lord Russell of Killowen, at 172. 
8 NUSSBAUM, Money 307. 
9 RG. (Dec. 14, 1934) 146 RGZ. x, 5; (July 5, 1935) 148 RGZ. 42, 44; 
Clunet 1936, 412; cf. STOEBER, 52 Z.int.R. (1938) 240. 
10 Belgium: PIRET, Les variations monetaires et leurs repercussions en droit 
prive beige (1935) 256 ff. 
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (Oct. zz, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 467. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (April 27, 1935) 33 Bull. Inst. Int. (1935) 278. 
Italy: App. Milano (July 19, 1934) 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 201, but contra: 
Cass. (Jan. 10, 1936) 34 Riv. Dir. Com. (1936) II 386. 
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Gold bullion clause. The early protective clauses, as well 
as recent attempts to avoid the dangers of money claims, 
resorted to plain obligations to pay a quantity of fine gold. 
In an American case of 1936, an ancient contract of long 
term lease fixed the yearly rent at 55 7, 2 So grains of pure 
unalloyed gold. The court held that this clause did not fall 
within the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, since no refer-
ence was made to American currency. As delivery of gold 
bullion was impossible, the equivalent in paper dollars was 
awarded as damages.11 The Supreme Court of the United 
States, however, dealing with another lessee's promise to 
pay "a quantity of gold which shall be equal to $1500 of 
the gold coin of the United States, etc.," held the Joint 
Resolution applicable on the ground that the contract in-
tended the payment of money rather than the delivery of a 
commodity. The lessor was a corporation which had noth-
ing to do with gold transactions and wanted simply a safe 
.. 
amount of money.12 This decision, despite the difference in 
the clauses, overrules the first case and leaves open, as mere 
commodity obligations, only those stipulations of a quantity 
of gold that treat gold as merchandise for industrial or 
dental purposes, or presumably, those concluded between 
gold dealers. 
The French Code and several followers have recognized 
loans given in bars (!ingots) as independent of money 
changes.13 Apart from this special and rare case, no authority 
in Europe is known to treat the question. In the writer's 
opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States has evi-
dently found the right solution.14 
11 Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933,48 Stat. n2, 31 U.S. C.§ 463; Emery 
Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 
938. 
12 Mr. Justice Cardozo in Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing 
Paper Co. (1936) 300 U. S. 324, 336. 
13 French C. C. art. 1896; Italian C. C. (1865) art. 1823, repealed in C. C. 
(1942); Spanish C. C. art. 1754 (2); the Netherlands C. C. art. 1795. 
14 See supra n. 12. Contra, as it seems, MANN, Money 55 n. 2 (i); M. 
WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 475 n. 2. 
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Other clauses. Commodities such as wheat, rye, coal, and 
kalium have temporarily been used as objects not susceptible 
of devaluation by monetary depreciation.15 More important 
are the clauses establishing sliding prices.16 
3· Legislation against Protective Clauses 
(a) Gold clauses of all kinds are destined to be swept 
away in one way or another in time of crisis. In the wake 
of the First World War and of the depression, gold coin 
clauses not frustrated by the disappearance of gold suc-
cumbed, like the pure gold value clauses, to emergency 
legislation in all but a few countries.17 The exceptions in-
clude England, where it has been held that gold value 
clauses are not affected by public policy ;18 and no statute 
has affected their force. It is known, however, that gold 
clauses are uncommon in England and therefore offer no 
threat to the currency. Other countries in which devalua-
tion did not affect gold clauses are Czechoslovakia19 and 
Switzer land. 20 
(b) French doctrine. 21 From the 18th century, the 
15 On these expedients in Germany in the 192o's, particularly the rye 
mortgage bonds, see NussBAUM, Vertraglicher Schutz etc., supra n. 3, 75· 
Promises of lessees to pay the rent in grains have been held valid in France, 
even by CAPITANT, D. H. 1926, Chronique 33, who was a rigorous advocate of 
the nullity of protective clauses, and by NoGARO, Revue Trim. D. Civ. 1925, 
5 at 8. 
1 6 See NUSSBAUM, Money 406; DAWSON and COULTRAP, "Contracting by 
Reference to Price Indices," 33 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1935) 685. HuBERT, "Observa-
tions sur Ia nature et Ia validite de Ia clause d'echelle mobile," 45 Revue 
Trim. D. Civ. (1947) I (inclining to invalidity) and ToULEMON, "L'indice-
or," I Revue Trim. D. Com. (1948) 364 (for validity). 
17 For the other countries, see NussBAUM, "Comparative and International 
Aspects of American Gold Clause Abrogation," 44 Yale L. J. (1935) 53, 6o, 
61; MANN, Money III n. 7· 
18 Feist Case, supra n. 6; cf. MANN, Money 109. 
19 S. Ct. (Dec. 10, 1936) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) 54; (June II, 1937) Prager 
Archiv 1937, 2088. 
20 GUISAN, 56 z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) ( 1937) z6oa, 276a, 295a; BG. (Feb. I, 
1938) 64 BGE. II 88, IOI. 
21 MESTRE et }AMES, La clause-or en droit franc;ais (1926); SCHKAFF, La 
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French writers protected the monetary maneuvers of the 
kings by a theory that all stipulations evading prescriptions 
of legal tender are void. When a Law of August I 2, I 870, 
invested the notes of the Banque de France with cours ligal 
and freed the bank of its obligation to cash the notes ( cours 
force), the Court of Cassation held previous stipulations 
for payment in gold or silver coins to be void, because they 
would impair the "liberating effect of the paper money" 
and thus conflict with the compulsory legal tender of the 
paper bills.22 During the continuous downward trend suffered 
by the French franc after the First World War, this prac-
tice was maintained and fortified. In the whole range of 
domestic contracts, clauses protecting the creditor against 
the depreciation of the French currency are regularly de-
clared ineffective. 
This doctrine, however, has not been extended to "inter-
national payments," to be discussed with the international 
scope of gold clause restrictions. 
The French theory that a compulsory legal tender is 
necessarily opposed to protective clauses, is not shared any-
where else. Its effect distinguishes the French law in the 
twofold respect that, in the domestic field, gold clauses are 
retroactively invalid without express legislative provision, 
while, in the international field, their validity is maintained 
without restriction. 
B. FOREIGN MONEY DEBTS 
Rules concerning the payment of debts expressed in terms 
of foreign currency are of two categories. English courts 
have developed rules of procedure tending to exclude awards 
of foreign money; in the United States these rules have 
generated effects in the field of substantive private law. 
depreciation monetaire {ed. 2, 1926); CAPITANT, D. H. 1926, Chronique 33. 
1927, Chronique I; NussBAUM, Money 335· 
22 Cass. civ. (Feb. n, 1873) D. I873·I.I77. 
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Continental codes have determined the extent to which a 
party may modify a contractual promise to pay in foreign 
money, in rules of a purely substantive character. 
No consideration will be given here to emergency laws 
which go so far as to annul contracts for payment in foreign 
money, as for instance, the French Law of April q, 1942, 
prohibiting resident individuals and juristic persons estab-
lished in France from signing insurance contracts in foreign 
money. 
I. Right to Conversion 
If foreign coins or notes are bought, either in specific 
pieces or as unascertained goods, they are a commodity. 
But when foreign money is the object of a debt, it is not a 
commodity, as was sometimes believed by American courts. 23 
The obligation is "a monetary obligation couched in terms 
of a foreign currency" 24 
The debtor, however, in an old commercial tradition, 25 
enjoys the option (facultas alternativa) of paying the debt 
in equivalent units of the local currency in force at the place 
of payment. 26 This rule has been elaborated in the Geneva 
uniform laws on bills of exchange and on checks. 27 
This unilateral privilege of the debtor, however, may 
be waived by agreement of the parties, ordinarily expressed 
by the clause of "effective" payment. 28 
23 See Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Henwood (C. C. A. 8th 1938) 98 F. 
(2d) x6o, 166; NussBAUM, Money 412. 
24 German C. C. § 244; 106 RGZ. 77· 
25 ScACCIA, Tractatus de commerciis et cambio (ed. 1669) § 2 gl. 5 Nos. 
185, 188; L. GoLDSCHMIDT, Handbuch des Handelsrechts (1868) II 53 n. 35; 
AscARELLI in Riv. Dir. Com. 1923 I 447, and in his book, La Moneta 24. 
26 E.g., Allg. Wechselordnung (1848) art. 37; German BGB. § 244; 
Swiss C. Obi. art. 84 par. 2; Scandinavian Law of Bills of Exchange, of x88o, 
art. 35· See the list of laws in F. MEYER, Weltwechselrecht 290; VIVANTE, 4 
Trattato Dir. Com. § 1566 n. 106. 
27 Treaty on Bills of Exchange, art. 41; on Checks, art. 36. 
28 E.g., art. 41 sub III, supra n. 27; BGB. § 244 par. I cit.; "lending" of 
foreign money implies a sufficient agreement, 153 RGZ. 385. 
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Business conceptions in the United States agree with these 
rules.29 
A great controversy, however, has often arisen with 
respect to the date determining the rate of conversion from 
the foreign into the domestic currency. In theory and in 
practice in civil law countries the just view prevails: con-
version must be made with reference to the time of actual 
payment, in order to give the creditor the exact value of 
his claim, no more and no less. 30 Unfortunately, the language 
of the Geneva Uniform Law on negotiable instruments 
points to the date of maturity.31 An older laborious attempt 
by the International Law Association to unify the views 
on this question failed. 32 
2. Judicial Conversion33 
In contrast to most civil law courts, English and Ameri-
can courts do not allow themselves to order payment of 
29 See the proposal of 'commissioners on Uniform State Laws, National 
Conference Handbook ( 1933) 160. 
30 Argentina: App. Buenos Aires Comm. (Oct. 15, 1924) 10 Revue Dor 72. 
Austria: OGH. (April 25, 1922) 5 Rspr. 110, 295; (Feb. 27, 1934) id. 1934, 
64. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June 8, 1921) Pasicrisie 1921.2.111. 
Egypt: Mixed App. Alexandria (Jan. 8, 1930) 23 Revue Dor 279· 
France: Cass. req. (Nov. 8, 1923) Clunet 1923, 576; civ. (Dec. 5, 1927) id. 
1928, 66o; req. (March 19, 1930) id. 1931, 1082; civ. (July 8, 1931) id. 
1932, 721, but contra, for the date of maturity, Cass. req. (Feb. 13, 1937) 
Clunet 1937, 766. The latter solution with the additional damages for default 
is advocated by HAMEL, 2 Banques 470. 
Germany: RG. (Feb. 20, 1920) 98 RGZ. 16o; Plenary Ct. (Jan. 24, 1921) 
101 RGZ. 312. 
Italy: Cass. (July 27, 1939) Taccone v. Uff. Bottonieri, Dir. Int. 1940, 267. 
Switzerland: BG. (June 27, 1918) 44 BGE. II 213; (May 23, 1928) 54 
BGE. II 257; (Feb. 11, 1931) 57 BGE. II 69. When speaking of the date of 
maturity, the court has awarded damages for debtor's default between 
maturity and payment, see NuSSBAUM, Money 425 n. 14. 
31 See German RG. (July 1, 1924) 108 RGZ. 337; (March 17, 1925) 110 
RGZ. 295, commenting on the identical German provision. 
32 Vienna Rules 1926, Report of the 34th Conference (1927) 543 If., 718 If.; 
STOURM, 14 Revue Dor (1926) 52; 15 id. 18. 
33 See McCoRMICK, Damages 190 and cited literature; Note, 40 Harv. L. 
Rev. (1927) 619; also 2 BEALE 1341 If. 
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foreign money.34 The date for determining the rate of 
conversion into the domestic currency raises difficult ques-
tions. It has been settled by the House of Lords that dam-
ages in tort should be converted as of the date of wrong, 35 
and a similar rule prevails with regard to damages for 
breach of contract.36 The case of a liquidated debt was 
doubtful, 37 but has been decided as of the date when the 
debt matured.38 
The Supreme Court of the United States has developed 
this theory into a rule of substantive law by which an obli-
gation expressed in foreign currency is converted ipso jure, 
at the rate in effect on the day of breach or default of the 
debtor, so as to give the creditor an optional right to be 
paid in dollars.39 This automatic transformation by Ameri-
can law, however, depends on the fact that the obligation 
is governed by American law and, in the case in which it 
was proclaimed, seems to have been grounded in addition 
34 England: Manners v. Pearson & Son [ 1898] 1 Ch. 581, 587; Graumann 
v. Treitel [ 1940] 2 All E. R. 188. 
United States: Statute of April 2, 1792, c. 16 § 20, 1 Stat. 250, 31 U.S. C. A. 
§ 371: " ... all proceedings in the courts shall be kept and had" (in dollars). 
Canada: Rev. Stat. 1927, c. 40 s. 15 (1). 
35 Celia, S. S. v. The Volturno, S. S. [ 1921] 2 A. C. 544, 563 f. per Lord 
Wrenbury, as interpreted in several cases, last, Ottoman Bank v. Chakarian 
[ 1930] A. C. 277-P. C. 
36 Di Ferdinanda v. Simon, Smits & Co. [ 1920] 2 K. B. 704, aff'd [ 1920] 
3 K. B. 409-C. A.; Barry v. Van den Hurk [1920] 2 K. B. 709; Lebeaupin 
v. Crispin and Co. [1920] 2 K. B. 714-C. A.; Madeleine Vionnet et Cie. v. 
Wills [ 1940] 1 K. B. 72-C. A.; Privy Council in Ottoman Bank v. Chakarian, 
supra n. 35· 
Australia: McDonald v. Wells (1931) 45 Commw. L. R. 506-High Court 
of Australia. 
37 See the discussion by MANN, Money 291-302. 
S8 Lloyd Royal Beige v. Louis Dreyfus & Co. (1927) 27 Ll. L. Rep. 288; 
Graumann v. Treitel [ 1940] 2 All E. R. 188; cf. ibid. editorial note; 
CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 858 n. 3· Also for promissory notes and bills of exchange, 
Salim Nasrallah Khoury v. Khayat [1943] A. C. 507. 
Scotland: Macfie's Judicial Factor v. Macfie (1932) Scot. L. T. 460. 
Canada: Simms v. Cherrenkoff ( 1921) 62 D. L. R. 703. 
Australia: In re Tillam Boehme and Tickle Pty., Ltd. [1932] Viet. L. R. 146. 
39 Mr. Justice Holmes in Hicks v. Guinness (1925) 269 U. S. 71, even in a 
case of an account stated. 
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on the fact that the place of payment was in the country. 
In another case, where just to the contrary German law 
governed and the debt was payable in Germany, Mr. Justice 
Holmes, speaking for the majority, subjected the obliga-
tion to conversion only "at the moment when suit was 
brought," or as this should be understood, at the date of the 
judgment.40 The courts of New York have a different 
theory,41 that under ordinary circumstances the rate on the 
date of breach would control the effect of the breach on 
foreign debts, but they admit exceptions in favor of the rate 
of exchange at the time of the judgment.42 
The mystic power of territorial law in the theory of 
Mr. Justice Holmes, the doubts and, above all, the hard-
ships caused by,, all these premature conversions have been 
sufficiently criticized.43 It follows that calculation according 
to the rate at the time of judgment is the lesser evil, so 
long as no satisfactory machinery is found for leaving the 
conversion to the enforcement officer or a supervisory court. 
C. INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES 
Numerous American bonds, like the shares of certain 
American corporations, circulate all over the world, but 
their legal characteristics are untouched by any foreign law. 
Indeed, neither the fact that they are bought in mass and 
quoted on foreign stock exchanges, 44 nor still less that a 
40 Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey (1926} 272 U. S. 517; 
see FRAENKEL, "Foreign Moneys in Domestic Courts," 35 Col. L. Rev. (1935) 
360, 385. 
41 Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank (1923) 235 N.Y. 37, 79, 138 N. E. 497; 
Comptoir Commercial d'Importation v. Zabriskie (1926) 127 Misc. 461, 216 
N. Y. Supp. 473, aff'd, 222 App. Div. 736, 225 N. Y. Supp. 8o8; Sokoloff. v. 
National City Bank (1928) 250 N. Y. 69, 164 N. E. 745· 
4 2 See FRAENKEL, supra n. 40, at 389. But see Transamerica General Corp. 
v. Zunino (1948) 82 N. Y. Supp. (2d} 595, 604. 
48 NussBAUM, Money 431; MANN, Money 306; M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 
470 § 447· 
"On the contrary tendency of certain courts, see infra ns. 49, 91. 
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loan is floated in a country other than that of the debtor,45 
alter the purely domestic character of the bonds. The normal 
distinctive characteristic of an issue relevant for interna-
tional consideration is the alternative fixation of the money 
amount in two or more currencies, by a "multiple currency" 
clause, at the option of the bondholder. Such clauses, how-
ever, are of different classes. Their two main types, known 
under their French names, may be termed here option of 
currency and option of collection. 
1. Option of Currency (Option de Change) 
In the typical international loan which is to be offered to 
the capital markets of several countries, the sum of interest 
and principal is fixed from the start in the currencies of all 
participating places and payable, at the option of the holder, 
at any of these places. Thus, the bonds and coupons of a 
loan of the municipality of Vienna in 1902 expressed the 
principal sum as 100 kronen-85 marks-105 francs-4.3 
pounds sterling-20 dollars of the United States, in gold 
coin. 46 Here there are several obligations, each independent 
of the others, as alternative obligations are. Devaluation of 
one or more of the currencies does not affect the right of the 
creditor to ask payment at the place where the money has 
full value. Although this clause is intended to induce the 
prospective investors of a certain place by offering payment 
also at this place, no restriction to the original subscribers 
of this place or their successors is attached, because the 
bonds are also intended to be negotiated throughout the 
world. This makes it possible for all holders to claim the 
sum at the place of least devaluation. 
45 In discussions of the International Law Association on suretyship for 
international loans, the reporter, B. VAN NIEROP, contended that just this 
was the criterion of an international loan, 40th Report (1938) 192, also 
Nouv. Revue 1940, 368. This view may be exact from a purely financial 
point of view, but is misleading in legal respects. 
46 u6 RGZ. 196, 208. 
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The loan, in fact, despite the currency option is "indi-
visible, " 41 granting every holder exactly the same rights. 
Whether the Joint Resolution of the United States Con-
gress, of June 5, 1933, affected multiple currency clauses, 
is controversiaU8 
2. Option of Collection (Option de Place) 
The American loans of the 1920's to European cor-
porations usually contained a clause that both principal and 
interest of the bonds as well as any premium on the principal 
shall, in addition to being payable in Manhattan, also be 
collectible at the option of the holders, at the city office 
of a New York bank in London, and at certain indicated 
banks in Amsterdam, Zurich, Stockholm, etc., in each case at 
the then current buying rate of the respective banks for sight 
exchange on New York. This means that the amounts are 
not only primarily expressed in, but based on, the American 
currency, which is ,,therefore decisive in all future events. 
The holder has the choice of several places for his con-
venience, to obtain substantially the same value at all times. 
This situation has been universally recognized with respect 
to many loan issues49 despite numerous objections drawn 
from forced interpretation of stipulations or code pro-
visions, or from an ambiguous wording of certain contracts. 5° 
47 United States: McAdoo v. Southern Pacific Co. (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1935) 
10 F. Supp. 953· 
Austria: OGH. (June 1, 1937) 37 Bull. Inst. Int. (1937) 245· 
France: Cass. civ. (June 19, 1933) Clunet 1934, 939· To the same effect: 
Germany: RG. (July r, 1926) JW. 1926, 2675; (Dec. 22, 1927) 27 
Bankarchiv 162. 
Switzerland: BG. (May 23, 1928) 54 BGE. II 257, Clunet 1929, 497· 
48 See cases infra ns. 104-108. 
49 Publications Permanent Court (1929) Series A, Nos. 20/21 at 35; App. 
Haag (Jan. 14, 1935) N. J. 1935, II9. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 4, 1936) Pasicrisie 1936 II 52, 54· 
France: Cass. (Feb. 24, 1938) Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) 323. 
Italy: App. Napoli (Feb. 21, 1936) Foro Ita!. 1936 I 498. 
The Netherlands: H. R. (March 13, 1936) N. ]. and W. 1936, No. 280, 
34 Bull. Inst. Int. ( 1936) 304 (Royal Dutch case). 
50 The ambiguous formulations would fill a voluminous chapter. See 
NussBAUM, Money 454, 455 ff.; MANN, Money 138, 140 ff. 
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But a few courts have, indeed, incorrectly attempted to 
help creditors evade the American Joint Resolution by con-
tending that any place of issue suffices to subject the debt 
to the locallaw.51 
The character of the option of collection, just explained, 
is not only certain if the bonds are issued at one place, but 
also in case the bonds are issued in several countries when 
an identical external form of the bonds is employed.52 Even 
though several utranches" (divisions of the issue) may be 
formed, the languages being different, the collection clause 
exclusively decides the rate and therefore the content of the 
obligation. Such view alone, "giving deciding weight to the 
wording of the clause, conforms to the significance of bonds 
as incorporating rights and to the needs of international 
intercourse.' '58 
II. CoNFLICT OF LAws 
A. LEX PECUNIAE 
By indicating the currency of a state, the parties refer, 
or the law refers, to the legal prescription defining certain 
units of measurement. What a French franc is, is decided 
at any time according to the French legal provisions then 
in force, that is, under the principle of nominalism, those of 
the numerous French currency laws which are in force at 
the time of the payment or judgment respectively, including 
the provisions determining legal tender.54 
51 Infra ns. 85, 90, 91. 
52 This refutes the main defense argument based on the nationality of the 
holder. See the convincing reasoning of the Plenary Opinion of the Austrian 
Supreme Court (1935) 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 899. 
58 RG. (July x, 1926} JW. 1926, 2675; (Dec. 22, 1927) 27 Bankarchiv 162, 
against former decisions; see RABEL, xo Z.ausi.PR. ( 1936} 505. 
54 Great Britain: Ottoman Bank of Nicosia v. Chakarian [ 1938] A. C. 26o, 
270, per Lord Wrlght-P. C. 
Canada, Ontario: Derwa v. Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light & Power Co. 
[ 1928] 4 D. L. R. 542. 
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (Jan. 19, 1934) (Dec. 12, 1934) xo Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 
172. 
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This reference, however, indicates the only importance 
of the foreign currency laws as such. Even provisions on 
legal tender do not affect the obligation except by the fact 
that they are a part of the law governing the mode of 
performance. 
A contrary theory, establishing a veritable "law of 
currency" ( W ahrungsstatut), i.e., a conflicts rule providing 
that the fate of an obligation should be decided by the 
changes of the monetary system referred to, has been sug-
gested.55 The discussion of this problem took place with par-
ticular respect to revalorization (see infra B 3). 
B. LEX CONTRACTUS 
The copious discussion of the law governing money debts 
and notably bonds, has developed a wholesome unifying 
tendency, in ascribing to one law the great bulk of prob-
lems. What local connection serves to determine this law, 
depends on the nature of the contract-which would seem 
trite if it were not forgotten all too often.56 As shown 
before, in the case of bonds, this is the law of the country 
of the financing institution and the principal market. We 
are thereby enabled to deal shortly with a variety of subjects 
to which the principle ought to extend. 
1. Content of Debt 
Currency in which the debt is payable. 51 Whether a clause 
is meant as option of place of payment or only as option of 
collection, and what amount of money .is uin obligatione" 
55 Theory of NEUMEYER and NussBAUM, see infra n. 65. 
56 Even a recent book by GUTZWILLER, Der Geltungsbereich der Wahrungs-
vorschriften (Freiburg 1940) 92 ff. looks for a law applicable to "obligations 
expressed in a determinate currency" (p. 103) without distinguishing the 
nature of the contracts. He believes that "currency debts" do not show a 
lex causae in numerous cases (p. 107). This makes for more uncertainty 
(pp. 107 ff.) than is conceded in the present book. 
67 RG. (July 13, 1929) Leipz. Z. 1930, 306, cf. MELCHIOR 281, 284. 
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(money of account, monnaie de compte) depends on the 
law of the contract.58 What constitutes payment sufficient to 
discharge the obligation is an almost identical question and 
is certainly not to be decided under any other law.59 English 
cases, after hesitation, have taken the same view when after 
accord and satisfaction, the question was whether an offer 
for nonliquidated damages has a basis in a still-existing 
obligation.60 Also the faculty to deposit the sum due with 
the court follows the governing law.61 
2. Default 
The qualification and effect of default is governed by 
the same law. This extends to the question whether damages 
on the ground of default are awarded in excess of interest; 
whether damages are granted because of a loss through 
devaluation of the currency in which the obligation is ex-
pressed j 62 how unliquidated damages are to be measured ;63 
and whether rescission may be based on the diminution 
of the purchasing power of the money equivalent. 
3. Revalorization 
Evidently, the law of the contract also governs the ques-
tion whether a subsequent statute or judicial equity adjusts 
depreciated money debts. 64 In a contrary isolated opinion, 
58 MELCHIOR 277 ff.; MANN, Money 13 8; BATIFFOL, Traite 623 n. 3· 
59 DICEY (ed. 5) 678; CHESHIRE 281, but incorrectly at 660 (lex fori), in 
ed. 3, 353, 857. 
60 Ralli v. Dennistoun (1851) 6 Exch. 483, 155 Eng. Rf. 633. Not contrary, 
Lord Maugh in The Baarn [ 1934] P. 171, 185-C. A.; see MANN, Money 254. 
61 United States: Zimmermann v. Sutherland (1927) 274 U. S. 253· Prob-
ably to the same effect, The Baarn [1933] P. 251-C. A. 
6 2 United States: Transamerica General Corp. v. Zunino (1948) 82 N.Y. 
Supp. (2d) 595, 604. 
England: Scrutton, L. J., in Societe des Hotels Le Touquet Paris-PI age v. 
Cummings [1922] 1 K. B. 451, 461. 
Germany: RG. (Jan. 8, 1930) IPRspr. 1930 No. 48 and others. 
63 MANN, Money 201, 215; contra: CHESHIRE 66o (lex fori), 857 in ed. 3· 
64 Prevailing opinion adopted by the courts in: 
England: Anderson v. Equitable Assurance Society of the United States 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF MONEY OBLIGATIONS 35 
the law of the currency rather than that of the obligation 
applies.65 Hence, French rules would decide against any 
revaluation of a debt couched in French francs, although the 
debt arises from a German contract and its amount under 
the German rules is transformed into certain percentages 
of the new currency. An English debt of German marks 
would have to be revalorized in American courts. The cur-
rency, however, in which a debt is expressed, has nothing 
to do with the equitable increase of the debt to a higher 
content. 
4· Gold Clause 
The law applicable to the obligation in general naturally 
determines the existence and construction of a gold clause ;66 
its character as a gold coin or gold value clause ;67 and the 
legislative measur~s upholding or impairing the clause.68 
(1926) 134 L. T. R. 557, 565, 566-C. A.; see also Re Schnapper [19361 
I All E. R. 322, cf. MANN, Money 205 ff. 
Austria: OGH. (Sept. II, 1929) JW. 1929, 3519, Clunet 1930, 750; (March 
12, 1930) JW. 1930, 2480, Clunet 1931, 196 (Austrian law on mark debts); 
(April 24, 1927) JW. 1927, 1899 (German law on a German debt). 
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (Nov. II, 1924) JW. 1925, 574; (Jan. 19 and Dec. 
16, 1934) 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 172. 
Germany: II9 RGZ. 259, 264; 120 id. 70, 76; 121 id. 337; see MELCHIOR 
294 and constant practice. The currency reform in the Western Zone of 
Germany has raised new questions; on the municipal problems, see VON 
CAEMMERER, 3 Siidd. }ur. Zeitg. (1948) 497· 
The Netherlands: See 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 856; H.R. (Jan. 2, 1931) W. 
12259· 
Sweden: S. Ct. (May 27, 1930) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1930, 507; (Oct. r6, 1930) 
id. 513, as cited in MICHAEL! 321 f. 
Switzerland: 51 BGE. II 303; 53 id. II 76; and constant practice. 
65 RG. (March 5, 1928) 120 RGZ. 277, 279; (Feb. 9, 1931) JW. 1932, 583; 
NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. III 368 ff.; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 254· 
Contra: ScHLEGELBERGER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 869 and the overwhelming 
majority of German writers. 
66 England: St. Pierre v. South American Stores ( Gath & Chaves) Ltd. 
[19371 3 All E. R. 349, 352, 354-C. A. 
67 Denmark: S. Ct. (Dec. 13, 1934) 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 280. 
Finland: Helsingfors (Dec. 23, 1937) 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 280. 
68 England: International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders A. G. 
v. The King [19361 3 All E. R. 407; [19371 A. C. 505 (Lord Wright's judg-
ment), reversed on other grounds, H. L. [19371 A. C. 500. 
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The last-mentioned application gave an excellent method 
for treating the very numerous intra-European transactions 
in which gold dollars were promised merely for the reason 
that the American currency appeared the most constant 
measure of value, without any thought of submitting to 
American law. In these cases, the American Joint Resolu-
tion was correctly discarded.69 In other categories of cases, 
however, the application of the general law of the contract 
has encountered various obstacles, particularly in the extra-
ordinarily wide repercussions of the Joint Resolution. 
The international scope of the Joint Resolution. The 
Congressional Act of June 5, 1933, was evidently intended 
for the broadest conceivable application. According to its 
text, it extends to all gold clauses attached to obligations 
payable in money of the United States; no mention is made 
of the law governing the debt, nor is a domestic place of 
paymene0 or a domestic domicil of the parties required. 
This wide scope has been recognized by the courts. 71 
Canada, Ontario: Derwa v. Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light & Power Co. 
[1928] 4 D. L. R. 542. 
Austria: OGH. {Sept. II, 1929) Rspr. No. 332; {July 8, 1935) Rspr. No. 
164; (Dec. 5, 1935) Clunet 1937, 127; {June x, 1937) 37 Bull. Inst. Int. 
(1937) 245. Opinion (Nov. 26, 1935) Clunet 1936, 442, 717. 
Denmark: See decisions supra Ch. 34 n. 49, and this Ch. n. 67. 
Egypt: App. Mix. Alexandria (Feb. 18, 1936) D. 1936.2.78. 
Germany: RG. {Oct. 6, 1933) JW. 1933, 2583. 
Italy: Trib. Torino {July 7, 1934) Foro Ita!. I934.I.I351; App. Napoli 
{Feb. 21, 1936) Foro Ita!. 1936.1.498. 
Norway: S. Ct. (Dec. 8, 1937) 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 71, Revue de 
sciences et de legislation financiere 1937, 646. 
The Netherlands: H. R. (March 13, 1936) Case of Bataafsche Petroleum 
Co., N. ]. 1936, 506. 
Sweden: S. Ct. {Jan. 30, 1937) 36 Bull. Inst. Int. (1937) 327, II Z.ausl.PR. 
( 1937) 286. ENGLISH in 3 Guldklausulmiilet {Stockholm 1937) 130. 
69 Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. {Oct. 22, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop. R. (1938) 467: the 
clause serving only to protect against a devaluation of the Czecho-crown 
does not justify the payment of a reduced amount in Kc in case of a dollar 
decline. 
Germany: Cf. supra n. 9 on "goldmark" clauses. 
10 But see the obiter dictum by Learned Hand, ]., in Anglo-Continentale 
Treuhand, A. G. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. (C. C. A. zd 1936) 81 F. {zd} u. 
71 Campania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank 
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Attempts repeatedly made in foreign courts to claim the 
full gold value of a debt on the ground that the Joint Reso-
lution was not meant to cover bonds issued or payable in 
a foreign country, were futile. 72 
It would seem that Congress, without considering the 
problem closely, intended to give the Act the largest possible 
territorial scope, without, however, wishing to transcend 
the traditional limits of sovereignty.73 In fact, no such trans-
gression has been committed in judicial decisions. In the 
outstanding New York case of a loan between foreign 
parties, where the court declared the broad domain of the 
Resolution, the loan had been floated and the bonds were 
payable in New York; it was expressly stated that the law 
of New York governed the obligation. 74 
Another unfounded attempt has sometimes been made 
to bar the Joint Resolution from the applicable American 
law because the parties did not contemplate the possibility 
that the apparently safest currency of the world would be 
depreciated by such an extraordinary measure, and their 
intention therefore was restricted to the American law 
previous to the Resolution. But since the parties definitely 
excluded the European laws as unreliable, they could not 
limit the American law to certain cases and leave the others 
without applicable law. 75 
Exceptional statutes. In two countries, gold clauses have 
been invalidated if the law of the currency so stated.76 A 
of Finland (1935) 269 N. Y. 22, 198 N. E. 617, cert. denied, 297 U. S. 705. 
Notes, 45 Yale L. J. (1936) 723, 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936) 726. 
72 Such arguments have been rejected in Germany, OLG. Dusseldorf (Sept. 
26, 1934) IPRspr. 1934 No. 93 (b); RG. (May 28, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058. 
73 RABEL, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) at 507. 
74 Supra n. 71. 
75 RABEL, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) at 509; for English dicta, see MANN, Money 
228. Cf. Vol. II p. 393· 
76 Austria: Law of April 4, 1934, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 267, Clunet 1937, 
643, cf. KOESSLER, id. 496. 
Poland: Law of June 12, 1934, 1 Z.osteurop.R. (1935) 499; 2 id. 439· 
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National Socialist German law even declared that all bonds 
issued abroad for sums expressed in a foreign currency, 
should be devaluated according to the devaluation of the 
foreign currency, irrespective of a gold clause attached. 77 
The German state thus undertook to invalidate a gold clause 
valid under all foreign laws involved, merely because a 
domestic court was seized of the matter. The law was a 
countermove against a questionable judgment of the Reichs-
gericht excluding the application of the Joint Resolution to 
American bonds circulating in Germany, on the ground of 
alleged National Socialist principles,78 but is itself guilty of 
an outrage. It has rightly been refused recognition in 
Switzerland. 79 
French doctrine of international payment. Despite the 
practice of considering gold clauses void as offending the 
cours force of French bank notes, the French Supreme Court 
in 1920 held the New York Life Insurance Company bound 
to the contractual gold value promised in an insurance policy 
to a Frenchman. The cours force based on French national 
interest should not prevent the importation of gold from a 
foreign debtor into France.80 The courts subsequently have 
elaborated a doctrine of "international payment," which is 
two-sided so as to obligate also a French debtor to a foreign 
creditor, at least in theory. An international payment has 
been defined as a double transfer of funds between France 
and a foreign country; the contract must "produce, as a 
movement of flux and reflux across the frontiers, reciprocal 
consequences in either country."81 The Court of Cassation 
77 Law on Foreign Currency Bonds, of June 26, 1936, RGBI. I 575 and 
Decree of Dec. 5, 1936, RGBJ. I 1oxo; 10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 391, 666. This 
law is also technically defective. 
78 RG. (May 28, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058, see infra n. 89. 
79 BG. (Feb. r, 1938) 64 BGE. II 88. 
8° Cass. req. (June 7, 1920) D. 1920.1.237, S. 1920.1.193, Clunet 1920, 654, 
Revue 1921, 452. 
81 Att. Gen. Paul Matter, opinion in Cass. civ. (May 17, 1927) D. 1928.1.25, 
S. 1927.1.289, Clunet 1931, 6, commonly quoted. Cf. MAITER in Etudes de 
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considers "the nature and elements of an operation" rather 
than the place of payment, or the domicil of the parties, 
and inquires whether the scope of domestic economy is sur-
passed82 The currency laws have expressly recognized gold 
and similar clauses in such cases.83 The validity of the clauses 
concerning the money of account, thus, does not depend on 
the law governing the debt.84 
Law of place of payment. In many foreign courts, among 
other attempts to bar the application of the Joint Resolu-
tion, creditors contended that the question belonged not to 
the law governing the contract but to the law of the place 
of payment as governing the mode of performance. In the 
meaning of the Restatement it would even be categorized 
as a problem of discharge of the obligation, and therefore 
be subject to the lex loci solutionis ( § 35 8 d). 
The courts, in general, have resisted this theory. Among 
inconclusive except~ons, the English Court of Appeals has 
enforced a Canadian mortgage bond, payable in London in 
sterling gold coin of Great Britain, despite the abrogation 
of gold clauses by the Canadian Gold Clauses Act, 1937.85 
Although the justices relied on the lex loci solutionis for 
the "mode" of payment, their opinions were probably 
more influenced by the text of the clause in the contract at 
bar, which could be read as entitling the bearer to British, 
in contrast to Canadian, money, if ever there should be a 
difference. This would amount to a partial reference of the 
parties to a special law, a construction occurring also else-
where ;86 but it is a forced construction. The House of Lords 
droit civil a Ia memoire de Henri Capitant (I939) I, 4 ff., also in Nouv. 
Revue I943, 209. 
82 Cass. civ. (Feb. I4, I934) D. I934·I.73·78, S. I934·I.297· 
83 Stabilization Law of July 25, I928; Monetary Law of Oct. I, I936 and 
Feb. I8, I937· 
84 BATIFFOL, Traite 624. 
85 British and French Trust Corp. v. New Brunswick Ry. Co. [I937] 4 All 
E. R. 516, Note in I8 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I937) 220. 86 Austria: See decisions in 9 Z.ausi.PR. ( I935) 89I, 897; IO id. 68o; II 
id. 269. 
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avoided the problem, but Lord Romer approved the wrong 
theory.87 
The judgments of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in the cases of the Serbian and Brazilian loans88 
stressed somewhat the place of payment, but in reality 
applied the law governing the loans which was identified 
with that of the borrowing government.89 This view follows 
tradition but does not satisfy modern needs. 
Public policy (situs of the bond). In the above-mentioned 
lawsuit which attracted great attention in Germany, the 
Reichsgericht decided that the American Joint Resolution 
did not apply to such American-governed bonds as were in 
German circulation at the time when the Act came into 
force.90 This decision, if it had remained in effect, would 
have caused an impracticable discrimination and violated 
the equality of the holders of bonds belonging to the same 
issue. The German government's repudiation of the decision 
was justified, although as noted above the repudiation decree 
itself was highly objectionable. 
Public policy (place of collection). The Dutch Supreme 
Court, too, resorted to public policy when it denied effect 
to the Joint Resolution with respect to bonds of the Royal 
Dutch Company which showed a promise "to pay" in New 
York and the promise of "collectibility" in Amsterdam at 
the dollar rate of exchange, the suit seeking to recover 
florins in Amsterdam.91 The court maintained its view even 
87 New Brunswick Ry. Co. v. British and French Trust Corp. [1939] 
A. C. I, 43 f., criticized by CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 345· 
8 8 Publications Permanent Court ( 1929) Series A, Nos. 20/21. 
89 Correctly so, MANN, Money 224. 
90 RG. (May 28, 1936) Kreissparkasse Aachen v. Deutscher Sparkassen & 
Giroverband, ]W. 1936, 2058, Clunet 1936, 951; 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 385 
(suppressed in the official collection) overruling OLG. Dusseldorf (Sept. 26, 
1934) IPRspr. 1934, 300, 302; OLG. Koln (Sept. 13, 1935) ]W. 1936, 203, 204. 
An opinion by EDUARD WAHL which seems to have influenced the decision is 
published in 9 Z.int.R. ( 1935) 779· 
91 H. R. (March 13, 1936) N. ]. and W. 1936 No. 280, 34 Bull. Inst. Int. 
(1936) 304. 
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after the Nether lands had legislated against gold clauses. 92 
The courts of other countries have rejected specious 
arguments of such kind.93 Neither the physical presence of 
a bond instrument in a country nor the mere facility of 
collection are sufficient contacts for the use of the public 
policy doctrine, which, moreover, should be excluded when 
the devaluation is due to a currency reform for assumedly 
cogent reasons and carried out without discriminating 
against foreign creditors.94 It is inconsistent with the very 
nature of international loans that any material differences 
should be made between the holders of identically shaped 
instruments. No sound public policy is served by disturbing 
this necessary machinery. 
C. SCOPE OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS 
On the strength of the settled special rule that the law 
of the place of .performance governs the "mode" of per-
formance, that law decides what money is legal tender. It 
is also reasonable to include the question whether, in the 
absence of a party agreement, the debtor of foreign money 
may, at his option, pay in the currency of the place where 
the obligation is to be discharged. This is a recognized rule 
92 Cf. Dutch Law of June 24, 1938; H. R. (April 28, 1939) W. 1939, No. 
895, French tr., 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 291 (Canadian law, but Canadian 
Gold Clauses Act, 1937, criticized as too restricting); H. R. (May 26, 1939) 
W. 1939 No. 896, German tr., 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 90 (Osram loan, 
under German law; but gold clause prohibition, the law of 1936 on foreign 
currency restriction, and the currency transfer r~strictions are against Dutch 
public order). 
93 Austria: OGH. {Nov. 26, 1935) 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 891, 897; (July 10, 
1936) Rspr. 1936, II4· 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles {Feb. 4, 1936) S. 1937·4·1; aff'd, Cass. (Feb. 24, 
1938) 64 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) 323. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. go, 1937) 36 Bull. lnst. Int. (1937) 327,18 Brit. Year 
Book Int. Law (1937) 215, 217; cf. the report by MICHAELI gos-gn. 
Switzerland: BG. {Sept. 26, 1933) 59 BGE. II at 360; BG. (July 7, 1942) 
68 BGE. II 203, also in 1 Schweiz. Jahrb. I. R. (1944) 168. 
94 This is the prevailing opinion of German writers, cf. MANN, Money 
232 ff., but see NussBAUM, Money 393, regarding the Royal Dutch case as 
"not arbitrary." 
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m Switzerland95 and, with certain doubts, m Germany. 96 
It is included in the numerous, often too broad, French 
references to "the mode of payment, particularly the 
money."91 It also seems to lie within the theory of the 
English cases. 98 Finally, the Restatement with reason refers 
the question of which of several debts payable in the same 
state should be deemed discharged by a payment, to the 
law of that state.99 
The same, however, cannot be said of the next question, 
whether the parties may agree on effective payment in 
foreign money, nor of all other questions determining the 
quid rather than the quo modo of the obligation. The law 
of the place of payment should only come in, if at all, on 
the ground of public policy. 
The adequate scope of lex loci solutionis has so far been 
discussed critically by only a few writers. 100 A special point 
has found more attention. During the long periods when 
95 Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 84, speaking of money not being legal tender 
at the place of payment. 
96 Germany: BGB. § 244 par. 2, providing that the debtor can pay in 
domestic currency if the place of payment is in Germany, contains a con-
cealed conflicts rule, as the literature recognizes. For the literature, see 
MELCHIOR 287 n. 1. This conflicts rule should be construed as characterizing 
the question as one of the mode of payment. See NussBAUM, D. IPR. 259· 
But the rule has been said to yield to any foreign law of the contract 
(ENNECCERUS, Recht der Schuldverhaltnisse (ed. 1927) § 231 p. 21 n. 4) or 
to the foreign law of the contract, if the place of payment is outside Germany 
(M. WOLFF, IPR. 97) or, on the contrary, to belong to public policy 
(MELCHIOR 285 § 190). The Reichsgericht, which seemed to adopt the normal 
rule (Sept. 29, 1919) 96 RGZ. 270, 272, strangely deviated in the Plenary 
Meeting of the Civil Chambers of Jan. 24, 1921, 101 RGZ. 312, 316, where 
the place at which the payment is made rather than that in which the payment 
is due is regarded as decisive, following the isolated view of NEUMEYER, 3 
Int. Verwaltungs R. II 318. 
97 WEISS, 4 Traite 397; RADOUANT in Planiol et Ripert, 7 Traite Pratique 
526 § II93 and n. 2; 2 ARMIN JON § 132; BATIFFOL, Traite 623 n. I. 
98 See infra n. wo. 
99 Restatement § 368. This rule has been extended to the apportionment of 
income as between successive life beneficiaries, in Safe Deposit and Trust Co. 
of Baltimore v. Woodbridge (1945) 184 Md. 56o, 42 At!. (2d) 231, 159 
A. L. R. 580, criticized by HENDERSON, J., ibid. dissenting. 
lOO MELCHIOR 277 ff.; WEIGERT, supra ns. I, 2, 20; MANN, Money 169-179, 
249-251. 
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sterling currency indiscriminately obtained in the British 
Commonwealth and the Latin Monetary Union dominated 
many countries, contractual obligations of money were often 
expressed simply in pounds or francs. How to construe 
stipulations couched in pounds after these had been de-
valuated to different levels in the various territories, was 
an issue in several decisions of the House of Lords and the 
Privy Council. The decisions were of uncertain argument 
and difficult to reconcile with each other.101 They made it at 
least certain, however, that on one hand the local money 
at the place of payment was decisive, but on the other, that 
this was a special function of the lex loci solutionis, the use 
of which had to serve only a restricted purpose. 
Where payment in "francs" and "dollars" becomes an 
ambiguous indication, courts have often referred to the 
currency of the place of payment.102 But equitable considera-
tions have also led to judgments awarding a creditor pay-
ment only in his own lower currency/03 or a specification was 
inferred from premium payments in insurance contracts.104 
D. OPTION OF CURRENCY 
An option de change granting the creditor choice of the 
currency in which he may recover a sum fixed in the con-
101 Adelaide Electric Supply Co. v. Prudential Assurance Co. [1934] A. C. 
IZZ, I5I-H. L. (the law of the place of performance should regulate the 
discharge of the contract by performance) ; Auckland Corporation v. Alliance 
Assurance Co. [1937] A. C. 587-P. C. (bonds made payable by option of 
the holder in London, English pounds payable); Mount Albert Borough 
Council v. Australasian Temperance & General Mutual Life Assurance Soc., 
Ltd. (I937) [I938] A. C. 224-P. C. (bonds considered as governed by New 
Zealand law; the statute of Victoria reducing interests is inapplicable). 
102 Canada, Saskatchewan: Simms v. Cherrenkoff ( 1921) 6z D. L. R. 703. 
Quebec: La Corporation des Obligations Municipales Lim. v. La Ville de 
Montreal Nord (Super. Ct. 1921) 59 Que. S. C. 550. 
France: Cass. req. (Mar. I, I9Z6) Clunet 1926, 66I; (April IS, 1926) Clunet 
1926, 970. 
Switzerland: BG. (May 23, 1928) 54 BGE. II 257. 
1 03 Canada, Alberta: Sheppard v. First International Bank of Sweet Grass 
[1924] I D. L. R. 582. 
104 See the list of cases, NussBAUM, Money 440 n. 10. 
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tract, such as one pound sterling or five United States 
dollars, constitutes a promise independent of the factual 
relation of the currencies involved at the time of suit. Each 
alternative right remains unaffected if all other currencies 
are devaluated or the protective clauses with regard to them 
are abrogated by the laws of the countries to which the 
currencies belong. This view rests, of course, on the law 
governing the contract inasmuch as it sanctions the inten-
tion of the parties. This, however, does not answer all 
doubts. 
In the United States, it has been held that on a bond 
payable in dollars in New York or guilders in Amsterdam 
a bondholder of any nationality, including that of the United 
States, is entitled to sue for the full value of guilders pay-
able in Amsterdam, irrespective of the existing prohibition 
to sue for gold dollars payable at any place.105 However, 
subsequently another federal circuit court with reference to 
the same loan decreed that dollars could not be demanded 
for the value in guilders/06 Opinions were divided also on 
the occasion of another loan.107 The Supreme Court of the 
United States took the more rigorous stand.108 In its ap-
praisal, promises in alternate currency were not separate 
and independent contracts or obligations, but were parts of 
1 05 Anglo-Continental Treuhand A. G. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. 
(C. C. A. 2d 1936) 81 F. (zd) n, by Judge Learned Hand, cert. denied, 298 
u.s. 655· 
Analogous, for restrictive interpretation of the Belgian decree and law on 
gold clauses as an exorbitant measure, Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (April 
7, 1936) 35 Bull. Inst. Int. (1936) 130; Trib. com. Bruxelles (Dec. 17, 1936) 
36 iJ. (I 937) 299· 
106 Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Henwood (C. C. A. 8th 1938) 98 F. 
(2d) 160. 
107 The judgment of Learned Hand, J., was followed in Zurich Gen. Ace. & 
Liability Ins. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (1939) 279 N.Y. 495, 18 N. E. (2d) 
673; Anglo-Continentale Treuhand A. G. v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (1939) 
279 N. Y. 790, 19 N. E. (2d) 89; contra: City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. 
Bethlehem Steel Co. ( 1935) 244 App.Div. 634, 280 N. Y. Supp. 494· 
108 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood ( 1939) 307 U. S. 247; Bethlehem Steel 
Co. v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. and Anglo-Continentale 
Treuhand A. G. (1939) 307 U. S. 265. 
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one and the same monetary obligation of the debtor "which 
was under American law and fell within the terms of the 
Joint Resolution: 'obligations payable in money of the 
United States.'" This decision may be regarded as an un-
warranted extension of the Joint Resolution which does not 
mention foreign currency debts.109 In any case, the Court 
ignored the faculty of the parties to stipulate in a contract 
governed by American law obligations subject to a special 
law. 
In fact, foreign courts have taken a different view of such 
clauses. The problem, of course, is directly concerned with 
the amount of the debt. It would be a mistake to include 
the right in question in the domain of modalities of pay-
ment belonging to the law of the place of performance. 
Nevertheless, the f.ermer German Commercial Supreme 
Court and the Reichsgericht have entertained a theory that 
the contract with its alternative currency clause submits the 
obligation conditionally to the law of the place the creditor 
should select for presenting his bond for payment.110 In the 
case of the Viennese Investment Loan, the Reichsgericht 
held Austrian law to govern the debt but Swiss law to govern 
the payment in Swiss francs in Zurich so as to discard an 
Austrian legislative act authorizing the city of Vienna to 
pay exclusively in valueless Austrian crowns.111 Similar con-
structions have been adopted in other countries.112 Some 
related arguments have also been used by the Permanent 
109 WEIGERT, supra n. I, at 33· 
110 24 ROHGE. 388; RGZ.: I, 59. 61; 5. 254; IOO, 79; 126,196. 
111 RG. (Nov. 14, 1929) 126 RGZ. 196; considered representing German 
law in Pan-American Securities Corp. v. Fried. Krupp A. G. (1938) 6 N. Y. 
Supp. (2d) 993· 
112 Canada, Quebec: La Corporation des Obligations Municipales Limitee 
v. La Ville de Montreal Nord (Super. Ct. 1921) 59 Que. S. C. 550. 
Switzerland: BG. (May 23, I928) 54 BGE. II 257, Clunet 1929, 497· 
In France, a similar decision was wrongly rendered in a case of option 
of place, Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 16, 1938) Mouren et Comite de Ia Bourse 
d'Amsterdam v. Soc. des Services Contractuels des Messageries Maritimes, 
Gaz. Pal 1938 II 728, 40 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 98. 
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Court of International Justice and the English Court of 
Appeals.113 
This reasoning has been acutely criticizedY4 However, 
all these cases point to the intention of the parties. The 
problem may demonstrate the opportunity of recognizing 
an appropriate sphere, not of the law of the place of per-
formance, but of the choice of law by the parties. It seems 
a sound case for conceding that the parties may agree on 
the applicable law under condition subsequent. A multi-
lateral currency clause constitutes the right to recover a 
money value despite depreciation of the other currencies 
and should not be frustrated by subsequent statutes of the 
states controlling these currencies. Judge Learned Hand's 
opinion mentioned above 115 is entirely agreeable to this 
construction. We might submit, therefore, that a genuine 
multiple currency clause includes an implied choice of law 
under the condition of its exercise. This small corner of 
refuge in the international field ought to be left to the 
victims of the governmental money manipulators. 
E. MORATORIUM AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 
(a) M oratorium.116 Moratorium is a temporary statu-
tory postponement, for all debts, or those of a certain kind, 
of the date when payment is due. Such exceptional defer-
ment may be so short that its effect can be assimilated to 
the "terms of grace" of the law merchant, traditionally 
113 Publications Permanent Court (1929) Judgment No. 14, Series A, Nos. 
zo/zr (see supra n. 5 at p. 44, cf. Judgment No. 15, id. p. 122); British and 
French Trust Corp. v. New Brunswick Ry. Co. [1937] 4 All E. R. 516 (see 
supra p. 39 n. 85. 
114 NUSSBAUM, D. lPR. 261; NUSSBAUM, Money 383: "bad law," citing 
decisions in his favor. Co11tra: WEIGERT, supra n. r, 37, basing the decision 
on the "law of the currency," which is also questionable. 
115 See supra n. 105. 
116 GmRON, "Moratorie e regressi nel diritto internazionale privato," 9 
Rivista (1915) rsz. 
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subjected to the law of the place of payment or of the 
forum.111 Otherwise, the matter is controversial.118 
In England, it has been held that the law of the place 
of payment as such is decisive,119 because the matter relates 
to the mode of performance. Beale120 advocates this view 
despite a contrary decision of New York, 121 which applied 
the law of the place of contracting. M. Wolff supports this 
opinion by the equitable consideration that a debtor should 
not be required to pay in a country where he cannot collect 
his own claims.122 
In civil law countries, the French Law of I 870 granting 
prorogations to the payment of bills of exchange and notes, 
expressly claimed extraterritorial force. 123 This law once 
gave rise to a widespread but unsuccessful debate and to 
conflicting decisions in numerous countries. A frequent doc-
trine limited any statutory moratorium to the territory of 
the state issuing l't, even though it was intended to be applied 
to debts payable abroad. In a similar view, public policy is 
always repugnant to the defense of a foreign moratorium.124 
But the French statute, in fact, merely prohibited the mak-
ing of protests, an entirely special matter regarding en-
forcement of obligations flowing from negotiable instru-
ments.125 
Recent cases of moratoria, decreed in close connection 
117 DEZAND, 10 Repert. 176 § 25. 
118 Cour Paris (June 25, 1931) Clunet 1932) 993 declares inapplicable the 
French moratorium to a bill of exchange accepted in Switzerland for a pay-
ment in Paris. The decision is approved by PRUDHOMME, ibid., but questioned 
by BATIFFOL, Traite 622 n. I. 
119 Rouquette v. Overman ( 1875) L. R. IO Q. B. 525, 535; In re Francke and 
Rasch [I9I8] I Ch. 470, 482. 
120 2 BEALE I270. 
121 Taylor v. Kouchaki (1916) 56 N.Y. L. }. (I9I6) 8I3. 
122 Priv. Int. Law 479 § 455· 
123 GHIRON, supra n. 116, at I6I. 
124 GHIRON I76 ff. j contra: 2 FRANKENSTEIN 242 n. 27. 
125 2 MElLI 35I· 
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with exchange restrictions, depend on the treatment of such 
restrictions. We may say that the character and motivation 
of the individual statutes relaxing the strict observation of 
contracts have always influenced consideration of such 
statutes in other countries. 
(b) Exchange restrictions.126 The main principle, again, 
must be that the law of the contract decides the force of 
any restriction. This includes two rules : (a) where the 
governing law itself sets up an obstacle to the discharge of 
money obligations, the parties are bound to it, irrespective 
of where the payment is to be performed and where the 
suit for payment is brought, and (b) restrictions by a state 
whose law does not govern the contract are immaterial. 
This natural principle seems to have become the accepted 
basis of the international literature of the 193o's and 1940's. 
The emphasis, however, has not been on the principle at all 
but on the possible exceptions. These are varied and the 
over-all picture is confused. 
Procedural theory. One of the arguments supporting the 
disregard of foreign restrictions has been their allegedly 
territorial nature. Assets within the forum, it has been said, 
cannot be exempted from enforcement by virtue of a foreign 
prohibition. Sometimes it has been added that the German 
restrictions especially, despite their immense scope and 
ruthless elaboration, expressly refrained from affecting the 
substance of the creditor's right, in that they limited them-
selves to the temporary prevention of payment, either volun-
tary or enforced. Thus, enforcement in England would only 
be a procedural matter, dependent on English rules.121 Ger-
126 FREUTEL, 56 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. r, 30 (informative on problems); 
much material is collected by RASHBA, "Foreign Exchange Restrictions and 
Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws," 41 Mich. L. Rev. (1943) 777, 1089. 
Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit Bank [1948] z All E. R. rozs-C. A. 
1 27 Thus, MANN, Money 266 ff. A new surprising position in recognizing 
Czechoslovakian restrictions has been taken by the English Court of Appeal 
in Kahler v. Midland Bank [1948] I All E. R. 8u. Comment is reserved for 
Volume IV. 
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man and other compulsory systems, however, if allegedly 
not cancelling the obligation, in fact vitally impair its sub-
stance. On the other hand, it is of cardinal importance that 
we should not extend jurisdiction, based merely on the 
local situation of an asset, so as to impregnate a foreign-
governed obligation with local policy.128 
Public policy. Foreign legislation on currency exchange 
has very often been discarded as "political," as confiscatory, 
or as penal-a rather vague approach.129 Moral indignation 
repudiating the foreign restrictions has been embarrassing 
when statutes of the forum resorted to similar methods. 
The best support of a reaction against such foreign mea-
sures is afforded by the argument that they pursue in a 
unilateral manner economic purposes of a state to the detri-
ment of foreign interests. On this ground, rather than on 
all others alleged, German, Austrian, and Swiss courts 
have correctly rejected debtors' excuses based on Hun-
garian, Yugoslavian,. and German currency restrictions, 
respectively .130 
This view, advocated in the United States,131 is better 
suited than a rigid condemnation of all extraordinary 
foreign measures for the safeguard of national economy. 
128 An unwarranted objection to this proviso has been raised by RASHBA, 
supra n. 126, who warns against exaggeration of the principle that substantial 
contact with the forum is indispensable for the application of the local law 
considered as public policy. 
129 See for details, RASHBA, 41 Mich. L. Rev., supra n. 126, at 1089 ff. 
130 Germany: KG. (Oct. 27, 1932) JW. 1932, 3773, IPRspr. 1932 No. 9i LG. 
Berlin I (Feb. 19, 1932) JW. 1932, 2306, IPRspr. 1932 No. 10. 
Austria: OGH. (Dec. 10, 1935) 10 Z.ausi.PR. (i936) 398, Clunet 1937, 
333; cf. WAHLE, 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 779· 
Switzerland: 6o BGE. II 294, 310; 62 id. 242, 246; 62 id. II 108. The rejec-
tion extends to the case where the debt is governed by German law, see BG. 
(March 2, 1937) 63 BGE. II 42. In its decision of July 7, 1942, 68 BGE. II 
203, supra n. 93, the court agreed with an American judgment because of 
analogous policy. 
In the Swedish case, S. Ct. (June 10, 1942) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1942, 389, 394, 
as cited in MICHAEL! 311 f., Bagge applied the same approach, whereas the 
majority resorted to Swedish law as the law of the contract. 
181 FREUTEL, 56 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. 1, at 58. Cf. DoMKE, The Control 
of Alien Property ( 1947) 206, 313. 
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It is also superior by far to a third view which holds the 
debtor responsible for not being able to pay, since his own 
state has caused his inability; he should bear the risk of 
damage occasioned by such legislation while he enjoys the 
benefits procured by the national economy of which he is 
a part.132 
Is the law of the place of payment influential? This ques-
tion carries us back to the pretended importance of illegality 
under the law of a foreign place of performance. By aban-
doning this dogma, a court may easily defy a foreign cur-
rency restriction imposed in an incompetent state. 
On the other hand, no one can reasonably be expected to 
pay English pounds in Chile while this is prohibited there.133 
In the two Baarn cases, the court did not resort to the 
Chilean law of obligations and had no need to do so for 
the purpose of excusing the debtor.134 The law governing 
the contract, whatever it is, will provide for the effect of 
nonpayment as well as for the question whether payment 
in local money is to be accounted for at the exchange rate. 
132 Repeated from "Situs Problems," II Law and Cont. Probl. (1945) at 123. 
133 This against MANN, Money 255-258. 
134 The Baarn (No. 1) [1933] P. 251; (No. 2) [1934] P. 171. 
CHAPTER 36 
Sales of Movables 1 
I. LAws AND DRAFTS 
1. Inadequate Proposals 
(a) Application of general conflicts rules. Codes, restate-
ments, and most court decisions as well as the great majority 
of writers have treated sale of goods as the main example 
for what they conceive to be the conflicts rule for all, or at 
least for bilateral, contracts.2 Indeed, not one of the numer-
ous decisions in the United States, dealing with the law 
applicable to sales of goods, expresses any doubt on this 
point. In appearance, the court always chooses the law of 
1 Special treatment has been given to this contract in the following treatises: 
8 LAURENT I92-229 §§ 126-I58; DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. I ff.; 2 FRANKEN-
STEIN 295; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 269-27I; BATIFFOL I6I ff.; 2 SCHNITZER 550 ff.; 
2 RESTREPO HERNANDEz" 69-76. 
In addition, see BAGGE, "Les conflits de lois en matiere de contrats de vente 
de biens meubles corporels," Recueil I928 V I27; BoERLIN, "Die ortliche 
Rechtsanwendung bei Kaufvertriigen nach der Rachtprechung des Bundes-
gerichts," 33 Z.Schweiz.R. (N. F.) ( 19I4) I99; HERZFELD, "Kauf und Darle-
hen im internationalen Privatrecht," 4 Basler Studien zur Rechtswissenschaft 
(I933)· 
Abbreviations in citing international drafts: Vienna Draft I926-Inter-
national Law Association, Draft of an International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Conflict of Laws. Contracts of Sale, 
Contracts for Work, and Contracts for Services. 34th Report (I 927) 509 ff. 
Hague Committee Drafts I928-Three drafts on the conflict of laws con-
cerning sales; see Actes de Ia sixieme conference pp. 310 ff., 344 ff., 375, 395 If. 
(discussion), 376 ff. (texts). 
Hague Draft 193I-Draft of Convention on the Conflict of Laws in the 
Matter of Sales of Corporeal Movables, prepared by a Special Committee 
appointed by the Sixth Hague Conference, in their meeting of May 28 to 
June 2, I93I, 7 Z.ausi.PR. (I933) 957-9. 
A 32-page report on the meeting by }ULLIOT DE LA MoRANDIERE has been 
printed confidentially without indication of year and place. This excellent 
piece of work should be published. 
2 For the United States, this has been stated by STUMBERG 370. 
4 SI 
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the place of contracting, 3 or that of the place of perform-
ance,4 following some fixed or casual axiom. The truth, 
however, is that often the real reasons behind the choice 
of law, notably as they appear in the more recent cases, are 
much superior to the pretended schematic rule. 
In countries of the Latin group, the law of the nationality 
common to the parties5 or the law of the place of contract-
ing, have been applied mechanically as a matter of course. 
Innumerable German6 and a few old Swiss decisions7 have 
indulged in their weird theory, splitting the problems accord-
ing to whose obligations should be fulfilled at what place.8 
The law of the place of performance is automatically applied 
under the Treaty of Montevideo and the codes agreeing 
with this Treaty. 9 
All these overgeneralized rules do not serve the purpose 
of locating the great bulk of international and interstate 
sales of goods with adequate assurance. 
(b) Cases without a problem. The American cases, in 
which conclusion and "performance" are centered in the 
same state/0 according to the usual standards, offer no 
3 Carver-Beaver Yarn Co. v. Wolfson ( 1924) 249 Mass. 257, 143 N. E. 
919; Montreal Cotton v. Fidelity Co. ( 1927) 261 Mass. 385, 158 N. E. 795; 
Youssoupoff v. Widener (1927) 246 N. Y. 174, 158 N. E. 64; Willson v. 
Vlahos (1929) 266 Mass. 370, 165 N. E. 408; Hollidge v. Gussow, Kahn and 
Co. (C. C. A. 1st 1933) 67 F. (2d) 459; Northwood Lumber Corp. v. 
McKean, et al. (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 153 F. (2d) 753· See lists by 2 BEALE 1215; 
BATIFFOL 171 n. I, 172 ns. 1-3. 
4 BATIFFOL 174 § 193. 
5 France: Trib. Dreux (July 22, 1925) Clunet 1926, 643; French law would 
have been better justified by the seller's French domicil than by the London 
buyer's French nationality. 
Italy: App. Torino (Jan. 11, 1937) 36 Revue Dor 335, 4 Riv. Dir. Mar. 
( 193 8) II 89, 100 (a contract c. i. f.). 
The Netherlands: Hof Noordholland (Oct. 12, 1848) W. 1019. 
6 See the surveys by LEWALD 249 ff. and by STAUB-KOENIGE in 3 Staub 765, 
Anhang zu § 372, Anmerkung 9· 
1 Notably, BG. (Nov. 7, 1890) 16 BGE. 790. 
8 See Vol. II p. 466 ff. 
9 See Vol. II p. 463. 
10 Northrup v. Foot (N. Y. 1835) 14 Wend. 248; McKee v. Jones (1890) 
67 Miss. 405, 7 So. 348; Texarkana Pipe Works v. Caddo Oil and Refining 
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conflicts question. This observation may stand as a starting 
point, although there arise doubts when the various duties 
of the parties have to be complied with at different places. 
What we doubtless may recognize as a settled principle 
is that the local law governs all sales executed and fulfilled 
at once in one place by both parties, such as in shops and 
open markets. This also accounts for the usual invocation 
of the lex loci contractus for market bargains in recent 
formulations.11 The analogous rule for transactions in fairs12 
has been criticized and was eliminated from the last inter-
national draft/3 because in modern industrial fairs delivery 
or payment is as often postponed as in other business. 
However, it should be likewise regarded as well settled 
that when both parties, seller and buyer, are domiciled in 
the same state, where they undoubtedly make the contract, 
no foreign law is called for, unless stipulated for in their 
agreement.14 
Illustration. Two Swiss firms made a sales contract in 
Switzerland for delivery f. o. b. Porto or Lisbon and pay-
ment by letter of credit on banks in Lisbon. Although the 
goods were to be imported into Switzerland, the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal, balancing the "criteria" of the presum-
able intention of the parties, 'pronounced that Portuguese 
law should prevail. Neither the parties nor the lower court 
Co. (1921) 228 S. W. 586; Hooker v. McRae (1923) 131 Miss. 809, 95 So. 
744; Bird & Son v. Guarantee Const. Co. (C. C. A. 1st 1924) 295 Fed. 451; 
Midland Linseed Products Co. v. Warren Brothers Co. (C. C. A. 6th 1925) 
46 F. (2d) 87o; Montreal Cotton etc. Co. v. Fidelity Co. (1927) 261 Mass. 
385, 158 N. E. 795; Hollidge v. Gussow, Kahn & Co., Inc. (C. C. A. 1st 1933) 
67 F. (2d) 459· 
11 Polish Int. Priv. Law, art. 8, I; Vienna Draft 1926, Int. Law Ass'n, 34th 
Report (1927) 510; Hague Draft I931, 7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) 957· 
12 Vienna Draft 1926, supra n. I, art. I, B (c) I. 
13 See 2 FRANKENSTEIN 318; OsER-SCHOENENBERGER, Allgemeine Einleitung 
p. lxxviii No. 105; Hague Draft 193I, art. 4, see 7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) at 
958. 
14 See, for instance, the sales contract in H andelsg. Zurich (Sept. 3, 1943) 
2 Schweiz. Jahrb. I. R. (1945) 161, made in Switzerland by two Swiss firms, 
dealing with goods stored in Cadiz, Spain, and to be delivered there. That 
the price was payable in Switzerland was mentionable under the theory of 
presumable intention. 
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had thought for a moment of such a possibility, and the 
federal court itself ended up without reversing the decision 
because the lower court would nevertheless apply Swiss law 
as the "presumable Portuguese law."15 
This conception is consistent with the idea slowly emerg-
ing from the international drafts16 that in doubtful cases the 
choice of law is restricted to the two domicils of the parties 
to the sale. Nationality, of course, has no claim in this 
matter. 
The main problem, hence, is presented by executory sales 
contracts, where the domicils of the parties are situated in 
different countries, especially when other local connections 
are established by the acts necessary for the fulfillment of 
the contract. 
(c) Special considerations. Certain American cases, 
applying the lex loci contractus, are dominated by the par-
ticular lines of thought to be found in the treatment of the 
statute of frauds, 17 liquor prohibitions,18 Sunday contracts,19 
and other exceptional subject matters. 
2. The Important Contacts 
In view of the nature of ordinary sales contracts, three 
local connections have been advanced: the seller's domicil, 
the buyer's domicil, and the place of the most significant 
performance. The place of contracting has lost favor. 
(a) The law of the seller. The most recent and best 
15 BG. (June 22, I944) 2 Schweiz. Jahrb. I. R. (I945) I63; GUTZWILLER, 
ibid., notes his doubt on the right "balance." 
16 See n. I supra. 
11 DaCosta and Davis v. Davis and Hatch ( I854) 24 N. J. Law 319; 
Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Co. (I 886) I 5 R. I. 380, 5 At!. 632; D. Canale & 
Co. v. Pauly and Pauly Cheese Co. ( I9I4) I 55 Wis. 54 I, 145 N. W. 372. 
Cf. Vol. II p. 500 n. 65. 
18 Smith v. Godfrey ( I854) 28 N. H. 379, 61 Am. Dec. 6I7; Bliss v. 
Brainard (I86o) 4I N. H. 256; Keiwert v. Meyer (I878} 62 Ind. 587, 30 
Am. Rep. 206; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Bond (C. C. A. 8th I 89 5) 
66 Fed. 653. 
19 See Vol. II p. 564. 
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prepared proposals, although not yet many enacted laws, 
subsidiarity subject obligatory sales contracts concerned with 
goods to the law of the seller's domicil. 20 In the last inter-
national draft prepared by a special committee which was 
appointed by the Sixth Hague Conference and which met 
in 1931, article 3 (1) reads: 
In the absence of a law declared applicable by the 
parties ... , the contract is governed by the internal law 
of the country where the 'seller has his ordinary residence 
at the moment when he receives the order. If the order is 
received at an establishment of the seller, the sale is gov-
erned by the law of the country where this establishment 
is situated. 21 
In a considered argument, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, too, 
has found the seller's law to be suitable to the entire sales 
contract, neither the place of paymene2 nor that of destina-
tion and receipt of the goods being regarded as having any 
substantial importance. 23 This view finds its main justifica-
tion in the dominant nature of the seller's promise to pro-
vide the buyer with the specific goods needed, while the 
buyer's obligation to pay the price, has nothing distinctive 
among all the manifold money obligations. 
Less impressive is the argument that the seller is in a con-
20 Polish Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 No. 3: contracts concluded in retail business 
are subject to the law of the place where the seller is established. 
Czechoslovakia: Int. Priv. Law, § 46 No. I: sales in carrying on trade or 
manufacture ... are subject to the law of the place where the seller's trade 
or manufacture is established. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law (x889) art. 34, (1940) art. 38: 
domicil of the promisor of unascertained or fungible goods, 
Institute of Int. Law, 22 Annuaire (1908) 290 art. 2 (d); Draft Nolde, 
B (f), 33 Annuaire ( 1927) III 198; Vienna Draft 1926, Int. Law Ass'n, 34th 
Report (1927) 509 B (a); Hague Drafts at the Sixth Conference, Actes 
p. 376. 
21 Hague Draft 1931, see 7 Z,ausi.PR. (1933) 957· 
22 Swiss BG. (Dec. 13, 1932) 58 BGE. II 433, 435, cf. NIEDERER, 6o 
Z,Schweiz,R. (N. F.) 257a. 
23 Swiss BGE,, 32 II 297. 39 II I67; cf. ROMBERGER, Obi. Vertriige so; 
OsER-SCHOENENBERGER, Allgemeine Einleitung lxxvii No. 104. 
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siderably more insecure legal and factual situation than 
the buyer, since he bears the risk inherent in the supply and 
storage of the goods and in the capital investment involved 
and he carries extensive legal responsibilities, among other 
things for unknown defects of title and quality. Common 
law goes even further in extending his liability for damages. 
The laws cumulate an amplitude of remedies and options for 
the buyer. However, they do so because the economic power 
and organization of the seller make him prevailingly the 
stronger party. Moreover, the present laws do not help buy-
ers to escape stipulations that nullify their legal advantages. 
Hence, the conclusion that the seller should at least be sure 
of the applicable law and not find himself open to some 
surprising foreign severity, 24 is unconvincing. Besides, such 
argument is open to the general objection that a party is 
not necessarily better off with his domiciliary law and should 
not enjoy domestic privileges in international deals. 
Emphasis on the seller's establishment is sufficiently justi-
fied by his complicated and characteristic duties in the nor-
mal development of interstate or international business. 
It is at the same time consistent with the need of any firm 
exporting goods to various countries, to be able to fix sales 
conditions on the basis of one central law. Where sellers 
deal in mass sales, as mail-order houses, automobile manu-
facturers, fruit growers, textile dealers, and many others, 
the central law cannot conveniently be other than that of 
the domicil. 
(b) The law of the buyer. Suggestions that the domicil 
of the buyer should be taken as the decisive contact, are 
infrequent. Certain of these proposals were manifestly· un-
founded. 25 But a new effort in this direction has been made 
24 HERZFELD, Kauf und Darlehen 85-96. 
25 The most surprising contention was expressed by CLAUGHTON ScoTT, 
British delegate at the Sixth Hague Conference, who asserted that the 
British government would preferably agree to the application of the buyer's 
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for a particular purpose. The international committees 
working on conflicts rules for sales made several successive 
attempts to complement the primary rule calling for the 
seller's law by elaborate exceptions for the benefit of the 
buyer. In the last two drafts of the International Law Asso-
ciation and of the Hague Conference, the law of the buyer 
has been declared applicab_le to the entire contract under 
certain circumstances : 
Vienna Draft, 1926, B (b) : 
The law of the buyer ... shall, however, apply in the 
following cases: 
1. Where the seller or his agent or representative con-
cludes the contract during a visit in the country of the buyer. 
2. \Vhere the agent or representative of the seller has 
his office, whether principal or branch, which concludes the 
contract, in the country of the buyer and the agent or repre-
sentative concludes the contract in his own name. 
3· Where the agent or representative of the seller has 
his office, whether principal or branch, which concludes the 
contract, in the country of the buyer, and the movables at 
the date when the contract is concluded are situate in the 
country of the buyer. 
This drafting is superlatively careless.26 If an agent sells 
in his own name, there is no sales ~on tract other than his; 
if the contract of a casual visiting agent is subject to the 
local law, it is incomprehensible that contracting by a per-
law if to rigid rules at all. He was moved mainly, however, by the idea that 
the bank of the buyer must examine the documents sent by the seller and 
should be able to do it according to the buyer's law. Due objections were 
made to this muddled argument by ALTEN, }ULLIOT DE LA MoRANDIERE and 
UssrNG. But the argument is wrong in the first place because the legal points 
to be examined by any bank are regulated by general conditions and customs 
rather than national laws. See moreover infra Ch. 37 p. 96. 
Another advocate of the buyer's law, KRONSTEIN, 2 Bl. IPR. ( 1927) 126, 
133, argues that the seller has sufficient opportunity to ask the buyer to submit 
himself to the seller's law, and if he does not use it, he should be judged 
according to the law of the other party! 
26 See the criticism in Int. Law Ass'n, 34th Report (1927) 498 (ERNST 
WoLFF, MrTTELSTEIN, BARRATT). 
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manently established representative should not have the 
same effect; the mere presence of a supply for the seller 
has no relevant influence on the treatment of a sale of un-
ascertained goods, at least not if delivery is to be made in 
another country, et cetera. 
The eminent lawyers working at The Hague finally 
reached the following formulation: 
Draft of June 2, 1931, art. 3 (2): 
The sale is governed by the internal law of the ·country 
where the buyer has his ordinary residence or where he 
has the place of business which issued the order, if in this 
country the order has been received either by the seller or 
by his representative, agent or travelling salesman. 
What idea inspired the formulation of this exception? 
During the Conference some delegates found the ground 
in a recourse to the lex loci contractus as identified with the 
lex domicilii of the buyer.27 Others rejected the lex loci con-
tractus on principle, but explained that the exceptional rule 
was due to the situation of small buyers contracting with 
travelling agents and unable to ascertain the foreign seller's 
law.28 It was generally emphasized that the result should 
not depend on the extent of an agent's authority to sell, 
but a practical test should be preferred: when the seller or 
his agent of any kind, including one who may only solicit 
orders or merely accept an order as a messenger, is present 
at a place in the country of the buyer and the latter ad-
dresses his order to him, the domestic law governs. 
The resulting requirements combine the buyer's domicil 
with one condition of the conclusion of the contract, viz., 
the arrival of the buyer's contractual declaration at an 
address in the same country. This is a rather strange rule. 
1f the place where the contract is made is immaterial for 
27 BASDEVANT, Actes 315, followed by a Belgian and a Polish orator. 
28 BAGGE and ALTI!N, id. 291 ff., 312, 317 n. 2, 318. 
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the choice of law, as has been rightly assumed, why should 
a fragment of the making suffice to localize the contract? 
How can we hold that a contract be subject to the law of 
one party, although the contract is made and entirely to be 
performed in another country? However, if it is only in-
tended by this simple de_vice to avoid the difficulties of 
searching for the legendary place of contracting, the most 
essential objection to the lex loci contractus remains; the 
external circumstances of concluding the contract have no 
necessary relation to the character of the contract. 
Again, why should the mere presence of a selling agent 
in the country of the buyer influence the choice of law, if 
the order itself, for instance, specifies that the goods are 
deliverable at the principal's factory or at a vessel in a 
distant port? The problem of agency is not so simple. As 
explained in another chapter, we must distinguish (I) the 
authorization of the agent-the extent of which is, in fact, 
governed by the law of the place where he acts on the 
authority; ( 2) the contract between the principal and the 
agent, which follows its independent conflicts rule; and ( 3) 
the contract of the agent with the third party, in our case 
the sales contract. We cannot always subject this sales con-
tract to the local law of the place where the agent happens 
to act. Much less is the same tenden~y justified when a mere 
messenger intervenes or an agent simply receives an order. 
(c) The law of the shipping place. The experts at the 
Sixth Hague Conference took no account of the well-known 
fundamentals of international trade. Very probably, this 
happened intentionally.29 But in contrast it should be noted 
that English and American courts have given consideration 
to mercantile habits, and, as a matter of course, have 
applied the law of the place at which the seller is bound to 
make shipment of the goods.30 
29 See infra n. 48. 
so Shohfi v. Rice (1922) 241 Mass. 2II, 135 N. E. 141. More cases to the 
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F. o. b. contract. Thus, it is the practice of English31 
and American courts to apply the law of the seller's state 
to the entirety of rights and duties flowing from the con-
tract, whenever the seller, under the contract, has to de-
liver f. o. b. at his factory, 32 or to a carrier, 33 cars,34 railway 
express, 35 or at a shipping point.36 Correspondingly, the law 
of the buyer's place applies when delivery is due at the 
buyer's place. 37 
A perfectly justified exception is made when, contrary to 
the prevailing usage, in an inexact, though not rare, language, 
the clause f. o. b. is meant only to fix the price. When, for 
instance, two lumber dealers in Pittsburgh contracted for 
a car of lumber "f. o. b. Montreal," but the seller fulfilled 
his obligation by shipping the goods in Ohio, the court 
correctly applied not Quebec but Ohio law.38 
A recent decision of the highest Swiss court applies the 
law of the place of f. o. b. delivery as a matter of course. 39 
same effect will be cited in the following notes and on various occa.sions in 
Ch. 37· 
Likewise, e.g., Switzerland: Trib. Geneve (March 4, 1932) Sem. Jud. 1932, 
523 (place of loading and furnishing of a letter of credit). 
31 Benaim & Co. v. Debono [1924] A. C. 514. 
32 Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp. (1937) 93 
Utah 414, 73 Pac. (2d) 1272; In re Pittsburgh Industrial Iron Works 
(D. C. W. D. Pa. 1910) 179 Fed. 151. 
83 Johnson County Savings Bank v. Walker (1908) So Conn. 509, 69 At!. 
15; Denio Milling Co. v. Malin (1917) 25 Wyo. 143, 165 Pac. 1II3. 
34 Northwestern Terra Cotta Co. v. Caldwell (C. C. A. 8th 1916) 234 Fed. 
491; State of Delaware, for Use of General Crushed Stone Co. v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (D. C. Del. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 467: moratory 
interests on the price are due according to Pennsylvania law, not because the 
"entire contract" was to be performed in Pennsylvania as headnote 13 asserts, 
but because seller has "accepted" the contract in his place in Pennsylvania 
and his responsibility ceased with delivery f. o. b. Harrington, Pa. 
35 Willson v. Vlahos (1929) 266 Mass. 370, 165 N. E. 408. 
36 Griffin v. Metal Product Co. (1919) 264 Pa. 254, 107 Atl. 713. 
87 Price v. Burns (1902) 101 III. App. 418; York Metal & Alloys Co. v. 
Cyclops Steel Co. (1924) 280 Pa. 585, 124 At!. 752. 
ss Ward Lumber Co. v. American L. & M. Co. (1915) 247 Pa. 267, 93 
At!. 470. The contract was made in Ohio, cf. infra Ch. 37 p. 81 n. 17. 
39 BG. (Dec. 3, 1946) 72 BGE. II 405, 4II: sale "wagon Tanger"; in this 
case, it is true, the goods were also to be examined and accepted in Tangier, 
but the court treats this acceptance as merely provisional. 
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In Germany, this question has been neglected, although 
there is a distinguishable controversy regarding jurisdic-
tion. In commercial forms and regulations, the f. o. b. place 
has frequently been indicated to be the "place of perform-
ance," and this has sometimes been understood to include 
a stipulation for submission to the jurisdiction of the cqurts 
of this place.40 According to a contrary view, such clauses 
are merely concerned with the passing of the risk of loss.41 
C. i. f. contract. As the clause of "cost, insurance, freight" 
is essentially a modified f. o. b. clause, we may consider the 
importance of the shipping places in both instances to be 
analogous. The tendency of business is equally strong to 
regard the place of shipping, at the f. o. b. place or to the 
c. i. f. place, as the "place of performance." The courts 
have known this for a long time. It is true that former 
Illinois decisions declared that in a sale c. i. f. Antwerp 
with shipment in New York, the seller's damages for non-
performance were to be measured according to Belgian law 
as that of the place of "delivery."42 But these decisions were 
"in violent contrast with the general rule in other juris-
dictions. " 43 A much-noted English decision concluded from 
this phenomenon that English jurisdiction over a contract, 
based under Order XI r. 1 (e) on. the place of performance, 
was to be denied where goods were shipped from Hamburg 
c. i. f. Tyne on the Thames.44 German trade forms and 
40 See HEUER, "Von der Fob-Kiausel," Leipz. Z. 1925, 26; DuRINGER-
HACHENBURG (ed. 2) Anhang ZU §§ 3551 358. 
41 GROSSMANN-DOERTH, tJberseekauf 181-190. 
42 Staackman, Horschitz & Co. v. Cary ( 1916) 197 Ill. App. 601. 
43 L. 0. VAN DoREN, The Law of Shipment ( 1932) 498, citing Seaver v. 
Lindsay Light Co. (1922) 233 N. Y. 273, 135 N. E. 329, disapproving the 
Staackman case. 
44 Crozier, Stephens & Co. v. Auerbach (1908) 2 K. B. 161-C. A., cor-
rectly criticizing Barrow v. Myers and Co. (1888) 4 T. L. R. 441. 
Another, definitely wrong, view was again taken in an obiter dictum by 
Lord Phillimore, inN. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij v. Finlay & 
Co. [1927] A. C. 604, 609-H. L., where the goods had to be shipped from 
Java to Bombay c. i. f. and the learned Judge asserted that normally lex lod 
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general conditions of mercantile organizations have widely 
identified the shipping place in c. i. f. contracts with the 
"place of performance."45 Again, this usually implies that 
risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are shipped 
at the port of dispatch. But it means also, in my opinion, 
that where the shipping place is in the seller's country, the 
parties intend that the courts of his country should have 
jurisdiction. 46 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE oF SHIPMENT AND ANALOGous AcTs 
I. The Concept of Delivery to the Carrier 
In the most usual types of international commerce, ship-
ment is included among the obligations of the seller, al-
though he is not obligated to bear the risk of loss during 
the travel of the merchandise. The English and Uniform 
Sales Acts have accepted this old and universal conception, 
stating that where, in pursuance of a contract, the seller 
delivers the goods to a carrier for the purpose of trans-
mission to the buyer, property and risks presumably pass to 
the buyer.47 In traditional and widespread commercial think-
ing, much emphasis is laid on this act of the seller, because 
it forms the pointed end to all the multiple activities of the 
seller and indicates the time and place at which the goods, 
although not yet in the physical power of the buyer and 
solutionis would dictate the application of the law of the place of delivery, 
i.e., of Bombay. 
45 GROSSMANN-DOERTH, Uberseekauf 245: "outright official formula" (in 
business). 
46 As to risk, see GROSSMANN-DOERTH, id. 247, 361 ff. As to jurisdiction, the 
same author, id. 245 ff., 362-364 construes the German clauses determining 
the "place of performance" to the effect that a seller in Ham burg stipulating 
for "f. o. b. Amsterdam" does not want to submit himself to the Dutch 
courts, and therefore any clauses fixing "the place of performance" should 
not be referred to jurisdiction, unless they say so, or the case is exceptional. 
Similarly BRANDLE II9. But the conclusion is wrong in the case where the 
shipping place is in Germany. 
47 Sale of Goods Act, s. 18 rule 5 (z); Uniform Sales Act, sec. 19 rule 
4 (z). 
SALES OF MOVABLES 
very often not yet in his ownership, leave the custody and 
risk of the seller. 
The types of commercial sale contracts are very diverse, 
however. They differ according to the peculiarities of vari-
ous kinds of goods and according to the habits of the various 
trading centers and c;:ommodity exchanges. It has often been 
contended that the variety is too great to allow legal rules, 
or even uniform proposals for drafting individual sales 
conditions, to comprehend commercial sales in general. 
This objection, despite its annoying repetition by some 
lawyers, has not prevented the Scandinavian Sales of Goods 
Act of 1906, the Warsaw-Oxford C. I. F. Rules (1932) 
and the Draft of an International Sales Act ( 1939) from 
establishing comprehensive regulations for sales in general, 
as a basis which may be modified for the various types of 
contracts. These generalizations, however, were only pos-
sible on the ground that the entire distribution of rights 
and duties in sales contracts rests on the determination of 
the place where the goods are expected to arrive at a certain 
time and to leave the seller's orbit. Manufacturers most 
often sell their products, within the country and in export 
trade, to be taken at the factory yard or at the station of 
the factory. The many cases, in themselves somewhat differ-
ent, where the seller's obligation of active dealing with the 
goods extends to the dispatching of the goods from a sea-
port, as in most overseas transactions, form a group to-
gether with the others where the seller has to bring the 
thing sold to a river port, to barges, or to cars at a point 
on the way. On the other hand, the contract may promise 
to have the goods at the disposition of the buyer at his own 
place or station. The act of providing the goods at the 
seller's place of shipment, at an intermediate place, or of 
rendering them at the buyer's place or at any other place, 
has been technically termed delivery in the draft of an inter-
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national sales act. But since the recent American drafts of 
a Revised Sales Act do not accept this technical meaning 
of delivery, we have to speak of shipment and tender of 
delivery. A possible name would be ((surrender'' of the 
goods by the seller. 
Delivery or surrender in this sense is doubtless the center 
of the relationship created by sale between parties of dif-
ferent countries. In a c. i. f. contract, for example, the seller 
procures the contracts of freight and insurance up to the 
port of destination, but he bears responsibility and risk of 
loss only until shipment. This means that, if he sends goods 
conforming to the contract from his place to the port of 
shipment and the goods perish or deteriorate on the way 
with or without his fault, he has to substitute other goods in 
time or be in default. So soon, however, as he delivers the 
goods to the carrier and they are loaded or possibly when 
they merely reach the custody of the carrier, events beyond 
the control of the parties are at the risk of the buyer. Ac-
cording to the American draft of a sales law, such delivery 
would include transfer of title, which, in the prevailing opin-
ion, rather, occurs when the documents, such as the invoice, 
bill of lading, bill of exchange, and insurance policy, are re-
ceived by the buyer or his bank. But delivery includes the 
extremely important act of specification (identification, 
specialization) by which specified goods take the place of 
the unascertained goods described in the contract. In the 
correct solution, warranty of quality is directly dependent 
on the conditions existing at the time of surrender. 
This concept of surrender has a variable element, since 
according to the different basic types used in commerce, 
the seller may tender the goods in any one of the places 
to be touched by the goods. In every case, it indicates the 
salient point in the course of any individual transfer. The 
activities of concluding the contract and preparing delivery, 
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as well as the subsequent happenings when the goods travel, 
are unloaded, tendered, examined, accepted or refused, and 
stored, and when the documents are sent and received, are 
none of these so significant and distinctive of the contract in 
the estimate of average parties, as delivery to the carrier. 
2. Shipment and Conflicts Law 
Curiously enough, very rarely has the possibility been 
envisaged of connecting sales contracts with the law of the 
place of delivery to the carrier, except under the heading 
of lex loci solutionis, which, however, could refer to any 
act and in particular the physical reception of the goods. 
Even the writers especially devoted to the study of the 
commercial facts have neglected, if not definitely argued 
against, employment of this contact. 
In the first place, it has been emphasized that the parties 
select the f. o. b. point within the travel of the goods accord-
ing to such facts as the tariffs of carriers, timetable of 
vessels, suitability of ports to the kind of merchandise sold, 
rates of transshipment, and business connections with trans-
portation and insurance personnel.48 However true this may 
be, when the parties agree on such point, they do connect 
the contract with this place more than with any other. That 
the intention of the parties is not really directed toward any 
determined law, is no valid objection, so long as they have 
not specifically agreed on a different law. 
Furthermore, it has been stressed that separate important 
local connections exist at the places where the documents 
are endorsed, or dispatched, or received.49 But if any rule of 
conflicts is needed to take care of these accompanying rela-
tions, it must be a special rule. 5° 
48 BRANDLE 120. 
49 nRXNDLB 119. 
50 See infra Ch. 38 pp. 96-98. 
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Shipment in a third country. Much more weight is attribu-
table to the obvious consideration that the shipping point 
may be situated elsewhere than in countries of the parties. 
Neither the hypothetical intention of the parties, nor an 
objective evaluation of such cases can refer the determina-
tion of the applicable law merely to the place of shipment. 
We have seen how instinctively the American courts have 
applied the law of the seller or of the buyer according to 
the situation of the f. o. b. point in the state of either. Again, 
there are American cases concerning an f. o. b. point in a 
third jurisdiction, that may help to find our way, although 
these decisions are objectionable on other grounds. 
In a recent case, a firm in New York, dealing in malt and 
hops, through its commission broker in New Jersey, re-· 
ceived an order of a New Jersey company for Polish hops, 
to be imported f. o. b. Philadelphia docks. The New Jersey 
court ascertained the acceptance of the order in New York 
and for this customary flimsy reason applied the law of 
New York as the lex loci contractus.51 Despite the formal-
istic approach, it was correct to disregard the f. o. b. place 
in another state, which resulted incidentally from the im-
portation. 
Where a conditional sale was made in Massachusetts, the 
domicil of the buyer, and the seller was a Pennsylvania 
corporation, the shovel sold was to be delivered "f. o. b. 
Manchester, New Hampshire." The decision of the Massa-
chusetts court has often been criticized because of its failure 
to satisfy the law of the situs, New Hampshire, with regard 
to the retaking of possession.52 The court, however, was 
right in holding the delivery in New Hampshire immaterial 
51 Manhattan Overseas Co. v. Camden County Beverage Co. (1940) 125 
N. ]. Law 239, 15 Atl. (2d) 217, aff'd (1941) 126 N. J. Law 421, 19 At!. 
(2d) 828. 
52 Thomas G. Jewett v. Keystone Driller Co. (1933) 282 Mass. 469, 185 
N. E. 369, 87 A. L. R. 1298. See Ch. 38 p. 83 n. 25. 
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for determining the law of the obligatory contract, even if 
no doubt had existed about the length of time during which 
the shovel should stay there. That the law of the forum was 
chosen could be justified by the domicil of the buyer in 
addition to the circumstance that delivery f. o. b. Manches-· 
ter was stipulated at the buyer's request and for his con-
venience. He wanted the shovel there and used it there, 
though not for long. 
The English courts, too, are correct in applying English 
law to a contract made between English firms for delivery 
c. i. f. London, although the goods are to be shipped from 
New Y ork.53 The real justification is that the shipping point 
in a foreign country appears immaterial for the legal re-
lationship between the parties. Lex loci contractus, resulting 
in the application of English law, was incidentally harmless 
in one case, 54 where hops were to be sent from the Pacific 
Coast to England, since the selling corporation was estab-
lished in London as well as in San Francisco and the buyer 
in Sunderland, England. Had the seller been domiciled only 
in San Francisco, the courts would have inconveniently sub-
jected him to English law, as also the Hague Draft of I 93 I 
does, merely because the order was given in England. 
On the other hand, where a machine is to be installed at 
the place of the buyer, it follows that the buyer's place is 
the only decisive connection. 55 
III. CoNCLUSION 
The international drafts have achieved a great progress 
in supplanting the lex loci contractus and the lex loci solu-
53 Manbre Saccharine Co., Ltd. v. Corn Products Co., Ltd. [1919] 1 K. B. 
198. 
54 Bid dell Bros. v. E. Clemens Horst Co. [1911] 1 K. B. 214; [1911] 1 K. B. 
934-A. C.; reversed [1912] A. C. 18-H. L. 
55 Canada, Ontario: Linderme Machine Works Co. v. Kuntz Brewery, Ltd. 
(1921) 21 0. W. N. 51 (right to reject). 
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tionis, the two mechanical and ill-fitted rules, by the law of 
the seller's domicil. Most decisions are really sustained by 
actual circumstances including this fact of domicil. But it is 
erroneous to formulate exceptions for the law of the buyer 
either on the basis, again, of the lex loci contractus or of a 
fragment of the process of contracting. International sales 
in which the goods move from one country into another, 
gravitate toward the side of the buyer only if "delivery" is 
due at a place in his orbit. 
There can be no doubt of this when delivery, always in 
the meaning explained before, has to be effected at the 
buyer's residence, factory, station, or pier. A buyer expecting 
the goods to be brought and offered to him in his own 
country quite as if they came from a domestic seller, can 
reasonably expect to have his domestic law applied. Nor 
would any other solution suit the situation of the seller. 
He may have his own storehouse in the country from which 
he intends to take the merchandise, or his agent may win 
him customers by promising local delivery. He also may 
send his wares to his correspondent on a bill of lading to 
his own order, retaining full title until subsequent delivery 
by the agent against cash. These are cases clearly requiring 
the application of the local law. To implement the vague 
ideas of the parties or the general conditions annexed to a 
sale, as respects primary obligations, default, excesses, sub-
stitute goods, and warranty, the law at the place of delivery 
has real advantages that have been too generally attributed 
to the law of the place of performance. 
Between the extreme cases where delivery is to be made 
either at the seller's or the buyer's place, the intermediate 
points usually emphasized in trade can most often be counted 
within the sphere of one or the other. When an American 
or Canadian merchant ships goods on a through bill of 
lading by rail with subsequent transshipment to an ocean 
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vessel, the transfer to the initial carrier, of course, points 
to his state's law even though the first stage of the carriage 
may end beyond the state line. It should not make any 
difference that in other countries no such genuine through 
bills are in use. Generally, whether the goods are shipped 
at a point in the seller's state or, in an overseas transaction, 
in a foreign state on his side of the ocean-as a Canadian 
seller f. o. b. New York, or a Swiss exporter c. i. f. New 
York with shipment in Amsterdam-the contract is still 
centered nearer to the seller. Nor is there a valid reason 
to abandon the seller's law if the Rotterdam agent of an 
Argentine exporter in the latter's name sells grains c. i. f. 
Rotterdam, shipment Buenos Aires, to a Swiss importer. 
Such persons domiciled and contracting in Europe know 
that the most important part of the transaction must occur 
overseas. 
Illustration. In a case decided by the Swiss Federal Tri-
bunal (July 20, 1920) 46 BGE. 260, a London firm through 
a Swiss agent sold to a Swiss firm in Switzerland Orange 
Pekoe tea from Ceylon c. i. f. Marseille. Swiss law was 
applied because both parties invoked it. That the foreign 
firm "had to expect that the acts of its representative would 
be determined under Swiss law," should have bearing only 
on his authority. If the court had not been bound by stipu-
lations of the parties on the applicable law, English rather 
than Swiss law ought to have determined the issue. 
On the other hand, the situation is substantially different 
when the goods travel overseas at the risk of the seller and 
must be presented to the buyer at some place on the conti-
nent where the buyer's domicil is located. Where a Japanese 
trader sells silk to a manufacturer in Lyons according to the 
standard conditions of Lyons, in which the chapter on "ship-
wreck and other risks of transportation" annuls the contract 
in case of loss-one of the "avoidance" clauses usual in sales 
for arrival-the parties concentrate the effect of the con-
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tract in the port of arrival in Europe. As the natural contact 
therefore is not at the seller's place, it is at the buyer's place. 
It deserves consideration whether the division of the 
countries into legal systems does not offer an analogous 
contrast. Suppose a United States seller ships goods from 
New York to Panama for a Colombian buyer, with the clause 
"to arrive" in Panama, would the buyer not expect to have 
his law applied rather than that of the United States? With-
out a profound difference in legal systems, where, for in-
stance, goods are to be sent from a seller in Michigan f. o. b. 
Duluth, Minnesota, to a buyer in Chicago, no such im-
portance can be attributed to the f. o. b. clause. 
Apart from these uncertain enlargements, we may sum-
marize as follows. The seller's law should be resorted to in 
all doubtful cases, with the exception that the internal law 
of the buyer governs the contract where the goods are to 
be surrendered at a place situated within the buyer's country. 
In other words, we may say that the law of the buyer's 
place should govern only if the parties have agreed on it, 
or if the contract is for surrender in the country of the 
buyer or at a place fixed at his request outside the seller's 
orbit. 
What is a party's place. The Vienna Draft defined "the 
law of the seller" by the following provision: "If the sale is 
effected by an individual in the course of commerce carried 
on by him, or by a firm, association, or corporation, the law 
of the seller shall be the territorial law of the country 
where, at the date when the contract is concluded, the office, 
whether principal or branch, which concludes the contract, 
is situate."56 
56 lnt. Law Ass'n, Report 34th Conference (1927) 509, B (a) (r). Cf. 
Poland, Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 No. 4: domicil of a merchant with respect to 
the course of his business is the seat of his enterprise; if he has several 
enterprises, the seat of that enterprise with which the transaction has been 
concluded, is decisive. 
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As already pointed out, the Hague Draft of 1931 de-
clares applicable "the law of the country where the seller 
has his ordinary residence at the time when he received the 
order. If the order is received by an establishment of the 
seller, the sale is governed by the law of the country in 
which this establishment is situated."57 
The latter test intends to eliminate the vexatious question 
where the contract is made. The word "establishment" is 
meant to include headquarters and branches of corporations 
but not other places of business which are not a "seat." It 
would be much better and clearer language to speak of 
ordinary residence (of individuals) and places of business 
(of individuals and organizations) and to make decisive 
the place where the seller performs the act by which he 
consents to the contract. 
IV. SPECIAL KINDS oF MovABLES 
I. Sales on Exchange 
Sales of commodities in the course of transactions in an 
authorized exchange, like sales on a stock exchange,58 are 
subject to the usages of the institution. They are, more-
over, subject to many administrative provisions and are 
executed in forms not used in ordinary business. From all 
these reasons, it has been concluded that such contracts are 
tacitly submitted by the parties to the local law,59 or ob-
jectively expressed, that this is the only adequate law.60 
57 7 Z.ausi.PR. (I933) 957· 
58 BATIFFOL I82 § I99· 
59 See Vol. II p. 385. 
so Czechoslovakia: Int. Priv. Law, § 45· 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 No. I. 
Vienna Draft I926, art. I, B (c) (I); Hague Draft I93I, art. 4, 7 Z.ausi.PR. 
957; BRANDL, Int. Biirsenprivatrecht 59; NIBOYET in Recueil I927 I IOI ff., 
33 Annuaire ( I927) III 2I3. 
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2. Other Sales under Administrative Control 
For similar reasons, sales are considered localized when 
they are made "by auction, by judicial process, by order of 
the court, or under an execution. " 61 
Registered chattels-ships. In view of the significance 
of registration, in a widespread opinion, the sale of regis-
tered vessels is governed by the law of the place of registra-
tion or of the flag. Thus, the Vienna Draft states: 
As regards contracts of sale of ships, vessels and air-
craft which are registered, the law applicable shall be the 
territorial law of the country where the ship, vessel, or 
aircraft is registered. 62 
This rule has been likewise suggested by Judge Hough 
in a dissenting opinion of 1921, where the court followed 
the lex loci contractus, on the ground that registration only 
gives advantages to the purchaser and is not essential for 
the passing of the title between the parties. 63 The register 
publicizes the legal situation of the vessel for the informa-
tion of presumptive buyers, whose rights relating to third 
persons are more or less strongly influenced by the entry 
in the register.64 
In many countries, this situation is complicated by pro-
hibiting sales of registered vessels to aliens65 and prescribing 
that sales be concluded before their consuls for the purpose 
61 Text of Vienna Draft, art. I, B (c) (x), following an American proposal, 
Int. Law Ass'n, 34th Report (1927) 506. 
62 Art. I, B (c) (2): a simplification of a proposal of the Int. Chamber of 
Commerce (34th Report 1927, p. 506). Similarly most writers, see NIBOYET, 
Recueil 1927 I 102; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 496 § 1228. 
63 Gaston, Williams & Wigmore of Canada, Ltd. v. Warner (C. C. A. 2d 
1921) 272 Fed. 56, 66. 
In the old case, Lynch v. Postlethwaite (1819) 7 Mart. (La.) 69, 12 Am. 
Dec. 495, the lex loci contractus (Mississippi) was applied, to satisfy La. 
C. C. art. 10. 
64 This is admitted by BATIFFOL 173 § 192 who nevertheless insists on 
lex loci solutionis. 
ScERNI, 77, cf. 195 recognizes the ordinary test of lex loci contractus. 
ss E.g., England: Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. I. 
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of registration.66 The parties, of course, may disregard a 
registration existing at the time of sale, if the buyer is not 
interested in maintaining the previous nationality of the 
vessel.67 They can agree on any other law of the contract. 
But the seller would be responsible to his home authorities, 
and possibly the contract would be considered invalid in 
other countries as well. 
3· Patent Rights68 
The relation of a patent right to the territory of the 
country where it has been created, and the registration re-
quired for transfer of such rights, have also sometimes been 
taken as suggesting a choice of law for sales promising such 
transfer.69 But as very often inventors acquire patents in 
fifty states and may dispose of many of them in one contract, 
this would imply the application of dozens of private laws. 
Little authority is to be found on the sale of patent rights, 
and this only if we include contracts for the granting of 
licenses. But there is no obstacle to extending the conflicts 
rules whatever 'they may be, to such contracts, whether 
they are construed as sales or otherwise. The few cases in 
point apply the common tests rather than localizing the 
sale at the patent roll. 
Illustrations: ( i) In an English case, a German firm, 
evidently under German law, granted a license under an 
English patent to another German firm, but subsequently 
66 E.g., Peru: C. Com. art. 591; certain privileged debts must be paid 
before the sale, id. art. 863. 
Cuba: C. Com. art. 578. 
67 This suffices to render justice to BATIFFOL's desire, 174 n. 1, to recognize 
the sale of a Norwegian vessel in Japan to be brought into Japanese 
ownership. 
68 It may be remembered that the assignment of a patent right is co-
ordinated to a sales contract quite as a transfer of title to a sale of a tangible 
thing. Exclusive licenses are also bought, although agreements on nonexclusive 
licenses may be better compared with leases. 
69 Thus recently, BAT!FFOL 183 § zoo. 
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infringed this agreement by giving another license to a 
third person in an English contract. The court recognized 
the application of German law to the obligations of the 
grantor of the license.70 The case, of course, did not lend 
itself to a different choice of law. 
(ii) Where two patented machines were sold in St. Louis 
with the option to purchase the patent rights for several 
countries and the right to have the machines patented in 
any European country, in an action for breach of contract 
the court considered the statute of frauds of the place of 
contracting and of the forum, but did not even mention _the 
states in which the objects had been or might be patented/1 
The German practice, a little richer,72 brings out the same 
point somewhat more clearly. In addition to various cases 
where two domestic parties contracted with respect to 
foreign patents/3 the Reichsgericht also applied German 
law to the assignment of the exclusive exploitation of an 
Austrian patent, by a German chemist to a Viennese firm. 74 
The German seller of an invention to be patented by him in 
Italy is, of course, obligated under German law to take all 
the steps prescribed by Italian patent law.75 
4· Copyright 
The modern right of authors to their literary or artistic 
products is not fixed in the territory for which protection 
is granted. It is distinguishable from the physical thing-
manuscript, painting, blueprint, film, etc. But it is not a 
mere part of the right of personality as one influential 
70 Actien Gesellschaft fiir Cartonnagen Ind. v. Temler and Seeman (1900) 
18 R. P. c. 6. 
71 Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. Lax and Shaw, Ltd. (C. C. A. 8th 1926) II F. 
(zd) 240. 
72 See NussBAUM, D. IPR. 338 n. 2. 
78 E.g., RG. (Oct. n, 191I) II Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 254; (July 1, 
1931) 31 Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 534, IPRspr. 1931, 197. 
74 RG. (June 10, 1933) Leipz. Z. 1933, 1325, IPRspr. 1933, 44- It was 
also stressed that the price was fixed in marks and the parties invoked German 
law. 
75 RG. (July s, 19n) II Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 142. 
SALES OF MOVABLES 75 
theory construed it. 76 It is a privilege accorded by law as an 
absolute right to the ideal content embodied in the work. 
Hence, when transfer of a copyright is promised, there is 
no fixed local connection necessitating conflicts rules different 
from those referring to tangible objects. The agreement 
for transfer can be distinguished from the transfer itself 
quite as well as in the case of chattels. In fact, there are 
many formalities prescribed for the assignment of an 
author's right, 77 but they do not, as a rule, affect promises 
to assign it. 
In this light, the German Supreme Court analyzed a con-
tract of publication concluded between Viennese authors of 
an operetta with a publisher of Stuttgart, Germany, accord-
ing to the presumaole intention of the parties, as in any 
other contract for work. The interpretation in favor of the 
place of the publisher, however, is doubtfuP8 My own sug-
gestion, in the absence of agreement by the parties on the 
applicable law, is that the ordinary rules advocated above 
for chattels should apply. 
Indeed, when a writer or artist himself promises to trans-
fer-totally or partially-his right in the work to the extent 
that he has the power to do so/9 his own domicil is a fair 
point of connection. And where licenses are issued in mass, 
as to movie theatres, the place of the vendor again is an 
appropriate contact. 
76 Theory of Orro GIERKE, abandoned by most writers. 
77 See P. 0LAGNIER, z Le droit d'auteur (1934) Z9Z. 
78 RG. (Oct. Z9, 19Z7) II8 RGZ. z8z, see Vol. II pp. 434, 435 n. 13. 
79 Cf. RABEL, Z7 N. F. Griinhut's Zschr. (1899); MICHAELIDES-NOUAROS, 
Le droit moral de !'auteur (Lyon 1935); ·Inter-American Convention on the 
Rights of the Author in Literary, Scientific, and Artistic Works, of July zz, 
1946, art. XI. 
CHAPTER 37 
Sales of Goods: Scope of Rule 
I. CoNTRACT AND PROPERTY 
I. Translative Effect of Contract 
CLEAP AGE of municipal systems.1 As is well known, in the group of laws following the Roman model the 
sales contract creates obligations only. Title is trans-
ferred by a distinguishable act of conveyance, which, in its 
more refined form, is also considered a "contract," but one 
restricted to the declarations of giving and accepting owner-
ship. If the Roman pattern is strictly observed, such trans-
fer needs, in addition to this specific consent, the surrender 
and acquisition of physical possession (traditio), or at least 
a substitute therefor, such as brevi manu traditio (the buyer, 
tenant of possession for the seller, becomes possessor), 
constitutum possessorium (the seller makes himself the 
buyer's tenant of possession), cessio vindicationis (the seller 
assigns his claim to possession). When a chattel is bought 
in a shop and taken home, the two contracts, obligatory 
and translatory, are simultaneous. 
The last-mentioned type of transaction is called "sale" 
in the still-maintained terminology of the common law, 
recalling ancient germanic law ( sala). In the Anglo-Ameri-
can sales acts as well as in many codes of the Latin group, 
this appears as the basic kind of sales contract. The sales 
acts and many civil codes even continue to make it appear 
as though in principle any sales contract concerning a mov-
able, would transfer ownership to the buyer. Within this 
1 See RABEL, Recht des Warenkaufs 28 ff. 
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group of conservative formulas, there is, however, a certain 
division. The American Uniform Sales Act, section I9, 
rule I, presumes that the parties intend the property to pass 
to the buyer when the contract is made. The CodeN apole6n, 
article I IJ8, makes the buyer of the chattel the owner "at 
the moment when it ought to have been delivered," which 
was commonly, against occasional protest, construed as 
meaning only the time of contracting; the text has been taken 
more seriously in recent comment. Yet, en fait de meubles, 
la possession vaut titre, Civil Code, article 2279; the pre-
vailing doctrine, therefore, restricts the translative effect of 
a sale without transfer of possession so as to give the buyer 
title only as between the parties. Some modern French 
scholars seem inclined to recognize that such property, not 
effective against third parties, is no property at all.2 
In daily application to modern life, all these contrasts 
are not nearly so acute as they seem in theory. There is no 
difficulty in dividing, whether in common law3 or French-
Italian law,~ an executed sale into an executory contract 
and its performance by transfer of money and property. 
Even the cash-and-carry transactions, with which the over-
aged concept of "sale" continues to agree and which are of 
course still frequent in daily retail commerce, can thus be 
analyzed as double acts. In all important commercial deal-
ings, the dualistic approach is indispensable. In fact, it has 
been followed in this country with slowly increasing aware-
2 This was the view of HENRI CAPITANT, as orally told to the writer. He 
preferred the Roman system. The interpretation of C. C. arts. II38 and 1583 
with respect to the transfer of property will be discussed in more detail in 
Vol. IV, Ch. 54· 
3 Cf., for instance, BENJAMIN, On Sale 315. 
4 See GoRLA, La Compravendita 5-10. A practical argument sometimes used 
in civil law for distinguishing the sale of movables from an executory con-
tract is that the buyer having paid cash in a shop should not be forced to 
prove his payment. But why should there not be a presumption of payment 
where contract and delivery are proved to have occurred in the shop and 
the buyer has no charge account? 
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ness through the Uniform Sales Act to the most recent 
American drafts of a Revised Uniform Sales Act. The 
French doctrine has cumulated exceptions to article 1138, 
until the principle that the sales contract passes title has 
been hollowed out. And for the great majority of com-
mercial sales, business practice has largely overcome the 
differences in the legal systems. 
Classification. Therefore the municipal divergencies men-
tioned above really cause only limited conflicts. N everthe-
less, the question remains what law should determine 
whether the contract transfers title. Some answers suffer 
from the traditional undue influence of the municipal sys-
tems themselves. Under the one-sided impulse of the French 
and Italian codes, the law governing the contract, which is 
by another mistake usually identified with the law of the 
place of contracting, decides also whether title passes by 
contracting. 5 Others have restricted the application of the 
law of the contract to the so-called passing of title between 
the parties; effects in relation to third persons would depend 
on the law governing title.6 Fortunately, on the Continent 
a third view has come into ascendance, namely, that obliga-
tion and title are to be thoroughly segregated with the 
understanding that the law of the situs also covers the rela-
tionship of the parties with each other respecting the title. 7 
The same view prevails in England.8 The lex situs remains 
predominant whether the transfer of property is to be 
accomplished by contract or ((traditio." This proposition 
5 VELLA, Obbligazioni 1095, cited by FBDOZZI-CERETI 741 n. I. 
6 7 LAURENT §§ 222 ff., 283, 8 id. § 130 j RoLIN, Z Principes §§ 912 ff., 3 id. 
§§ u67 ff. j DESPAGNET II36 § 395· Contra: DESBOIS, CJunet 1931, 281, Z90j 
BATIFFOL 395 § 475 and cit.j FEDOZZI-CERETI 740 ff. j DIENA, Z Dir. Com. Int. 
36 § ro6. 
1 For instance, VALERY § 395; RAAPE, D. IPR. 335; 2 ARMIN JON 63 § 28; 
NIBOYET 633 § 506. 
s FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 385, who should be consulted against the 
recent theories of SCHMITTHOFF 1901 and CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 576. 
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has been confirmed by the Institute of International Law.9 
In the same vein, the Hague Draft of I 93 I on conflicts 
rules concerning sales of goods, article 6, number 3, refrains 
from determining how ownership passes to the buyer because 
this question is separate and not easily solved. 
In the United States, the bewildering confusion of con-
tract and title doctrines in the sales acts for a long time ob-
scured the problem, and still seems to create great un-
certainty. Prevailingly, courts have erred in the direction 
of extending the law of the place of contracting to the 
transfer of title. 10 Minor even approved the theory that a 
conveyance, assignment, or sale, if valid where made, should 
be upheld in every jurisdiction as between the parties.11 
Beale disputed this approach. He explained the fact that 
most cases apply the law of the place of contracting to the 
title question, by the coincidence that in the particular cases 
the movables were situated in the state of contracting and in 
this state "the transfer of the title depended on the validity 
of the contract."12 To the same effect, Goodrich describes as 
typical a case where "the court stressed the law of the place 
of contract, quoted approvingly a statement that the domi-
ciliary law governed, and rendered a decision which applied 
in fact the law of the situs of the property."13 At present, 
the Restatement has made it clear, and the point seems 
undisputed that in sales no less than in other contracts, the 
validity of the transfer of title and the nature of the inter-
ests created by the "contract" are ~xclusively governed by 
the law of the place where the chattel is at the time of con-
tracting. (§§ 257, 258) 
Consequences. This universally and rightly accepted 
9 Art. 2 par. 3 of the decisions of Madrid, 24 Annuaire ( 1911) 368, 394, cf. 
the article by the reporter, DIENA, in Revue 1911, 561-586, at 564. 
10 See PARMELE in I Whart<Jn 681 § 311 a j STUMBERG 367, cf. infra n. 22. 
11 MINOR 293 § 128 and n. I. 
12 2 BEALE 978 § 255.1. 
1 3 GooDRICH 408 § 150 n. 84. 
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opinion needs comment where the obligatory contract is 
governed by a law other than that of the situs. Attention 
is drawn in this respect to a paragraph in Beale's treatise: 
"The question whether a sale can be avoided because 
of the insolvency of the buyer depends on the law of the 
state of situs at the time of sale, though the goods have 
been taken into another state. By that law must be deter-
mined the validity of the consideration, whether a parol 
sale passes title, and whether a sale is voidable for fraud."14 
Since § 257 of the Restatement, on which this paragraph 
is based, exclusively deals with the validity of conveyances, 
including legality of the transfer and transfer in fraud of 
third persons, a reader might think that rescission on the 
ground of insolvency of the buyer, invalidity of considera-
tion and voidability for fraud are always considered inci-
dents of the conveyance rather than of the contract. How-
ever, this cannot be the meaning, since it would not be borne 
out by the cases alleged in support. Apart from some de-
cisions cited but which are not in point/5 the cases concern 
the rescission of the sales contract on the ground of initial 
insolvency of the buyer/6 and are prompted by the par-
ticular statute of Pennsylvania allowing rescission by seller 
only when a trick, artifice, or deception has been practiced 
by the buyer, whereas other laws are more favorable to the 
seller. The decisions are clearly based on the ordinary con-
14 2 BEALE 982 § 257.1. 
In Continental law, the complications in case of insolvency and bankruptcy 
were discussed as early as 1913 by DE BoEcK, Revue 1913, 289 ff., 793 ff. 
15 Bulkley v. Honold ( 1856) 19 How. 390, deals with breach of warranty 
in the sale of a vessel the situation of which is only one of several elements, 
see infra Ch. 37 p. 92 n. 68. Arnold v. Shade ( 1858) 3 Phil a. 82, applies the 
law indicated by contracting, performance, and seller's domicil to the transfer 
of title to an insolvent buyer. Madry v. Young ( 1831) 3 La. 160, applies Mis-
sissippi law as lex situs to the title in a slave, but the same law to the 
contract, because not only were the slaves there but also the contract was 
made there. 
16 This is also true of the case cited by BEALE, supra n. 14, for validity of 
consideration. 
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tractual tests and not on the situs of the chattel.17 The 
courts, thus, do not disregard the contractual element but, 
on the contrary, neglect the possible significance of property 
law. 
The difference in the systems was sensed in the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunals when they had to decide which party 
was affected by the seizure or loss of goods that had been 
sold before World War I and were in transportation be-
tween countries having different rules for the transfer of 
title. Thus, goods sold by a German to a Belgian buyer and 
requisitioned by the German government while still on 
German soil, were in the seller's ownership, according to 
the principle of traditio ( BGB. § 929) ; therefore, it was 
not the Belgian buyer who was expropriated by the war 
measure.18 In other instances, these tribunals shared in the 
confusion so frequent in English and Latin doctrines, by 
applying to the transfer of ownership the law intended by 
the parties, as though title questions were included in party 
autonomy.19 Section 18 of the English Sales Act and sec-
17 In the order of BEALE's citation: Parker v. Byrnes (D. C. Mass. I87I) 
I8 Fed. Cas. No. 10,728 (I Lowell 539): lex contractus, based on place of 
contracting, seller's domicil and delivery, all in Boston. Mann v. Salsberg 
(190I) 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 28o: lex loci solutionis, as the contract (before the 
Uniform Sales Act was adopted in Pennsylvania in I9I5) is presumed to be 
a contract for arrival (in Pennsylvania). Perlman v. Sartorius ( I894) I62 
Pa. 320, 29 At!. 852: the Pennsylvania court applies Maryland law to which 
locus contractus, locus solutionis, and seller's domicil point. Lowrey & Co. v. 
Ulmer (1896) I Pa. Super. Ct. 425: the Pennsylvania court applies the law 
of New York where the goods were shipped f. o. b. Whiting Mfg. Co. v. 
Bank (I9oo) I5 Pa. Super. Ct. 4I9: exactly like the Perlman case. W. G. 
Ward Lumber Co. v. American Lumber & Mfg. Co. (I9I5) 247 Pa. 267, 93 
At!. 470: the Pennsylvania court applies the law of Ohio, because the contract 
was made and, by delivery to carrier, was performed there. Kline v. Baker 
(I868) 99 Mass. 253: applies Pennsylvania law indicated by the places of 
contracting and performance (through delivery to the carrier) and domicil 
of the seller. 
18 Germano-Belgian Mixed Arb. Trib. (April 30, I923) 3 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes 274· The Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (June u, I926) Charles 
Semon & Co. v. German Government, 6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 75, Clunet 
1926, I033, may also have applied the English Sales Act, s. I7, as lex situs 
in shipping the goods to the claimants' agents in Germany. 
19 Germano-Rumanian Mixed Arb. Trib. (June I6, I925) 5 Recueil trib. 
arb. mixtes 200, Revue I9271 97; contra: NIBOYET, ibid. at I08. 
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tion 19 of the Uniform Sales Act allow the intention of the 
parties to determine at what time the title shall pass, but 
this is only a municipal law governing goods in its own terri-
tory. The parties have no power to choose this law of situs, 
although they may choose the law for the obligatory con-
tract. In case of goods sold and sent from Germany to 
England and which arrived in English territory, the Tri-
bunal correctly stated that property had not passed in Ger-
many under the German law of property, but held that the 
goods although in England were not transferred because 
a German seller accustomed to his own law was not sup-
posed to have intended to transfer until the buyer acquired 
possession.20 This fiction amounted to an extension of the 
German property law to England; it was also out of place 
because the question of risk was in issue and should have 
been solved irrespective of all these problems. 
2. "Conditional Sales" (Sales with Transfer of Title on 
Condition of Payment) 
The difficulty of distinguishing transfer of title and 
promise of transfer again has been felt in common law and 
Latin countries in sales retaining full title in the seller until 
payment. In Germany, under romanistic legislation, the 
statement is obvious that in a sale with reservation of title 
the contract is absolute, and merely the title is conditionaP1 
In conflicts cases, American courts, treating conditional 
sales as a unit, have applied the lex loci contractus to the 
questions affecting the title (at least as between the parties) 22 
20 Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (April 7, 1927) 7 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes 345, criticized by RABEL and RAISER, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 62, 67. 
21 BGB. § 455, and commentaries, for instance, RGR. Kom. (ed. 8) § 455 
II I. 
22 STUMBERG 367; 2 BEALE 1001 § 272.3; LEE, "Conflict of Laws Relating to 
Installment Sales," 41 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1943) 445; Restatement §§ 273, 277, 
and WILLISTON, 2 Sales § 339 only refer to "transfer of title." 
In Louisiana, where the seller's privilege takes the place of conditional 
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or, sometimes, the lex situs to certain obligations, instead 
of separating obligation from the domain of lex situs. The 
result, however, has been harmless to the extent that in 
many cases where the lex loci contractus was applied, the 
chattel was in the state of contracting, and that the lex loci 
solutionis was resorted to when the seller promised to de-
liver the chattel in a certain state. In both cases, the law 
applied was identical with the law of the situs, either at the 
time of the contract, or at the critical time of delivery into 
the power of the buyer.23 
More recently, a vivid discussion has been devoted to the 
treatment of the seller's right to repossess and the buyer's 
right of redemption. Again, the courts have qualified these 
rights either as contractual or as interests subject to the 
law of the situs.24 In the Massachusetts case arousing most 
of the debate/5 the question whether the buyer had a right 
of redemption when the seller failed to give him notice of 
foreclosure, was regarded by the majority of the court as 
an incident of the contract and subjected to the law of the 
place of contracting (Massachusetts). The dissenting vote, 
on the contrary, emphasized the buyer's interest in the 
chattel, created at the situs and governed by the lex situs 
(New Hampshire). The latter view has been widely in-
dorsed26 and adopted in the Restatement, § 28 r. It needs a 
sounder motivating force. Although the right to retake and 
sale, lex loci contractus is applied to foreign-concluded conditional sales, ex-
cepting evasion. Overland Texarkana Co. v. Bickley (1922) 152 La. 622, 94 
So. 138. 
23 25 A. L. R. at u62; WHARTON § 416 f.; 87 A. L. R. 1309 at I3I4i 
LoRENZEN, 31 Yale L. ]. (1921) 6o-62; 2 BEALE 1002 § 272.4; WILLISTON, 
2 Sales § 339 n. II. 
24 See Note, "Determination of Law Governing Power of Redemption in 
Conditional Sales of Chattels," 43 Yale L. ]. ( 1934) 323. 
25Thomas G. Jewett v. Keystone Driller Co. {1933) 282 Mass. 469, 185 
N. E. 369; critical Notes, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1934) 128; 33 Col. L. Rev. 
(1933) 1061; II N.Y. U. L. Q. Rev. (1934) 281; 18 Minn. L. Rev. (1934) 
431, 474; 43 Yale L. J. (1934) 323. 
26 Thus in all Notes cited supra n. 25; LORENZEN, Cases 643; 2 BEALE IOOI 
n, 6 j GOODRICH 418 § 153 and n. 120. 
5 
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the right to redeem are fair matters of property, there are 
corresponding rights and duties within the "contract." Yet, 
since it would be unsound to recognize two laws for the two 
sides of the same matter, the lex situs must be estab-
lished as a special subsidiary law to cover the problems of 
repossession. 27 
This suggestion extends to a series of problems not in-
cluded in the current American discussion. For instance, 
the municipal laws vary with respect to the relation of 
repossession by the vendor to rescission. In the United 
States, despite some peculiar doctrines, 28 the tendency is to 
allow the conditional seller in case of nonpayment to retake 
possession in order either to collect the price from the pro-
ceeds or to rescind the contract; apart from statute and 
agreement, reclaiming the goods is deemed to be an election 
to rescind the contract, which frees the buyer. 29 German 
prevailing opinion assumes that retaking without attaching 
the chattel does not necessarily mean rescission, although 
it may, and some writers have stressed the unfairness of 
repossession without cancelling the contract. 30 The Austrian 
Supreme Court, in fact, has rejected this right.31 The Swiss 
Code eliminates both remedies involved in conditional sales, 
if not stipulated.32 It would be entirely impractical to decide 
this question under any other law than that of the situs, 
which determines the right of retaking. 
27 I understand GooDRICH ibid. to the same effect. 
28 The Supreme Court of Michigan, in a series of cases, has assumed 
that it is "inconsistent" for a seller to stipulate in the agreement reservation 
of title and recovery of the price; he may base his claim of price only on an 
absolute sale with reservation of a mere security interest which amounts to 
a mortgage or a lien. See Atkinson v. Japink (1915) 186 Mich. 335, 152 
N. W. 1079; Peter Schuttler Co. v. Gunther (1923) 222 Mich. 430,· 192 
N. W. 661. For a more exact expression, see GEORGE BoGERT, 2A U. L. A. 8 
§ 8, 169 § 124, 172 § 126. 
29 Uniform Conditional Sales Act, §§ 21, 23; WILLISTON, 3 Sales § 579b. 
30 See GuNTER STULZ, Der Eig;entumsvorbehalt im in- und ausliindischen 
Recht (ed. 3), and Law on Installment Contracts, of May 16, 1894, § 5· 
31 Austria: OGH., GIU. N. F. Nos. 2656, 2801 (installment payments). 
32 C. Obi. arts. 226, 227 par. 2, cf. 214 par. 3· 
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Therefore, although the questions concerning rescission 
and the effect of conditions upon the existence of the con-
tract are legal incidents of the contract, those obligatory 
problems closely connected with the property in the chattel, 
in the absence of a party agreement, are decidedly influenced 
by this connection, and thus indirectly governed by the law 
of the particular situs. In the prevailing view, this law is 
that of the state in which the property was delivered rather 
than that in which the vendor retakes the chattel or which 
regulates procedure and subsequent events. 33 It seems con-
fusing that many conditional sales contracts include the 
vague clause that "the terms shall be in conformity with the 
laws of any state wherein it may be sought to be enforced."34 
3· Unpaid Seller's Privilege 
The existence and extent of a lien or security title for 
the vendor's claims as regards price and damages are deter-
mined in the Restatement by the law of the place "where the 
chattel is at the time when the pledge or lien is created."35 
Since, however, the nature of a lien as a pure right in rem 
is not settled in all instances, the law of the contract has not 
been generally excluded.36 
In particular, does the French privilege du vendeur really 
depend only on the lex situs? Beale seems inclined to favor 
this view.37 In a comparable gesture, the authors of the 
Hague Draft of I 93 I, article 6, excluded from its scope not 
only rights in rem and creditor actions for fraudulent aliena-
tion but also the seller's privilege. The nature of this legal 
prerogative accompanying the sales contract is very con-
33 See particularly, GooDRICH 418 § 153 n. 119. 
34 See, for instance, Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works (1943) 180 
Tenn. 137, 172 S. W. (2d) 812, 148 A. L. R. 370, 375· 
35 Restatement § 279. 
36 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 401 and n. (i) citing Note, 64 L. R. A. 
( 1904) 831 f. 
37 2 BEALE 1008 § 279·3; definitely so, NIBOYET, 4 Traite 463. 
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troversial in France, and the problems have been inherited 
by Louisiana. 38 Rights of third persons protected by the law 
of the place where the goods are at a given time, of course 
restrict the effect of the privilege, if this law so decides.39 
But which law creates the privilege? 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has developed a doc-
trine in which it restricts the privilege granted in the Civil 
Code to sales contracts executed in the state. 40 But some 
local "completion" of a foreign-negotiated contract has 
been held a sufficient basis for applying the domestic law 
including the privilege.41 The gist of the doctrine42 seems to 
be that the privilege attaches to contracts governed by 
Louisiana law, the test being fixed by the lex loci contractus. 
"A common law contract cannot claim the vendor's privilege 
given by the Civil Code of Louisiana." 43 The drawbacks 
of this theory are climaxed by the curious application of 
Louisiana law even though the goods may be in a foreign 
state at the time of contracting. A Dutch court has recog-
nized the unlimited application of the law of the contract 
so as to recognize the Belgian court's refusal of priority for 
the seller's claim in Dutch bankruptcy proceedings.44 
However, neither the lex situs alone nor the law of the 
contract alone can be decisive. The correct view was laid 
down by the Institute of International Law in 1910: the 
lex situs has the power "to limit or exclude ... the effects 
of privileges established by the law governing the legal 
relationship to which the privilege is attached."45 
38 Louisiana C. C. ( 1870) art. 3227 par. I; B. MARGOLIN, "Vendor's Privi-
lege," 4 Tul. L. Rev. (1930) 239· In Quebec the institution has been refused 
adoption, C. C. art. 1012. 
39 7 LAURENT 267 § 212; RoLIN, 3 Principes 477 § 1446, 490 § 1457. 
40 H. B. Claflin & Co. v. D. A. Mayer ( 1889) 41 La. Ann. 1048, 7 So. 139· 
41 Mcilvaine and Speigel v. Legare (1884) 36 La. Ann. 359· 
42 See the cases cited by 2 BEALE 1008 § 279·3· 
43 G. A. Gray Co. v. Taylor Bros. Iron-Works Co., Ltd. (C. C. A. 5th 
1894) 66 Fed. 686, 689. 
44 App. Hertogenbusch (June 22, 1909) Heijmans v. Bolsius, Clunet 1912, 
6o1. 
45 Madrid 1910, 24 Annuaire (1911) 394 art. 3· 
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There is a third law to be considered in an analogous 
manner: the law governing bankruptcy proceedings involv-
ing assets of the buyer. It is neither to be ignored nor ex-
clusively to be observed. Conflicts have been caused in the 
three neighboring states, France, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands, through different rules on the treatment of the pre-
rogative in bankruptcy.46 Public policy has been unneces-
sarily invoked, 47 and the Dutch Supreme Court has rendered 
a most erroneous decision by resorting to the exclusive use 
of the lex fori. 48 The court went so far as to grant the ven-
dor a preference under Dutch law which he would not have 
enjoyed under the Belgian laws of the contract. 
The effect of rescission on third persons and their status 
in bankruptcy proceedings are questions which require 
reference to very different connections.49 
4· Risk of Loss 
The buyer bears the "risk of loss," when he has to pay 
the price despite destruction, seizure, theft, or deterioration 
of the goods occurring without the fault of either party. 
In the old doctrine, which still appears in the English and 
American sales acts as a principle, though susceptible of 
exceptions, risk of loss passes with the title. Many writers 
46 Effect in bankruptcy is denied in France, C. Com. art. 550 par. 6, al-
lowed in the case of certain machines in Belgium, C. Com. art. 546 and 
Law of Dec. 16, 1857, art. 20, and generally granted in the Netherlands, BW. 
arts. u8o, n85(3), II90. 
47 In a case of a bankrupt buyer where the apparatus sold was in Belgium, 
Trib. com. Seine (Sept. 6, 1906) Clunet 1907, 366, Revue 1909, 582 applied 
French law as that of the place of contracting and at the same time as 
prescribed by public order. The Belgian Trib. civ. Liege (Nov. 14, 1907) 
Revue 1909, 961 denied exequatur to this French judgment on the theory of 
lex situs and on the ground of Belgian public order. Cf. Note, LACHAU, Revue 
1909, 588; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 91 n. 187; 8 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 1287. 
48 Rb. Amsterdam (Oct. 29, 1915) W. 9935 applied the Belgian law of 
the contract but was reversed, Hof Amsterdam (Nov. 3, 1916) W. 10069, 
and H. R. (June 15, 1917) W. 10139, 1 VAN HASSELT 137. See the criticism by 
TRAVERS, 7 Droit Com. Int. I 423 § 11432. 
49 See for such a discussion, TRAVERS, id. §§ 11435, 11438 ff. 
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still naively repeat the slogan of the doctrine of liability 
for tort, casum sentit dominus, as if it indicated the doc-
trine of risk. 
Based on this tradition, reputed French writers have 
thought that since in French municipal law risk is bound 
together with property, its transfer must be governed in 
French courts by the statute real, whereas German courts, 
according to their different characterization, would have to 
apply the law governing the contract. 50 Such characteriza-
tion, in this case, would not be determined by the law of the 
forum but by the law governing the contract.51 However, 
the premise is wrong in all respects. Neither in France nor 
anywhere else, despite traditional pronouncements, is it 
true that risk passes necessarily with the title. In the case 
where the seller has to ship the goods and his obligation 
ends with the shipment (sale for shipment), which is the 
great rule of all sales not confined to one town, risk passes 
with the shipment in all laws and systems. In overseas com-
merce, the risk is regularly shifted to the buyer through 
delivery to the vessel, although ownership is, with the ex-
ception of the United States, ordinarily transferred through 
the arrival of the documents of title. The distribution of 
risk of loss is felt to be an essential part of the contract; 
it is the most conspicuous item in commercial offers and 
forms. Property, on the other hand, is a legal matter, prac-
tically always left by the parties to subsequent consideration 
by the lawyers in cases of divergence. 
There was unanimity in the Committee on the Interna-
tional Sales Act that risk and title can and must be sepa-
rated; the same view was held by all but three governments 
answering the Dutch questionnaire for the Sixth Hague 
50 DESBOIS1 CJunet 1931, 281, 295 approved by BATIFFOL 399 § 479; cf. 
EsMEIN in Planiol et Ripert, 6 Traite Pratique §§ 412 ff. 
51 DESBOIS1 id. 296 n. 17 par. 2. 
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Conference52 and by the Committee of I 93 I which estab-
lished the last draft on the conflicts rules for sales. Scarcely 
worth mentioning are other suggestions of special laws for 
the problem of risk.63 
If we neatly isolate the question of who bears the risk of 
casual events after the seller surrenders the goods, or what 
casual events burden the buyer, we have no doubt that the 
question belongs to the law governing the contract.54 This 
solution has been expressly adopted by the Hague Draft 
of I 93 I ,55 and appears indispensable, because the passage 
of risk, the duties of delivery, the duty of taking delivery, 
and certain collateral duties56 are essentially interwoven. 
The unhappy German method of attributing the duties 
of either party to the law of his domicil requires determina-
tion of the question whose obligation is concerned in the 
passing of the risk. One decision declared it an obligation 
of an English merchant who had sold f. o. b. Hamburg to 
bear the risk so long as it did not pass to the buyer under 
his own, viz. English, law.57 But other cases have shifted 
the emphasis to the question whether the buyer owes the 
price, so as to call for the buyer's law.58 The first argument 
is evidently wrong, although the result is desirable. The 
second produces strange results, when the law of the buyer's 
52 Only Hungary, Japan, and Spain wanted to have risk of loss excluded 
from the convention because of its connection with property. Inclusion was 
approved by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
burg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
Cf. }uLLIOT DE LA MoRANDIIlRE, supra Ch. 36 n. I. 
63 For the application of the law of the defendant party, 2 BAR 16, 107; 
ALMEN, I Skandinav. Kaufrecht 55· Contra: DrENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 42 
§ 107. Another strange proposal by 2 FRANKENSTEIN 299 has had no appeal. 
54 To the same effect, e.g., BAGGE, Recueil I928 V 201; FEDOZZI-CERETI 741. 
55 7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) 958 art. 6 (3): The present Convention is not ap-
plicable ... to the transfe:P of title, but with the understanding that the 
question of risk is subject to the law determined by this Convention. 
56 Infra II, 2, p. 96. 
5 7 OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 24, I907) 2I Z.int.R. 68, Clunet 1909, 217. 
68 OLG. Kiel (July 2, 1918) Schleswig-Holsteinische Anzeigen 1919, 27, 
cited by LEWALD, IO Repert 81 No. 47· 
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domicil has more exigent conditions for the passage of risk 
than the law of the seller.59 If, for instance, a Frenchman 
by correspondence sells a specific lot of silk to a German 
who is to take delivery in Lyons, risk passes in France at the 
time of contracting, whereas under German law it would 
not yet pass. If the silk is burned in the meantime by acci-
dental fire, should the buyer be liberated from his debt, 
although French law entitles the seller to the price? This 
is a queer solution in view of the fact that German law is 
not considered to govern the entire contract.60 Only one law 
can conveniently govern both parties. 
Again, the variety of substantive rules concerning the 
transfer of risk is by far less conspicuous in international 
trade than in the civil codes. There is an impressive bulk 
of uniform usages and rules beyond any national law. In 
addition, modern insurance largely diminishes the burden 
of risk. Yet some differences remain. An example is pre-
sented by the English principle that, if goods, shipped in 
the time prescribed by the contract, perish on the voyage 
overseas, the seller may nevertheless tender the bill of lad-
ing to the buyer with full effect.61 The seller may do this 
even knowing that the goods are lost. 62 French courts do 
not allow such tender except when the seller is "in good 
faith. " 63 German courts require transmission of the docu-
ments or notice of shipment of the goods appropriated to 
the contract, before risk can pass, thus excluding retroactive 
59 Such a case was construed as between Germany and England, RABEL-
RAISER, 3 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1929) 77, 78; I should consider it, however, certain that 
present English courts ought to recognize the passing of the risk by shipping 
(as suggested at p. 8o n. r ibid.) irrespective of reception or proof of arrival 
of the goods. 
so See RABEL-RAISER, id. 8o; approved by RAAPE, D. IPR. 293 against 
HAUDEK 84. Cf. NEUNER, 2 Z.ausi.P.R. ( 1928) 123 ff. 
61 Atkin, }., in C. Groom, Ltd. v. Barber [r9I5] I K. B. 316, 324. 
6 2 Manbre Saccharine Co. v. Corn Products Co., Ltd. [I9I9] I K. B. I98: 
S. S. Algonquin, carrying starch and syrup c. i. f. London, was sunk by sub-
marine or mine. Cf. KENNEDY, C. I. F. Contracts 119. WILLISTON, 2 Sales 
106 n. 13. 
63 See Note, AUBRUN, to App. Paris (Jan. 2I, I920) D. I92I. 2.IOI. 
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effect of the tender of documents upon the risk. 64 It would 
seem self-evident that the choice of law among these solu-
tions can only be made for any individual type of contract, 
irrespective of the passing of the title which depends on 
valid tender and acceptance of the documents or is accom-
plished by shipment, according to the theory adopted. 
II. VARIOUS INCIDENTS 
I. Warranty of Quality 
(a) American decisions. Stumberg65 has reviewed the 
cases which for the most part antedate the time when the 
Uniform Sales Act unified the law of warranty. He finds 
that the courts applied the law of the state where the con-
tract was made, or made and performed. But he wisely 
warns against such "metaphysical arguments" and recom-
mends referring all questions concerning the undertaking 
of the vendor to the state into which the goods are sent. 
The real impulses behind the decisions collected by Stum-
berg, however, seem exactly to follow the recognition of 
the place of "delivery" usual in commerce and emphasized 
here. Thus, the standard of quality was determined for 
branded potatoes, delivered by the seller who was in Mary-
land to the carrier f. o. b. M~ryland, according to the 
standard of that state. 66 The trade terms and usages of 
South Carolina were held to control a shipment of sheep 
manure from Chicago to South Carolina, because delivery 
had to be made at arrival against payment of the draft 
accompanying the bill of lading.67 The option between 
rescission and price reduction, adopted in Louisiana from 
the civil law model, was accorded to a buyer of New Or-
64 88 RGZ. 389; 92 id. u8; 93 id. r66. 
65 STUMBERG 372-375. 
ss Miles v. Vermont Fruit Co. (1924) 98 Vt. r, 124 Atl. 559· 
67 Markey v. Brunson (C. C. A. 4th 1923) 286 Fed. 893. 
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leans when a New York vendor sold a ship, then in port 
at New Orleans, and delivered it there to a buyer there 
residing. 68 Merchantable quality of two pianos was required 
under the law of Pennsylvania where the selling manu-
facturer resided and where he delivered the objects, as 
Stumberg adds, apparently to a carrier.69 Finally, in the 
case of strawberries shipped from Arkansas to Massa-
chusetts, Arkansas law was applied to the effect that accep-
tance of the goods by the buyer was not a bar to an action 
for breach of an express warranty/0 which was correct if 
the sale was for shipment in the ordinary manner. 
However, these decisions, applying the law of the con-
tract and determining correctly this law, all deal with prob-
lems certainly belonging to its general scope. No special 
conflicts rule, hence, is noticeable. But some rule of such 
kind may be suggested by the European discussion to which 
we now turn. 
(b) Civil law doctrines. Agreement has been reached 
that the law of the contract determines, on one hand, the 
extent of the buyer's examination of the goods as to 
quantity, weight, and quality, and on the other hand, the 
remedies for breach of warranty of quality, such as rescis-
sion, recoupment, damages, and substitute delivery. Con-
siderable doubts, however, have been caused by certain par-
ticulars of the law of warranty. What law should decide 
on the activity necessary for the buyer to avail himself of 
the remedies for breach of warranty? This concerns in the 
first place the form and time of an examination of the goods, 
the duty of giving notice of defects, and the period in which 
action must be brought. In the second place, the discussion 
involves the effects of omissions in these regards as well as 
the duty of the buyer to take care of goods rejected by him. 
68 Bulkley v. Honold (1856) 19 How. 390. 
69 Snow v. The Shomacker Mfg. Co. (1881) 69 Ala. III, 44 Am. Rep. 509. 
70 Willson v. Vlahos (1929) z66 Mass. 370, 165 N. E. 408. 
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The buyer has no duty of examining the goods, but only 
a "burden": his failure of examination leaves him ignorant 
of defects discoverable and therefore subject to notice. For 
this activity the agreement of the parties or the usages 
look to a certain place according to the circumstances, such 
as consignment to the buyer, to his agent or subpurchaser, 
or to the buyer for immediate transhipment to a purchaser 
without inspection, et cetera. 
The important proposal of the Hague Draft of 1931, 
article 5, answers the question in the most satisfactory man-
ner as follows : 
In the absence of an express clause to the contrary, the 
internal law of the country where according to the contract 
the goods delivered ought to be inspected, shall apply with 
respect to the formalities and the time within which the 
examination and notifications must take place as well as the 
measures to be taken in case of rejection of the goods.71 
(c) Duty of giving notice. The imposition on the buyer 
placed by § 49 of the Uniform Sales Act that he should give 
notice of a breach of promise or warranty within a reason-
able time after the buyer's knowledge of breach has unified 
the once greatly varying state laws. Correspondingly, no 
cases affecting the problem seem to exist. 
The situation abroad is very different. 72 In most countries 
having separate codes for civil and commercial laws, non-
mercantile buyers have generally been under no duty of 
giving notice but must only observe the period of limita-
tion of actions for breach of warranty, commonly six months 
after delivery.73 In the United States, a somewhat related 
discrimination against merchant buyers has recently been 
suggested. 74 
71 7 Z.ausi.PR. ( I933) 958. 
72 The assertion by HERZFELD, Kauf und Darlehen 98 that this duty is 
known in all countries in the same manner, is very wrong. 
73 See, e.g., German BGB. §§ 459 ff. in contrast to HGB. § 377· 
14Revised Uniform Sales Act, Proposed Final Draft No. I (I944) §§ 92 (I), 
95 (b). 
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Three opinions have been advanced, suggesting (I) the 
law of the contract ;75 ( 2) the law of the place where the 
buyer has to perform his duty of taking delivery against 
payment ;76 and ( 3) the law of the place where he has to 
provide for examination of the goods. 77 The second test was 
adopted by the German Supreme Court in abandoning 
former attempts to enforce its theory of splitting the con-
tract.78 The court felt that a unified and special approach 
was needed.79 But its stand is too much influenced by the 
doctrine of locus solutionis. The place where the goods are 
tendered to the buyer is not necessarily the place where he 
is supposed to inspect them. Therefore, the third opinion, 
which has been literally accepted by the Hague Draft of 
I 93 I, quoted above, is preferable. 
Fairness, in fact, seems to demand that a buyer should 
not be compelled to study the rules of a distant country for 
his own proceeding, provided that the contract does not 
explicitly prescribe the conditions of his claim, which it does 
very frequently. 
(d) Method of examination. If goods are to be ex-
amined in France, obviously the judicial expertise prescribed 
there must be carried out. In Eastern Asia, where certain 
practices of "survey" are usual for certain kinds of goods, 
75 Former German decisions cited by LEWALD 254, also HERZFELD, Kauf 
und Darlehen 98 ff.; the German government wanted this rule, contrary to 
the views of all other Notes of governments at the Sixth Hague Conference. 
Switzerland: BG. (Mar. 5, 1923) 49 BGE. II 70 (buyer's domicil as locus 
solutionis); BG. (Dec. 3, 1946) 72 BGE. II 405, 411 (lex loci solutionis for 
delivery, examination, and acceptance). 
16 Germany: 46 RGZ. 193; 73 id. 379 (rescission); 81 id. 273 (damages); 
see also LEWALD 254, 255 (aa) and (bb). 
Switzerland: BG. (Dec. 3, 1946) 72 BGE. 405, 413 (form and time for 
examination and notice of defects; place where the goods are at the time of 
examination). 
11 BAGGE, Recuei] 1928 V at 167; FEDOZZI-CERET! 741 n. 3; ALTEN in Sixth 
Hague Conference, Actes 327. 
Switzerland: BG. (Jan. 16, 1930) 56 BGE. II 38, Clunet 1930, 1168. 
78 RG. (Feb. 4, 1913) 81 RGZ. 273; dictum (April 21, 1925) 17 Warn. 
Rspr. (1925) 240; HEINICHEN in 3 Staub (ed. 14) 551, Anhang zu § 372 n. 9· 
79 See LEWALD 254 f. 
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expert merchants or a consulate officer intervening, these 
forms are contemplated by the parties, or by the usages 
binding them, even though they are in Europe. Generally, 
it is considered that if different formalities are prescribed 
at the various places, the law of the place where the goods 
are to be inspected is preferable to the law of the contract; 
this is recommended in the interest of the buyer, but some-
times also that of the seller, for instance, where he turns 
to a lawyer of the place prescribed for examination, who 
knows only the local law. It is, hence, a settled rule that the 
methods and proceedings of the place in which the examina-
tion is to occur must be observed. This might be expected 
to be recognized under any law, but the above proposal of 
the Hague Draft, which assures the same result through 
a special conflicts rule, may be advisable. 
(e) Time for notice of defects. An attempt to have the 
law of the forum determine the time in which the seller must 
be notified of a defect in quality or quantity, 80 has been 
commonly rejected. Another controversy concerns the ques-
tion whether such provisions pertain to the form or the 
substance of the matter. But whatever the answer, pro-
visions regarding notice are so closely connected with those 
requiring examination that it has been declared impracticable 
to choose them from different laws.81 This seems justified, 
if we have in mind an agent of the buyer at a remote place 
(but, of course, a place within the contemplation of the 
parties). The law of this place should determine for all 
practical purposes the diligence that the buyer owes to the 
seller. 
(f) Custody of rejected goods. To the described scope of 
the local law the Hague Draft in its final stage has added 
only the buyer's duty to preserve goods that he has rejected.82 
80 App. Amiens (Feb. n, 1905) Revue 1907, 216, approved by VALERY 991 
§ 68]. 
81 RoLIN, 3 Principes 200 § 1186, referring to numerous Belgian decisions. 
82 Report of ]ULLIOT de Ia MoRANDIIlRE, suPra Ch. 36 n. r, 27 par. 4· 
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The Draft has not extended the local law to the legal 
consequences of the buyer's failure to give notice, not even 
insofar as such omission is deemed to deprive the buyer of 
certain or all remedies, by presumed waiver or by force of 
law. The silence of the draft is too prudent; it is intended 
to empower a judge to resort to the local law, should he 
find a necessary tie between the legal effects of omitting the 
notice and the prescribed time of notice. An express con-
flicts rule would be preferable. 
2. Collateral Duties 
Although most collateral duties are, as a matter of course, 
controlled by the law of the contract,83 doubt may arise 
about the classification of the seller's obligation to tender 
the documents and of the buyer's obligation to furnish a 
letter of credit. 
(a) Tender of documents. The vendor's liability with 
respect to the dispatch and arrival of the bill of lading, 
invoice, insurance policy, and other documents required by 
custom or the terms of the contract has been neglected. Of 
course, what documents are required, is in the last resort 
answered under the law of the contract. 
Is the same true, for instance, with respect to the ques-
tion mentioned before,84 whether the seller may tender the 
documents after destruction of the goods, or even when he 
knows of their loss, and yet fulfill thereby his obligation, 
so as to transfer the risk retroactively? And if the docu-
ments are regularly dispatched, may they reach the buyer 
after the arrival of the vessel in the port of destination and 
after unloading is commenced, as agreed in common law,85 
or not, as in France ?86 An English writer has presumed that 
83 Swiss BG. (March 8, 1913) 39 BGE. II 161, 166. 
84 See supra p. 90. 
85 Brett, M. R., in Sanders Brothers v. Maclean ( 1883) II Q. B. D. 327, 
337-C. A.; BENJAMIN, On Sale 776 If. 
8 6 France: GEORGES SCHWOB, Les contrats de Ia London Corn Trade 
Association ( 1928) 251. 
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the documents ought to be tendered at the buyer's place of 
business or residence.87 Another English lawyer has, indeed, 
postulated that the law of the buyer's domicil should apply 
to the entire sales contract because of the duty of getting 
the documents to the buyer. 88 
It does not appear in the English cases applying English 
law as a matter of course, that the buyer must presumably 
receive the documents at his domicil; still less is that a 
universal rule. At any rate, the choice of law is better 
directed toward the law of the contract, which is usually 
the seller's law and which must consider the usage at the 
port of arrival. 
(b) Furnishing letter of credit. The problem is illus-
trated by a case decided by a court in Geneva. The contract 
was made in Calcutta where the seller was domiciled, and 
where the bags of jute sold were to be delivered c. i. f. 
Piraeus, Greece. The buyer, seemingly in Athens, had to 
furnish a letter of credit, and offered a credit letter issued 
by a London city bank. The court held in effect that the 
seller could expect exchange of the documents against pay-
ment in Calcutta without the delay required by transmitting 
the documents to London, and that by application of Indian 
law, as law of conclusion and performance, the buyer was 
in default. 89 The holding is right but the argument is wrong. 
In this case, Calcutta, in addition to being the place for the 
buyer's performance, was the place of the seller's domicil 
and of shipment. Hence, the contract was fully centered 
there. On the other hand, if the contract had been satisfied 
87 KENNEDY, C. I. F. Contracts uo, against the authoritative doubt of 
Atkin,]., in Stein, Forbes & Co. v. County Tailoring Co. (1916) II5 L. T. R. 
215. 
The Warsaw-Oxford Rules, Rule 16, in an otherwise complete statement, 
fails to indicate the place at which the documents should be "presented" 
(presentes) to the buyer. Int. Law Ass'n, 37th Report (1933) 429. 
88 CLAUGHTON ScOTT in Sixth Hague Conference, Actes 288. See supra 
Ch. 36 p. 56 n. 25. 
89 App. Geneve (March 4, 1932) Sem. Jud. 1932, 523, 527. An arbitration 
clause for the Bengal Chamber of Commerce was found ineffective. 
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with a credit by the London bank not made payable at 
a bank in Calcutta, there would nevertheless be no reason 
why English law should enter into the picture. 
The lex contractus suffices in all these cases. 
3· Measure of Damages 
Excluding the law of the forum, the law of the contract 
governs damages. This is the present view of the American 
courts, 90 and the Restatement confirms it, although it identi-
fies this law with the law of the place of performance.91 
The same is true with respect to the right and duty of a 
party to ascertain the measure of general damages through 
resale or repurchase, and with respect to analogous trans-
actions for the purpose of minimizing the damage. Only 
the forms of procedure and the intervention of officials in 
such cases depend on the law of the place where the trans-
actions occur.92 
4· Specific Performance 
In an old decision the German Supreme Court argued 
that the disability of a seller of goods at common law and 
under the English Sale of Goods Act to sue the buyer for 
90 Vol. II p. 542. See recently, State of Delaware, for Use of General 
Crushed Stone Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. {D. C. Del. 1943) 
49 F. Supp. 467 {interest) ; Pennsylvania law was correctly applied not 
because the entire contract was performed in that state, as the headline { 13) 
falsely asserts, but because the responsibility of the selling company ceased 
with the delivery of stone to the carrier in Pennsylvania. 
91 Restatement § 413, adopted by a few decisions and WILLISTON, 3 Sales 
275 § 589d. 
92 Italy: Cass. civ. (June 20, 1938) Foro Ita!. Rep. 1938, 2080 No. 457, 
Giur Ita!. Rep. 1938, 789 No. 130: as it seems, the Italian buyer bought goods 
in Germany, then sued in Italy for rescission and damages for breach, which 
were allowed in principle. In a separate suit he demanded the balance after 
resale by him of the defective goods, in accordance with German law. Held 
that Italian law applied for competence and forms of the resale. 
Switzerland: BG. {March 8, 1913) 39 BGE. II 161, 167: Cologne was the 
place of performance for delivery and payment, expressly stipulated. Hence, 
German law governed the resale made in Cologne. 
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payment of the price before the passage of the title was a 
part of English procedural law and therefore not applicable 
in a German court. 93 
This result may be questioned, insofar as English law, 
if applicable to a sales contract, in principle should be 
applied as a whole, including the so-called "remedies." But 
since judicial discretion under the equitable jurisdiction of 
specific performance, not to mention the sanction of im-
prisonment for contempt, can scarcely be reproduced in a 
civil law court, the procedural part of the English institu-
tion may be considered important by a foreign court. This 
is the more acceptable, because in the inverse case an 
English or American court can not help but resort to its 
customary practice, although it may be inclined to favor 
specific performance when an applicable foreign law grants 
an action for satisfaction in kind. 94 
5. Special Kinds of Sales 
A painting was sold in England and delivered there. 
Therefore English law applied to the contract. As the 
seller reserved his right to repurchase under certain circum-
stances and the painting was brought to Pennsylvania, he 
would have had to pay the repurchase price in that state. 
The New York Court of Appeals, however, declared that 
the law governing the main contract also applied to the 
repurchase agreement.95 This decision is obviously correct 
and a memento against the splitting of contract stipulations. 
The same may be said, for instance, of a sale on approval 
and of a sale with a condition for return or approval, dis-
tinguished in civil law as sales under suspensive condition 
of approval and under resolutive condition of disapproval. 
93 RG. (April 28, 1900) 46 RGZ. 193, 199; cf. OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 31, 
1924) 34 Z.int.R. (1925) at 450 f. 
94 M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 240 and n. 4· 
95 Youssoupoff v. Widener (1927) 246 N.Y. 174, 158 N. E. 64. 
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There is no reason why the ordinary tests should not extend 
to the accessory agreement. 96 
III. PARTY AuTONOMY AND PuBLIC PoLICY 
In the discussions of the international committees work-
ing on the conflicts rules concerning sales of goods, the prob-
lem of public policy has had a very big place. Finally, the 
many objections raised against party agreements on the 
applicable law, violating the various "imperative" rules, 
were overcome with the result that clauses designating the 
applicable law, either express or undoubtedly implied, are 
valid, and this law includes the conditions of the consent 
of the parties.97 It is, then, left to each participant state 
to deny "for reason of public order" application of the law 
determined by the draft (Convention), that is, either that 
agreed upon or in the absence of agreement, that directly 
prescribed by the Convention.98 
If the courts would accept these simple rules and restrict 
the public policy of the forum to the limits earlier advo-
cated, 99 all desires would be fulfilled. 
An illustration of fundamental conceptions of the forum 
justifiably intervening is afforded by a German case of a 
conditional sale on the installment plan, supposedly gov-
erned by Dutch law. A stipulation for the forfeiture of the 
paid installments in case of default, allegedly valid under 
Dutch law, was refused enforcement as offending the pur-
pose of a German provision prohibiting such clauses.100 
96 Otherwise, HERZFELD, Kauf und Darlehen 99 and n. u8 who stresses 
the precarious situation of the seller. 
97 7 Z.ausl.PR. ( 193 3) 957 art. 2. The text requires an "express" clause, 
but this term is awkwardly chosen. 
98 7 id. art. 7· 
99 Vol. II Ch. 33 p. 581. 
100 RG. (March 28, 1931) 85 Scuff. Arch. 2oo, Clunet 1933, 162. Cf. German 
Law of May 16, 1894, §§ 1, 6, concerning sales on installment payments. 
This decision has been approved in Italy by FEDOZZI-CERETI 740 n. r and in 
Brazil by EsPINOLA, 8 Tratado 613. 
CHAPTER 38 
Sale of Immovables 
I. WHAT LAw GovERNS THE CoNTRACT 
CONCERNING the characterization as immovable, the old traditional rule that lex situs determines 
what rights are immovable, continues universally 
despite the doctrinal objections of a few followers of the 
"qualification according to lex fori." 1 This auxiliary con-
flicts rule on characterization promotes uniformity in the 
domain of property as well as in that of contract. 
In other respects, the picture is not so bright, and espe-
cially not in the United States. Here, the inconsistency 
apparent in choice of law for contracts in general, repeats 
itself in the special field of contractual promises to transfer 
land or an interest in land. After many vain efforts to 
extract a coherent law from the decisions, 2 the best way is 
to recommend the rule approved by the majority of modern 
legislation and literature. 
I. Lex Situs Compulsory 
In the old doctrine, the law of the place where the land 
is located, extended to all parts of the transaction by which 
1Restatement § 208; Montevideo Treaty on Int. Civ. Law (1889) art. 26, 
(1940) art. 32 (verbis "as to their quality"); C6digo Bustamante, art. 112. 
See OSER-SCHOENENBERGER lxxvi No. 102; NEUNER, Der Sinn 130. For the 
adversaries, see Vol. I p. 52 n. 30 and Vol. IV Ch. 54· 
2 "When we look behind the decisions in relation to specific questions for 
the formulation of a general and comprehensive criterion which will satis-
factorily and consistently account for the results actually reached ... disap-
pointment generally ensues," Note, "Governing Law of Real Property Con-
tracts," L. R. A. 1916A, IOII at 1015. "There is confusion in the authorities 
upon the subject," GooDRICH, "Two States and Real Estate," 89 U. of Pa. 
L. Rev. (1941) 417 at 420 n. 15. 
101 
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two parties sold and purchased any interest in land. Story 
shared in this tradition3 and his close follower, Foelix, 
wrote that the lex rei sitae governs "the obligations flowing 
from the sale of an immovable, the causes operating its 
nullity and its cancellation or rescission." 4 
This clearly was the starting point of English and Ameri-
can conflicts law. Although its influence in the individual 
cases is difficult to evaluate, the principle is certainly applied 
when a court construes the contract, termed with character-
istic vagueness "relating to land," as a single undivided 
entity, subject to the lex situs. The Iowa court followed 
this view in a decision discussed in the second volume, 5 as 
it applied the statute of frauds of the situs without further 
investigation. 
In this country, however, the simplicity of the old doctrine 
was efficiently shaken by the famous judgment of Holmes, 
then a Massachusetts judge, in Polson v. Stewart. 6 The 
court recognized as valid a contract made by a married 
woman in North Carolina, although she promised to con-
vey land in Massachusetts where she lacked capacity. In 
other words, the state of the situs recognized the obligatory 
contract of North Carolina as it stood. Theoretically at 
least, it would seem that at present the ancient doctrine has 
been abandoned in the United States, 7 as well as in most 
countries. The Restatement fully recognizes the distinction 
between conveyance or transfer of land and contract to 
transfer or to convey land, and submits the validity of the 
latter promises to the law of the place of contracting.8 
3 STORY §§ 3 72 ff. 
4 FoEL!X (ed. 3) 110 § 6o. Similarly, FlORE §§ 215, 224, often criticized in 
the literature, see as to Italy, FEoozzr 251. 
5 Meylink v. Rhea (1904) 123 Iowa 310, 98 N. W. 779, discussed as to 
formality Vol. II p. 489. For other cases, see L. R. A. 1916A, 1022 n. 36. 
6 (1897) 167 Mass. 211, 45 N. E. 737, 36 L. R. A. 771; LoRENZEN, Cases 593· 
7 See, for instance, II Am. Jur. (1937) 335 § 38 n. 2j 2 Beale§§ 340.1, 346.6, 
s Restatement § 340 and comment. 
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Remainders exist in Spain° and some other jurisdictions10 
to the extent that the domestic law is prescribed with 
respect to domestic immovables, in a one-sided public 
policy. 
Again, the Treaty of Montevideo reaches the same 
result as the old doctrine under the theory of lex loci solu-
tionis, forcibly applied to all contracts promising interests 
in any property.11 
2. Lex Loci Contractus 
Beale and the Restatement postulate the law of the place 
of contracting with respect to the validity of the contract, 
whereas the lex situs operates in matters of performance.12 
Others have undertaken to harmonize the cases to the same 
effect by the distinction that "executory contracts" to trans-
fer real property are under the lex loci contractus, while 
executed contracts follow the lex loci solutionis.13 
Misled by the theory of the last act in completing a 
contract, a few decisions have applied the law of the place 
9 See the Note of the Spanish Government to the Sixth Hague Conference, 
Document I43; cf. also ECHAVARRI, 3 Cod. Com. 465. 
to Brazil: (Requiring writing and registration, App. Alagoas (March 3, 
I944) 27 Direito 404.) Former lntrod. C. C. art. I3 § un. III, cf. 2 PoNTES de 
MIRANDA 243 1 criticized by ESPINOLA, 8 Trata'do 547 § I57 citing BEVILAQUA, 
I C. C. Com. (ed. 6, I940) I36. The new art. 9 § I, however, seems to refer 
only to formalities, cf. ESPINOLA, 8-C Tratado I8I3 § I56. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6 No. 3· 
Switzerland: OsER-ScHOENENBERGER, Allgemeine Einleitung n. 48 and cited 
authors; 2 ScHNITZER 556; Swiss law is the presumable law of contract, but 
if another law applies to the contract, Swiss public policy governs the 
obligatory promise to convey Swiss immovables. 
Uruguay: C. C. art. 6; GUILLOT, I C. C. I23· 
In Italy, some authors believed that a "vendita immobiliare" as a whole 
had to be solemn. See Vol. II p. 490 n. I9, and for an application to the sale 
of aircraft, LOMONACO 86 § I4. The contrary and correct view has been con-
firmed by the wording of C. C. (I942) art. I350, corresponding with old art. 
I3I4 (I865). 
11 Montevideo Treaty on Int. Civ. Law (I889) art. 34 par. un., (I940) art. 
38 par. I (note the words "En consecuencia"). 
12 Restatement § 340; 2 BEALE II901 IZI6. 
13 MINOR 3I § II; L. R. A. I9I6A, I027; this formulation seems to stem 
from the wording of STORY § 363, first sent. 
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where the deed of conveyance was delivered, determining 
thereby such problems as the measure of damages for breach 
of contract.14 This seems to mean that the entire obligatory 
portion of the contract is under this law. It is uncertain 
whether the same scope was intended in a decision deter-
mining the measure of damages for nondelivery of a deed.15 
The land was in South Dakota but the deed was promised 
and to be delivered in Iowa. The court applied Iowa law. 
This could mean a special conflicts rule for the isolated 
duty of delivering the instrument, but probably does not 
mean it. According to the Restatement, § 341 ( 1), the law 
of the place where a deed of conveyance of an interest in 
land is delivered determines "the contractual duties of the 
grantor," which proposition seems to clash with every other 
rule respecting contracts recognized in the Restatement. 
Delivery of the deed is a condition of conveyance. That 
the place where it is actually made, or for that matter, 
where it is to occur, should determine the legal effects of 
a conveyance, partly dislodging the significance of the situs 
of the land, is a possible idea. But that the place of that 
delivery should also localize the duty of the seller, to make 
good a defective title to the land, cannot be ·reasonably 
explained. This is a mere product of an obsolete concept of 
breach of warranty. 
These theories share in general the defects of emphasiz-
ing accidental localities, and some of them add the dis-
advantage of splitting title and obligation where no separa-
tion is required by the nature of the transaction. 
3· Subsidiary Rule of Lex Situs 
In the opinion prevailing in the world, obligations to 
transfer land or interests in land are governed by lex situs, 
14 Atwood v. Walker ( 1901) 179 Mass. 514, 61 N. E. 58. 
15 Clark v. Belt (C. C. A. 8th 1915) 223 Fed. 573· 
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where no other connection appears definitely required. This 
law is regarded as presumably intended by the parties or 
as the law most naturally competent. This is the undoubted 
English doctrine ;16 it is taught in France,11 Italy/8 and most 
countries/9 shared in Germany in consequence of the pre-
dominance of the lex loci solutionis/0 and has been adopted 
by international proposals.21 There is also American au-
thority for complying with the intention of the parties, for 
which the location of the land may be important, 22 but 
classification of the individual cases is difficult. 23 
Exceptions to the subsidiary rule of the situs have been 
16 England: Lloyd v. Guibert {1865) L. R. 1 Q. B. u5, ~~~;Rex. v. Inter-
national Trustee [1937] A. c. soo, 529; WESTLAKE 269 § 216; DICEY s88, 
953 If.; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 712 If.; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 532; M. 
WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 441, 533· 
1 7 France: NIBOYET in 2 Repert. 251 § 63; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, D. 
1931.2.33; BATIFFOL 108 §§ 122 If., 393 §§ 471 ff. Contra: BAR TIN, ~ Principes 
65 n. 5 without argument. 
18 FEDOZZI-CERETI 741. 
1 9 The Netherlands: KosTERS 756; MuLDER 170. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 No. 2. 
Switzerland: OsER-SCHOENENBERG No. 102; BECKER in 6 Gmur Vorbemerk-
ungen zu, arts. 184-186 No. 27. 
Contra: RoLIN, Revue Dr. Int. {Bruxelles) {1908) 6o~ {in contrast to 
leases of immovables). 
20 RG. {Oct. 14, 1897) JW. 1897, 581; {Dec. 7, 1920) tot RGZ. 64; Nuss-
BAUM, D. IPR. 232. 
21 lost. of Int. Law (Florence), 22 Annuaire (1908) 290 art. 2 {b); Int. 
Law Ass'n, Vienna Draft 1926, art. r, A, in 34th Report {1927) 509. 
22 STORY § 363; GooDRICH 394 § 145; II Am. Jur. 335 § 38. 
23 See, to the same effect, Note, L. R. A. 1916A at 1021 ff. The decisions 
referred to by 2 BEALE II90 § 340, I at n. 4 'for the lex situs mostly concern 
capacity, although Hamilton v. Glassell (C. C. A. 5th 1932) 57 F. {2d) 1032, 
1033 is based on presumed party intention. LoRENZEN, 6 Repert. 307 Nos. 129, 
130 does not regard lex situs as governing all phases of the contract, as 
BATIFFOL IIO § 123 has understood; LORENZEN discusses the problem on 
p. 324 No. 206. 
The often cited decision in the New York case, Hotel Woodward Co. v. 
Ford Motor Co. {C. C. A. 2d 1919) 258 Fed. 322 belongs to the several 
cases where lex fori coincides with lex loci solutionis; in addition both 
parties were domiciled in New York. The judge would personally have pre-
ferred the law of Georgia where the deed was executed. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Selover etc. v. 
Walsh (1912) 226 U.S. II2 only confirms the constitutional power of a state 
to apply the law of the place of contracting without deciding whether it 
should do so under a sound conflicts rule. 
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claimed, apart from a contrary agreement of the parties, 24 
for land situated on a border,25 and land that is only a small 
part of an estate. 26 Certainly an exception must also be 
admitted when both parties are domiciled in the same 
country and there contract with respect to foreign land. 
Illustrations. (i) An English decision applied English 
law to the purchase of a share in a decedent's estate, in-
cluding real and personal property in Chile, where the 
parties were three brothers, all of them domiciled in 
England, and the purchaser residing in Chile.27 Presuming 
that the court correctly found Chilean law unsuitable to 
the contract, the lex loci contractus had so many relations 
to the case including the domicil and residence of the ven-
dors, that its application was justified. 
( ii) When a contract on the installment plan for the 
purchase of Colorado land was made in Minnesota and the 
Minnesota court applied its domestic statute prescribing 
a certain notice to be given before forfeiture of the paid 
installment sums, the court invoked the principle that the 
lex loci contractus applies when the price is to be paid in 
the state. 28 But not only was the seller a corporation char-
tered and domiciled in Minnesota but the buyer was a citizen 
of that state. For this reason it was a domestic contract. 
(iii) Other cases are more doubtfuP9 Where a contract 
was made in California for the purchase of mining property 
in Mexico with the price secured by notes and mortgages in 
California,30 the court failed to state that the California 
connections were strong enough to sustain a tacit agreement 
for California law. It should, then, not have applied this 
law to the question of rescission. 
24 England: British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (I92I) 127 L. T. R. 209. 
25 British South Africa Co. v. De Beers Consol. Mines [I9IO] I Ch. 354; 
z Ch. soz, C. A.; [I9I2] A. C. 52. 
26 M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 44I § 4I5. 
27 Cood v. Cood ( I863) 33 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 273, 278, criticized by M. 
WoLFF, ibid. 
28 Finnes v. Selover (I907) IOZ Minn. 334, II3 N. W. 883. 
29 See BATIFFOL I I I ff. on American cases; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 232 on 
certain decisions of lower German courts. 
30 Loaiza v. Superior Ct. ( 1890) 8 5 Cal. 11, 24 Pac. 707, 9 L. R. A. 376. 
The parties were English and Mexican nonresidents. 
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Such subsidiary localization of the contract at the situs 
is preferable to the artificial method of identifying the place 
of contracting with the situs. An offer for the purchase of 
land in Maryland was mailed from England and the accep-
tance mailed back; the deed should have been delivered in 
England, but was not. The Maryland court invoked the 
settled method of applying its own law qua lex situs, but 
conceived this as an extension of the real property rule and 
thought it should corroborate the result by an auxiliary 
construction in the course of which the place of delivery 
of the deed was discarded because no English town had 
been named. 31 Neither approach was correct; the law of 
the forum could simply be assumed to be the most closely 
connected law. 
In this prevailing view, obligatory and real property 
transactions are distinguished, not only when they appear in 
separate agreements or instruments as happens in many 
countries, but also when they are closely knit together in a 
deed of conveyance. The obligatory part of the entire trans-
action depends on the real property law of the situs only 
insofar as no effect on the title or interests is possible with-
out the consent of the state of situs. The situs prescribes the 
kind and conditions of the transferable interest, the for-
malities of the transfer and capacity to alienate and acquire 
such interest. 
Equitable remedies. On the other hand, the subject has 
become slightly complicated in common law because of the 
intervention of equity jurisdiction.32 The Court of Chancery, 
by assuming a constructive trust and in other ways, under-
took to right wrongs done by an English defendant with 
3LLatrobe v. Winans {1899) 89 Md. 636, 43 Atl. 8z9. 
32 BEALE, "Equitable Interests in Foreign Property," zo Harv. L. Rev. 
(1907) 382; 2 BEALE 953 ff.; GooDRICH, supra n. 2, 425 ff.; GOODRICH 398 
§ 147· 
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regard to foreign land. In particular, the practice has been 
settled that on a contract for selling or charging land, where 
the land is outside the jurisdiction of English courts, an 
action in personam is allowed to enforce the execution of a 
correct sales instrument sufficient under the lex situs.33 The 
lex situs is thereby respected to the extent that no interest 
in the land is deemed to be validly promised that does not 
conform to the law of the situs. The promise to convey a 
recognized interest, however, is effective irrespective of the 
validity of the contract under the law of the situs. No Anglo-
American peculiarity of international bearing is noticeable 
in this practice, as confined to the problems of taking juris-
diction and of administering the local equity procedure. 
Only when the domestic law is applied despite the closer 
connection of the contract with the situs, as has occurred 
in some cases just for the purpose of taking jurisdiction 
otherwise not obtainable, do these courts deviate from 
normal jurisprudence. 
II. FORM AND CAPACITY 
I. Form 
Whether a contract prom1smg to transfer an interest 
in land must be written, authenticated, registered, or in 
the form of a deed, is usually determined under the general 
conflicts rules concerning formality. 34 In the doctrine pre-
vailing throughout the world, this means that the contract 
may comply either with the law of the place of contracting 
or with the law governing the substance.35 In this special 
33 Lord Cottenham in Ex parte Pollard (I84o) Mont. & Ch. 239· 
34 France: Lex loci contractus is emphasized by Cour Paris (June 6, I889) 
Clunet I889, 826; NIBOYET 634 § 507, 2, but this can scarcely be meant as a 
compulsory rule. 
Germany: EG. BGB. art. u; cf. WALKER 332 n. 12; see Vol. II p. 490. 
The Netherlands: OFFERHAus, 30 Yale L. ]. (I92I) II7. 
Rumania: PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 77 No. 253· 
I BAR 620; GIERKE, I D. Privatrecht 23I n. 6I; 2 MElLI 67. 
35 Vol. II p. 487. 
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application, this optional variant of locus regit actum is also 
recognized in England, if not clearly by judicial authority, 
at least by the writers.36 The American approach, uncertain 
between lex loci contractus and lex situs, would seem to 
suggest a correction toward the same view. 37 The Treaty 
of Montevideo, however, applies the lex situs under the 
guise of lex loci solutionis.38 
In some countries, the lex situs is applied, either openly 
or as a matter of public policy, to formalities when domestic 
immovables are involved.39 
It will be discussed separately whether these rules extend 
to the manifold provisions prescribing formalities for 
authorizing agents to make a contract for the transfer of 
land.40 
2. Capacity 
Although capacity to transfer an immovable, of course, 
depends on the conflicts law of the country where it is situ-
ated, capacity to promise such transfer is distinguishable. 
It was a question of the capacity of a married woman on 
which Mr. Justice Holmes formulated the contrast between 
personal covenants and the incidents of the lex situs .41 
In conformity with their general attitude, common law 
courts will prefer the law governing the contract,42 whereas 
36 CHESHIRE {ed. 3) 727, referring to In re Smith, Lawrence v. Kitson 
[1916] 2 Ch. 206; M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 533· DICEY 588, 957 favored the 
proper law in certain cases. 
37 GoODRICH 272 § 106 i BATIFFOL I II § 125. 
38 Supra n. II. 
39 Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6 ( 3) ; and others, supra n. 10. 
40 Infra Ch. 40 p. 159. 
41 Polson v. Stewart ( 1897) 167 Mass. 2II, 45 N. E. 737; see Vol. II p. 490 
n. 17. 
42 England: Bank of Africa, Ltd. v. Cohen [ 1909] 2 Ch. 129 (lex situs) ; 
CHESHIRE ( ed. 3) 727; W. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 533 § 499· 
United States: 2 BEALE II77; GooDRICH 383 § 145. 
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at civil law the personal law governs.43 The latter 1s also 
sporadically applied in the United States.44 
If the promise is valid under the law of the contract, 
but the promisor is unable to fulfill it because of incapacity 
under the law of the situs, he at least owes damages for 
not conveying the interest, 45 except in the state where the 
land lies and in other states where he is regarded as in-
competent. 
III. CovEN ANTS FOR TITLE 
At common law, agreements in deeds of conveyance are 
distinguished as those "running with the land" and those 
not running. The former category includes promises creating 
under certain conditions a benefit for, or a burden on, the 
successors of the purchaser without, however, establishing 
encumbrances that would benefit or burden any owner of 
the land in the manner of a jus in re. (It is misleading, 
therefore, to call these agreements "real covenants.") 
Also the grantee may promise, for instance, restrictions on 
building binding his successors in title. 
Interstate conflicts exist mainly with respect to covenants 
deemed to be implied in some states but not in others. For 
instance, some states, by statutory or judicial construction, 
interpret the words "grant and bargain" used by the grantor 
as implying promises of good title, quiet enjoyment, and 
freedom of encumbrances, in favor of the purchaser and all 
persons acquiring from him through similar conveyances. 
In the traditional view, covenants running with the land 
43 Germany: EG. BGB. art. 7· For the authority of guardians, see OLG. 
Miinchen (Sept. 8, 1938) H. R. R. 1939, No. 8r. 
The exceptions for transactions by foreigners who would have capacity 
under the domestic law, are applicable, whereas they do not apply usually 
to capacity for disposing of foreign real property by act within the forum. 
See Vol. I p. 187; German EG. BGB. art. 7 par. 3; Ita!. C. C. Disp. Pre!. 
( 1942) art. 17 par. 2, etc. 
44 Vol. I pp. 103 n. 7, 183 n. 19. 
45 CHESHIRE ( ed. 3) 727. 
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are governed by the lex situs. 46 Consequently, it is assumed 
in the Restatement that this law decides whether and under 
what conditions a covenant runs with the land. 
For the agreements not running with the land, opinions 
are divided. In one view, the lex situs again applies.47 In 
another, followed in a series of cases, these agreements 
being "merely contractual" and without connection with 
the land, are declared to be governed by the law of the 
contract, that is, commonly the lex loci contractus.48 The 
Restatement places them under the law of the place where 
the deed of conveyance is delivered.49 There is considerable 
opposition to this treatment, though termed logical, on the 
ground that the distinction is questionable or difficult, or too 
technical for the purpose of conflicts law. In this view, 
covenants should fall under one law, the lex situs, avoiding 
the confusion caused by the distinction of groups and division 
of opinions.50 
There is much force in this proposition but more pre-
cision is needed as to the ground and scope of the lex situs. 
Legal history may help. The cases extending lex situs to all 
covenants evidently have been influenced by the old broad 
scope of that law which comprehended the entire contract 
by force of sovereignty. If the choice of law resorts to le.t 
46 Restatement§ 341 (2) and comment; Platner v. Vincent (1921) 187 Cal. 
443, 202 Pac. 6 55; LORENZEN, Cases 587; for other cases, see GooDRICH § 146 
ns. 28, 29, 30; MINOR 457 § 185; LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws 245 n. 38; 
17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094; L. R. A. 19r6A, 1027 n. 49, and for the municipal 
doctrine in question, WM. RAWLE, Covenants for Title (ed. 5, r887) 301 § 205. 
47 Lyndon Lumber Co. v. Sawyer (r9o8) 135 Wis. 525, rr6 N. W. 255; 
Alcorn v. Epler (1917) 206 Ill. App. 140. 
48 Bethell v. Bethell (r876) 54 Ind. 428, LORENZEN, Cases 585; other In-
diana cases, see GooDRICH § 146 n. 33; other cases, Note, L. R. A. 1916A, 
1027 n. 48; WHARTON§ 276 (d). 
49 Restatement § 341 ( r). 
5 0 Note, 9 Cal. L. Rev. (1921) at 35; 10 id. (1922) 174; LoRENZEN, 20 
Yale L. J. (1911) 427, and in 6 Repert. 308, 131; HEILMAN, "Conflict of Laws 
Treatment of Interpretation and Construction of Deeds in Reference to 
Covenants," 29 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1931) 277; GooDRICH 397· 
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situs only for convenience, it has to consider any contrary 
agreement of the parties as well as the special situations 
in which the contract is centered elsewhere. Do these con-
siderations not apply to covenants running with the land? 
On the other hand, what is the relationship in nature be-
tween covenants for title and veritable iura in re, the proper 
field of lex situs? 
That so much is unstable and controversial in the matter 
of covenants for title in common law, in contrast with the 
romanistic systems which sharply distinguish obligation 
from right in a thing, must be a residue of legal history. 
Traditionally, in England, as almost everywhere except in 
classical Rome and derivative systems, real rights were 
rights to possession and consisted in the better claim be-
tween two persons. The abstract and absolute character 
inherent in the developed Roman dominium and jus in re 
aliena was absent or less marked. Moreover, until the nine-
teenth century, formal certainty, as assured by public land 
registers in Central Europe, did not exist, and surrogates 
were needed, quite as in ancient times. Covenants and title 
records are derived in the last instance from the universal 
custom of instrumenta antiqua-so termed by the Roman 
jurists contemplating the Eastern usages, and by the Italian 
lawyers in considering the Lombard practice,-a chain of 
conveyances transmitted from each vendor to his purchaser, 
together with the deed embodying the actual sale. Each 
document contained a comprehensive stipulation of war-
ranty against the vendor, his family, and successors infring-
ing the alienation, and promising protection or penalties 
in case of attacks by strangers. 
The usage in England was almost exactly the same, 
although with great legal elaboration. The extended con-
veyance clauses beginning to appear in the thirteenth century 
regularly expressed the promise of warranty to the feoffee, 
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his heirs and "assigns," which granted a remote successor 
direct claim against the original feoffor. 51 These warranties 
of title formed the transition from a merely relative concept 
of a claim to possession to the absolute right in real prop-
erty. Where a legal system is ready to accord the buyer 
independent possession and full ownership by derivation 
from the former owner, there is no necessity for promises 
of the vendor that he himself or persons on his behalf shall 
not disturb the buyer's right, although the French Civil Code 
(article I 628) still contains the doctrine of fait du vendeur, 
and a certain usefulness may be found in it. 52 Clauses cover-
ing eviction by third parties on the ground of the vendor's 
defective title lose importance with the introduction of 
means providing public knowledge of the true legal situation 
of the land. 
In the light of these short observations, it is instructive 
to comment on two outstanding judicial statements. 
Geiszler v. De Graaf.53 This New York decision de-
scribes the nineteenth century distinction between two types 
of covenants for title. Covenants in which the grantor of 
land promises quiet enjoyment to the purchaser or declares 
warranty of title, were distinguished from those in which 
he declares that he has lawful seisin or the right to convey 
or that the land is free of encumbrances. 
In the former type of covenant, the breach was construed 
to occur only on eviction, actual or constructive.54 The 
benefit of this covenant runs with the land and any subse-
51 See the excellent article by S. J. BAILEY, "Warranties of Land in the 
Thirteenth Century," 8 Cambr. L. J. ( 1944) 274; 9 id. 82. 
52 The present writer has repeatedly dealt with the subject and refers in 
particular to his book, I Haftung des Verkiiufers wegen Mangels im Recht 
(1902) 33 If. (Roman Law and papyri), 169 If. (Germanic laws); and 
various articles, esp. KATAGRAPHE, 54 Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung, 
Roman. Abt. ( 1934) 189, 198; "Le fait du vendeur et du debiteur," 2 
Rheinische Z. f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht. 
sa Dictum by Brien, J., (1901) 166 N.Y. 339, 59 N. E. 993· 
54 WM. RAWLE, Covenants for Title (ed. 5, 1887) § 202. 
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quent purchaser in an uninterrupted chain of conveyances 
containing such a covenant ("privity of estate") may sue 
any predecessor for the breach of warranty. A breach of 
the latter type of covenant occurred, if at all, upon delivery 
of the deed and therefore the right of the grantee became a 
chose in action which did not run with the land. This rule, 
probably based on the ancient impossibility of assigning 
chases in action was abandoned by the New Y ark court. 
With respect to the first group it seems never to have 
been doubted, either in New Y ark or elsewhere in America, 
that the traditional stipulations of warranty were within 
the scope of the lex situs, although in Europe this has only 
been assumed by Foelix and one other writer.55 But this 
treatment is only convenient, not necessary. Of course, the 
contractual bond between the parties to each of the suc-
cessive contracts is insufficient to justify the "running"; 
there must be an agreement "touching and concerning the 
land" and "privity of estate."56 Nevertheless, the warranty 
of good title or the promise to indemnify the purchaser and 
his successors, creates a contractual obligation, necessary 
and significant for the situation. The unconscious reason 
why this institution is attributed to the law of the situation 
is the same which once suggested the so-called "jumping 
recourse." 57 The succession of auctores of old and the series 
of written documents since the Middle Ages form the mecha-
nism to secure the legal position of the possessor; they 
furnish the only practical evidence of title, until prescrip-
tion is realized. Since conflicts law has only to ponder the 
social importance of local connections, it may reasonably 
connect the complex of such warranty relations with the 
05 I FOELIX ( ed. 3) 110 § 6o; MASSE, I Droit Comm. ( ed. 2) 546 § 637, as 
cited by 8 LAURENT 222. Contra: the editor of FoELIX (ed. Demangeat) loc. 
cit.; LAURENT /oc. cit. 
56 CLARK, Covenants I 50. 
57 Haftung des Verkliufers, supra n. 52, 244-249. 
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situs of the land, which is where the records of title are 
held and the only fixed contact of the entire chain. 
As to covenants of lawful seisin, or right to convey the 
land, and against encumbrances, since they were said to be 
broken upon delivery of the deed, they were subjected to 
the law of the place of this delivery. The modern construc-
tion, followed in an English statute of I 8 8 I, 58 is now shared 
by most American courts. In the absence of contrary agree-
ment, the grantor is presumed to give his promise to every 
successor in the chain so that the right is assigned with the 
land to the subsequent purchaser. This assignment is inde-
pendent of any "nominal" breach said to be committed by 
delivery of the deed with the false statement. Hence, all 
the mentioned types of covenants run with the land. Pre-
sumably they are under the lex situs. 
We may, then, finally appreciate the desirability of treat-
ing all covenants under the same law, and therefore of 
determining the nature and effects of the promises by the 
law of the state where the land is. 
But there can be a difference in conflicts law between 
covenants for title and veritable encumbrances. In the field 
of obligation, and only in it, the parties enjoy autonomy in 
the true sense, so that they may at their pleasure vary the 
qualification of the rights created by their stipulations. 
They must as well be able to choose the applicable law. 
Likewise, in a case such as Good v. Cood/9 where the con-
tract relating to foreign land is made at the common domi-
cil of the parties, the contract is centered there and covers 
all obligations of warranty. 
Smith v. Ingram. Another point is illustrated by the 
doctrine neatly presented in Smith v. Ingram and often 
repeated since. 60 Two effects of covenants of warranty were 
58 44 & 45 Viet., c. 41, s. 7· 
59 Supra n. 27. 
60 ( 1903) 132 N. C. 959, 44 S. E. 643, 61 L. R. A. 878; WHARTON 630 and 
6 
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distinguished. One is that the vendor is estopped from 
claiming the land against any purchaser in the proper chain 
of transfers. This effect, subject to the law of the situs, 
was denied in the instant case under the law of North Caro-
lina where the land was, the seller being a married woman, 
whose contract was valid under the law of her domicil in 
South Carolina. The other effect is that an action on the 
covenant arises for breach of warranty, as a purely per-
sonal contact, sounding in damages only, and this would be 
determined by whatever law governs the obligatory contract. 
To a comparatist this reasoning appears very attractive. 
A parallel may support it and suggest its adoption in civil 
law courts. In fact, the doctrine of estoppel has produced 
a perfect analogy to the Roman exceptio rei venditae et 
traditae-not noted thus far by historians, as it seems.61 
In the just-mentioned ancient stipulations, and in later 
periods by the legal force of sales contracts, the vendor 
promised that both he and his successors should not disturb 
the purchaser and the successors of the latter. Under 
Roman law, however, where the vendor sold and delivered 
land (or a slave) to the buyer but either failed to proceed to 
the formal act ( mancipatio) required for transferring the 
ownership at law ( dominum ex jure Quiritium) or had only 
subsequently acquired the title, the seller was entitled at 
law to enforce his "Quiritarian" ownership by vindicatio. 
But because he was obligated to transfer title to the buyer, 
he encountered the praetorian defense that he had sold and 
delivered. This exception was a part of the mechanism by 
which the praetor recognized an interest of the buyer, which 
under the name of "in bonis habere" closely approached 
n. 15 § 276 (d); 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094. The decision in the particular case 
of Smith v. Ingram had an odious result, pointed out in the dissenting vote 
by Walker, J., but this phase was due to the old doctrine concerning the 
capacity of married women. 
61 I do not mean to say that the Romans knew covenants running with the 
land; see BUCKLAND and McNAIR, Roman Law and Common Law (1936) 91. 
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ownership and by the Greek interpreters was called boni-
tarian ownership. Thus, the purchaser and his successors 
in title were protected against the owner or one from whom 
he derived title, on the ground of an obligatory right trans-
formed into a kind of property. This defense against the 
nominal owner pertains to the law of the situation. 
Apart from estoppel, the law of the contract, generally 
but not necessarily the law of the situs, covers the creation 
and effect of all covenants.62 This result is simple and 
satisfactory. 
Our discussion has no bearing on such agreements as a 
promise to convey, 63 or a promise by the vendor of a manu-
facturing plant not to enter into competition with the 
purchaser. 64 
IV. LAEsw ENoRMis (INADEQUACY oF CoNSIDERATION) 
In conformity with French law,65 the Civil Code of Louisi-
ana66 allows a vendor of an immovable estate sold for less 
than half the value, to demand rescission, unless the pur-
chaser chooses to make up the just price and keep the 
thing sold. This remedy, abolished in Quebec,67 and most 
other countries, developed out of an institution going back 
62 Just for the historical interest connected with warranty for title, we may 
note the controversy in the old French doctrine 'regarding the law determining 
the vendor's duty to furnish security against possible eviction. Certain post-
glossators, reading GAlUS' Lex si fundus, Dig. 2I, 2, 6, interpreted the con-
suetudo eius regionis in qua negotium gestum est, as the law of the vendor's 
domicil rather than the lex situs, and BouLLENOIS, 2 Traite de Ia personnalite 
et de Ia realite des loix (I766) 46I explained the former as presumably 
intended by the parties. In the nineteenth century, this warranty was not 
distinguished from the other incidents of a sale of immovables, see 8 
LAURENT 223 § IS3· 63 MrNoR +ss § ISs. 
64 Robinson v. Suburban Brick Co. (C. C. A. 4th I904) I27 Fed. 804, 
65 France: C. C. arts. I674-I68s, "of rescission of the sale on the ground of 
lesion." 
Austria: Allg. BGB. § 934 has preserved the general remedy of lesion. 
66 Louisiana: C. C. (I82S) arts. 2s67-2s78; (I87o) arts. 2s89-26oo. 
67 Quebec: C. C. arts. 6 so, IOI2. But it still exists in Italy: C. C. (I 86 s) 
arts. I S29-I S37; ( I942) art. I448. On South Africa, see infra ns. 78, 79· 
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to the legislation of the early Byzantine Empire.68 In com-
mon law, a shocking insufficiency of valuable consideration 
in a bilateral agreement is likely to be treated as a pre-
sumptive fraud69 and as such has been paralleled with the 
laesio enormis of civil law. 
In conflicts law, the subject has been interestingly dis-
cussed, notably by French writers. A number of authors 
have construed, from a purely French point of view, every 
lision as a defect of consent and therefore subject to the 
national law of the damaged party.70 In another theory, the 
lex situs applies directly or as intended by the parties. 71 But 
the lex situs has also been supported on another ground. 
Maury, 72 after an elaborate historical study, states separate 
legislative motives for the six different cases of genuine 
lesion at present founding rescission in French law. With 
respect to the vendor's lesion, he discards the idea of de-
ficient assent or moral coercion and he doubts whether the 
purpose of protecting vendors or owners has been decisive. 
68 Cod. Just. 4, 44, 2, proved to be interpolated by GRADENWITZ, 2 Bulletino 
dell 'istituto di diritto romano (1889) I4; see JoLOWICZ, "L'origine de Ia 
laesio enormis," in I Introduction a !'etude du droit compare (Etudes Lambert 
I938) I85. For the connections between Justinian's compilation and the 
modern doctrines, see DAWSON, "Economic Duress etc.", II Tul. L. Rev. (I937) 
345. 364 ff. 
69 Coles v. Perry ( I851) 7 Tex. I09, I34· 
70 8 LAURENT 2I2-2I6; BARTIN, 2 Principes 66 § 243; AUDINET in S. 
I931.2.145; LAPRADELLE in Revue I932, 295· 
For the law of the vendor as the party possibly obligated, 2 BAR 43; 2 
FRANKENSTEIN 302. 
The personal law of the vendor in combination with other laws has been 
advocated by RoLIN, 3 Principes 210. 
71 Cour Paris (Feb. 9, I93I) D. I931.2.33, S. I93I.2.I45, Clunet I932, I09, 
Revue I93I, 348 (lex rei sitae for lesion of a contract in Paris for sale of a 
German immovable, notwithstanding lex loci contractus applied to the con-
tract in general); Cass. req. (June 29, I93I) S. I932.I.289, Revue I932, 295 
(on the ground of a Morocco law); see attempts to harmonize at least the 
second decision with the theory of lex loci solutionis by BATIFFOL 343 n. 5, 
35I n. I. C6digo Bustamente, art. I82: "territorial law" for rescission in 
general also seems to mean the lex situs. 2 BRacHER § I85; CHAMPCOMMUNAL, 
Revue I932, 508. 
72 MAURY, "La lesion dans les contrats," Revue Crit. I936, 344, 352 ff., 
and in 3 Travaux du comite fran~ais de droit int. prive (I936) 70-I04. 
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Finally, accepting the latter idea, he restricts the French 
provision to French immovables. This places the problem 
under the lex situs. BatiffoP3 objects that the true thought 
of the French legislator is not so much to care for an Ameri-
can owner of a villa in Cannes on the Riviera, but to favor 
a French family owning immovables wheresoever. His con-
clusion is to apply the law of the contract. But Capitant has 
authoritatively stated that it is impossible to say which 
among the mingled ideas from the Byzantines to the present 
can be termed the true foundation of this institution. When 
Maury replied that "Certainly it is very difficult to choose, 
but since we place ourselves in the point of view of private 
international law, we are forced to do it," Capitant 
answered: "But this is arbitrary." 74 
It is not exact that conflicts law should depend on a 
doubtful intention in the legislative background of the 
domestic and still less of a foreign legislation. Nor are 
Maury's results good enough. He himself notes a "crying 
injustice" in deducing that when a sale is made under French 
law with respect to German immovables, French law would 
not be applicable because it refers to French immovables 
only, whereas the general remedy of German law against 
usury, the nullity of a contract violating good morals (BGB. 
§ I 3 8), would not apply because it refers only to contracts 
governed by German law.75 Why should a remedy be severed 
from the contract? The problem is not one of real property 
although it has been claimed as such most recently by 
Niboyet.76 On the other hand, the lex loci contractus as 
such77 has no More justification than usual. The law of the 
73 BATIFFOL, Revue 1934, 630 and BATIFFOL 351 § 405 n. 4· 
74 3 Travaux du comite fran~ais, supra n. 72, 100, 102. 
75 MAURY, Revue Crit. 1936 at 382. 
76 NIBOYET, 4 Traite 243 § 1158. 
17 FEDOZZI-CERETI 732 j 2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 72 § II 12. 
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contract must govern, and this is ordinarily, but not always, 
the law of the place where the land is. 78 
Illustration. A contract was entered into in the Transvaal 
Republic for the sale of land situated in the Cape Province. 
Lesion was a valid defense under Transvaallaw/9 although 
such defense has been repealed by the law in the Cape 
Province.80 The court applied the law of the place of con-
tracting, which was also the law of the forum, on the argu-
ment that lesion like fraud must be judged in considering 
the place where the vendor committed it.81 In our view the 
situs of the immovable is not "an immaterial incident," as 
the court assumed, but (in the absence of closer connections 
in particular cases) it is the center of the entire transaction, 
as it also furnishes the data for appraising the "just price." 
78 LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, Note, D. 1931.2.33; BATIFFOL 350 § 404. 
79 Transvaal: SeeR. W. LEE, An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (ed. 
4, 1946) 234 n. 3· 
80 Cape of Good Hope Prov.: Act No. 8 of 1879, § 8. 
81 De Wet v. Browning [1930] S. A. L. R. Transvaal Prov. Div. 409. 
CHAPTER 39 
Representation 
I. DEPENDENCE ON MuNICIPAL DocTRINEs 
1. Three Main Doctrines 
I N SURVEYING the present laws of representation in the world it is unfortunately still necessary to insert a 
few historical notes. The stages of evolution have left 
too many marks on this doctrine in numerous countries. 
Originally, nowhere was it imagined that one person 
(Agent, A), by making a contract with a third party 
(Tertius, T), could create obligatory rights and duties be-
tween the third party and a principal ( P). The official law 
of the Roman Empire, the classical Greek law, the Ger-
manic laws, and the English law during the whole Middle 
Ages, were no exceptions. Needs of daily life, of course, 
required makeshift arrangements to approach the purposes 
of representation, surrogates sometimes coming very near 
to the legally barred result. In the seventeenth century, 
representation was finally recognized. Yet, as late as the 
nineteenth century some notable writers asserted that repre-
sentation in creating obligations was logically impossible.1 
To make the strange phenomenon conceivable to the reluc-
tant mind of the lawyers, various awkward attempts were 
made of which some shadows may be detected in the doc-
trines of conflicts law. Only at the cost of much pain was 
the simple truth learned that conclusion of a contract 
through an agent produces a threefold relationship, corres-
ponding with the three persons involved. What happened 
1 THiiL, I Handelsrecht ( ed. 6, 1879) 234· 
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to conflicts law when uncouth doctrines insisted on seemg 
the three-dimensional phenomenon in two dimensions, may 
be seen in the two theories dominating French and Ameri-
can laws, respectively, which are briefly described as follows. 
(a) Doctrine of mandate. An old doctrine, widely main-
tained in Latin countries, is that of the two-sided "mandate." 
On one hand, article 1984 of the French Code states that: 
"Le mandat ou procuration est un acte par lequel une 
personne donne a une autre le pouvoir de faire quelque chose 
pour le mandant et en son nom."2 
On the other hand, "mandate" is at the same time character-
ized as a contract (art. 1984 par. 2) creating obligations 
between principal and agent (arts. 1991, 1998). Broadly 
speaking, this is the same method of dealing with the prob-
lems of representation as that originally used in common 
law; the contract of "agency" between principal and agent 
at the same time includes the grant of powers to represent 
the principal. Speaking only of the case where the agent is 
to perform a legal transaction, "mandate" or "agency" 
and "representation" are conceived as one sole legal insti-
tution producing two relationships: one internal between 
the principal and the agent, the other external between the 
principal and the third party. The internal relationship 
extends to the conditions under which A, by contracting with 
T, causes legal effects for and against P. Consequently, these 
conditions are included in the law governing the contract 
of "mandate," which again is most frequently identified 
with the law of the place where the contract of "mandate" 
is completed. 
(b) Incident of main contract. In an American decision 
2 In Louisiana, the Supreme Court, in one of its most drastic moves, has 
declared the words "in his name" of the analogous art. 2985 C. C. "not 
essential," so as to abandon the civil law definition and to adopt the com-
mon Ia w concept of power of attorney. See Sentell v. Richardson { 1947) 
211 La. 288, 29 So. {2d) 852; JoNES, Note, 7 L<•. L. Rev. (1948) 409. 
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of I 841, in order to find what law governs the effect of an au-
thority, an elaborate attempt was made to answer the ques-
tion, "what law determines whether the act (of the agent) 
constitutes a contract, with whom and to what effect."3 In 
other words, there is but one external relationship in which 
the power of the agent to affect the principal's legal situa-
tion is a mere incident. As the contract with the third party 
is governed according to the orthodox doctrine, by the law 
of the place where it is made, this also covers the agent's 
authority. 
It has never been stated, but it appears almost certain 
to the present writer that the continuous American practice 
ultimately laid down in the Restatement comes from that 
decision. While in the first mentioned theory the lex loci 
contractus of the agency contract applies, in this view the 
lex loci contractus of the third party contract governs the 
extent of the agent's authority. 
(c) Modern theory. The German, and to a certain 
degree the English, courts have recognized that the power 
of an agent to affect the rights and duties of the principal 
constitutes an independent institution and ought to have 
its own proper law, not necessarily coincident with those 
governing either of the two other relationships. 
Notwithstanding other propositions advanced in this 
field, these three conflicts doctrines demonstrate their inti-
mate connection with the development of representation 
in the municipal systems, or more exactly, in the general 
science of private law. 
2. Agency (Mandate) and Authorization 
The Roman ius civile did not progress to a true concept 
of representation in obligatory contracts, although business 
3 Carnegie v. Morrison (1841) 43 Mass. 381, 397 (issuance of a letter of 
credit by the agent of London bankers in Boston.) 
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life, protected by the praetors, furnished an increasing num-
ber of auxiliary institutions and Justinian's compilation pre-
sented a treasury of scattered remedies. 4 The Continental 
commentators, sometimes unable to continue adequately the 
ancient development, clung to the contract of mandatum, 
which was recognized in classical and Byzantine times as 
one of the four orthodox contracts concluded by consent and 
enforced by corresponding civil actions. Discarding all the 
more helpful possibilities that the Corpus Juris richly offered 
from oriental and occidental practice, the doctrine preferred 
the pattern of the classical mandatum. In Rome mandate 
was a contract between principal ( mandans) and agent (is 
cui mandatur, later mandatarius) imposing on the agent 
an obligation, originally gratuitous, to perform a factual 
work or to conclude a legal transaction in the interest of 
the mandator or of a third person. The agent, in making a 
contract with another party in performance of his obligation 
to the principal, necessarily entered alone into the contract 
with the third party. The effects of this contract had to be 
transferred within the internal relationship from the man-
datarius to the mandans. On this ancient foundation, the 
main line of doctrinal tradition took its orientation toward 
the agency contract rather than toward an institution of 
representation. When, finally, on the Continent, during the 
seventeenth century, as a result of various previous impulses, 
representation by free persons was formally recognized in 
law, the old formulations were nevertheless retained, and 
the legal doctrine mirrored life in a curiously distorted 
picture. Thus Puchta taught: 
The effect of the mandate is partly the constitution of 
representation with its effects, in this respect the mandate 
is called authority, partly an obligation between the man-
4 RABEL, Grundziige des Ri:imischen Privatrechts (1915) 507-512, and in 
subsequent articles, mostly followed in the literature. 
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dant and the mandatary from which the former acquires 
the actio mandati directa, the latter the contraria.5 
This doctrine was in force as late as I 87 I, when its critic, 
Laband, described it as follows: 
Wherever someone acts instead of another upon his 
authority, a mandate is assumed to exist; the principal is 
called mandant and the agent mandatarius; agency, man-
date, contract of authorization are words used synony-
mously by the lawyers. Those distinguishing more exactly, 
refer the term agency to the relationship between mandant 
and mandatarius, authority to the relationship between the 
mandant and the third party; agency indicates the internal, 
authority the external side of the relationship.6 
Conflicts law has experienced many strong influences 
of this conception. The writers, viewing representation from 
the angle of "mandate," without thinking assumed that the 
law governing this contract also determines whether and to 
what extent a transaction made by the agent in any country 
constitutes rights and duties for the principal. Hence, pro-
vided that the main contract is effective in all other respects, 
it binds the principal if the law governing the contract of 
agency (mandate) so determines. 
The law thus specified was, moreover, schematically 
identified with the lex loci contractus of the mandate. Again, 
to ascertain the place of contracting of the mandate, the 
traditional opinion held the mandate to be completed at 
the place where the agent "accepts the charge," 7 that is, 
in general, where the agent lives. But counterpropositions 
preferred the place where the mandant "receives the accep-
5 PUCHTA, Pandekten § 323· 
6 LABAND, IO Z. Handelsr. I83, 203 with respect to the German part of the 
literature. 
7 CASAREGIS, Discursus de commercio, disc. 179, §§ I, 2 n. I91 followed by 
HERT!US, I Opuscula de Collis. Leg. 147; BURGE, 3 Commentaries, pt. 2 ch. 20 
p. 753; STORY § 285; FIORE ( ed. 2) §§ 129 ff.; DESPAGNET 894 § 300 (reserving 
contrary intention); ROLIN, 3 Principes § 1390; WAHL in Baudry-Lacantinerie 
et Saignat 266 n. I § soo. 
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tance" from the agent,S or where the mandant is estab-
lished,9 which both come down to localizing it at the domicil 
of the principal. 
This awkward theory has still some followers/ 0 especially 
in Italy11 and in Latin America.12 
Not until Laband's famous article from which I have just 
quoted, was it clearly understood that a sharp distinction 
is needed. ( I) Principal and agent are connected by a re-
lationship producing a right or a duty, or both, of the agent 
to act on account of the principal. This relationship may 
be based on a contract without consideration, as the Roman 
mandatum was a gratuitous promise. But in modern times 
it flows normally from such contracts as agency or partner-
ship, or from an appointment of an administrator or guard-
ian by a court, or directly from law. ( 2) Authority is the 
power of the agent to conclude a contract with a third 
party. 
Employment, partnership, and the like may exist without 
authorization, and the latter may be conferred without 
imposing any contractual duty. Authority may exist contrary 
to internal directions by the principal to the agent; formali-
ties may be prescribed only for the underlying contract or 
only for the authorization; death or revocation may termi-
nate the former only, et cetera. 
The distinction was fully carried out in the German 
doctrine and elaborated in the German Civil Code of I 89613 
8 7 LAURENT 541 §§ 452 f. 
9 AssER-RIVIER, Elements § 97· 
1o Probably for the same reason, the Draft submitted by BARON NOLDE to 
the Institute for International Law, 33 Annuaire ( 1927) III 219, speaks 
merely of mandate as governed by the domiciliary law of the principal, and 
ignores the problem of authority. 
11 FEDOZZI-CERETI 740 ff., with the only concession to the local law that it 
ought to safeguard its own imperative provisions. 
12 E.g., Argentina: ALCORTA, 3 Der. Int. Priv. 109 ff. 
Brazil: ESPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 572 § 242; SERPA LoPES, 2 Lei Introd. 360. 
13 BGB. §§ 164 ff. on "representation" and "authority" are included in the 
general part, separated from the sources of obligations. 
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and the subsequent literature. At present, it prevails in the 
modern currents everywhere in civil law countries, including 
the views of the leading French writers of private law14 
and, although not too apparent, in most Latin-American 
legal literature. Numerous recent codes,15 among them the 
Italian Civil Code of 1942/6 have changed the former sys-
tem and separated the doctrines of representation and 
agency. 
This dualism so slowly perceived in the Continental doc-
trine was equally obscured in the late and difficult beginning 
of true representation in England. The doctrine of Principal 
and Agent started from that of Master and Servant and 
never could be entirely separated from it. Command and 
ratification were the first grounds for making the master 
liable for the contract or tort of the servant.17 Authority 
remained until recently such a ground, a condition of vi-
carious liability, and hence a part of the doctrine of agency 
rather than a clearly autonomous subject. In our times, how-
ever, despite some antiquated arrangements of encyclo-
pedias and inappropriate definitions,18 English and Ameri-
can writers have been fully aware of the significance of 
14 France: I COLIN et CAPITA NT 88, cf. 2 id. 704, 706; DEMOGUE, I Obliga-
tions §§ 89-155; EsMEIN in Planiol et Ripert, 6 Traite Pratique 72 § 55· 
15 The Swiss C. Obi. {1881) arts. 394-406 on mandate followed the French 
model, C. C. arts. 1984-2010. The Rev. C. Obi. adqpts the division in represen-
tation and authority, arts. 32-40, and the sources of obligations, especially 
mandate, arts. 394 ff. 
Poland: C. Obi. arts. 93 ff. on representation, arts. 498 ff. on mandate. 
The same distinction is made in the Scandinavian countries. 
16 The Italian C. C. {1865) arts. 1737-1763 is similarly replaced by C. C. 
( 1942) arts. 1387-1400 on representation and authority, arts. 1703 ff. on 
mandate and related contracts. 
17 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 2 History of English Law (1911) 530; HOLDS-
WORTH, 8 History of English Law (1922) 222, 227 f., 252 f. See also HOLMES, 
Agency, in Collected Legal Papers (1920) at 96. 
18 In such a modern English book as CHESHIRE and FIFOOT, The Law of 
Contracts ( 1945) 294, agency and authority are still not called by their 
names but described as "the two aspects of the contract of agency." What we 
call authority is circuitously defined "as leading to privity between principal 
and third party." 
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authority. They even share in two theoretical developments 
of the German doctrine that bring the conceptual distinction 
to a climax. 
The German Civil Code frankly admits that the prin-
cipal may declare his grant of authority directly to the third 
party ( § I 70), or by public notification ( § I 7 I), and treats 
him in the same manner, if he embodies his authorization 
in a written instrument and the agent shows it to the third 
party ( § I 72). These cases are plainly recognized in the 
American Restatement of Agency as "apparent authority" 
(§§8,9). 
Another characteristic feature of the modern system is 
that authorization is conceived as a unilateral act of the 
principal,19 in full contrast to the contract of agency. This 
construction, formulated in the German Civil Code, § I67, 
is likewise laid down in the Restatement of Agency. 20 It has 
also not been considered too subtle by the English courts 
in which the point has been recently reaffirmed in a case of 
conflict between English and German law. 21 
There is, of course, a fundamental difference between 
the two great systems. In civil law, representation requires 
that the agent should be authorized to act, and in fact 
should openly act, in the name of or at least on behalf of 
the principal, so as to make him from the beginning the 
exclusive party to the contract. 
At common law, when an agent acts in his own name and 
19 It is another question whether this act is "abstract," that is, may operate 
irrespective of the validity of the agency contract. National Socialist writers, 
in denying this effect, which is debatable, attacked the entire doctrine; for 
example, HERBERT MEYER, 2 Z. Ak. deutsches R. (1935) 53· But here Swiss 
law recognizes one of the rare cases of abstract acts; see OSER-SCHOEN-
ENBERGER art. 32 n. 27. 
20 Restatement of Agency §§ 15, 16, 26 comment a. The separation is felt 
but not quite correctly expressed as late as in TIFFANY, Agency 9· 
21 Lewis, J., in Sinfra AG. v. Sinfra, Ltd. [ 1939] 2 All E. R. 675, 682: "A 
power of attorney is not a contract. It is a onesided instrument." Lindley, L. J., 
in Chatenay v. The Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co., Ltd. [1891] 1 Q. B. 
79 at 85. 
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the other party does not know him to be an agent, the agent 
becomes the party to the contract, but the "undisclosed" 
principal may be sued by the third party, or may sue the 
latter under certain conditions.22 Accordingly, the concept 
of authorization must be defined broadly enough to cover 
the manifestations by which the person in whose interest, 
though not name, the act is to be done makes himself the 
principal. It is essential for our purposes that authorization 
be therefore understood in a double sense: the one for civil 
law consisting in the agent's power to act in the name of 
the person represented; and the other for common law con-
sisting in the agent's permission to act either in the prin-
cipal's name or as an undisclosed agent, or both. This con-
ception is no more difficult than the common law doctrine 
itself, but precise terminology is not available to cover this 
large ground. 
Terminology. The Restatement of Agency chooses to 
speak vaguely of the power "to affect the legal relations 
of the principal" ( § 7). If authorization be defined as assent 
of the principal that the agent should contract in his name 
"or on his behalf," 23 this identification would go counter to 
the common significance of "on behalf" as indicating dis-
closed principals, named and unnamed, or only the latter. 24 
Nor is "on account" a distinctive term, although it would 
admirably designate the representation of interests, since 
the word seems to be employed in the Agency Restatement 
sometimes also as a synonym of the term, "for a disclosed 
principal. " 25 
22 See GooDHART and HAMSON, "Undisclosed Principals in Contract," 4 
Cambr. L. J. (1932) 320, conclusion at 356. 
23 Thus BRESLAUER, 50 Jurid. Rev. (1938) at 308 n. 7· 
24 See, e.g., BoWSTEAD, Agency art. 27, "in whose name or on whose behalf," 
with respect to ratification which is not permitted to an undisclosed principal. 
25 See, e.g., §§ 7 comment d, 85 (r) and illustration 1; cf. § 4· In § 199, 
however, "on his account" and "on account of the principal" expressly mean 
an undisclosed principal. 
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For international purposes, we had better revert to an 
old terminology as follows : 
Acting in the interest of another person ("on account" 
of a principal in a proper sense) may be either: 
(I) direct (open) representation, i.e., acting "on behalf" 
of a principal (disclosed agency), namely, either (a) in the 
name of another person, or (b) on behalf of whom it may 
concern (unnamed agency; Restatement: partially disclosed 
principal) ; or: 
( 2) indirect representation (representation of interest 
but not of right), i.e., acting in the agent's own name for an 
undisclosed principal. 
In order to embrace all these institutions, authority 
broadly defined may be termed as a power to act "on ac-
count" of the principal, which seems identical with the 
power "to affect his legal situation."26 
Conflicts law must adopt the distinction between agency 
and authorization. Authority originates or survives if its 
law so disposes, irrespective of an accompanying agency 
contract following its own law. An American food concern 
may send an employee to Guatemala to buy bananas, and his 
power to bind the firm may be construed under the law of 
that state. This, however, is no reason why his salary and 
the right of the firm to dismiss him should not be subject 
to American law. 
Conflicts rules, on the other hand, may readily combine 
direct and indirect representation referring both to a 
national law which may or may not recognize the common 
law doctrine. 
26 Agency Restatement § 7: "Authority is the power of the agent to affect 
the legal relations of the principal ... "; Conflicts Restatement § 345 "on 
account." 
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Other sources of theoretical mistakes arose with the 
various primitive attempts to lay down the principle of open 
(disclosed) representation. The slogan, qui facit per alium, 
est perinde ac si faciet per se ipsum, much used in the medi-
eval development of the English master and servant doc-
trine,27 came to embody the idea that the represented and 
the representing persons are deemed to be one, in a merger 
of personalities. That this fiction dominated the history of 
agency in England, is not an exact proposition according 
to prevailing opinion. 28 But a distinct tradition of writers 
on conflicts law on the Continent took inspiration from some 
remarks of Casaregis. This jurist, who died in 1728, ex-
plained the transfer of property in goods sent from a seller 
to the buyer through delivery to a carrier, by the following 
construction (for which there were ancient analogies) : The 
seller, a "correspondent" of the buyer, is his commissioner. 
In complying with the buyer's order, he assumes a double 
personality, since in consigning the goods he conveys the 
property from himself as vendor to himself as the buyer's 
agent. 29 This dictum was read together with the same 
author's doctrine-which Story qualified as "so reasonable 
in itself, "-that the principal's order for purchase plus the 
ultimate consent by the agent form the contract in loco in 
quo et ipse ( mandatarius) · et venditor existunt.30 
27 See for the early occurrences, SAYRE, "Criminal Responsibility for the 
Act of Another," 43 Harv. L. Rev. (1930) 689, 690 n. 9· 
28 The sources collected by HoLMES, History of Agency, in 3 Select Essays 
in Anglo-American Legal History ( 1909) 368, In the prevailing opinion do 
not support Holmes' hypothesis that modern agency doctrine in general, and 
the rules concerning the undisclosed principal in particular, originated 
from the fiction of identity. See PoLLOCK and MAITLAND, 2 History of English 
Law (1911) 532 n. 1; YouNG B. SMITH, "Frolic and Detour," 23 Col. L. Rev. 
( 1923) 444, at 452 and cited authors; WiiRDINGER, Geschichte der Stell-
vertretung (agency) in England (1933) 241. 
29 CASAREGIS, Discursus de commercio, disc. 38 § 51 (ed. 1737) p. 126. 
30 Disc. 179 § 10 ( ed. 1737) p. 192; STORY § 285. 
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In a long chain of subsequent writings these figures of 
speech led to the conception that the principal, represented 
by half of the agent's double personality, appears himself 
in the conclusion of the main contract. Among the various 
consequences derived therefrom in municipal law, it was 
contended by some outstanding Romanists that the contract 
with the third party is exclusively and immediately con-
cluded by the principaP1 In this radical view, all requisites 
of consent to the main contract, such as sanity of mind, 
serious intention, freedom from coercion, fraud, and mis-
representation, the significance of knowledge in such matters 
as warranty of title and quality, were exclusively referred 
to the principaP2 However, in other versions, less emphasis 
was laid on the principal's part, and in some the fiction had 
even a reversed effect of making the principal disappear 
behind his representative. 
In 1828, the English chancellor, Lord Lyndhurst, adopted 
the obvious application of the fiction to conflicts law, by 
stating that: 
"If I, residing in England, send down my agent to Scot-
land, and he makes contracts for me there, it is the same as 
if I myself went there and made them."33 
Story found the same view accepted in two Louisiana de-
cisions.34 It has been approved in the case of Milliken v. 
Pratt35 and often since. The French and Italian literature 
followed largely the same trend. 36 The person of the prin-
cipal merges, se confond, with that of the agent,-this 
31 DERNBURG, I Heidelberger Kritische Zeitschrift I8 as cited by LABAND, 
infra n. 32; UNGER, 2 System des osterreichischen allegemeinen Privatrechts 
(ed. 3, r868) I36. 
32 Contra: LABAND, IO Z. Handelsr. 225 f.; THoL, I Handelsrecht ( ed. 6, 
I879) 236 § 70. 
33 Pattison v. Mills ( 1828) r Dow & Cl. 342, 363. 
34 Mr. Justice Mathews in Whiston v. Stodder (r8zo) 8 Mart. (La.) 95, 
134; Malpica v. McKown (r83o) r La. 248, 254; STORY§ 285. 
35 (r878) 125 Mass. 374· 
36 See 3 FIORE § II 50. 
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dogma appears as late as in the work of Andre Weiss.37 
In his words, a French principal acting through an agent in 
Belgium, is considered "to be on the Belgian soil. " 38 
These fictions are, like so many others, artificial and 
fallacious. As Bar pointed out, 39 how can the contract be 
regarded as made by the principal at the place of the agent, 
if the agent nevertheless decides whether and on what terms 
the contract should be made? And moreover, with the logic 
employed in this traditional approach, why should we not 
reach the opposite conclusion, viz., that the contract is 
deemed made at the principal's real domicil? 
As to legislative policy, of course, the overemphasis 
laid on the external side of agency is certainly preferable 
to the overstressing of the internal side of which the man-
date theory is guilty. But in many respects it is important 
not to forget that both principal and agent contribute to 
the effect of representation. Although they do so by no 
means on the same plane in concurrent acts of consent to 
the main contract, as was sometimes contended,40 they co-
operate, the one by conferring authority and the other by 
making the contract. 
The merger theory was rather detrimental to the early 
formation of the American conflicts rules. As an illustration, 
we may remember the Louisiana case of I 830, in which a 
shipmaster entered into a contract in Mexico and the Mexi-
can law affirmed his implie.d authority and made the ship-
owner personally liable, contrary to the law of Louisiana 
where the owner was domiciled. The court applied the Mexi-
37 WEiss, 4 Traite 373· 
38 Exactly to the same effect, VALERY§ 658: by charging his employee to 
go to France to represent him, the master transports himself in some manner 
to that country under guise of this representative; hence the contract is 
formed as though the master were present. 
39 2 BAR § 268. Among recent Latin-American writers, 2 RESTREPO 
HERNANDEZ §§ 1294-6 has warned against the fiction. 
40 See HuPKA, Vollmacht 36 against MriTEIS, Die Lehre von der Stell-
ve rtretung 109, 182. 
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can law as the law of the place where the contract with the 
third party was made, simply because if the owner had been 
personally present and had concluded that contract, the 
measure of his liability would be determined under Mexican 
law.41 That the principal was not present and did not make 
the contract, was forgotten under the spell of the fiction. 42 
In Milliken v. Pratt/3 a case considered as leading in con-
flict of laws concerning both the place of contracting and 
agency, the fiction was extended in a particularly offensive 
way. A married woman who could not bind herself under 
her domiciliary law of Massachusetts, delivered a note to 
her husband, guaranteeing the debt. The husband sent it by 
mail to his creditor in Maine. The Massachusetts court, 
eliminating its own law, held her liable under the law of 
Maine, because "if the contract is completed in another 
state, it makes no difference in principle whether the citizen 
of this state goes in person or sends an agent, or writes a 
letter across the boundary line between the two states." 
This makes the place of the recipient of a letter a place of 
acting by agent, treating the mail as agent although it is 
only a messenger. And in all the innumerable situations 
covered by this broad definition, the party giving a declara-
tion is considered as quasi-present at a place where either 
the recipient is present or the contract is deemed to be made. 
The real question had nothing to do with agency44 and leads 
to the debatable question of the place at which a declara-
tion by letter is localized, in order to satisfy the devious 
test of the place of contracting. The true issue involved the 
41 Arayo v. Currell (1830) I La. 528, 20 Am. Dec. 286, 289. 
42 See the pointed refutation by Story in Pope v. Nickerson (1844) 3 
Story, U. S. Circ. Ct. Reports 465, 480. 
43 ( 1878) 125 Mass. 374· 
44 Bell v. Packard (1879) 69 Me. 105, 31 Am. Rep. 251 presents a skillful 
argument and leaves the mail out of it. The contrary decision in Hauck 
Clothing Co. v. Sophia Sharpe (1900) 83 Mo. App. 385 is equally tendentious. 
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territorial scope of the laws restricting or freeing the 
capacity of married women.45 
4· The Developed Systems 
In many older and some quite recent treatises of con-
flicts law, all there is of agency is the eternal question where 
a contract through an agent is made. The question is idle, 
since the agent alone concludes the contract. 
The true problems of voluntary representation arise 
from its tripartite structure. In sum, we have to distinguish 
the contract (if any) creating obligatory rights and duties 
between principal and agent; the unilateral authorization by 
the principal empowering the agent to make a contract (or 
other transaction) with a third person; and this contract 
itself. 
It may also be recalled that civil law only considers acting 
on behalf of a principal as representation, and accordingly 
requires the principal's authorization to act on his behalf. 
In the best elaborated doctrine, the agent must make it 
clear to the third person that he acts not only in the prin-
cipal's interest but to make him immediately the exclusive 
party.46 Where the agency is undisclosed, the contract ex-
clusively regards the agent personally, and only the actions 
arising between agent and principal provide the means of 
transferring the effects of the external transaction to the 
principal. There are, however, important exceptions. Par-
ticularly in the case of a commission agent, claims acquired 
by the agent in his own name are deemed to belong to the 
principal as between these two persons or their creditors. 
The cautious provision of the German Commercial Code 
( § 392 paragraph 2) to this effect has been hesitatingly 
extended by judicial practice to other cases. Scandinavian 
4 5 See Ch. 40 ns. 46 f. and ns. 97 f.; cf. 46 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1948) at 634. 
46 German BGB. § 164 par. 2. 
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law has definitely gone (to some extent) beyond the Ger-
man pattern.47 These modifications of the logical antithesis 
between representation in law and representation in interest 
have given rise to a suggestive comparison with the common 
law doctrine which confers rights and duties on an undis-
closed principal. The two systems starting from opposed 
principles admit exceptions that diminish the contrast. They 
retain, however, their basically different outlooks and both 
leave notable gaps.48 Thus, they lend importance to the 
question what law governs. 
In the international field, the opposition of the systems 
was once incisively diminished by the common law rules 
presuming that the agent of a foreign, nonresident, or 
absent principal is not authorized to act on behalf of the 
principal, and that he is exclusively personally bound when 
acting in his own name. The usages of trade on which these 
distinctions were based, have disappeared. 
A remarkable divergence exists also in the types of inter-
mediaries developed in commercial life and then constituted 
special legal institutions. In common law, the terms, agent, 
factor, broker, and commission agent have retained much 
of their original colloquial meaning with overlapping con-
notations. They are not identical with any nomenclature of 
a civil law country, in most of which the language equally 
fluctuates between commercial routine and legal exactitude. 
In Germany, such expressions as Prokurist, H andlungsbe-
vollmachtigter, Kommissionar, A gent, and Filialleiter, are 
most rigidly legal. The language of conflicts law ought to 
47 Scandinavian law as adopted in Sweden, Agency Law of April 18, 1914, 
§§ 57, 58, see CAPELLE, Das Aussenverhiiltnis bei der Vertretung fremder 
Interessen nach Skandinavischem Recht, in Festschrift fiir Leo Raape ( 1948) 
325. 330. 
48 See in the first place SCHMIDT-R!MPLER, Das Kommissionsgeschiift, in 
Ehrenberg's Handb. V, r, 479, 6ro; HANS R. HARTMANN, Das Ausfiihrungs-
geschiift im deutschen und englischen Kommissionsrecht (Rostock 1935) re-
viewed by ScHMIDT-RIMPLER, II Z.aus!.PR. (1937) 744-753. 
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be broad enough to embrace all such categories m a few 
rules. 
II. ANGLo-AMERICAN FoRMULATIONS oF THE CoNFLicTs RuLES 
1. Dicey 
The two rules of Dicey have been so often cited in the 
English courts that they must be mentioned, though with 
utmost disapproval. Rule I 79 predicates under the headline 
of "Contract of Agency" that: 
"An agent's authority, as between himself and his prin-
cipal, is governed by the law with reference to which the 
agency is constituted, which is in general the law of the 
country where the relation of principal and agent is created." 
Does this section deal with authority or the contract 
of agency? With respect to the latter, the application of 
the general subsidiary criterion of lex loci contractus would 
be entirely wrong. However, the notes refer to the Ameri-
can cases dealing with the powers of a shipmaster and 
a partner. 
On the other hand, Rule I So (c) says that: 
"When a principal in one country contracts in another 
country through an agent, the rights and liabilities of the 
principal as regards third parties are, in general, gov-
erned by the law of such other country, i.e., where the con-
tract is made (lex loci contractus)." 
If this rule, as it seems on its face, refers to the law govern-
ing the main contract, it may again be criticized insofar 
as it calls for the lex loci contractus. But in the notes and 
comment, Dicey evidently includes authority, and he pre-
sumes an intention of the parties that the agent should have 
authority in each country in accordance with the laws there-
of. Thus, authority, totally missing in the text of the rules, 
is obscurely interpolated in both comments. Moreover, the 
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attempt to proclaim the lex loci contractus for these matters 
is not supported by the English cases.49 
2. Restatement 
The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, under 
the topic of "creation of a contract" establishes one rule 
( § 342) concerning the obligations of a principal and his 
agent as between themselves, 50 unfortunately calling for 
"the law of the place where the agreement was made." 
Authority is separated and treated in three bewildering 
rules, which can only be approximately understood in con-
nection with the Restatement of Agency. The latter Re-
statement, in an original attempt to break down the powers 
of agents into categories, distinguishes four classes: 
(I) "authority," short-named, created by manifestation 
of the principal to the agent ;51 
( 2) "apparent authority," created by manifestation of 
the principal to the third party ;52 
(3) estoppel, which on condition that the third party 
"changes his position," produces an action for him against 
the principal ;53 and 
( 4) unnamed "powers" arising in various situations, 54 
which, for instance, include the acts incidental to, or usual, 
or necessary for conducting authorized transactions. 55 
While these classes, despite certain doubts, may be help-
ful for analytical purposes in municipal law, it is astonishing 
49 On this point of the criticism, see BRESLAUER, so Jurid. Rev., supra n. 23, 
at 303. See now the thorough criticism by the editors of DICEY ( ed. 6, 1949), 
with criticisms partially similar to mine. 
50 At the same time, the sections in question deal with partnership. It has 
been submitted before (Vol. II, Ch. 21) that this treatment is wrong insofar 
as the personal law of partnerships is ignored. Of course, partnership is 
also one of many sources of representation. 
51§§ 7. 26. 
52§§ 8, 12 comment a, 27. 
53 §§ 31 ( 1) comment a, 159 comment e. 
54 § 12 comment b refers in particular to §§ r61-176, 194-202. 
•
5 §§ 161, 194. 
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that the Conflicts Restatement should undertake to lay 
down three different rules for the three groups ( 1 ) , ( 2), 
and ( 4) , omitting ( 3) . We shall look into the confusing 
results of this effort. 5 6 But we may take encouragement from 
the neat separation of authority from agency. 
3· Encyclopedias 
The various comments on the conflicts rules in practi-
tioners' works, are unenlightening and full of contradictions. 
They ought to be radically reformed. 
III. THE THREE SuBJECT MATTERs oF CoNFLICTs LAw 
The right categories of operating facts to be subjected 
to conflicts rules are easily found. The three distinguishable 
relationships among the three persons involved in agency 
require three independent conflicts rules, although, of 
course, they by no means necessarily have to refer to dif-
ferent laws. 
I. Authority 
The law or laws governing the power of an agent to act 
on behalf, or on account, respectively, of the principal have 
to comprehend creation, extent, modification, and termina-
tion of the power. Authorization by ratification must also 
be included, and all shades of manifestations to the third 
party or the public through which authority is either really 
constituted or only apparently but reliably asserted.57 There 
56 Infra Ch. 40 p. 159. 
5 7 The subject of what in common law was shortly called implied authority, 
has been much discussed in the German doctrine. A full and critical report 
on the not too happy formulations of the German Civil Code and the litera-
ture is to be found in THEMISTOCLES D. MACRIS, of Athens, Greece, Die 
Stillschweigende Vollmachtserteilung (Mar burg 1941). 
On the French doctrine, see the informative article by LE:Auri:, "Le mandat 
apparent dans ses rapports avec Ia theorie generale de l'apparence," 45 Revue 
Trim. D. Civ. ( 1947) 288. 
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is no sense in differentiating in conflicts law powers con-
ferred by the principal on the agent directly, or by declara-
tion or conduct on which the third party relies. For, in any 
case where any relations between the principal and third 
parties should arise, the third party may only rely on some 
manifestation, i.e., declaration, act, real or apparent acqUI-
escence, not of the agent but of the principal. 
2. Underlying Relationship 58 
The internal situation between principal and agent, 
whether based on a contract or not, extends to all their 
obligations toward each other, including the duty of the 
agent to follow the instructions of the principal and to 
notify all third persons concerned of modifications or termi-
nation of his authority. It would seem that also the fiduciary 
position of agents and the control by the principal to which 
they are subjected in American law, general as they appear, 59 
are incidents of the underlying relationships, such as em-
ployment and partnership, rather than of the authority. 
3· External Relationship 
Where an agent concludes a contract with a third party, 
or makes or receives a unilateral legal statement, in the 
principal's name, such transaction is the basis for all rela-
tionships imaginable betvxeen the principal or the agent 
on the one hand, and the third party on the other. 
Due to the extraordinary confusion in this field, the 
assertion has sometimes been ventured in the United States 
that a contract made by an authorized agent is governed 
by the law of the agent's domicil or of the place where the 
58 Following the common law terminology but distinguishing as we do, 
FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 368, speaks of "authority," in opposition to 
"power"; this corresponds in the case of disclosed agency with what we 
call the internal instructions given within the underlying relationship. 
59 See Restatement of Agency §§ 13, 14. 
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agent exercises his authority. 60 This is true of authorization 
but not of the third party contract. Nor is this contract 
subject to the lex loci contractus,S1 any more than other 
agreements. The governing law is simply determined ac-
cording to the type or individual character of the contract 
itself, sale, bailment, loan, et cetera. 
The law governing the "main" or "third party" contract 
(or other transaction), whatever law it may be, decides 
whether a party to it can be represented by another person 
at all, or under what circumstances; whether, for instance, 
authorization must be given by a special act or in a written 
document62 and whether the agent must make known his 
authority to the third party. 6~ The particular common law 
doctrine regarding the rights to sue and be sued when the 
principal is not disclosed in the contract, also belongs to the 
effects of the main contract, which has not always been 
understood. 64 
The same is also true, however, with regard to the effects 
of the contract, if the agent's authority is missing or in-
sufficient.6" In this respect again confusion is frequent. 66 
The American courts are not in similar danger because they 
6o I5 C. }. S. 886, Conflict of Laws § 11 n. 28. 
61 2 C. J. S. I038, Agency § 8 n. 83. 
62 With regard to the formal requirements, this is a delicate question; see 
infra Ch. 40, III, I, pp. I69-I70. 
sa 9 Repert. 2I No. 6. 
64 In Mas pons v. Mildred, Goyeneche & Co. ( I882) 9 Q. B. D. 530, 539 the 
Appeal Court correctly declared that the nature and extent of the authority 
given by a domiciled Spaniard to another in Havana, Cuba, was to be as-
certained under the Spanish law there in force but, when this was ascertained, 
the law governing the third party contract determined "the persons who can 
sue and can be sued on that contract." Wrongly, BRESLAUER, 50 Jurid. Rev. 
( I938) 30I, 309, 3IO f. assumes that the latter question is the very question 
of authority, that therefore the decision is inconsistent and that it proclaims 
the law of the place of the main contract for authority. Also DICEY 725 is not 
quite clear on the classification. 
65See RABEL, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (I929) 824 (against 2 ZITELMANN 211, I 
FRANKENSTEIN 59I) followed by RAAPE, D.IPR. 275, II. See also FEDOZZI-
CERETI 751. 
66 Thus, RG., 76 Seuff. Arch. 2 is confused. See RABEL, supra n. 65, at 823. 
The tortuous ways of the doctrine since Casaregis are still reported by such 
authors as ALCORTA, 3 Der. Int. Priv. 113. 
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apply the law of the main contract to every problem of 
authority. Correct classification is assured, if we remember 
that in the best opinion liability of an unauthorized agent 
to the other party is based on his fraudulent or innocent 
misrepresentation of authority. 67 Common law has led the 
way in this construction, which is expressly formulated in 
the provisions of the Restatement of Agency on implied 
warranty of authoritt8 and has been consistently recog-
nized by the English courts.69 
We shall deal next with authority (Chapter 40) and 
subsequently with the most typical contracts between prin-
cipals and agents. The transaction with a third party with all 
its just-mentioned incidents, is determined by its own nature. 
6 7 HUPKA, Die Haftung des Vertreters ohne Vertretungsmacht ( 1903) on 
the basis of comparative research. With meticulous consequence KosTERS 771 
advocates with the Dutch H. R. (April 4, 1913) W. 9494 the law of the 
place where the agent warrants authority, to govern the liability of the 
agent to the third party. · 
68 § 329· 
69 See Brit. Russian Gazette and Trade Outlook, Ltd. v. Ass. Newspaper, 
Ltd. etc. [1933] 2 K. B. 616-C. A. 
CHAPTER 40 
Authority 
}\S EXPLAINED before, the present chapter is ex-
..t1. elusively intended to report on the conflicts concern-
ing the authority of agents, that is, their powers to 
enter into transactions with third persons on behalf or on 
account of a principal. For the sake of simplicity, we shall 
suppose that the transaction with a third person is a con-
tract in the technical sense which we have called the main 
contract or the third party contract. The local connections 
between which the choice of law for the existence and the 
scope of authority must be determined are not numerous. 
The selection ought to be confined, roughly speaking, to two 
contacts, namely, the places where the principal is deemed 
to be situated and where the agent is deemed to act. We 
may call them the law of the principal and the local law. 
I. THE CoNFLICTS RuLES 
r. Policies of Conflicts Rules 
The influential theories of Story1 and Bar2 had a common 
merit. They emphasized the policy problem inherent in the 
choice of law governing the validity and effect of an agent's 
authority. Both eminent writers were in agreement that the 
protection of the principal's interest was of prevailing sig-
nificance. Although they realized the difficulty for a third 
party to obtain full knowledge of the existence and extent 
of the powers of a person acting on behalf of a foreign prin-
1 STORY§ 286 (b), and in Pope v. Nickerson (1844) 3 Story, U.S. Circ. Ct. 
Reports 465. 
2 2 BAR 69. 
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cipal, they argued nevertheless that the latter could only 
be made liable under the law of his domicil. In this view, the 
third party must inform himself concerning the facts of 
the agency on which he relies, or else be satisfied with what 
liability an unauthorized agent may incur. It was thought 
intolerable that one should, without having conferred the 
requisite power under his own law, incur liability by reason 
of another person's transactions. This might subject him to 
any law in the world! 
The Restatement, in its first section on the subject, § 343, 
approaches this appreciation of the problem by prescribing 
the law of the place where the agreement constituting 
authority is made. 
An opposite view, however, has doubtless acquired su-
perior strength. Arguments and formulations vary, but 
the emphasis in all variants has shifted from the principal's 
place to that of the agent's activity. Lord Phillimore, in 
a much noticed brief remark, pointed to "the duty as well 
as expediency of upholding bona fide transactions with the 
subjects of foreign states," which he called the first prin-
ciple of private internationallaw.3 His many followers have 
concluded that security of commerce requires protection of 
the third party in assuming that the agent has the powers 
that he would have under the local law. In the case of 
"apparent authority," though for unknown reasons only in 
this case, the Restatement likewise refers to the law of the 
state where "reliance is placed" on the authorization 
( § 344) . According to another analysis, the state in which 
the transaction takes place is entitled to preference over 
the foreign law to which the principal may be subject. 4 It 
is often argued that the creation of an authority is of less 
importance than its practical exercise by the agent in enter-
3 4 PHILLIMORE § 705; 2 MElLI 39; RoLIN, 3 Principes 420 ff. 
4 THOL, 1 Handelsrecht (ed. 6, 1879) § 67 n. 3· 
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ing into a transaction with a third party. Accordingly, 
§ 345 of the Restatement proclaims the law of the place 
where the agent is to "act for the principal or other part-
ners," and the German courts stress the law of the place 
where the authority "develops its effect." 5 
Both basic theories have been recently attacked for con-
sidering the protection of interests instead of being content 
with a simple application of the law of the place of per-
formance.6 This idea, however, rests on the old, inadequate 
theory of mandate as containing a duty which is to be 
"performed.'' 
The debate has indeed suffered from a congenital defect, 
namely, an unwarranted generalization of reasoning. As 
will appear immediately below, Story and Bar dealt with 
special cases in which the powers of the agent were from the 
beginning limited by a law deserving universal effect. In 
pursuance of their arguments, we may contend that the law 
of the principal governs the powers of a shipmaster and 
those conferred on certain representatives directly by law 
or by public appointment. On the other hand, where a 
principal constitutes authorization by an ordinary, private, 
voluntary act, intending its use in a foreign state, the law 
of this state is justifiedly considered competent to construe 
the validity and effects of the authorization. In the former 
cases the protection of the principal, in the latter cases the 
protection of the third parties, obtain preference. 
The two theories, thus, can be reconciled. Neither does 
Story's opinion mirror the present American law, 7 nor is it 
completely obsolete, 8 nor wrong because of unilateral con-
sideration of the risk of the principal. 9 But it is no more 
5 See infra n. 74· 
6 BATIFFOL 282 § 315. 
7 KUHN, Comp. Com. 277, cf. Recueil 1928 I 258. 
8 BRESLAUER, 50 }urid. Rev. (1938) 307. 
9 2 BEALE I 196. 
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correct to harmonize, as does Wharton, 10 the theory of the 
principal's law in Pope v. Nickerson and the proper law 
doctrine adopted in the Chatenay Case by the supposition 
that the intentions of the parties were different. 
We shall first discuss the special situations of authoriza-
tions recognized everywhere as constituted under the law 
with which the principal is connected. The rest of this 
chapter will be devoted to the domain, commonly the only 
one envisaged, of the powers of privately constituted agents. 
2. Authorizations Internationally Determined by Their 
Source 
(a) Shipmaster's powers. Story, in his treatise/1 dis-
cussed the common law rule that the master of a ship has 
a limited authority to borrow money in a foreign port and 
give a bottomry bond only in cases of necessary repairs and 
other pressing emergencies, while in some maritime countries 
the master has a broader authority, or at least a broader 
liability may attach to the vessel and the owner. Story 
approved the English practice restricting the master of an 
English ship according to the law of the domicil of the 
owner. 
Later, in the Massachusetts federal circuit court, Story 
applied this view in the case of Pope v. Nickerson 12 in which 
a Massachusetts vessel, owned by a resident of that state, 
on a voyage from Malaga to Philadelphia, put in to Ber-
muda under stress of weather and was sold by the master 
with the whole cargo. The liability of the owners for the 
acts of the master was limited by the laws of Spain and 
Massachusetts to the value of the vessel and her freight, 
but was unlimited in Pennsylvania. 
lO WHARTON 875 § 408a. 
11 STORY § 286 (b). 
12 Pope v. Nickerson ( 1844) 3 Story, U. S. Circ. Ct. Reports 465, 474, 19 
Fed. Cas. 1022 No. II1274· 
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Story held13 that "if the ship is owned and navigated 
under the flag of a foreign country, the authority of the 
master to contract for and to bind the owners, must be 
measured by the laws of that country, unless he is held out 
to persons in other countries, as possessing a more enlarged 
authority. . . . If any person chooses to trust him under 
any circumstances, or beyond this-it is a matter of blind 
credulity, and at his own peril. ... If we were to resort 
to a different rule-to the laws of the different countries 
which the ship might visit, for the interpretation of his 
powers, while he was in the ports of that country-we 
should have the most extraordinary and conflicting obli-
gations arising .... " 
To be sure, Story, while arguing about the force of the 
law of the flag, exclaimed that "No one ever imagined that 
in any other case of agency to be transacted in a foreign 
country, the principal was bound beyond the instructions 
or authority given to his agent .... The authority con-
fided (to him) by the principal is measured by the interpre-
tation and extent of that authority, by or according to the 
law of the place where it is given, by the lex loci and not 
by the laws of a foreign country .... " However, this is 
an entirely mistaken obiter dictum, whereas his decision in 
the instant case was perfectly correct. 
That a shipmaster's authority is to be measured once 
and for all according to the law of the flag, may indeed be 
called a universally settled rule. It has been adopted in 
England, clearly in Lloyd v. Guibert14 and probably in con-
stant practice.15 It appears in the resolutions of interna-
tional congresses16 and in the C6digo Bustamente.11 It pre-
13 Jd. at 475 ff. 
14 (I86S) L. R. I Q. B. us; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 3ZZ f. 
15 M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 450 § 4z4; infra p. Z6I. 
16 Congresses of Antwerp and Brussels, see I Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 4Z6. 
17 Art. Z79· 
7 
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vails commonly.18 In this respect, it can be said therefore 
that legitimate reliance of the public may be based not on 
local laws but only on the law of the state to which the 
vessel belongs. 
Story and other common law jurists have spoken of the 
master's authority as interpreted under the law of the flag. 
On the Continent, it is often directly construed as a legal 
power. There is no substantial difference of meaning. The 
decisive consideration is the international preference en-
joyed by the law of the state where the vessel is registered. 
(b) Legal authority. To refute the application of lex 
loci contractus of the main contract, Bar contended that 
security of commerce, instead of requiring this application, 
on the contrary demanded the application of the law under 
which the authority was given.19 For illustrations, he re-
ferred to the directors of a corporation, the powers held 
in civil law on the ground of family relations, and those 
of a shipmaster. "What would be the use, for instance, for 
a stock corporation to limit the powers of a director by 
requiring assent of the board or of the assembly of stock-
holders, if he were not so bound in contracting abroad?" 
These are forceful arguments. But they support the lex 
domicilii merely in application to what are called in civil 
law countries legal representatives. Such include the father, 
mother, guardian, or curator of an individual, inasmuch as 
they are granted by law supervision over person or property 
and conclude legal transactions in the name of the child 
or dependent person, or assist in his transactions; the organs 
of legal persons; receivers in bankruptcy, administrators of 
decedents' estates and all other agents acting with legally 
defined powers for estates, without being the titular owner 
as common law trustees are. 
1 8 With the ill-reputed exception of the German Reichsgericht, see infra 
Ch. 43· See for France, citations in 3 Repert. 30 No. 45· 
19 2 BAR 69. 
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The principle extends to formally fixed powers which 
cannot be restricted with effect against third parties. Such 
powers are vested in many countries in the boards of cor-
porations,20 in commercial managers such as procura insti-
toria under Italian,21 or procura under German law,22 in 
guardians, 23 and others. The investigation of such powers 
is reduced to a minimum of inquiry. 
This doctrine seems to be settled at present, clearly in 
Germany, 24 and also in other civil law jurisdictions.25 It 
is the only view consistent with the principle of personal law. 
This law determines in what respect and by whom an indi-
vidual or association is represented by operation of law.26 
At common law, the situation is different. The category 
of "authority by law" is not unknown, but consists of few 
and doubted cases.27 Powers based on family relations are 
scarce. The personal law thus largely disappears behind 
the law of the place of contracting, or that governing the 
contract. 
However, in the broad domain of the law of corporations 
and other associations, we have found it highly advisable to 
recognize that the law governing the life of the organiza-
tion should extend to the powers of the principal officers 
or managing partners.28 This postulate, it is true, is often 
neglected. 
20 See Vol. II pp. 169 f. 
21 C. C. (I 942) arts. 2203 ff. 22 BGB. §§ 49, so; see for other commercial dependent agents, § 54· 
28 French C. C. art. 450; German BGB. § 1793. 
24 When I suggested this approach in 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 809 ff., the 
doctrine seemed insecure, but it has been commonly confirmed since. 25 E.g., Hungary: Curia (Oct. 27, 1937) 5 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 396; the 
manager of an Amsterdam shipping enterprise, a registered merchant in 
Vienna, had unlimited authority under Austrian law to hire there a 
Hungarian worker. 
26 Vol. I pp. 318, 6o2; Vol. II pp. 167 ff. 27 MECHEM, Agency 9· 2 WHARTON 868 spoke of taking charge of the 
affairs of another "either by the voluntary act of such latter person desiring 
to be relieved of care, or by act of the law, as in the case of guardianships 
and commissions of lunacy." 
2s Vol. II, pp. 168-172. 
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Illustration: An Ohio corporation owning land in West 
Virginia conferred on Porter, a real-estate broker ( appar-
ently in Ohio), by formal action of its board of directors a 
power of attorney "to sell the property." In a subsequent 
lawsuit, the issue depended on the authority of a subagent 
in West Virginia appointed by Porter. The West Virginia 
court applied its domestic law, laid down in two preceding 
decisions of the court, in order to state that the board of 
directors-in Ohio !-had failed to comply with the for-
mality prescribed in West Virginia that the signature and 
the corporate seal be affixed.29 Although the law of the 
forum for several reasons was applicable to determine the 
subagent's powers, it should not have been extended to the 
original authorization except upon its questionable force 
as lex situs, which is not even mentioned in the report. 
Finally, the powers of all persons appointed by a court 
or an administrative agency, whether connected with a trust 
relation or not, are as a rule legally defined and therefore 
must be expected to be subject to the law of their creation. 
In all these cases, neglected in the treatises, the law 
under which a power is deemed to be constituted has a 
natural and overwhelming claim. Exceptions for protecting 
innocent third parties will not be justified except in rare 
cases. Persons dealing with the alleged principal officers of 
an association or court appointees, indeed, should be charged 
with the knowledge of the existence and extent of their 
powers. On the other hand, they may rely on the source of 
these powers. 
3· Authorization Determined by Local Law 
(a) Former views: Law of the principal. It is only in 
the field of authorization by private legal act that the law 
of the principal has been pushed into the background. For 
29 Gallagher v. Washington County Savings, Loan and Building Co. 
(1943) 25 S. E. (zd) 914, 918. The court invoked§ 345 of the Restatement. 
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a time it was favored on the Continent.30 Some followers of 
the mandate theory supported it as the law of the place 
where the mandator receives acceptance.31 More writers 
have maintained the same device as a subsidiary test, as in 
the case of an agent sent to several countries.32 
(b) Local law. On the other hand, the fiction of identity 
was a strong factor in promoting the law of the place where 
the agent represents the principal. As late as I 917, the 
Appeal Court at the Hague applied Italian law to the 
authority of a Genoese broker with the justification that the 
Dutch principal was deemed to have traveled to Genoa.33 
The real grounds, of course, for preferring the law under 
which the agent "exercises his power"-or however else 
the courts express the local law-lie in the idea that third 
persons should be able easily to ascertain the powers of 
the agent. Most frequently, this consideration has been 
aided by presumptions concerning the intentions of the 
parties. For, so far as the principal manifests his will 
unequivocally and brings it to the knowledge of the third 
party, no problem arises. But when he is silent or negligent 
or relies on internal instructions or legal restrictions relating 
to the power conferred by him, which are unknown or 
unusual in the foreign country, construction of his conduct 
in the light of the local law is regarded as justified. Similar 
problems arise with respect to the validity and termination 
of authority. 
80 Belgium: 7 LAURENT 539 § 450 (place of the principal as the party 
making the offer of mandate). 
Germany: 8 ROHGE. 150. 
Italy: FEDOZZI-CERETI 751 and n. 3, reserving the law of the forum pro-
tecting bona fide parties. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. 14, 1876) W. 4132. 
81 Supra p. 125 n. 7· 
82 Thus, e.g., 2 WHARTON 869 § 406 (who confuses the case with that of a 
soliciting agent); DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 283; VALERY § 658; 2 ScHNITZER 
541. And see infra at n. 59· 
88 App. s'Gravenhage (June 8, 1917) W. 10208, applying Ital. C. C. (1865) 
art. 376. 
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Other rationalizations are questionable. That modern 
writers should think (in Savigny's manner) of the principal 
as "submitting" himself to the foreign law only because he 
sends his agent there, 34 resurrects an antiquated emphasis 
on the volition of a party. It is also objectionable that Beale 
terms the question one of jurisdiction.35 Ultimately, Beale 
ascribes the principal's subjection to the foreign law to the 
fact that he causes the use of the authority in the foreign 
state.36 Not even this justification is accurate. 
Beale's main example is Milliken v. Pratt which we have 
not found to be a suitable part of agency law.37 Accepting 
its bizarre construction of the mail service as a regular 
agency, Beale concluded that Massachusetts law was ap-
plicable because the woman caused the postal delivery in 
that state.38 This amounts to saying that a person under a 
disability at his domicil, can render himself competent by 
directing his note to another state through the mail. Com-
monly, the same weird result has been reached under the 
law of the place where the contract is "completed." 
In another case39 adduced by Beale, a married woman 
signed an accommodation note in favor of her husband's 
firm in Alabama, supposing that it would be discounted in 
Alabama. The note was, however, taken to Illinois. The 
New York court declared that she was not liable because 
of incapacity under her own law. But did she not "cause" 
the discount in Illinois, in the sense of a conditio sine qua 
non? She did, although it may be contended that she did not 
authorize such discount. Causation is the wrong word also 
84 2 BEALE u98; similarly e.g., RG. (Dec. 5, 1896) 38 RGZ. 194, whereas 
recent decisions stress the needs of commerce. 
35 2 BEALE II98 § 345.2. 
36 Restatement § 345 and comment c. 
37 Supra Ch. 39 n. 43· 
38 2 BEALE II97 § 345.2. 
39 Union National Bank of Chicago v. Chapman (1902) 169 N. Y. 538, 
62 N. E. 672. 
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for the reason that it raises the idea of some compulsion on 
the agent whereas authorization confers merely a power, 
and a duty of employing it flows only from an accompany-
ing contract. 
The true reason for the application of the local law is 
simply objective expediency, provided that the principal 
has contemplated acting in the foreign country. 
England. Among the approaches taken by the courts in 
various countries, the most impressive is illustrated by the 
English case, Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph 
Co.40 While numerous other English decisions are elusive 
or confusing, this Court of Appeal decision is outstanding. 
A Brazilian executed in Brazil in the Portuguese language 
a power of attorney authorizing a broker in London to buy 
and sell shares of stock. The court had to decide under what 
law the extent of the authority was to be determined. Al-
though starting from the usual references to lex loci con-
tractus and lex loci solutionis, the Court of Appeal passed 
to the twofold consideration that ( r) the true meaning of 
the authority was to be ascertained on the ground of all 
circumstances of the execution of the instrument including 
the Brazilian law, and ( 2) if the meaning was that shares 
were to be bought and sold in England, "the extent of the 
authority in any country in which the authority is to be acted 
upon is to be taken to be according to the law of the par-
ticular country where it is acted upon." The court, thus, 
emphasized two distinguishable requisites of representa-
tion, one to be determined with a certain regard to Bra-
zilian law, and the other with an exclusive view to English 
law. 
Recent decisions follow the same line.41 
40 [1891] I Q. B. 79, 83 f.; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 319 seems to interpret the 
case quite differently. 
41 Sinfra Aktiengesellschaft v. Sinfra, Ltd. [ 1939] 2 All E. R. 675; Apt v. 
Apt [1947] P. 127, aff'd, C. A. [1947] 2 All E. R. 677 at 68o: analogy for 
authorization of a proxy marriage. 
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It has been said42 that a contrary opinion was expressed 
in 1933.43 An English insurance company, employed by 
a New Y ark insurance broker through an English broker, 
insured a Canadian corporation residing in New York. The 
American broker cancelled the policy, and the question was 
whether he had authority and ground to do so. The court 
affirmed this question, applying New York law to determine 
the extent of the broker's authority. This decision was 
amply justified, since the power was considered conferred 
by the brokerage contract and therefore effective as against 
the insured. Lord Scrutton, it is true, invoked Dicey's Rule 
No. I 79 and applied the law of New York as the place 
where the brokerage contract was made. But the learned 
judge would scarcely have followed this theory if the broker-
age contract had been concluded somewhere else. This 
Appeal Court decision, scantily equipped, should not be 
regarded as overruling former considerations. 
Germany. Exactly the same approach as that manifested 
in the Chatenay Case was developed by the German courts 
in an elaborate system presently to be discussed.44 
France. The majority of French authors are led by the 
theory of identity of principal and agent to the application 
of the law of the place where the agent contracts with the 
third person.45 
United States. Likewise, despite Story, the American 
courts do not apply the law of the principal to an agent's 
authority. Nor is it true that they determine the validity 
and scope of an authority under the law of the place where 
42 Note, 5 Cambr. L. J. ( 1934) 251; FALCON BRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 373; . 
see SCHOCH, 4 Giur. Comp. DIP. 290. 
43 Ruby Steamship Corp. v. Commercial Union Ass. Co. (1933) 46 LI. L. 
Rep. 265, 39 Com. Cas. 48, 4 Giur. Comp. DIP. No. 161. 
44 Infra pp. 156 ff. On the Swedish views, see MicHAEL! 301 f. 
45 LAURENT 544; WEISS and VALERY, see supra Ch. 38 ns. 37, 38. Directly 
to the same practical effect, BATIFFOL, Traite 609 § 609 and Cass. civ. (July 
2, 1946) Gaz. Pal. {Nov. 30, 1946) cited by him. 
Contra: ARMINJON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 412. 
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the authority is constituted as has been asserted on the basis 
of one sole case, 46 that of Freeman's Appeal.41 There, the 
Connecticut court was interested in applying the law of the 
forum to deny capacity to a married woman domiciled in 
the state, in opposition to the leading case of Milliken v. 
Pratt and all other cases in point.48 The woman, in her own 
state of Connecticut, had signed a note of guarantee for 
her husband and handed it to him, and he mailed it to 
Illinois. The decision was based on her incapacity to author-
ize him as her agent in Connecticut. What such an argu-
ment is worth, is shown by the previous decision of the same 
court validating a married woman's blank endorsement 
of an insurance policy, delivered to her husband in Con-
necticut, on the ground that the husband filled it out in 
New J ersey.49 
The usual approach of the American courts is different. 
They determine the powers of an agent according to the 
law of the place "where the agent exercises his authority," 
identifying this place with the place where the contract 
between the agent and the third party is made.50 It is not 
certain under what theory this law, the lex loci contractus 
of the main contract, is applied. The decisions often refer 
to the alleged general rule of Scudder v. Union National 
BanP1 that the validity of a contract is governed by the 
law of the place of contracting. But in almost every single 
case some additional connection has pointed to the same 
law, apart from the fact that most decisions are concerned 
46 Thus 2 C. ]. S. 1038, Agency § 8 and n. 82; Restatement § 343· However, 
a recent case may be added with respect to formality. See infra n. 89. 
47 ( 1897) 68 Conn. 533, 37 Ad. 420. 
48 Supra Ch. 39 n. 43· 
49 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Westervelt (x884) 52 Conn. 592. 
2 BEALE II96 n. 3 places the case on a more convincing ground: the assign-
ment of the policy to the beneficiary was the act authorized by the woman. 
60 2 BEALE II95; 15 C. J. S. 886 n. 28 and Supp. 1948. This includes recent 
cases such as Moore v. Burdine (La. 1937) 174 So. 279; Paxson v. Com-
missioner of Int. Revenue (C. C. A. 3d 1944) 144 F. (zd) 772. 
51 (x87s) 91 u. s. 406. 
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with insurance contracts made by a local agent. If as sug-
gested before, 52 the rule goes back to a case of I 84I, its 
significance is that the existence and extent of authority is a 
mere incident of the contract with a third party, quite as 
form and capacity have been so often treated in this country. 
What exact localization this theory furnishes if we 
abandon the tenet of lex loci contractus, will be discussed 
later.53 
Latin America. Despite the continued influence of the old 
mandate theory, Latin-American writers also seem to veer 
towards the law of the place where the agent "carries out 
his mandate."54 The hope is justified that authority may 
be given its own place in the conflicts law. 
(c) Limitations on the local law: Types of agents. The 
German doctrine applying the law of the place where the 
agent exercises his power, was first established in the case 
of an agent having a permanent and fixed place of business. 
Bar, the advocate of the law of the principal, conceded an 
exception for foreign domiciled representatives. 55 The Ger-
man courts, in fact, for a long time emphasized the agent's 
domicil only under a threefold limitation: namely, (I) the 
agent should be an individual or organization, established 
at a fixed place of business in a country other than that of 
the principal; ( 2) he should have concluded contracts in 
that country only; moreover, (3) the suit should arise from 
52 Carnegie v. Morrison (I84I) 2 Metcalf (43 Mass.) 38I, supra Ch. 39 
n. 3· We exclude entirely the liability of stockholders for acts of directors 
in a state other than that of incorporation, often categorized under the 
subject of agency, as by Thomas v. Matthiessen (I9I4) 232 U. S. 22I and in 
England by BRESLAUER, so Jurid. Rev. (I938) at 3I4. On the subject itself, 
see Vol. II pp. 8 I ff. 
53 /nfra II, I (a), pp. I63, I65. 
54 E.g., Brazil: EsPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 372 § 242; SERPA LoPES, 2 Lei Introd. 
360 § 26I. 
55 BAR, in I Ehrenberg's Handb. 345 and n. 5; followed by HUPKA, Voll-
macht 2 52; similarly, 2 WHARTON 867 § 405. 
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different interpretations of the scope of authority m the 
countries of principal and agent.56 
The typical case, thus defined, presents the core of the 
matter and seems to be treated practically everywhere to 
the same effect. In the words of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, 
"the manifestation of the agent goes out from the territory 
of his law and is directed from there to the third person."57 
The latter, as the Reichsgericht constantly states, has to 
rely on this law. 
This unanimity may partly be explained by the fact that 
in outstanding cases the solution is obtainable from both 
ends of the controversial line of thought. The courts often 
stress the necessity for the third party to depend on the 
local law. But where the agent is a branch or agency in the 
exclusive service of the principal firm, his place of business 
may be regarded as a special domicil of the principal him-
self. Such reasoning has inevitably prevailed when a foreign 
corporation carries on business in a state. Whether or not 
that state prescribes that an agent with full powers must be 
appointed and registered, the powers of any permanent 
representative of the foreign corporation are conveniently 
measured by the local standard. 
The same solution is to be found where the agent is a 
domiciled independent contractor. When a Dutch firm 
through its branch in Cardiff, England, employed an Italian 
brokerage firm domiciled in Genoa, Italy, to sell coal, the 
Dutch court did not hesitate to apply the Italian Code of 
Commerce in construing its authority.58 
56 Germany: RG. (Dec. 5, r896) 38 RGZ. 194; (Jan. 14, I9ro) 66 Seuff. 
Arch. No. 73; (Dec. 5, 19n) 78 RGZ. 55· 
57 Switzerland: Inspired by 2 MEILI 39, BG. (Dec. 22, 1916) 42 BGE. II 
648, 650 (validity of "procura" of a foreign branch); accord: (Dec. 14, 
1920) 46 BGE. II 490, 493 (branch manager); (March 5, 1923) 49 BGE. 
II 70, 74 (although concerned with agency in contracting, seems also con-
clusive for authority). 
58 The Netherlands: App. Haag (June 8, 1917) W. 10208, with the argu-
ment that because authorization was given to a brokerage firm carrying on its 
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But, while modern followers of the law of the principal 
are forced to acknowledge concessions in the cases men-
tioned, some have insisted on their rule in the case of a 
traveling salesman having no fixed domicil. 59 Nevertheless, 
the German courts which once proclaimed such a distinc-
tion,60 have enlarged their formulation of the rule in such 
generally expressed dicta that it is prevailingly understood 
to include the powers of any agent.61 In the United States, 
it has not been doubted that when a traveling salesman 
goes from state to state selling goods, "the situs of the 
contracts he makes is where he exercises his authority." 62 
The recent English decision in the Sinfra Case has recognized 
that where a power of attorney is issued for use in several 
countries, the scope of a copy for use in England is deter-
mined by English law ;63 the English presumption is that 
any authority given for several countries entitles the agent 
to act in each country in accordance with the laws thereof.64 
Kinds of problems. Since the differences of municipal 
rules concerning the extent of authority, and particularly of 
implied authority, are outstanding in judicial discussions 
everywhere, they appear also in the foreground of the 
business in Genoa, Italy, the contract constituting the authority was made in 
Italy. The court distinguishes sharply the contract made through the agent 
with the third party. Cf. e.g., Swiss BG. (July 20, I92o) 46 BGE. II 26o, 263: 
the plaintiff, having a special agent in Switzerland, had to take into con-
sideration that the acts of its representative are determined under Swiss law. 
59 Supra n. 32. 
60 RG. (June 15, I92o) 76 Seuff. Arch. 2, still followed by NussBAUM, 
D. IPR. 263, and LAUTERBACH in Palandt, Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (1944) 
I9I2, 5 (a). But the decision was confused and has no authority; see for 
criticism, RABEL, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (I929) 822. 
61 See the authors cited in 3 Z. ausl. PR. (I929) 815 n. I; and adde LG. 
Berlin I (Oct. 5, I932) IPRspr. I932 No. 63 with comment by RABEL, 7 
Z.ausi.PR. (I933) 802. 
62 Succession of Welsh (I904) III La. 8oi, 35 So. 9I3 (for the purpose of 
applying the Louisiana law of seller's privilege); Kamper v. Hunter Land 
Co. (I92o) I46 Minn. 337, 34I, I78 N. W. 747· 
63 Sinfra Aktiengesellschaft v. Sinfra, Ltd. [I939] 2 All E. R. 675. 
64 Esher, M. R., in the Chatenay Case at 83, cited by DICEY 725 Rule I8o 
(c), comment and note (e). 
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literature from Story to the present time. But the rule that 
the law of the agent's act governs, naturally enlarges its 
own domain. Problems such as the effect of ratification and 
termination of authority cannot conveniently be solved in 
a different manner. The scope of the local law expands, and 
it becomes the general law governing voluntary authority. 
The American practice has never made a distinction among 
the problems. 
(d) The Restatement. In § 343, whether an agreement 
constitutes "authorization" is said to be determined by the 
law of the place where it is made, the lex loci actus. How-
ever, § 344 subjects "apparent" authority to the law of the 
state "where reliance is placed upon such apparent authoriza-
tion." Finally, § 34 5, under the condition that there is 
authority or apparent authority for acting in a state, leaves 
it to this state to decide "whether an act done (there by 
the agent) on account of the principal imposes a contractual 
duty upon the principal." 
We know that Beale65 intended to consider the risks and 
rights not only of the principal, as Story did, but also of 
the third party, which he found protected in the cases. But 
we are faced once more with patently contradictory rules, 
since here less than anywhere else can creation and effects 
of the legal relationship be submitted to different laws. 
If § 343, for instance, says that the state where an agree-
ment is made determines whether it constitutes an authori-
zation, does this not include the requirement of personal 
capacity to appoint an agent? Yet, illustration 2 to § 345 
states that a married woman's promissory note signed and 
handed to her husband in X is valid if the wife is responsible 
under the law of Y where it was to be, and was, discounted. 
Certainly this is the solution prevailing in the courts. But 
this practice clashes with the broad language of § 343· To 
65 2 BEALE II96 § 345.1. 
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read Beale's own comment to § 34 5, 66 it seems that he en-
dorsed the cases in many other respects. Is, then, § 343 in 
reality restricted to the question whether P in X sends the 
agent to state Y to act on his behalf ( cf. § 34 5 comment c) ? 
This would make sense, but does not exhaust the meaning 
of the section. 
For comment a to § 345 of the Restatement assigns to 
§ 343, viz., the lex loci actus, the "extent" of authority. 
However, illustration 3 to § 345 calls for the law of the 
place of acting to determine, according to § 345, implied 
authority. 
The place of reliance ( § 344) must be something different 
from the place where the agent "acts" ( § 34 5), and the 
difference might reflect a diversity of opinion about the 
selection of convenient contacts. But what this place of 
reliance exactly is, why the rule is changed from § 344 to 
§ 345, and what is meant by the agent's "act," is nowhere 
explained. The suspicion seems justified that the reliance 
rule for apparent authority intends to satisfy some scholastic 
need for a symmetrical contraposition of the manifestations 
to the third party in contrast to manifestations to the agent. 
The confusion is due in the first place to the stereotyped 
use of lex loci contractus and, in the second place, to the 
erroneous belief that the distinctions proposed in the Agency 
Restatement could support differentiated rules of conflict. 
Leaving these obscure riddles unsolved, we may remark 
with satisfaction not only, as noted before,67 that agency and 
authority are neatly distinguished but also that the local 
law receives a significant role with the express purpose of 
protecting the expectation of third parties. 
66 22 BEALE II9S· 
67 Ch. 39 p. I39· 
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4· Consideration of the Principal's Law 
In applying the local law of the place where the agent 
"exercises" his authority, the English and German courts 
expressly presuppose that the principal has agreed that the 
agent should act for him in the specific country. With a 
similar intention, though less correctly, the Restatement, 
§ 34 5, requires "causation" by the principal for the agent's 
acts in the foreign country (supra pp. 152 and 159). The 
American courts require "some conduct of the principal 
... warranting a legal presumption of agency."68 
Does all this mean a preliminary conflicts rule referring 
to the law of the principal's domicil or of the place where 
he constitutes the authority? In my own former proposal 
I suggested that the law of the principal's domicil ought to 
determine "whether the principal has declared his assent 
that the agent should act for him in the specific foreign 
country." 69 The Restatement takes a similar position, as 
§ 343 subjects the question whether an authorization to 
act in the foreign country exists, to the law of the place 
where the agreement is made. This is usually the domicil 
of the principal. 
However, this reservation has been criticized as too 
subtle, 70 and it would be consistent with the point of view 
as KUHN, Comp. Com. 277, cf. Hauck Clothing Co. v. Sophia Sharpe ( 1900) 
83 Mo. App. 385. The mother in Missouri sent her note to the son in Indiana 
"without legal restriction and with legal authority to sell it, where and to 
whom he wanted," at 392. 
69 RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 835, cf. 7 id. (1933) 8o6. 
Cf. the English Sinfra Case, supra n. 63; the judge contrasts extent and 
revocability with "formation," and leaves a question open as to formality 
and capacity. 
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (March 18, 1895) 16 Hans. GZ. (1895) HBI. 
139: the law of the flag decides whether the shipowner could be bound "at 
all" by the signing of the bill of lading, whereas the law of the port of 
destination under German practice governs the rest of the problems. OLG. 
Hamburg (March 3, 1914) 35 Hans. GZ. ( 1914) HBI. 131: the Italian agent 
was not at all authorized to contract for the Hamburg firm, hence no 
question of the extent of authority arose. 
70 BATIFFOL 282 n. 5; BRESLAUER, supra p. 145 n. 8, at 312. 
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preferred in discussing consent by silence and analogous 
questions/1 here also to abandon insistence that the above 
formulated question should be determined by any special 
law. In the Chatenay Case, the court required the ascertain-
ment that the Brazilian principal by his power of attorney 
under the circumstances prevailing in Brazil intended to 
authorize selling and purchasing in England. But this ques-
tion was not expressly assigned to Brazilian law; the judg-
ment may be read as applying English law in prescribing 
an investigation of the Portuguese language, the Brazilian 
usages, and the legal knowledge of the principal in order to 
construe his intention. This is probably how the English 
commentators understand the case.72 
An express intention of the principal to submit his authori-
zation to the law of a certain country is extremely rare. 
But a tacit selection of the applicable law has sometimes 
been correctly assumed when the powers were given for 
the purpose of proceeding in the courts or government 
offices of a foreign country.13 By the same reasoning, the 
English rules providing for strict interpretation of powers 
of attorney, 74 apply where a sealed deed of authorization 
is conferred in England. 
II. THE DEFINITION oF LocAL LAw 
1. Various Views 
Although the distinct trend of the courts in the United 
States, England, Germany, the Nether lands, and probably 
most other countries has veered toward the local law, no 
agreement has resulted in the exact definition of this law. 
11 See Vol. II p. 522. 
72 See CHESHIRE 264. 
To a similar effect, probably RAAPE, D. IPR. 275 speaking of simultaneous 
application of the law of the principal. 
73LG. Berlin I {Oct. 5, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, No. 63 at I35· 
74 See BowsTEAD, Agency 49 art. 36. 
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Usually there is no reason for doubt, because a permanently 
established agent of a foreign principal concludes a con-
tract with a third party in the country of his domicil. Thus, 
the extent of the general authority of a London ship broker 
to make a charter party for a foreign shipowner or charterer 
certainly is subject to English law.75 But which of the three 
involved connecting factors, viz., the conclusion of the 
contract, the domicil, or the agent's part in the conclusion, 
prevails if these factors do not coincide? 
(a) Lex loci contractus of the main contract.76 The 
French authors and the American cases are probably to be 
interpreted to the effect that authority is governed entirely 
by the law of the place where the main contract is made. 
If we do not believe in the force of the lex loci contractus, 
this rule may be transformed into either of two possible 
variants. It might be concluded that authority should be 
determined by whatever law governs the main contract. 
This agrees with an approach sometimes suggested in 
Europe.77 
Or the place where the agent does the act embodying his 
consent to the main contract might be emphasized. This 
would bring the American tradition into a near relation to 
the following attempts at localization. 
(b) Law of the agent's domicil. Whenever the local law 
has been applied in view of a permanent domicil of an 
agent, his place has been contemplated as that where he 
exercised his powers or acted in the interest of the principal; 
the law of this place governed his transactions. In par-
ticular, the German and Swiss highest courts have con-
stantly had such a situation in mind. 78 
75 E.g., the Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 29, 1930) W. 12345, N. J. 
1934. 631. 
76 KosTERS 769 advocates this law when it is more favorable to the third 
party than the law of the principal's domicil. 
77 BRESLAUER, so Jurid. Rev. ( 1938} at 308 optimistically contends that 
this is the true doctrine to be drawn from the English cases. 
78 All the cases supra ns. 56, 61, and n. 57 are conclusive on this point. 
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(c) Law of the place of operation. A few American 
decisions mention, among coincidental facts, the place where 
a power of attorney was to be exercised. Thus, a power of 
attorney to lease Mexican land was subjected to Mexican 
law because, among other contacts, it was "to be exercised 
in Mexico." 79 The termination by death of an authority to 
sell Texas land was declared to be governed by Texas law 
with the justification that attempts had been made to carry 
out the power in the state.8° Commonly, it is true, such 
language seems to mean nothing else than the place where 
the main contract is made. 81 
The German courts have constantly used the same lan-
guage in the formula that the power conferred by authoriza-
tion is governed by the law of the place where that power 
is to take effect or "deploys its force, " 82 for instance, the 
place where the agent and the third party meet. 83 It is 
identical with the place of "reliance" according to § 344 of 
the Restatement and its illustration, in the case of an agent's 
showing his written power of attorney to the third party. 
The contract may be concluded subsequently at any place. 
If A sends T an offer with notice that he is authorized by 
P to transact with him, he may be considered as using the 
authority at his own place, while the contract may be con-
sidered completed by the mailing of T's acceptance. It may 
also be said in such a case that the agent "acts" at his own 
place (Restatement § 34 5), although T places his "re-
liance" on the letter when he receives it. Or vice versa, the 
agent may visit the other party and show his authority 
79 Merinos Viesca y Campania v. Pan American P. & T. Co. (D. C. E. D. 
N.Y. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 352; cf. 2 C.]. S. 1038 at n. 83. 
so Gilmer v. Veatch (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) I2I S. W. 545· 
81 This is the impression given by 12 C. J. 451; 5 R. C. L. 934; II Am. 
Jur. 395 § II2 n. II; Succession of Welsh (1904) III La. Sox, 35 So. 913; 
Kamper v. Hunter Land Co. (1920) 146 Minn. 337, 340, 178 N. W. 747· 
82 See in particular RG. (Dec. 5, I9II) 78 RGZ. 55; (June 14, 1923) Recht 
1923, No. 1222; KG. (Dec. 14, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, No. 9· 
sa RG. (March 23, 1929) Leipz. Z. 1929, 1268 No. 3· 
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while he subsequently writes the decisive letter from his 
own domicil. It is true that the other party is supposed to 
rely on the authority at the very moment of contracting, 
whether he sees a written authority at this moment or not 
at all; but the formulation here in question stresses the act 
of the agent in which he leans on the authorization. 
Also an English judge has stated that the place where 
an authority is "operated," determines the law.84 
2. Rationale 
Ad (a) The proposition of applying the law governing 
the main contract is manifestly wrong, despite its adop-
tion in the courts of this country. If A in London, agent of 
a Bombay firm P, sells to T in New York roo bags of jute, 
deliverable f. o. b. Bombay, the sale is governed by the 
Anglo-Indian Sale of Goods Act. To determine for this 
reason the power of the London agent under the same law, 
would defy the very idea from which the argument starts. 
The applicable law would be that of the principal instead 
of that on which T may rely. 
On the other hand, in Mas pons v. Mildred,S 5 the English 
Court of Appeal held that the extent of an authority given 
and accepted in Havana, Cuba, between firms there domi-
ciled was governed by Spanish law, then in force in Cuba. 
Nevertheless the main contract concluded with the third 
party, a firm in England, by correspondence, was declared to 
be under English law, probably according to the party's in-
tentions. It would have been grotesque to determine the 
extent of the agent's power by English law. 
Again, suppose that A, the local agent of a foreign finance 
84 Sinfra Aktiengesellschaft v. Sinfra, Ltd., supra n. 63, at 682; in Apt v. 
Apt [1947] 2 All E. R. 677-C. A. at 679, Cohen, L. J., refers to the law of 
the intended place of performance, which was a sufficient formula in the 
instant case. 
85 Supra Cb. 39 p. 141 n. 64. 
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corporation P, makes a loan to T and the printed loan form 
includes a stipulation for the law of P's home state. Does 
this clause extend to the question whether the agent was 
entitled to waive some forfeiture clause of the printed 
form? The courts are unanimous in subjecting this question 
to the local law. 
Ad (b) In the narrower, but by far most important, case 
of a permanently established agent, the law of his place 
offers a sound compromise. The business place of a branch 
manager or a servant of the foreign principal, amounts to 
a secondary seat of the latter. If the contract is made in 
the jurisdiction where the agent resides, which is the regular 
case, no practical doubt disturbs the courts. It would be 
pedantic to search for another place of reliance. Indeed, 
the locality in which the agent shows the written power of 
attorney to the third party, or where the principal orally 
tells him that he authorizes A, is immaterial in such a 
situation. 
Illustration. P of New York at a convention in Chicago 
tells T of Arizona that he has a new district manager A for 
several states with headquarters in Denver, Colorado, and 
hopes that Twill patronize him. According to § 344 of the 
Restatement, this "apparent authorization" would be deter-
mined by the law of Illinois. If subsequently, A makes an 
offer by letter to T in Arizona and T accepts by letter, 
according to § 345 of the Restatement, the "effect" of the 
authorization would be determined by the Arizona law 
which conflicts with § 343 and § 344, but in this case agrees 
with the decisions. Under the German rule for agents with 
fixed domicil, the Colorado law governs the acts that the 
agent is entitled to make. It is submitted that this agrees 
with the presumable intentions of all three parties. 
Ad (c) The place where the agent "acts" (Restatement 
§ 345) may be any place in the course of his activity from 
his assertion that he is authorized to the completion of the 
third party contract. 
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In American decisions, it is true, this exact point has 
never been raised. In one case, 86 the district manager of the 
Firestone Corporation in Oklahoma went to Texas for the 
purpose of concluding a contract and at the same time made 
an oral promise to a third beneficiary. But since the federal 
court in Texas stated that "the foreign corporation sent 
its district manager to this state," the possibility was not 
considered that his implied authority might have been gov-
erned by the law of Oklahoma; under the circumstances, 
the agent was not functioning as district manager but as 
a special envoy. 
Conclusion. The law of the principal has lost its claim to 
govern generally the conditions and effects of authority. 
A logical solution would always point to the place where 
the agent warrants his authority expressly or impliedly. But 
it might in some cases be doubted where this place is. More-
over, if he or the principal manifests the authorization dur-
ing the negotiations, the ultimate consent by the agent to the 
contract is the more important event. 
While such doubts challenge a single rule, judicial ex-
perience has furnished, instead of one, two rules. 
If an agent, acting for a foreign principal, carries on 
his function from a fixed place of business, the law of this 
place governs. 
In all other cases, the law of that place should govern, 
in which the agent manifests (declares or dispatches) his 
consent to the main transaction. 
The law of the principal's domicil is not even applied 
when it is more favorable to the third party than that just 
mentioned. When a Danish city,. having contracted with 
a domiciled agent of a German firm for the purchase of 
certain goods, resorted to a provision of the German Com-
86 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Fisk Tire Co. (C. C. A. Texas 1935) 
87 S. W. (zd) 794· 
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mercial Code, § 86, paragraph 2, authorizing third persons 
to address notice of defects and rejection of goods to the 
agent, the Reichsgericht refused the plea. Because security 
of commerce requires that persons dealing with the agent 
should be able easily to examine and ascertain the scope of 
his authority, for this purpose, they must rely on the law 
at the place of the agent. A larger extent of powers under 
the law of the principal is not necessarily more favorable 
to the third party. "It may be disadvantageous to him, for 
instance, where it is in question whether his declaration 
to the agent binds or obligates him. In no case should the 
application of any law depend on its being or not being 
favorable to him." 87 This, in my opinion, is convincing. 
III. ScoPE OF THE LocAL LAw 
1. Validity of Authority 
(a) Form. Although the majority of American cases 
apply the lex loci contractus of the main contract,88 there 
is no firm rule. When a power of attorney was signed in 
Italy before a vice-consul of the United States without a 
seal being affixed, the act was recognized as formally valid 
in accordance with Italian law, and hence declared sufficient 
to support the execution by the agent of a sealed instrument 
in the United States.89 This agrees with the first Restate-
ment rule rather than with the traditional rule, although 
it is not clear why an American consul should be supposed 
to act under Italian rules of formalities. 
Municipal laws include many formal requirements for 
authorizations. The rule of the common law just alluded 
to requires that an authority to execute a deed must also 
87 RG. (Jan. 14, 1910) 66 Seuff. Arch. No. 73· All these propositions made 
in 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 835 seem to me still the best. 
88 2 BEALE §§ 332.4, 342.1. 
89 /n re Everett Estate (1941) 112 Vt. 252, 23 Atl. (2d) 202. 
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be under seal. 90 In many states of the United States authority 
for an agent to contract for the sale of land91 requires an 
instrument satisfying the statute of frauds, like the sale 
itself. 92 In a widespread doctrine, authority is generally sub-
jected to the same formalities as the authorized contract. 93 
The German law has taken the contrary viewpoint; al-
though a contract to transfer title to land requires solemni-
zation by court or notary,94 authorization to conclude such 
contract is formless ;95 however, increasing exceptions have 
been stated.96 
The conflicts question has scarcely been treated with 
special reference to authority. The repeatedly mentioned 
German conflicts rule, in its latest broad formulation, seems 
to extend to formalities the law of the place where the 
agent exercises his authority; this place is identical with 
the situs when the agent sells an immovable at the place of 
its location.97 
The American practice, on the other hand, ought to be 
crystallized to the effect that the law governing the third 
90 BowsTEAD, Agency 31 art. 24; Restatement of Agency § 28. But this Re-
statement § 29 notes that if an oral authorization is insufficient to make a deed 
of conveyance effective, it suffices to maintain the deed regarded as a 
memorandum of a contract to convey. 
9l Authority to transfer land or rights in immovables is another thing and 
always is governed by lex situs. 
92 MECHEM, Agency 96, 257. For a recent example of a contrary West 
Virginia statute under which oral authorization to contract for real estate 
is permitted, see Gallagher v. Washington County Savings Loan and Building 
Co. (1943) 25 S. E. (2d} 914. 
93 Restatement of Agency § 27. 
Georgia: C. C. ( 1910) § 3574; a "broad and sweeping rule," Byrd v. Piha 
(1927) 165 Ga. 397, 141 S. E. 48; Oellrich v. Georgia R. R. (1884) 73 Ga. 
389. 
Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 1392. 
94 BGB. § 313. 
95 103 RGZ. 295, 3oo-3o2, and many other decisions. 
96 See comments to § 313 of the BGB. 
97 See the dicta in LG. Berlin (Dec. 5, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, 133 No. 63; 
cf. KG. (Dec. 14, 1933) IPRspr. 1933 No. 9· To the same effect, the Pre-
liminary Draft of a Uniform Law on Representation in Private Law Con-
tracts (October 1946) requires the formality prescribed by the law of the 
country where the act is to be accomplished. 
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party contract should determine the form in which the 
power must be conferred upon the agent. This result logi-
cally and conveniently includes the closely connected prob-
lem whether the agent needs a special authorization for 
the intended transaction, this being under all circumstances 
an incident of the main contract. 98 
On the optional theory of locus regit actum, finally, an 
authorization would also be sufficient if its form complies 
with the law of the place where the principal constitutes it. 
How far this theory may be carried, seems to deserve 
future investigation. 
(b) Capacity. In the United States, this problem has 
been lost in the game of searching for the place where a 
married woman makes a contract when she sends a note 
through correspondence, agents, or messengers.99 
In civil law, the personal capacity of a principal to 
authorize an agent is in practice governed by the law of 
the former's domicil rather than his nationality.100 
If we eliminate lex loci contractus and avoid confusion 
with the main contract, the problem reverts to the question 
of policy, whether a principal, incompetent by his domi-
ciliary law, should be deemed capable if the law of the place 
where his authorization is used so provides. According to 
the conclusions reached in Volume One, capacity to establish 
obligations should be determined under their proper law, 
if not accorded by the personal law. The law governing 
authority to create obligations, therefore, should be able 
to grant capacity. 
(c) Intrinsic requirements. American as well as German 
98 Supra Ch. 39 p. 141. 
99 Supra pp. 134, 155. 
100 On the ground of the older theory (STORY and BAR, supra ns. r, 2) 
the domicil of the principal determines all of the authority. Consistently, 
only domicil, not nationality, remains a possible test for determining the 
capacity of authorizing, which I adopted in 7 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1933) 8o6. But in 
the following text I give up even this restricted role of the personal law. 
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courts do not hesitate to determine such questions as nullity 
and revocability101 of a power of attorney according to the 
local law. 
2. Implied Authority 
Modern laws abound in usages, customary constructions, 
legal presumptions, and legal rules, defining the acts which 
agents of certain classes or under c~rtain circumstances are 
authorized or not authorized to do on account of the prin-
cipal. Some codes, particularly the German Commercial 
and Civil Codes, have elaborated various categories of 
such commonly called "implied" authority, and the Re-
statement of Agency also distinguishes "authority," "ap-
parent authority," estoppel, and unnamed other "powers." 
The Conflicts Restatement, § 344, it is true, singles out 
"apparent" authority for applying the law of the place 
where the third party places "reliance" upon such authority. 
To the contrary, it has become evident in considering the 
case law of German courts that there can be no distinction 
on the international plane among constructions, presump-
tions, and rules, or among court interpretation, legal rules 
of construction, and subsidiary legal rules, as well as between 
statements or conduct of the principal toward the agent and 
toward the third party, or between directly obligating 
declarations and estoppeU02 They are not neatly separable 
even in the most elaborate municipal laws, and in fact not 
distinguished in many jurisdictions. They must be of equiva-
lent significance in the conflict of laws. Neither English nor 
American courts, to my knowledge, have shown any inclina-
tion to classify in heterogeneous compartments what is 
distinguished as express and apparent authority, and in the 
1o1 Infra sub ( 3) and (4). 
1 0 2 I refer for details to my repeatedly cited article, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 
at 825 f. 
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latter category, as authority to do what is usual in a par-
ticular trade or what agrees to local usage, authority ex-
tended by statute, etc. The idea of estoppel in its broadest 
meaning appears to Continental observers of the English 
theory as present more or less in all parts of the doctrine 
of implied authority.103 
Illustrations. (i) P in state X hands to A his written 
authorization to purchase goods on P's account in state Y. 
A shows this statement toT in Y. Pis bound toT according 
to the law of Y without respect to internally declared re-
strictions. The Restatement, § 344, illustration, expressly 
decides this case under the law of Y, because the authority 
is apparent and T relies on it in state Y. The substantive 
rule, however, is exactly the same in the German Civil Code 
( § 4 72) which expressly says that where the principal has 
handed the agent a written authorization and the agent 
shows it to the third person, the agent is authorized in 
relation to this person. Although thereby a true authoriza-
tion is recognized, the German conflicts rule simply applies 
the law of Y as that of the place where the agent acts 
upon his authority. The right conflicts rule naturally covers 
this case. 
( ii) Whether a traveling salesman is enti tied to sell 
for cash and to grant deferment of payment, is a question 
of the extent of his power, regulated in Germany by a legal 
rule and in France by an implied agreement ( mandat tacite). 
In the case of a French salesman traveling in Germany, 
the German Reichsoberhandelsgericht once decided the ques-
tion under the French law of the principal,104 whereas it 
would be determined at present according to the German 
Commercial Code ( § 55, paragraph 2). Even the authority 
of a commercial agent under the German Commercial Code 
( § 8 6, paragraph 2) to accept certain statements of third 
persons, although considered a "legal authority," has been 
refused to the Danish agent of a German firm acting in 
103 Cf. MACRIS, supra p. 139 n. 57, at 278 ff., 293· 
104 ROHG. (Dec. 4, 1872) 8 ROHGE. 150, Clunet 1874, 81. 
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Denmark.105 English and American courts decide to the 
same effect. 
(iii) An agricultural producer in Silesia sent eggs for 
sale through an agent on the market of Berlin. The sender 
was to be deemed to have "submitted" to the usages of 
the Berlin market. As Willes, J., said in Lloyd v. Guibert, 
"whoso goes to Rome, must do as those at Rome do."106 
The Reichsgericht, criticized for having ignored this rule/07 
amended its practice immediately.108 
This resort to the local laws is also supported by the 
differences in the usual national types of agents. An English 
factor, operating in England, cannot be conveniently treated 
like a Brazilian commercial agent in Brazil. The legal pre-
sumptions and usual constructions defining what the author-
ized broker or clerk or traveling salesman may and may 
not do on the account of the principal, are commonly 
intended merely for agents carrying on business within the 
state and for all such agents. 
The American decisions show similar tendencies. Most 
of those in point, 109 it must be noted, do not deal with our 
general problem but concern insurance agents, a very special 
matter, the local sphere of the state where the insured lives 
being much emphasized in constitutional and conflicts prac-
tice of the courts. With this reservation, the cases may be 
cited regarding the authority of local insurance agents to 
issue a policy,110 to waive conditions,111 or to give binding 
1os RG. (Jan. I4, I9IO) 66 Seuff. Arch. No. 73· 
106 (I 86 5) 6 Best & Sm. 100, I 3 I Eng. Rep. II34· 
107 RG. (June 26, I928) JW. I928, 3I09; IPRspr. I928 No. 39, criticized 
by DoVE, JW. ibid. 
1os RG. (Oct. I3, I928) IPRspr. I928 No. 40. 
109 Perry v. Pye (I9I3) 215 Mass. 403, I02 N. E. 653 (cf. 2 BEALE II95 
n. 6) does not offer any problem. 
110 Gallagher v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. (Tex. I9I8) 206 
S. W. 2I2; Grant v. North American Benefit Corp. of IIJinois ( I928) 223 Mo. 
App. Io4, 8 S. W. (2d) I043· 
111 Cohen v. Home Ins. Co. (I9I6) 6 Boyce 207, 97 Atl. IOI4; American 
Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co. (I9I7) 74 Fla. I30, 77 So. I68; 
Keesler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. of New York (I9I9) I77 N. C. 394, 
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information.112 The law of the insured person's residence 
has been applied under the theory that the contract was 
made, or in the case of insurance of immovables, the object 
was situated 118 in that state. 
No separate rule is apparent with respect to general 
agents.114 General powers are the main subject of the cus-
tomary and legal definitions of implied authority. Whether, 
of course, the particular main contract can be made by a 
general agent, or whether special powers are needed for 
such purposes as contracts relating to land, lawsuits, com-
promises on litigious matters, or gifts, is a problem of the 
main transaction itself. 
3· Ratification 
The old conflicts literature was affected by the theoretical 
mistakes of doctrines which involved "ratification" and 
"confirmation" of contracts made by an unauthorized agent 
and unnecessarily bothered about distinctions between lack 
of and transgression of authority.115 The modern view is 
very simple; it accepts the Roman idea of ratification. 
Mandat et qui ratum habet means that ratification is an 
authorization subsequent to the main contract. Its nature 
is identical with a precedent authorization. This idea oper-
ated in indirect representation in the internal relationship 
between principal and agent, 116 but its effect on the agent's 
power is confined to disclosed agency, even in the common 
law doctrine. 
99 S. E. 97; Sovereign Camp W. 0. W. v. Newsom (I920) I42 Ark. I32, 
2I9 S. W. 759 (including estoppel); Springfield Mtl. Ass. v. Atnip (I925) 
I69 Ark. 968, 279 S. W. IS (false indication of age by the agent). 
112 McMaster v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. N.D. Ia. I897) 78 Fed. 33· 
England: Pattison v. Mills (I8z8) I Dow and Cl. 342. 
113 Cases of American Fire Ins. Co., Gallagher, Keesler, supra ns. uo, III. 
114 Contrarily to NussBAUM, D. IPR. 264, see the decisions of LG. Berlin I 
and KG., supra n. 97· 
115 See, e.g., 7 LAURENT 546 § 457· 
116 The latter is meant in CASAREGIS, Discursus I79 §§ 20, 64, 76, 89 and 
his followers including 3 FIORE § nsi. 
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Opinions are divided only with respect to the permissi-
bility of such belated confirmation. Thus, in the United 
States, three solutions depend upon whether ratification is 
allowable at all, or after a reasonable time, or so long as 
the other party does not cancel the contract.117 
From the nature of ratification as a true authorization, 
it follows that its effect is retroactive, and this, too, is com-
monly settled. Hence, there is no reason why the law of the 
place where the agent acts should not extend to this inci-
dent. No fiction of "submission" of the principal to the 
foreign law118 is needed. 
(a) Normal rule. The rule, therefore, is that the law of 
the place where the agent acts as a representative governs 
the validity and effect of a manifestation of the principal 
allegedly consenting to the agent's transaction.119 The Re-
statement, § 33 I (I), accedes to this rule saying, as is 
habitual, that this place is "the place of contracting."120 
Since there is no material difference between acting with-
out any authorization, and acting beyond authorization,121 
it does not matter, contrary to certain older doctrines, 
whether principal and agent before the ratification were 
bound by contract or whether the agent acted as a nego-
tiorum gestor. This result was reached by Story, speaking 
for the Supreme Court of the United States, in I832, al-
1 17 HUNTER, "What is the Effect of a Ratification of an Agent's Un-
authorized Contract?" 5 La. L. Rev. (1944) 308. 
11s BEALE, "The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State," 36 Harv. L. Rev. 
(1923) 241, 258; assumption of a renvoi is tentatively construed by GRis-
WOLD, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) 1165, 1200. 
119 United States: Dord v. Bonnaffee (1851) 6 La. Ann. 563; Golson v. 
Ebert (1873) 52 Mo. z6o; Pugh v. Cameron (1877) 11 W.Va. 523; Hill v. 
Chase (1886) 143 Mass. 129, 9 N. E. 30; WILLISTON, 1 Contracts § 278; 
2 BEALE 1076. 
Canada: Quebec: Trudel v. Assad ( 1912) 14 Que. Pr. zoz. 
12o Is the objection to this rule by STUMBERG 205 not influenced by the 
theory of the last act of completing a contract, of which he himself is rather 
critical? 
121 Restatement § 33 I says: "beyond or contrary to his instructions," which 
confuses the relationships. 
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though he operated with an imaginary lex loci solutionis.122 
(b) Soliciting agent. It is well settled that when an 
agent, sent out to solicit orders, transmits an order to his 
principal and the latter declares his consent to the customer, 
the contract is made by the principal himself.123 The reason, 
however, is not as is sometimes confusedly assumed, that 
the agent has no authority to contract. Whether he has or 
not, the material point is that he does not purport to con-
clude the contract. The place of the agent is immaterial 
in this case, as also his powers are. The result, that the 
principal makes the contract, is recognized by the American 
courts also for the purpose of ascertaining in what state a 
corporation does business by such a contract ;124 whether 
Louisiana's privilege of the vendor applies ;125 and under 
what law title is reserved, incidentally to the contract.126 
But the main contract, in reality, has its own law, accord-
ing to its nature and this law governs offer and acceptance. 
(c) Abnormal solution. Suppose that in the case of a 
liquor sale a soliciting agent in Iowa (where the sale would 
have been invalid) went beyond his authority and made a 
sale as if he were empowered to conclude the contract 
without reserving the approval of his principal in Illinois 
(where the sale would have been valid). But he sent the 
order to the principal who confirmed it to the buyer. Accord-
122 Boyle v. Zacharie ( 1832) 6 Pet. S. C. 635, 8 L. Ed. 527. The consignee 
of a cargo in New Orleans furnished suretyship and paid when the ship 
was attached there. The shipowner recognized the intervention, and Story 
localized his duty in Louisiana, because if he had contracted with the de-
fendant (Story says: "authorized" him) to advance money there on his ac-
count, this contract would have been performable there and the lex loci 
solutionis would be applicable. 
128 GooDRICH 264 n. 24; 7 LAURENT § 456 in fine; I FIORE § 133; 
2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ § 1297· 
124 Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Holder (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1895) 68 Fed. 467; 
State Mutual etc. Ins. Co. v. Brinkley (1895) 6x Ark. x, 35 S. W. 157. See 
also State v. Colby (1894) 92 Iowa 463, 6x N. W. 187; Kling v. Fries (1876) 
33 Mich. 275. 
125 Claflin v. Mayer (1889) 41 La. Ann. 1048, 7 So. 139. 
126 Barrett v. Kelley (1894) 66 Vt. 515, 29 Atl. 809. 
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ing to the normal rule, since the agent sold the liquor in 
Iowa, the contract, as governed by the law of Iowa, would 
be invalid and not subject to approval by the principal, 
although the latter, of course, might have made a new 
offer. This self-evident result seems to agree with the two 
decisions of the Iowa Supreme Coure27 which have subse-
quently been invoked for a contrary view by a federal circuit 
court. This court decided in Schuenfeldt v. Junkerman, an 
Iowa case, that although the contract was concluded in 
Iowa by an unauthorized agent, the confirmation by the 
principal, the firm in Chicago, constituted an acceptance 
of the order and completed the contract in Illinois, hence 
validly. When the validity of the contract is in question, 
as in liquor and Sunday contracts, the court considered "the 
very time and place where and when the act was done that 
gave life to the contract."128 Incautious commentators have 
tentatively extracted the recognition of a ratification hav-
ing no retroactive effect.129 The Restatement finally takes 
from this isolated decision the impulse for an astonishing 
general rule.130 The individual decision in the Shuenfeldt 
Case may be condoned as an instance of extraordinary favor 
extended by the courts to interstate contracts affected by 
the crude sanctions of Sunday and liquor laws. Moreover, 
as usual, the belief in lex loci contractus promoted extrava-
127 In Tegler v. Shipman (1871) 33 Iowa 194, zoo, the court stated as the 
general rule, that, "if the agent simply took an order from defendant upon 
his principals in Rock Island, which they might fill or refuse at their option, 
it was a Rock Island contract, and the plaintiff can recover unless it is 
shown that they sold the liquors with intent to enable the defendant to violate 
the provisions of the act .... " The decision in Taylor v. Pickett (I 879) 52 
Iowa 467, 3 N. W. 514, concerning the territorial scope of a license to sell, 
upheld instructions to the jury saying that "it would be a sale at the house," 
if the agent took orders subject to final acceptance by the principal, whereas 
the sale would be illegal if orders were taken "not subject to approval." 
12s Schuenfeldt v. Junkerman (C. C. N. D. Ia. 1884) 20 Fed. 357; HARPER 
and TAINTOR, Cases 154. 
129 II Am. Jur. 394 § nz. 
1so § 331 (2): "If by the law of the place where the agent acted, there is 
no contract as a result of the ratification, the ratification is regarded in the 
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gancies. But it is a grave mistake to disturb the international 
function of the normal rules by such arbitrary exceptions. 
Illustration. Suppose an ammunition manufacturer in 
Illinois sends a soliciting agent to Bolivia, who, pretending 
to be authorized to sell, accepts an order from an unlicensed 
dealer for delivery in a Bolivian port. While the buyer, 
violating Bolivian laws, must know that the contract is void, 
American courts, according to the Restatement, should 
argue that the manufacturer supplementing his authoriza-
tion concludes the contract under American law and there-
fore makes a valid contract. Every part of this argumenta-
tion is wrong. A unilateral confirmation of a void agreement 
is ineffectual. That the traditional theory of illegality at 
the place of performance is defied, would not matter so 
much as that the contract is really governed by Bolivian 
law, because of all the circumstances. 
The liquor cases could have been approached differently. 
Shuenfield, by the order, had delivered the goods at a rail-
way station in Chicago, his own city. The sale, for this 
reason, and for this alone, could have been governed by 
Illinois law. Equally, in the hypothetical case of an arma-
ments sale in Bolivia, if the goods were to be delivered 
f. o. b. New York, the buyer would be rightly supposed to 
comply with the laws of the United States, when sued in 
an American court; the decision would depend on the court's 
conception of international policy. 
4· Termination 
Death of the principal and revocation of authorization 
have been controversial matters in the municipal laws. 
From the old point of view of a merely two-sided relation-
ship, rights and obligations between master and servant, 
mandator and mandatary, naturally ended with such events, 
state where it is made as the acceptance of an offer made to the agent and 
transmitted by him and if the acceptance completes a contract, the contract 
is there made." 
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and the powers of the agent, too, were automatically 
ended. But the Roman praetor granted actions against a 
master during a year after he withdrew the peculium from 
a slave.131 A shop manager had the powers of an institor 
so long as his name was not canceled in the shop.132 Modern 
systems have prolonged either the underlying contract, or 
at least the authority, beyond its original termination, in 
the interest of third persons, or even of an innocent agent. 
(a) Death of principal. A general power of attorney 
conferred in California for sale of land in Texas was ended 
under Texan law by the death of the issuer, although it 
would have been valid until notice to the agent under Cali-
fornia law. The court in Texas based this decision on the 
attempt to carry out the powers in Texas.133 
This represents the universally prevailing and recom-
mendable conflicts rule,134 alone consistent with the applica-
tion of the local law to apparent authority. That the con-
tinuation of the power should require the consent of two 
laws, or even three/35 is strictly objectionable. 
(b) Revocation. An irrevocable general power of at-
torney was signed by an American in New York for all 
transaction on his behalf regarding his German assets. Under 
the law of New York, this authorization, not coupled with 
an interest of the agent, was revocable. German courts, 
under a questionable rule, have treated irrevocable general 
authorizations as void, at least for the purpose of transac-
tions contemplating transfers of rights in immovables. This 
German rule was applied to the case on the theory that 
authority is subject to the law where it is exercised.136 If, 
131 Actio annalis de peculia, LENEL, Edictum Perpetuum 277, 282 ff. 
132 ULPIAN, D. 14·3·II § 3· 
138 Gilmer v. Veatch (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) 121 S. W. 545· 
134 Thus, against STORY § 286 d: 4 PHILLIMORE 571 § 705; 3 FIORE § II 54; 
ALCORTA, 3 Der. Int. Priv. rr6; cf. 2 WHARTON 871. 
135 Thus, 2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ § 1306. 
136 LG. Berlin (Oct. s, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, No. 63, discussed as to the 
8 
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conversely, a German authorization were used in New York, 
its revocability would doubtless have to be determined 
under New York law. 
The identical solution has been recently followed in an 
English case,137 and may also be advocated as a universal 
rule. 
questionable municipal rule and the pioneering conflicts rule in my article, 
7 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1933) 797, evidently unknown to BATIFFOL 282 n. 6. To the same 
effect, KG. (Dec. 14, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, No. 9· 
187 Sinfra Aktiengesellschaft v. Sinfra, Ltd. [1939] 2 All E. R. 675, 682. 
CHAPTER 41 
Employment and Agency 
I. THE SUBJECT MATTER 
WHILE voluntary authorization operates in the rela-tion between the agent or, in common law, the prin-
cipal, and the third party, the internal relationship 
between principal and agent rests upon a contract commonly 
termed contract of agency, although this word is also used 
differently. This includes, for instance, a contract of broker-
age for buying securities, and excludes a sales contract made 
by a buyer intending a resale, or any other party contract-
ing on his own account. To embrace, however, the contracts 
for a factual work, generally the word "employment" is 
added which really has no recognized legal meaning and 
overlaps the scope of agency; brokerage may also be called 
an employment.1 Although these two terms do not express 
a neat contrast, there is a distinction, important at least 
for conflicts law, between the two groups of contracts 
involved. 
Common law has an appropriate and significant termi-
nology: "Master and servant" is a broad old doctrine within 
the category of "principal and agent." Its criterion is the 
superior choice, control, and direction, by the master, of the 
servant's conduct and method in doing the work.2 In Europe, 
1 35 Am. Jur. 448 § 5; 144 A. L. R. 740; 151 id. 1331. 
2 This distinction was first suggested by 2 MElLI So to the extent that he 
advocated the law of the organization into which the employee integrates 
himself by his contract. The same result was recently proposed by 2 FRANKEN-
STEIN 335 (inconsistent with 333 ff.); 2 SCHNITZER 571; BRESLAUER, 50 Jurid. 
Rev. ( 1938) at 293 (despite the vacillating English cases). No distinction 
has been made in the International Law Association, Vienna Draft 1926, 
34th Report ( 1927) 509 ff. 
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the same outstanding type of contract has emerged more 
recently from ancient narrow and modern broad concepts. 
In Romanistic tradition, locatio condu'ctio operarum 
(louage de service, Dienstmiete), the hiring of services, was 
comparatively the most adequate analogue; the Institute 
of International Law spoke of conflicts rules for this type 
as late as 1927.3 But the full ground was covered only by 
the addition of locatio conductio operis ( W erkvertrag), 
the contract for performing work, and numerous special 
kinds of contracts. 
On the other hand, the modern term Arbeitsvertrag, con-
frat de travail, or contralto di lavoro, was sometimes ex-
tended to all types of contracts in which the obligation to 
work is outstanding. At present, however, this name is re-
served for the contract concluded with dependent employees, 
industrial and agricultural as well as white collar workers, 
including even high-placed employees. This contract of work 
is to be defined as the private law contract whereby a person 
obligates himself to work with a certain continuity in the 
service and according to the directives of another person 
for a salary.4 It is unnecessary to restrict this concept to the 
accomplishment of material acts as contrasted with the 
conclusion of legal transactions. 5 
The National-Socialist doctrine was eagerly at work to 
eradicate the very idea of this individual private contract 
of labor. But it has withstood totalitarian fanaticism.6 
3 Annuaire 1927 III 219. 
4 Germany: I HUECK and NIPPERDEY 100. 
France: RouAsT in Planiol et Ripert, II Traite Pratique 9 § 67; 2 CoLIN et 
CAPITANT 587. 
Italy: BALDONI, Rivista 1932, 348, and cit.; Notes in 37 Riv. Dir. Com. 
(1939) II 387 to Cass. (Jan. 23, 1939) 40 id. (1942) I I77· 
Switzerland: OsER-SCHOENENBERGER III8 No. 9· 
Brazil: CESARINO }UNIOR, 2 Direito social brasileiro (ed. 2, 1943) 132 § 228. 
5 Thus RouAsT et DuRAND, Precis de legislation industrielle (1943) 286 
§ 256 and 291 § 262, excluding the contract of "mandat." 
6 At least these writers (SIEBERT, MANSFELD, etc.) tried to degrade the labor 
contract to an "auxiliary" position, see, e.g., RHODE, 3 Zeitschrift der 
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The thus established distinction of types is indeed of 
interest in conflicts law. In localizing the relations of an 
employer, there is a difference between his subordinates, 
bound to his business organization and instructions, and the 
professional persons lending him their services. Local con-
nections have an overwhelming influence on the activity 
of independent contractors, while their importance in the 
other case is conditional and limited, although by no means 
insignificant. To anticipate the tendency of the most ade-
quate decisions, we may observe that contracts of inde-
pendent persons are governed by the law of their own domi-
cil, and employment contracts with "servants" are governed 
by the law of that place of the principal's business to which 
the employee is attached. Usually, of course, servants live 
in the state where they are working, so as to make the laws 
of their domicil and of their working place identical. For 
this reason, the groups are often confused without any harm 
done. Moreover, the concept of servant in municipal law 
is for certain purposes sometimes reasonably extended 
beyond its usual scope.7 But for analytical purposes and 
for the practical needs of individual cases the distinction 
is needed. 
Under this approach it is of minor significance that, in 
civil law, servants are supposed to make contracts as simple 
agents in the name of their principal, as for instance com-
mercial clerks (German H andlungsgehilfe), whereas mem-
bers of professions either act in their own name, such as 
the commercial "agents" (German H andlungsagent) or, 
in appearing for their clients, exercise their own functions, 
such as attorneys. 
Our productive materials for the conflict of laws regard-
ing the employment of servants are scarce and are further 
Akademie fiir Deutsches Recht ( 1936) 371. A good survey on the discussion 
is given by CESARINO, supra n. 4, 125 ff. 
7 See infra n. 59· 
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diminished by the prevalence of workmen's compensation 
in the cases. This subject, for compelling reasons, requires 
special discussion. Only insofar as the law governing the 
employment contract is deemed to determine the question 
of indemnization for accidents may contributions be ex-
tracted from these cases. 
II. MASTER AND SERVANT8 
1. Lex Loci Contractus 
The law of the place of contracting has also been applied 
to employment contracts.9 This has remained the declared 
rule in Italy.10 The same rule obtained in the earliest En-
glish case on the subject,11 but other decisions reaching a 
seemingly similar result may be explained by additional local 
connections. The Dutch Supreme Court insisted on the rule 
in 1926 whenever the agreement fails to modify it.12 In 
Austria the more recent practice applies foreign law where 
the contract is made abroad with a foreigner. 13 Before 1917, 
the Brazilian courts did the same where the principal was 
a foreigner.14 
It is scarcely necessary to mention again how often a 
s RoUAST, "Les conflits de lois relatifs au contrat de travail," I Melanges 
Pillet I95; CALEB, "Contrat de travail," 5 Repert. 2IO ff.; GEMMA, Dir. Int. 
del Lavoro. 
9 FOELIX § I05; DESPAGNET § 300; 7 LAURENT § 454; WEISS, 4 Traite 374· 
10 Italy: c. c. Disp. Pre!. (I 86 5) art. 9; c. Com. (I 882) art. 58; c. c. Disp. 
Pre!. (1942) art. 25 par. I. GEMMA, Dir. Int. del Lavoro 159 ff.; however, 
makes a meritorious attempt to apply the law of the place of performance on 
the ground of implied party agreement. 
11 Arnott v. Redfern ( 1825) 2 Car. & P. 88, per Best, C. J. 
12 The Netherlands: H. R. (Dec. 2, I926) W. u6o6, N. J. 1927, 321. The 
facts are left obscure in the reports, and the tendency to favor the lex fori 
is all too transparent, though the Dutch branch manager seems to be 
prejudiced thereby. 
13 Austria: Allg. BGB. § 37; OGH. (Jan. 24, 1933) and (May 28, 1934) 
discussed by WAHLE, IO Z.ausi.PR. ( I936) 788, overruling the former deci-
sions cited by NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 272 n. 2 and BATIFFOL 268 n. 5· 
14 Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (June 20, 1896) Agr. No. 140, Jur. Sup. Trib. 
1896, 67, 0CTAVIO, Dicionario No. 266 against one dissident vote, which was 
followed in the C. C. 
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decision asserts adherence to the lex loci contractus, while 
performance and all other fact elements point to the same 
result. This is particularly frequent in the United States.15 
More remarkable, however, are decisions contrasting the 
law of the place of hiring with the law of domicil, as when 
a minor Irishman comes to Scotland and is there regarded 
as having capacity to be hired, because he is emancipated 
through independent establishment, "forisfamiliated," al-
though not domiciled in Scotland.16 
Lex loci contractus is a convenient rule if both parties 
are domiciled in the same state where they make the con-
tract. There is no reason why an intended foreign place of 
work should be material in such a case. When Italian parties 
contracted in Italy for service in the German branch of the 
firm, a German court correctly applied Italian law.17 It is 
farfetched to say that a French industrialist establishing 
a new factory in Africa and hiring personnel in France to 
take there, is contracting under an African law/8 or that a 
couple of American missionaries hiring a maid in the United 
States for their station in China, have Chinese law in mind. 
By itself, lex loci contractus is an inept rule, despite 
Dicey19 and Beale.20 
15 For this and other reasons, the long case lists in 2 BEALE 1196 are in-
significant. 
16 M'Feetridge v. Stewarts & Lloyds [1913] Sess. Cas. 773, per Lord 
Salvesen, at 790. 
17 Germany: OLG. Miinchen (April s, 1909) 23 ROLG. 245, 22 Z.int.R. 
(1912) 175· 
Sweden: S. Ct. (May 21, 1941) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1941, 350 No. So: contract 
between Swedish domiciled parties signed in Sweden for service in Johannes-
burg, South Africa; stipulation for restraint of competition validated under 
Swedish law; cf. SCHMIDT, Revue Crit. 1948, 430. 
1 8 Thus, RoUAST in Melanges Pillet at 203. 
19 DICEY 724; as to the inconsistency of his exposition, see BRESLAUER, so 
Jurid. Rev. ( 1938) 282. 
20 2 BEALE 1192 f.; Restatement § 342· 
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2. Law of the Master's Domicil 
Where a contract is made outside the principal's resi-
dence or place of business, considerable authority has never-
theless selected the latter place for choice of law.21 This 
approach is wrong when the law of the place of the head-
quarters is applied to workers in foreign branches of a firm. 
But restricted to the cases where the servant is in fact 
attached to the central business place of his firm, the rule is 
excellent. It is corroborated in many instances by the com-
prehensive integration of modern employees into the par-
ticular business organization. Working conditions (whether 
determined by collective agreement or unilateral regulation), 
duties and benefits, discipline, hospitalization, and insurance, 
are in force for all affiliated persons without reference to the 
place where they sign the contract or where they live. 
Where no other local attachment is manifest, the main office 
of the firm is the natural center. 
This localization of the employment relationship naturally 
also extends to : 
( i) Employees occasionally or temporarily sent out by 
their employers to perform services in another country ;22 
21 Institute of Int. Law, 22 Annuaire ( 1908) 29I, art. 2 (h). 
England: WESTLAKE 310 § 218. 
France: RoLIN, 3 Principes 418 § 1390. 
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 30, 1902) 6 ROLG. 5· 
The Netherlands: KosTERS 756; MULDER 170. 
22 United States: In the workmen's compensation cases, it has been often 
assumed that temporary work incidental to employment in a foreign state is 
no ground for the jurisdiction of the board. See Proper v. Polley ( 1932) 
259 N. Y. 516, I82 N. E. 161; Darsch v. Thearle Duffield Fire Works Co. 
(1922) 77 Ind. App. 357, 133 N. E. 525. For details, see infra Ch. 42 pp. 216 ff. 
England: South African Breweries v. King [1899] 2 Ch. 173; [1900] 
I Ch. 273-C. A. 
France: RouAsT in Melanges Pillet at 206. 
Germany: R. Arb. G. (April I, 1931) and (July x, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, 
Nos. 53, 54 (dicta as to private law). 
Italy: GEMMA, Dir. Int. del Lavoro 162 f. 
Switzerland: Ob. Ger. Zurich (June 22, 1933) 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 7Io: 
activity in various countries with possible change of domicil according to the 
orders of a Swedish principal governed by Swedish law, though uncodified 
and not known to the German agents. 
EMPLOYMENT AND AGENCY 
(ii) Traveling salesmen who have no fixed place of busi-
ness in the country or countries visited by them.23 
The combination of the master's domicil and the conclu-
sion of the contract between present persons, e.g., when 
the future employee was invited there to negotiate the con-
tract, has prompted several English decisions to apply the 
law of this place.24 This also seems a sound solution. On the 
other hand, the appointment of a soliciting sales agent for 
Michigan by an Ohio corporation certainly should not be an 
Ohio contract simply because the contract is consummated 
there by approval of the corporation. 25 
3· Law of the Servant's Working Place 
Prevailing opinion may at present be stated to the effect 
that where the servant is attached to a place of business 
different from the main office, the local law is applicable. 
Manifestly, this view complements rather than replaces 
the theory that the law of the principal's place governs. 
The working place to which the employee is attached de-
pends on the employer's organization. 
(a) Domestic working place. This approach has been 
preferred by many courts in favor of their own law. Some-
23 England: Arnott v. Redfern, infra n. 24. 
Germany: ROHG. (Dec. 4, I872) 8 ROHGE. ISO; cf. RG. (Dec. I, I9II) 
22 Z.int.R. ( I9I2) 3 II (German law of a German firm employing an Italian 
traveling salesman, as tacitly stipulated law). 
24 Arnott v. Redfern (I825) 2 Car. & P. 88: "English contract" between a 
London principal and a traveling Scotch sales agent on commission, made 
while the Scotchman was in London. In re Anglo-Austrian Bank [I920] 
I Ch. 69: P, German corporation, A, manager in England, contract made 
and signed in Germany. 
Oppenheimer v. Rosenthal [I937) I All E. R. 23: P, German corporation, 
A, manager of associated business in England, contract made in Germany. 
Younger, J., emphasized that the agent was directed and controlled by the 
firm. 
United States: Weiner v. Pictorial Paper Package Corp. (I939) 303 Mass. 
123, 131, zo N. E. (zd) 458, 462. 
25 This against Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Holder (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1895) 
68 Fed. 467; actually the decision sought to avoid invalidity of the contract 
because the corporation had no license for doing business in Michigan. 
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times they construct a "submission" of the principal to this 
law, sometimes it is claimed that private and public labor 
laws are interrelated and must be given territorial force. 
Such a rule, technically based either on lex loci solutionis or 
on public policy, in deviation from the regular test of the 
court, was applied in older Austrian decisions, 26 in Brazil 
under the Introductory Law of I 917/7 often in Italy, 28 and 
occasionally elsewhere. 
(b) Domestic or foreign working place. We may, how-
ever, at present presume that in most countries the rule 
is bilateral. Even when the place of work is not within the 
country, the law of the employer's business place to which 
an employee or worker is permanently assigned as a matter 
of organization, governs his relations with his employer. 
This is true for the foreign systems. 29 The same rule has 
26 OGH. (June r, 1929) and others, see WAHLE, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 788. 
2 7 Brazil, on the general rule of Introd. Law of 1916, art. 13 I, cf. OcTAVIO, 
Dicionario No. 266 at the end. 
28 E.g., App. Genova (April 18, 1904) Riv. Dir. Com. 1904 II 361: P, 
Berlitz school in Milan, A, Swiss in Switzerland where contract was made 
for teaching in Milan, Italian law applied restraining the teacher's activity 
after termination; Cass. (July 28, 1934) Foro Ital. 1934 I 824, Rivista 1934, 
557: Belgian company employs an Italian, contract made in Belgium, work 
in Italy, Italian law prevails and invalidates the clause for Belgian arbitra-
tion. Against the latter conclusion, BALDONI, Rivista 1934, 566: at present the 
place of business decides, not the place of contracting. 
Hungary: Curia P II 4864 (1931): P, firm in Saloniki, A, Hungarian in 
Greece, Greek law; Curia P II 2214 (1933): P, foreign firm, A, Hungarian 
in Hungarian branch, Hungarian law. See SzA.szy, II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 
175 Nos. 8, 9· 
The Netherlands: Trib. Amsterdam (April 7, 1932) N. J. 1932, 1541, II 
Z.ausi.PR. ( 1937) 203 No. 31: P, stock company domiciled in Amsterdam and 
carrying on a branch in Netherlands India, A, Dutchman to serve there, 
Netherlands-Indian law; App. Amsterdam (May 16, 1935) N. J. 1935, 1335, 
II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 229 No. 133: P, shipowner in Netherlands India, A, to 
serve on ships based there, Netherlands-Indian law prohibiting attachment 
of the wages (apparently the principle of the place of work rather than 
that of the flag is invoked). MEIJERS, N.J. 1927, 323, Note: commonly the 
place where the work is to be performed is assumed (to decide). 
29 Canada: Wilson v. Metcalfe Construction Co. [1947] 3 D. L. R. 491, 
aff'd [1947] 4 D. L. R. 472: American domiciled in Canada employed by an 
American firm in the construction, in Alaska and Canada, of the Alaska 
Highway, law of Alaska. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Nov. 26, 1938) Pasicrisie 1940 II 92: both parties 
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been claimed with respect to the United States,80 and is 
supported, if not by an impressive array of decisions, at least 
by a promising trend. 31 
4· Special Rules 
(a) Cases actually applying the national law common to 
the parties are isolated.32 Employment contracts have much 
Belgian nationals, contract made in Belgium, but work abroad, hence foreign 
law for form and notice; Trib. com. Bruxelles (Jan. 26, 1935) Jur. Com. 
Brux. 361, 364: P, Swiss, A, English, contract made and entire performance 
in Belgium, Belgian Jaw. 
France: Theory advocated by RoUAST in Melanges Pillet at 205; CALEB, 
5 Repert. 215 and BATIFFOL 270, who, however, states only two decisions not 
concerning workmen's compensation; of these claims, Cour Paris (Jan. 12, 
1900) Clunet 1900, 56o, favored "implicit" adoption of lex loci solutionis, 
whereas Cour Pau (Feb. 28, 1922) Clunet 1922, 406 would not deal with a 
true conflict of laws. 
Germany: KG. (Nov. 23, 1910) 23 ROLG. 61, 22 Z.int.R. (1912) 168: P, 
German firm, A, Warsaw employee, Warsaw-Polish law, hence no jurisdiction 
of a German merchant tribunal. OLG. Hamburg (July 16, 1936) JW. 1936, 
2939, 2940: provision of agent, who has to serve in Hamburg, is governed 
by German law. R. Arb. G. (July 20, 1935) JW. 1935, 3665, 6 Giur. Comp. 
DIP. 353 No. 269: an American corporation, through an agent, engaging an 
actor for performances in the United States, American law to decide whether 
the corporation can be sued on the agent's contract. 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 21, 1941) 67 BGE. II 179 speaking of the activity 
of the agent as primary whence it is concluded that the court generally 
applies the law of the working place, see 2 SCHNITZER 573, cf. infra n. 63 
on 6o BGE. II 322. BG. (Dec. 22, 1916) 42 BGE. II 650: branch manager. 
so BATIFFOL 266, as law of the place of performance. 
81 United States: Garnes v. Frazier & Foster (Ky. 1909) 118 S. W. 998 
(statute of frauds); Denihan v. Finn-lffiand (1932) 143 Misc. 525, 256 N. Y. 
Supp. 801 (damages for unjustified discharge; contract held to be concluded 
in Pennsylvania, but subject to New York law as the place of performance); 
Vandalia R. Co. v. Kelley (1918) 187 Ind. 323, 119 N. E. 257 ("Indiana con-
tract," because the railroad employee is employed there); Roth v. Patino 
( 1945) 185 Misc. 235, 56 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 853, 855 concerning workmen's 
compensation. Under the contract theory of most states, as well as under the 
quasi-contract theory of New York (infra Ch. 42), a workmen's compensation 
statute is not applied where a worker is a foreign resident and performs his 
work wholly outside the state. Thus, the claimants, in Cameron v. Ellis 
Construction Co. (1930) 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622, a Canadian sand pit 
worker, and in Elkhart Sawmill v. Skinner (1942) 111 Ind. App. 695, 42 N. E. 
(2d) 412, a Michigan timber cutter, were not regarded as having a New 
York or an Indiana employment contract, respectively. 
82 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 30, 1902) 6 ROLG. 5; R. Arb. G. 
(Aug. 27, 1930) JW. 1931, 159 and in other decisions; contra: NUSSBAUM 
272 n. 3, BATIFFOL 268 n. 2. 
Italy: App. Torino (April 6, 1934) Rivista 1935, 416. 
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more important local connections which overshadow this 
nationalistic criterion. 33 
(b) Contracts of employment made by the state or other 
public entities for public constructions have often been said 
to depend on the law of the seat of the principaP4 This rule 
would better be reduced to the meaning of the general rule 
stated above. 
(c) Briefly it may be noted that the contracts by which 
master and crew of a seagoing vessel are hired, as a rule, 
are commonly governed by the law of the flag. 35 
5. Public Law and Public Policy 
(a) Public law. In cardinal points, legal protection for 
workers has been beneficially unified under the conventions 
promoted by the International Labor Office. For the re-
maining differences, agreement seems to exist that the state 
policy over industrial, commercial, and agricultural labor 
33 Against the special rule, Cour Paris (Jan. 12, 1900) Clunet 1900, 569: 
two Americans in Paris, French law; German RG. (Mar. 16, 1895) 5 
Z.int.R. (1895) 507; OLG. Dresden (Jan. 25, 1907) 14 ROLG. 345: only 
certain German provisions are public policy; Greek Supreme Court ( 1932) 
No. I31, 43 Themis 449· 
34 Institute of Int. Law, 22 Annuaire (1908) 290 art. 2 (e); Poland, Int. 
Priv. Law, art. 8 No. 4; Sz..\szv, Droit international prive compare (1940) 
577· 
as united States: The City of Norwich (C. C. A. 2d 1922) 279 Fed. 687; 
56 C. J. 925, Seamen § 7 on 46 U. S. C. A. § 564 n. 13; American prohibitions 
expressly made applicable to seamen on foreign vessels, see The Troop 
(D. C. W. D. Wash. 1902) 117 Fed. 557, aff'd, Kenny v. Blake (C. C. A. 9th 
I903) 125 Fed. 672. 
England: Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 265 (subsidiarily). 
Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (Dec. I, I904) 20 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 
(I905) 934· 
France: Code du Travail Maritime (Law of Dec. I3, 1926) art. 5, with 
exceptions, see VERNEAux, 8 Repert. 529 ns. 22-25. 
Germany: RG. (Oct. 30, 1926) 39 Z.int.R. (1929) 276; Seemannsordnung 
§ I par. I. 
Italy: Disp. Pre!. C. Navig. art. 9 (if the flag is not Italian, the law may 
be chosen differently by the parties). 
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Feb. I, 1932) W. 12533, I VAN HASSELT 
419 (preferring the English place of the principal to the Dutch place where 
the seaman was enlisted in the ship's crew). 
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as expressed in the compendious modern administrative law, 
has territorial force, prevailing over private law and ex-
cluding private international law.36 On the other hand, the 
public law is territorially restricted. It extends to working 
places within the jurisdiction and those occupations on 
foreign soil which have been termed radiations from a 
domestic center by the German Supreme Labor Court. Thus, 
where an engineer is sent by his employer, a machine manu-
facturer, to install a machine sold to a foreign country,37 
or employees live in a neighboring town beyond the state 
border, laws concerning unemployment or social insurance 
may extend to them. But when groups of German enter-
prises were organized in order to carry on important works 
in France, for reparations after the First World War, the 
German laws on labor representation and the hiring of 
disabled war veterans were held inapplicable, although the 
employment contracts were presumably governed by Ger-
man law. 38 
It has been held, on the same theory, in Austria, that the 
law regulating the legal situation of commercial servants 
is inapplicable to the employees of foreign enterprises, 39 
and in Greece that the right of a worker injured abroad to 
compensation under the foreign law does not concern inter-
national public policy.40 
(b) Collective labor agreements. Labor contracts, nego-
tiated in collective bargaining between employers and labor 
unions, in the common opinion, are effective in the district 
in which the employer's working establishment is physically 
situated. The state in which this place is, determines all 
aa See Vol. II Ch. 33-
sr Swiss BG. (March 4, 1892) r8 BGE. 354· 
88 Supreme Labor Court (April r, 1931) and (July r, 1931) IPRspr. 1931 
Nos. 53, 54· 
89 OGH. (May 28, 1934) cited by WAHLE, ro Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 788. 
40 Aeropag (1932) No. 131, 43 Themis 449· 
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particulars.41 But insofar as these contracts pertain to pri-
vate law, it is recognized that they may be extended through 
agreement of the parties to foreign-located branches.42 And 
the elements of private law contained in the standard agree-
ments on working and wage rules incorporated into the 
individual labor contracts,-which have been correctly de-
scribed in this country as third party beneficiary agreements, 
subject to the conventional law of contracts,43-may be ex-
pected to be enforced in courts of other states. 
(c) Public policy. Less well settled, however, is the 
extent to which the private law of the forum should intrude 
into a private employment contract governed by foreign 
law.44 The domestic private law in question includes the 
termination of employment by dismissal and the compensa-
tion in case of unwarranted or premature dismissal, restraint 
of trade on a former employee, duties of preserving the 
health and morals of servants, and presumably laws pre-
scribing place, time, and means of wage payments. The 
territorial character of all provisions on such matters is 
often in the mind of writers.45 If the work is to be done in 
the forum, the domestic law would thus necessarily be 
applied. 
In the most appropriate view,46 however, provisions of 
412 HUECK and NIPPERDEY 225; BALDONI, "II contratto di lavoro nel diritto 
internazionale privato italiano," in 24 Rivista ( 1932) 346, 362. 
42 2 HUECK and NIPPERDEY 225; cf. C. GREGORY, Labor and the Law ( 1946) 
385. 
43 MULROY, "The Taft Hartley Act in Action," 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 
(1948) 595. 629· 
44 Cf. Vol. II pp. 561, 578. 
45 See for France, RouAST in Melanges Pillet at 211 ff. (with exceptions); 
CALEB, 5 Repert. 210 ff. (characterizing some of these problems as tort) ; fol-
lowing this lead, App. Bruxelles (Nov. 26, 1938) Pasicrisie 1940 II 92, Journ. 
des Trib. 1940, c. 87, even though the contract is made in Belgium between 
Belgian nationals, prescribes territorial application of the law of the foreign 
working place protecting the employees as to "paid furlough, form and 
effects of notice and discharge." Distinctions have been made by GEMMA, 
Dir. Int. del Lavoro 161 ff. 
46 This view has been developed against many other theories by KASKEL, 
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public labor law for the protection of employees are, of 
course, compulsory for the working conditions within the 
territory, but private interests safeguarded by protective 
provisions of local private law do not include relations 
governed by foreign law. The distinction is emphasized by 
the fact that public interests merely create duties of the 
employer towards the state, without giving the employee a 
cause of action, whilst contractual rights are enforceable 
against the other party. 
It is true that modern consideration for the worker has 
in part breached these confines. Private duties towards the 
employee may duplicate the public duties towards the state; 
public social protection may influence, directly or by con-
struction, the contractual relationship. All this has been 
observed in Europe,47 and exactly the same development is 
occurring at present in the United States. 
Thus, the Fair Labor Standards Act expressly prescribes 
an action for the employee against the employer.48 
The New York Labor Law only provides that the wages 
to be paid upon public works "shall be not less than the pre-
vailing rate of wages, 1149 and the Appellate Division, accept-
ing the correct principle, specifically found that the Labor 
Law gave an exclusive remedy to be exercised only by the 
fiscal officer.50 The Court of Appeals, however, held that a 
laborer could enforce the provisions of the statute by com-
mon law action since they must be inserted in the contract.51 
se~ Kaskei-Dersch, Arbeitsrecht 258, and advocated by I HuECK and NIP-
PERDEY II7. 
47 I HUECK and NIPPERDEY II7. 
48 § r6 (b), 52 Stat. I069 (I938), 29 U. S. C. § 2I6 (b) (Supp.). Applied 
to Bermuda Base in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell (I948) 69 S. Ct. 140. 
49 § 220 subd. 3, Cons. Laws, Book 30; cf. subd. 5 (c) and 7 on the en-
forcement by the fiscal officer. 
~° Fata v. Healy Co. (I94I) 263 App. Div. 725, 726. 
61 Fata v. Healy Co. (I943) 289 N.Y. 40I, 405, 46 N. E. (zd) 339: "It can-
not be doubted that provisions requiring the contractor to pay such wages 
are also inserted in the contract, whether voluntarily or under compulsion 
of the public body which is a party to the contract." (Note that this does not 
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III. INDEPENDENT AGENTS 
r. Rule 
More or less definitely, a part of the literature52 and 
the bulk of court decisions in many countries have decided 
that contracts made with attorneys, solicitors, physicians, 
or other persons exercising a public profession, as well as 
commercial orders to commission agents, factors, brokers, 
or any merchants acting in the interest of the principal, 
are governed by the law of the state where these persons 
have their permanent place of business. It has rightly been 
argued that no one can expect such persons, sought out at 
their domicil, to change their conditions according to the 
nationality or domicil of the client or customer; they exer-
cise functions within the social and cultural framework of 
their state; they are under legal rules and professional 
organizations governing a substantial part of their activity. 
It should be regarded as immaterial in this connection 
whether the acting person discloses his principal or not and 
whether his order is given from case to case or is a standing 
assignment. 
In opposition to this view, lex loci contractus retains a 
role in Italy and probably other Latin countries. Also Beale 
and the Restatement have turned the meaning of the cases 
to the stereotyped rule of the law of the place of contract-
ing. 53 These are undesirable remainders. 
mean public interest in every labor contract.) Cf. LENHOFF, "Optional Terms 
(Jus Dispositivum) and Required Terms (Jus Cogens) in the Law of Con-
tracts," 45 Mich. L. Rev. (1946) 39, 75· 
52 RoLIN, 3 Principes 416; NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 253, 262 ff.; 
NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 274; 2 SCHNITZER 571; ARMIN JON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 
409 and n. x. 
53 Restatement § 342; 2 BEALE II92 § 342.1; Ital. Disp. Prel. C. C. (1942) 
art. 25; 7 LAURENT§ 454; DESPAGNET 635. 
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2. Public Professions54 
(a) Attorneys. The English Privy Council once decided 
a case where the plaintiff, an attorney of Quebec, was 
appointed to represent the British Government in an inter-
national commission between Canada and the United States 
on the payment for fishing rights. The contract with the 
attorney was perhaps made in Ottawa, Ontario, and the 
meetings were held in Halifax, Nova Scotia. The Canadian 
courts and the Privy Council, however, selected the law of 
Quebec for determining the fees due to the plaintiff because 
this was the state where he normally exercised his profes-
sional functions. 55 The same view is held in other countries, 56 
and is probably in the mind of American courts. 57 
(b) Physicians. Cases are scarce, 58 but no opinion oppos-
ing the above view is known. 
3· Commercial Agents 
(a)Permanent agents. This term may indicate inde-
pendent merchants who place their activities at the serv1ce 
54 Inst. of Int. Law, 22 Annuaire ( 1908) 291, art. 2 (g). 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 (6): notaries, attorneys, and other persons 
exercising a public profession; WESTLAKE § 218: barristers. 
55 Regina v. Doutre (x884) 51 L. T. R. 669, Clunet x886, u6-P. C. 
56 Austria: OGH. (Jan. 17, 1928) JW. 1929, x6o. 
Germany: RG. (Oct. 25, 1935) 149 RGZ. 121: German attorney, as executor 
of will acting in the United States, fees according to the law of his legal 
domicil; RG. (March 20, 1936) 151 RGZ. 193: Austrian attorney for German 
party, "the law in force at the professional domicil governs the relations 
between the attorney and his client," Austrian law. 
Greece: 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 229 n. 7· 
Switzerland: App. Bern (April 7, 1933) 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 826 (Yugo-
slavian law). 
57 Roe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (C. C. A. 7th 1943) 132 F. (2d) 829 (limi-
tation of action) is not strict evidence since everything happened in Illinois. 
In Lust v. Atchinson etc. R. Co. (1932) 267 Ill. App. 6o it was held that the 
law of the place (San Francisco) where the attorney entered into his contract 
with his client determined whether the attorney has a lien for the costs of 
the suit against the defeated adversary. But evidently this decision was 
supported by the facts that the attorney was domiciled in San Francisco and 
the judgment was rendered there. 
58 Germany: OLG. Miinchen (June II, 1926) 75 Seuff. Arch. 313 No. 129. 
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of a firm, either as exclusive distributors in an assigned 
territory or to administer buildings, buy or sell in continuous 
relationship, solicit orders, or cash money. The delimitation 
of these types from the field of master and servant is some-
times difficult to state. Wise courts have extended by analogy 
legal provisions literally restricted to commercial servants 
so as to comprehend certain groups of merchants.59 There-
fore, conflicts rules should not necessarily require a radical 
distinction of functions. 
In the United States, the clear tendency to apply the 
law of the agent's domicil has been concealed under the 
cover of lex loci contractus. 
Illustration. The Transit Bus Sales Company, a resident 
of Wisconsin, obtained by written contract exclusive dis-
tribution of interurban busses manufactured by Kalamazoo 
Coaches, Inc., in the territory of "a number of states," in-
cluding Wisconsin and Upper Michigan. The court after 
much argument about the doubtful "place of contracting" 
construed it as being in Wisconsin.60 The sales territory, 
59 For example, in the United States where a truck driver uses his own 
vehicle to transport goods of another, courts have allowed common law 
action for injury or death, or applied statutes on workmen's compensation, 
social security, and unemployment compensation. Cf. Note, 144 A. L. R. 735, 
740, but see 151 A. L. R. 1331. 
In Germany, the case of independent contractors employed similarly to 
servants (Arbeitsnehmerahnliche Agenten) has been much discussed, see 
HuECK in 39 Riv. Dir. Com. (1941) I 143 at 145. 
A nice example, for our purposes, is furnished in a German case, RG. 
(Jan. 8, 1929) JW. 1929, 1291. A German firm appointed a firm in New 
York as exclusive general agent for distributing its goods in the United 
States and Canada. The goods, however, were to be bought by the American 
party as buyer and resold by it within its territory. In the words of the 
annotator, TITZE, the New Yorker is not an "agent" (in the German sense) 
since he sells in his own name; he is not a commercial employee, since he 
sells in carrying on his own business; and he is not a commission agent since 
he distributes on his own account." The court finds a relationship similar to 
"agency" as justification for applying by analogy the limitations on dis-
missal by the principal, prescribed for agency in § 92 of the Commercial 
Code. Of course, the court should not have applied German law at all, much 
less without a word of justification, cf. IPRspr. 1929 No. 34· 
60 Transit Bus Sales v. Kalamazoo Coaches, Inc. (C. C. A. 6th 1944) 145 F. 
(2d) 8o4; Alexander v. Barker (1902) 64 Kan. 396, 401, 67 Pac. 829 directly 
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of course, afforded no clue since the states of both parties 
are included. The decision in favor of Wisconsin law could 
have been very simple, on the ground of the place of busi-
ness of the sales agent.61 
In another recent case of a contract, combining sales and 
agency, exactly the same result has been based upon the law 
of the place of performance.62 
In a long chain of decisions, German and Swiss courts 
have developed the constant doctrine that the law of that 
place governs where "the agent deploys his activity," mean-
ing the fixed domicil where the agent is established and from 
which he is active in the interest of the principal.63 
applied the law of Cherokee, the place of activity and performance, to the 
validity of the contract of agency. 
In Gaston, Williams & Wigmore of Canada, Ltd. v. Warner {C. C. A. 2d 
1921) 272 Fed. 56, the broker employed for the sale of a ship was domiciled 
in New York where the brokerage contract was made and the vessel was 
to be delivered. It was held immaterial to the earning of the fee, on the 
ground of the law of New York, that both parties to the sale were British 
subjects and hence the sale, in wartime, was void. 
61 This theory should have been followed in Smith v. Compania Litogr. 
de Ia Habana ( 1926) 127 Misc. 508, 217 N. Y. Supp. 39· The plaintiff was 
to represent the defendant company of Cuba in the United States and 
Canada, and made the contract inter praesentes in Cuba. The court referred 
to the law of Cuba as mere lex loci contractus, which is insufficient, and as 
supplanting lex loci solutionis, because the agent had to work in several 
countries (a known, inappropriate approach). Finally, the Cuban law not 
being in evidence, the lex fori was applied. The agent probably had a domicil 
in the United States from which he traveled; the decision does not state the 
contrary. Even so, he lived and worked in North America. This fact surely 
supports the application of some American law-though not the lex fori-in 
preference to the labyrinthian solution of the court. 
6 2 Cowley v. Anderson {C. C. A. roth 1947) 159 F. (2d) r. 
63 Germany: RG. (Oct. n, 1893) JW. 1893, 549 (rights of agent after 
notice); 38 RGZ. 194, 51 id. 149; JW. 1899, 146 No. 21; OLG. Kolmar 
(March 27, 1896) 8 Z.int.R. (1898) 45, Clunet 1903, 886 (agent for buying 
flour in Paris, French law); OLG. Hamburg (June 26, 1909) 21 ROLG. 385 
(English agent for exclusive distribution for Great Britain and colonies, 
English law of restraint of trade). 
Otherwise, RG. {Oct. 28, 1932) 138 RGZ. 252 {on the ground of express 
agreement for the German law of the principal). RG. {Jan. 8, 1929) JW. 
1929, 1291 (without justification and much criticized). 
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II 322 {French general agent 
for France and the French colonies, French law). BG. {Oct. 25, 1939) 65 
BGE. II r68 (as a rule, law of the place where the exclusive representative 
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(b) Brokers and occasional agents. We distinguish this 
group for the one reason that certain doubts have arisen 
with regard to stockbrokers. Apart from some old decisions 
which do not even consider the conflict of laws,64 there is 
no controversy with respect to factors and to selling or 
buying agents contracting in their own name on orders. 
Certainly the domicil of the principal65 and the place where 
the order is given66 are without importance, although both 
have been favored by some theoreticians.67 Thus, where a 
grain broker in Chicago is ordered to buy or sell grain on 
the Chicago Board of Trade Exchange or a stockbroker 
in New York is ordered to transfer securities on the New 
York Stock Exchange, the local law of the broker and the 
exchange governs the entire contract, including validity, 
performance, and effects of wrong performance by either 
party. 68 However, complications do exist. 
deploys his activity). For many other cases, see KNAPP, 6o Z. Schweiz. R. 
(N. F.) (1941) 335 (a) No. 40. 
Austria: OGH. (July 9, 1937) Zentralblatt 1937, 748 No. 433, where the 
agent is a merchant registered and domiciled in Austria, Austrian law 
applies. 
Hungary: Curia P. VII 3813 (1931), SzA.szy, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 172 
No. 1: a Hungarian firm granted an American firm exclusive distribution of 
certain skins in the United States and Canada ; the agent gave notice and 
demands damages because the principal made a direct offer to another 
American firm. The court recognizes American law as governing, but under 
a sort of natural law, it charges the American plaintiff with lack of good 
faith because he failed to warn the defendant of the rigidity of American 
law. 
64 E.g., Cartwright v. Greene (x866) 47 Barb. 9 explains the effect of an 
account of del credere under the New York law of the principal, whereas 
the factors were in San Francisco. 
The French Supreme Court, Cass. req. (July 9, 1928) S. 1930.1.17, examin-
ing the question whether a broker in Leigh, England, was entitled to insert 
a clause of arbitration into the contract with the third party, thoughtlessly 
applied French law; see Note, NIBOYET, ibid. 
65 Thus, Adams v. Thayer (1931) 85 N.H. 177, 155 At!. 687, the principal 
lived in New Hampshire, the contract was centered in Massachusetts. 
66 Berry v. Chase (C. C. A. 6th 1906) 146 Fed. 625. French courts do not 
reaily apply in this case the lex loci contractus, see BATIFFOL 287 n. 3· 
67 The place where the order is given appears as late as in the proposals 
of PILLET to the Institute of International Law, 23 Annuaire ( 1910) 283, 
291, and in AMIEux's article, 2 Repert. 440 f. n. 17, although he concedes 
that this place is difficult to determine. 
68 France: Trib. com. Seine (July 4, 1894) Clunet 1894, 994 (London 
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The American practice has become fairly firm in applying 
this rule to the question whether the contract is invalid as 
gambling or wager. 69 The contract is even enforced in the 
states where it would be invalid under domestic law, 70 th~ 
few exceptions71 probably being obsolete. However, this 
concerns the relation of the states to federal institutions 
for the common benefit. Would the rule be applied to 
foreign exchanges as well? We have seen a more restrictive 
practice in European courts. 72 
A difficulty arises where the broker's place differs from 
the location of the exchange. Of course, it is commonly 
realized that the parties reasonably contemplate the rules 
of the exchange at which the order is intended to be exe-
cuted.73 American courts, furthermore, have conveniently 
applied the rules of an exchange not determined by the 
parties but at which the contract would be customarily 
executed. 74 In connection with this view, the legality of the 
broker) ; and many subsequent decisions, see BATIFFOL 287 n. 3; adde Paris 
(March 7, 1938) Clunet 1938, 739· 
Belgium: Cass. (June 4, 1940) 70 Pand. Belges 599, cited by BRANDL, Int. 
Biirsenprivatrecht 85 n. 13. 
Franco-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (July 25, 1925) Ruperts' Merck & Co. v. 
Broca & Cie., 5 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 795; (Feb. 22, 1926) Cohen v. Herz, 
6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 228. 
Germany: RG. (May ro, r884) 12 RGZ. 34, 36; (April r, 1896) 37 RGZ. 
266 (although the instant contract was invalidated by public policy) ; RG. 
(June r8, r887) 4 Bolze No. 26, according to NussBAUM, D. IPR. 276 n. 2 
denies the right of the English broker to intervene as a party according to 
English law. 
Italy: Cass. Napoli (Sept. r8, 1914) Clunet 1915, 703, and many other 
decisions, the "absolutely prevailing opinion" according to CAVAGLIERI, Dir. 
Int. Com. 425 n. r. 
69 Winslow v. Kaiser ( 1934) 313 Pa. 577, 170 Atl. 135· 
70 Jacobs v. Hyman (C. C. A. 5th 1923) 286 Fed. 346; MEYER, The Law 
of Stock Brokers and Stock Exchanges (1931) 678. 
71 MEYER, id. 677 n. 4· 
72 Vol. II pp. 568 If. 
73 E.g., Winslow v. Kaiser (1934) 313 Pa. 577, 170 Atl. 135. The defendant 
client "was visited with knowledge of the board's rules which allowed the 
matching of orders to buy and orders to sell." 
France: E.g., Trib. com. Dijon (July r, 1908) Clunet 1910,536 (selling out). 
Germany: Infra n. 79· 
Switzerland: See Vol. II Ch. 28. 
74 Berry v. Chase (C. C. A. 6th 1906) 146 Fed. 625, 629. 
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operation always depends on the law of the state of the 
exchange and not of the place where the order was given 
or received, thus excluding the law of the broker's domicil.T3 
Sometimes, a direct correspondence between the client and 
the substitute of his local broker, at the seat of the exchange, 
has facilitated the decision that the entire contract was 
governed by the law of the exchange/6 
Nevertheless, in numerous respects there remains room 
for the broker's law. Some decisions have ignored the prob-
lem, and some have directly referred to the law of the 
exchange, although the operation is made through a local 
broker with the aid of a subagent. On the other hand, in 
what appears to be the best considered decision, the Massa-
chusetts court states that, as in the absence of specification 
the order was executed in New York, it was only "in certain 
respects subject to the rules and regulations of the New 
York Stock Exchange," but not "to be governed by the 
laws of that state relating to stock bought on margins."77 
75 Brooks v. People's Bank (1921) 233 N.Y. 87; 134 N. E. 846; In re 
Clement D. Cates & Co. (D. C. S. D. Fla. 1922) 283 Fed. 541, 545; Hoyt v. 
Wickham (C. C. A. 8th 1928) 25 F. (2d) 777, 779; Lyons Milling Co. v. 
Golfe & Carkener (C. C. A. 10th 1931) 46 F. (2d) 241, 245; MEYER, The Law 
of Stock Brokers 677 n. 4, Supp. ( 1936) 236 § 181. 
Germany: To reach the same result, the Reichsgericht goes so far as to 
apply the law of the exchange as the general law of the contract, see supra 
n. 72 and BRANDL, Int. Biirsenprivatrecht 94· 
France: The courts emphasizing generally the determination of legality by 
the law of the exchange, e.g., Trib. sup. Colmar (Jan. 17, 1923) Clunet 1924, 
1049 and Note, NAsT, might decide likewise where the broker is established 
elsewhere. It is true that the frequent detour of decision through construing 
the place where the commission agent receives the order as place of con-
tracting might mislead in this case. 
76 Hoyt v. Wickham, supra n. 75· In Mullinix v. Hubbard (C. C. A. 8th 
1925) 6 F. (2d) 109, II4 the order was given in Memphis to a local branch 
of the New York stockholders; hence no further question of localization 
occurred. 
France: A similar case, though with express submission to the rules of 
the London stock exchange, in Trib. com. Seine (June 8, 1931) Clunet 1932, 
629· 
77 Papadopulos v. Bright (1928) 264 Mass. 42, 46, 161 N. E. 799 citing 
Barrell v. Paine (1922) 242 Mass. 415, 425, 136 N. E. 414; Marshall v. 
James (1925) 252 Mass. 306, 310, 147 N. E. 740. 
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This question was determined under the law of Massa-
chusetts, considered as the law of the place of contract; we 
ought to add that payment and delivery were due there, and 
more important yet, the broker was domiciled there. 
As a Quebec decision justly asserts, advances made by 
a broker in buying and selling at an exchange are to be 
recovered under the law governing the contract with the 
client, and not by the law of the place where the buying and 
selling took place.78 
The German Reichsgericht, to the contrary, prefers the 
law of the exchange as a whole9 to that of the broker. But 
this is just another consequence of overemphasizing the 
lex loci solutionis. Prevailing German literature is in 
opposition. 80 
The law of the broker's place of business, hence, should 
govern such problems as free consent and capacity of the 
parties, time and place of payment and of delivery to the 
customer, remedies for nonperformance by the broker, and 
his duty to account. Where the broker under his own law, 
e.g., German, is entitled to take up the ordered transaction in 
lieu of a third party, he may do so despite the contrary law 
of the state, e.g., England, where the exchange is situated 
in which the order would otherwise be carried out. But of 
course this question is decided under the usages of the 
exchange in the case where the order is performed by a 
subagent. On the other hand, if the customer fails to provide 
78 Finlayson v. Kell (1921) 23 Que. Pr. 328. 
79 RG. (Nov. 30, 1899) JW. 1900, 19 No. 32; (Nov. 21, 1910) JW. 1911, 
148 (German broker ordered to sell securities in the United States, American 
limitation of action; contra, LEHMANN in 5 Diiringer-Hachenburg II 676. RG. 
(May 30, 1923) 107 RGZ. 36, see infra n. So. 
France: Similarly, the editor of Clunet in Notes, e.g., Clunet 1938, 742, 745, 
speaking of the law of the exchange as "professional law." 
so This is the main point of controversy between German writers and the 
Reichsgericht, 107 RGZ. 36 j cf. NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 276 n. 2 j STAUB-KOENIGE 
in 4 Staub 638 § 383 n. 37; BRANDL, Int. Borsenprivatrecht 91; LEHMANN in 
5 Diiringer-Hachenburg 676 § 383 n. 25. 
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cover according to the contract, the broker is entitled to 
sell out by any method recognized at the exchange.81 
(c) Real-estate broker. When a real estate broker is 
domiciled at the situs of the immovable, this fact deter-
mines the applicable law without regard to the place where 
the brokerage agreement is made or a purchaser is found. 82 
The Georgia court, so reasoning, decided to apply the lex 
loci solutionis,S3 but this, too, is not the adequate rule. The 
broker sues for his fees, which he earns when he presents a 
buyer able and willing; this may occur at any place. If 
the broker resides outside the state of situs, an Illinois de-
cision has applied the Louisiana law of the situs on the 
ground that the agreement was made there.84 This, how-
ever, happened only by accident, as the activity of the broker 
was centered in Illinois where he also found a purchaser. 
Lex loci contractus in this case, as lex loci solutionis in the 
first case, is beside the point. The lex situs has simply scored 
another undeserved victory. 
Even more questionable are other decisions invalidating 
the brokerage and depriving the broker of his fees on the 
ground of his lack of license. While understandably the law 
of the situs upholds its public policy with respect to its 
land, 85 an Illinois court decided against a broker, licensed 
in Illinois, who found a purchaser for Illinois land in New 
York, where he was not licensed, 86 and in New York a 
81 Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 21, 1941) 67 BGE. II 179, 181 recognizes this 
in principle, although by substituting Swiss law for the "unknown" Czecho-
slovakian procedure, the rights of the banker of Prague against the Swiss 
customer were frustrated. 
82 Pratt v. Sloan (1930) 41 Ga. App. 150, 152 S. E. 275; since the broker 
was not licensed in Florida, the Georgia court dismissed his claim. 
83 BATIFFOL 288 n. 3 claims this construction for his theory. 
84 Benedict v. Dakin (1909) 243 Ill. 384, 90 N. E. 712: the fees are de-
termined according to the standard of Louisiana which is half of that of 
Illinois. 
85 Moore v. Burdine (La. 1937) 174 So. 279· 
86 Frankel v. Allied Mills, Inc. (1938) 369 Ill. 578, 17 N. E. (2d) 570. 
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broker's suit was dismissed because he was not licensed to 
deal in Pennsylvania land. 87 
Consistently, the contract ought to be centered at the 
domicil of the broker. The broker, then, should be required 
to be licensed at his domicil, and the situs may void his 
claim if he is not licensed there, although even this, once 
more, unduly disturbs the private law in the interest of 
administrative interstate diversity. 
4· Public Policy 
Under the French law, the promise of an exaggerated fee 
to any agent, including solicitors, barristers, notaries, archi-
tects, and enforcement agencies, may be reduced by the 
court. It has been correctly argued that the law of the con-
tract rather than the French territorial law should apply.88 
87 Angell v. Van Schaick (1892) 132 N.Y. 187, 30 N. E. 395· 
88 MAURY, Revue Crit. 1936, 371 ff., 382, commenting on a decision applying 
the French provision for the honorarium of a foreign advocate on a contract 
made in France. 
CHAPTER 42 
Workmen's Compensation 
I. THE SuBSTANTIVE LAw 
I. Municipal Systems1 
I T HAS always been recognized that liability of em-ployers for injury to the health of employees could be 
based on tort, which, however, required either proof, 
or at least a prima facie showing, of fault. The German 
Civil Code, § 618, added a contractual duty of employers to 
protect the employee against dangers to life and health, 
and this has been adopted in other codes. In the industrial 
age, however, special institutions have increasingly been 
found necessary to provide accident compensation not based 
on tortious and contractual liability of the employer and 
even despite excusable fault of the injured employee. In 
the common law countries, an additional reform was needed 
1 Strangely, despite an immense literature, no satisfactory modern com-
parative work exists. 
United States: ScHNEIDER's Workmen's Compensation (ed. 3, 1941) Supp. 
1947, Vol. I §§ 155-218, Extraterritorial Application of Acts and Conflict of 
Laws. Valuable surveys on the statutes and decisions have been furnished by 
YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. (1932) 338, 340; STUMBERG 189; HANCOCK, 
Torts 2n; DwAN, 20 Minn. L. Rev. (1935) 19; DuNLAP, 23 Cal. L. Rev. 
(1935) 381; Notes, 35 Col. L. Rev. (1935) 751; and particularly informative, 
Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1943) 242-247 (on whose dates I am leaning). 
On "Jurisdiction and Venue in Aviation Accident Cases Including Work-
men's Compensation Claims," with interesting side lights, see GoLDBERG, 36 
Cal. L. Rev. (1948) 41. 
European countries: The most informative general survey is still afforded 
by NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. (1922) 437 ff. § 69. The various pub-
lications of the International Labour Office contain numerous details. In 
Italy the R. Deer. (Aug. 17, 1935) No. 1765 in SALEMI, Codice corporativo e 
del lavoro ( 1942) § 206 seems to retain force. 
On Latin America, a short report by TrxrER, "The Development of Social 
Insurance in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay," 32 Int. Labour Rev. 
( 1935) 610 is mainly concerned with the social and administrative features. 
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to eliminate the defense of common employment. Pro-
gressive impulses were most felt in hazardous industries, 
which still constitute a special class in New York, but the 
area of "social protection" has constantly expanded, though 
it varies in the world. 
Finally, the legislative idea of the statutes has changed. 
The great tendency, taken as a whole, has been from im-
provements on, or substitutes for, the ordinary tort remedies 
to a theory of the employer's professional risk, and from 
individual responsibility of the employer to common liability 
of the employers of a district or industry, often with con-
tributions by the employees and public subsidies. 
Four groups of compensation organization are distin-
guishable: 
(a) A group of mere substitutes for tort actions, such 
as the British Employers' Liability Act, I88o, is repre-
sented in the United States by the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act, I908. The former Swiss Factory Liability Act, 
I88I/I887, illustrated an analogous attempt to insert a 
somewhat stricter liability in the employment contract. 
(b) A superior type of individual liability has been 
adopted in the workmen's compensation acts of most states 
of the United States (since I 908), the United States Em-
ployees' Compensation Act ( I9I6), the Longshoremen's 
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (I927), and the 
enactments of England ( I 9 2 5) and many other countries. 
These statutes apply regardless of real or presumed fault 
on the part of the employer, or the defense of common em-
ployment, and other features of the old master and servant 
doctrine. 
The American compensation acts are of two kinds. 
"Elective" or "optional" acts operate merely if the parties, 
or either party, declare for the act, or do not reject its 
application. Statutes of the other kind apply irrespective 
of any disposition by the parties. 
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(c) To secure the employee's claim, some of the same 
statutes in the United States and abroad favor, others re-
quire, that the employer take out insurance for the com-
pensation risk. The insurer may be a private company, 
or a public or semipublic institution, at the employer's 
option. 
By another method, the French Law of I 898 created a 
trust fund to which all employers contribute, for guarantee-
ing the claim of the injured in case of insolvency of the 
employer. 
(d) The most effective protection of workers is pro-
vided by the system of automatic insurance against accident. 
On the mere ground of occupation in work in a domestic 
enterprise the worker enters into a corporative, "social" 
relation with a public or semipublic insurance fund operating 
as an administrative agency. Germany adopted this system 
as early as I 8 8 5 under Bismarck and was followed by the 
states of central and northern Europe, and later by others, 
including certain jurisdictions on the American continent. 
Great Britain has joined this system by its National Insur-
ance Acts of 1946.2 
2 United States: See LENHOFF, "Insurance Features of Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws," 29 Cornell L. Q. ( 1944) 176, 353· 
Great Britain: National Insurance {Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946, and 
National Insurance Act, 1946, 9, ro, u, Geo. VI., c. 62 and c. 67. The Em-
ployers' Liability Act, r88o, has been repealed by Law Reform {Personal 
Injuries) Act, 1948, s. 1 (2). 
Canada: "Beginning in Ontario in 1914, workmen's compensation laws are 
now in force in every province except Prince Edward Island .... More 
nearly uniform than any other class of Labour Legislation, the provincial 
Workmen's Compensation Acts each provide for a system of State insurance 
... the Ontario statute embodies principles adopted from the German system 
of accident insurance and from a collective liability law enacted in 1911 by 
the State of Washington." Labour Legislation in Canada. Legislation Branch, 
Department of Labour of Canada, August 1945, p. 17. 
Brazil: Decree No. 85, of March 14, 1935 and following acts, see CESARINO 
JuNIOR, 2 Dir. Soc. Bras. 321 § 308. 
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2. International Treaties3 
International conventions of Geneva established a mtm-
mum of unified rules of compensation for the benefit of the 
workers.4 Of great influence is another Convention designed 
to end the frequent discriminations against alien workers 
in general, or nonresident workers, or nonresident alien 
dependents of workers, by guaranteeing reciprocity of treat-
ment. This Equality of Treatment (Accidents Compensa-
tion) Convention of 1925, was in force in forty-one states5 
on September 30, 1948. 
II. NATURE oF CoNFLicTs 
The nature of conflicts between divergent laws on pro-
fessional accidents varies according to the systems involved. 
On the one hand, statutes represented by those imposing 
employer's liability for presumed fault move in the sphere 
of quasi-tortious liability. Their application remains tied 
to the principle of the lex loci delicti. 
On the other hand, obligatory social insurance of the 
workers depends exclusively on territorial public law. The 
requirements of participation in the scheme by business 
establishments and insured workers are set out in detail 
in the statutes, and bind the courts as well as all other 
agencies. These statutes cannot be applied abroad. 
a The International Labour Code, published by the International Labour 
Office, Montreal 1941, 289-298. 
4 Workmen's Compensation (Agriculture) Convention, 1921; Workmen's 
Compensation (Accidents) Convention, 1925, Int. Labour Code, supra n. 3, 
at 289-298. More ratifications have been coming forth recently, such as in 
France by Decree No. 48-681 of April x6, 1948. 
5 Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslo-
vakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, 
Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Int. Labour Code, 299 n. 1. 
The new list omits Estonia and adds Bolivia, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Peru, 
and Venezuela. International Labour Conference, 32nd. Session, Reports on 
the Application of Conventions (Geneva 1949) I 38. 
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The situation created by most American and similar 
statutes, despite their different theories, results in the same 
rule of a purely territorial application of workmen's com-
pensation acts. The American states, with few exceptions, 
have established administrative boards which by their 
organization and composition of personnel are intended to 
administer exclusively the domestic workmen's compensa-
tion law. In this majority of states, the particular local 
circumstances and policies so completely dominate the spirit 
of the statutes, and a speedy and inexpensive regulation of 
claims is so important, that application of another state's 
compensation act is commonly thought to be entirely im-
practicable. 6 
Five jurisdictions, however, expressly permit an employee 
hired outside the state to enforce rights acquired under 
the foreign law.7 
Continental countries, following the system of individual 
employers' liability, have usually entrusted the administra-
tion of their industrial and agricultural accident statutes 
to the labor courts or other segments of the regular judiciary 
which are regarded as capable of deciding cases according 
to foreign law. Nevertheless, the arguments and solutions 
are fairly comparable to those advanced in the United States. 
Generally, indeed, the normal conflict arising when a 
worker employed in one state is injured in another, is a 
conflict of jurisdictions rather than of substantive laws. 
The intricacies and ramifications of this subject, however, 
have given it a certain prominence in the treatment of con-
flicts law. 
6 Mosely v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co. ( 1926) 313 Mo. 225, 245, 281 S. W. 
762, quoted by HANCOCK, Torts 214; Goodrich 244 § 97; Note, 57 Harv. L. 
Rev. ( 1943) at 246; DWAN, supra n. x, at 19. 
1 Arizona, Idaho, Utah, Vermont, Hawaii, see Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 
(1943) at 246; see also HANCOCK, Torts 215, 216. 
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III. THE THEORIES 
An able survey of the territorial delimitation of Ameri-
can workmen's compensation statutes, by their express pro-
visions or court construction, has stated six types of solu-
tions, one of which has five variants.8 Arminjon enumerates 
six different theories in France.9 Resorting to historical and 
comparative points of view, we may distinguish three main 
theories.10 
I. Tort Theory 
In the United States, workmen's compensation was first 
construed as substituting a statutory for a common law tort. 
Consequently, an act was applied always and only when 
the injury occurred in the state.11 At present, however, only 
very occasionally does a court retain the idea that the 
domestic statute does not include injuries outside the state.12 
The Restatement ( § 398) forms a presumption to the 
same effect, viz., that a workman may sue for bodily harm 
arising out of and in the course of the employment, but 
restricts this to contracts concluded in the state. Never-
theless, it presumes also ( § 399) the applicability of any 
workmen's compensation act when the harm is sustained 
in the state-a principle conforming to the tort theory and 
not corresponding with the actual situation, which, how-
ever, may suggest a possible equitable supplement to the 
main rule. 
The English Court of Appeals interprets the Work-
s Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 242. 
9 2 ARMINJON {ed. 2) 344 § 121. 
10 See Restatement, Introductory Note before § 398. 
11 See the cases in 15 Am. Dig. 2d Dec. Ed. 86. 
12 Oklahoma: Utley v. State Industrial Commission (1936) 176 Okla. 255, 
55 Pac. {2d) 762. The famous previous decisions in Massachusetts and 
Illinois were abrogated by statute, see STUMBERG 189 ns. 2-4. The conclu-
sions regarding the American principle in NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 
493 are obsolete. 
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men's Compensation Act, 1906, to the same effect as the 
tort theory on the ground that acts of Parliament do not 
extend beyond the territorial limits of the kingdom, unless 
they so declare.13 The Belgian Supreme Court follows 
strictly the tort doctrine,14 which is occasionally also found 
elsewhere.15 
In France, the tort theory has been developed in a con-
struction of the domestic compensation statutes as laws 
of securite et police, involving all professional activity on 
French soil. Some courts of appeal, taking this theory 
seriously, have emphasized the fact that the law has not 
considered where the contract is made or of what nationality 
the parties are, but only whether the work is done in 
France.16 However, the administrative courts and, follow-
ing them, the Court of Cassation, have adopted this theory 
with a singular reservation. They use it to assume jurisdic-
tion over all cases of injury occurring in France but, revers-
ing the lower courts, have also assumed jurisdiction under 
other theories in case of outside injuries.17 
13 Tomalin v. S. Pearson & Son, Ltd. (1909) 100 L. T. R. 685, Revue 1910, 
480, per Cozens-Hardy, M. R.; Schwartz v. India Rubber, Gutta Perch a and 
Telegraph Works Co., Ltd. [ 1912] 2 K. B. 299, Clunet 1913, 215. See also 
dictum in Krzus v. Crow's Nest Pass Coal Co., Ltd. [ 1912] A. C. 590, 597-
P. C. This absolute doctrine was rejected by the High Court of the Irish 
Free State, in Patrick Keegan v. Julia Dawson [1934] I. R. 232, without 
indicating the minimum requisites for applying the Act. 
Exceptions are made for seamen and persons employed on certain aircraft, 
and in the case of reciprocal treaties, see 34 HALSBURY ( ed. 2, 1940) 8oo 
§ II34• 
14 Cass. Belg. {Feb. 21, 1907) and (Nov. 26, 1908) Revue 1909, 952, the 
second also in Clunet 1909, 1178. 
15 Italy: App. R"oma {Aug. 18, 1935) Foro !tal. 1936.I.159, Rivista 1936, 
295, criticized by BALDONI, ibid. and BALLADORE PALLIERI, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 
(1938) 86 No. 36. But the latter author, according to BALDONI, Rivista 1932, 
440, also advocated the law of the place of the accident. 
In France, 2 ARMINJON {ed. 2) 346 likewise simply concludes for the law 
of the place of the accident. 
16 See especially App. Amiens (Dec. 10, 1913) Antifoul v. Hersant freres, 
Revue 1921, 501, later reversed, see infra n. 17. 
17 Circular of the Garde de Sceaux, of April 22, 1901, see SUMIEN, I 
Repert. 109 No. 19; Cass. civ. (May 8, 1907) Revue 1907, 539; also two 
decisions in the case, Antifoul v. Hers ant freres: Cass. civ. (March 10, 1913) 
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2. Contracts Theory 
(a) Lex loci contractus. Undoubtedly, the statutes es-
tablishing employer's liability for accidents commonly pre-
suppose a contract of employment. It has frequently been 
concluded therefrom that the statute covers contracts gov-
erned by domestic law; and through the usual influence 
of the lex loci actus principle, the thesis is reached that a 
workmen's compensation act has for its domain accidents 
occurring anywhere to workers hired by a contract within 
the state. For practical purposes, fifteen jurisdictions of 
the United States have adopted this proposition in its pure 
form/ 8 Similarly, all contracts of employment made in 
France are subject to the French statute in the theory of 
the Court of Cassation, irrespective of alien nationality of 
the parties, although at the same time accidents occurring 
in France form another ground for application.19 
An influential Italian doctrine follows the legal pre-
scription of lex loci contractus in the cases where the work-
ing place is outside the country, so that the Italian accident 
statute is applicable, as well when the work is done in Italy 
as when the contract is made in Italy. 20 
It is noteworthy, however, that in this matter even the 
Restatement has felt compelled to concede special treatment 
to a worker hired through an employment agency in, e.g., 
S. 1913.1.307, Revue 1914, 425, and Cass. Chambres reunies (May 26, 1921) 
Revue 1921, 501, reversing the Amiens decision, supra n. 16. 
18 By statute in Alabama, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Maine, Missouri, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont; by judicial practice without 
statutory reference to the place of contracting, Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey; and against the statutes requiring the worker's residence, 
California, Michigan. See 57 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1943) at 243 ns. 9, 10, 244 n. 
13; Bauer's Case ( 1943) 314 Mass. 4, 49 N. E. (zd) u8; and for New 
Jersey, Sweet v. Austin (1934) 12 N.J. Misc. 381, 171 Atl. 684; Franzen v. 
E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. (1942) 128 N.J. Law 549, 27 Atl. (2d) 615. 
19 Cass., decisions in the Antifoul Case, supra n. 17. 
20 BALDONI, Rivista 1932, 442; Rivista 1936, 298; followed by ScERNI 128; 
App. Milano (Dec. 12, 1930) Rivista 1932, 438 applied Italian law to a 
contract made in Italy between Italian parties for working abroad, but in 
this case both parties were Italian. 
9 
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Pennsylvania, where the worker is sent to enter his occupa-
tion in, e.g., California. In that case, it is agreed, the com-
pensation act of the state where the workman reports for 
duty governs compensation. 21 Why not recognize generally 
that it is not the making of the contract but the starting of 
the work that is essential? 
(b) Proper law. In a few cases, American courts have pre-
ferred the law of the place of performance. 22 On the other 
hand, the Indiana court, in an obviously just denial of 
compensation to a worker hired in Michigan to cut timber 
in Michigan, who was injured doing transitory work in 
Indiana, believed that this case constituted an exception to 
the rule of lex loci solutionis. 23 
In particular, the argument "that the rights and duties 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act are contractual 
and the provisions of the Act binding only as part of the 
employment contract," was invoked in a series of decisions 
restricted to "optional" acts. That is, since the effect of 
these acts depends upon election or a presumed agreement, 
which may be excluded by voluntary act of one or both of 
the parties, as the case may be, it has been thought that the 
liability rests upon consent of the parties, whereas a com-
pulsory act applies by operation of the law.24 
Thus, in Iowa quite recently the domestic act was applied 
because it was elective and the contract made in the state, 
though for work in Oklahoma.25 
21 § 398 comment a; cf. GooDRICH 249· 
22 Thus, Johns-Manville, Inc. v. Thrane ( 1923) 8o Ind. App. 432, 141 
N. E. 229, the court applies its own act to an occupation considered not 
temporary. 
Similarly, Belgium: Trib. civ. Arion (July 13, 1904) Revue 1905, 539; 
(July 20, 1904) id. 543· 
23 Elkhart Sawmill Co. v. Skinner (1942) 111 Ind. App. 695, 42 N. E. (2d) 
412. 
24 Sheehan Pipe Line Const. Co. v. State Industrial Comm. (1931) 151 
Okla. 272, 3 Pac. (zd) 199. 
25 Haverly v. Union Construction Co. ( 1945) 236 Iowa 278, 18 N. W. (2d} 
629; the criticism in 31 Ia. L. Rev. ( 1946) 472 is beside the point. 
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The contracts theory has been pushed to the farthest 
point by some French writers and decisions in France and 
Louisiana (whose act is optional). They directly invoke 
party autonomy to the effect that the law chosen or pre-
sumed to be chosen by the parties for governing the em-
ployment contract also includes the respective compensa-
tion statute. 26 It does not need much argumene7 to refute 
this transformation of a law applicable to a contract into a 
law selected by the parties. Where an "optional" compen-
sation act is not dependent on adoption by the parties but 
only permits either party to exclude its application by 
declaration in contracting, the choice has been said to be 
usually merely on paper. 28 At any rate, the law does not 
base its own force, in the absence of a declaration, on the 
agreement of the parties. Even though both parties may 
contribute to a fund covering the liability, the law governs 
as it is at the time of the award, changes of the law not 
being prevented by constitutional protection of contractual 
obligations, and the parties are without power to modify 
its effects. 
(c) Contracting and residence required. Certain Ameri-
can statutes restrict the jurisdiction of their boards to the 
case where, in addition to the making of the employment 
26 PERROUD, Clunet I906, 633; I910, 668; I912, 389; RAYNAUD, Clunet I9I3, 
63; SUMIEN, I Repert. uo; Cour Paris (March I6, I925) Revue I925, 348, 
Clunet I926, 346; cf. J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 592; McKane v. New Amster-
dam Casualty Co. (La. App. I940) I99 So. I75; Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum 
(La. App. I942) IO So. (2d} 109, reversed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States on the grounds discussed below; cf. Note, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) 
at 3 57· 
Particularly strange, Belgian Trib. civ. Mons (May 30, I925) Pasicrisie 
I925-3-12I applying lex loci contractus in adding that even though lex loci 
delicti (French law) were applied, a deviation in favor of the lex fori would 
be assumed according to the presumable intentions of the parties. 
27 See GOODRICH 240, 24I, and in France, NIBOYET, Recueil I927 I 2I, n. I. 
However, a recent American decision has recognized without restriction 
a party stipulation for the applicable law. Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central 
Airlines Corp. (C. C. A. 6th I948) I67 F. (2d) 727, 730; noted, r6 U. of 
Chi. L. Rev. (I949) I57· 
28 STUMBERG I93· 
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contract, the residence of employer or employee29 or both30 
is in the state. A sound instinct has driven these legislators 
away from purely contractual reasoning. But better formu-
lations have been found in the third group. 
3· Law of the Place of Employment 
(a) In general. Some American compensation statutes 
define their territorial sphere with reference to the place 
where the worker is regularly employed. This is sometimes 
the only test.31 In other statutes it is an alternative to the 
law of the place of contracting,32 or the working place and 
the employer's residence must both be in the state.33 
It may be recalled, moveover, that the employer's place 
of business or residence is an additional requisite to the 
domestic place of contracting in same states.34 And more 
important, when the place of the making of the contract is 
emphasized, following the beaten path of the doctrine, 
coincidence with the really important place of work is very 
largely the rule.35 
This slow trend to a method away from the inadequate 
terms of tort and contract, though not yet carried to a 
settled conclusion, 36 is unmistakable and effective. The re-
29 Florida, Georgia, see 57 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) at 244 n. 13 (d). 
30 North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, id. n. 13 (c). 
31 Oregon, West Virginia, id. 243 n. II. 
32 Arizona, Colorado, id. n. 12. 
33 Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, id. 244 n. 13 (e). 
34 Supra n. 29. 
35 Cf. e.g., for Georgia, McDonald-Haynes v. Minyard (1943) 69 Ga. 
App. 479, 26 S. E. (2d) 138. 
In New York, in the case of nonhazardous employment it is usually said 
that it suffices for application of the act (e.g., to traveling salesmen) that 
"the employment contract" is made in the state. See Wagoner v. Brown 
Mfg. Co. (1937) 274 N. Y. 593, 10 N. E. (2d) 567; Roth v. A. C. Horn Co. 
(1941) 262 App. Div. 922, 28 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 8o8, aff'd (1941) 287 N.Y. 
545; Lepow v. Lepow Knitting Mills ( 1942) 288 N. Y. 377, 43 N. E. (2d) 
450; cf. CRONIN, Note, 28 Cornell L. Q. (1943) 206 n. 4, 209 n. 19. 
36 GOODRICH, "Five Years of Conflict of Laws," 32 Va. L. Rev. (1946) 295, 
319: "So there developed the description of the acts as a regulation of the 
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suiting localization patently agrees with the European 
theories converging from the doctrines in older and newer 
types of liability to practically consonant delimitations. The 
Canadian laws, 37 German38 and Swiss39 courts, the Italian 
writers,40 and probably many other national systems41 refer 
to the place where the work is regularly to be done within 
the employer's business organization. 
It is still impossible to extract a precise common idea from 
these regulations. But two basic concepts have emerged; 
whether applied alternatively or in combination these con-
cepts at any rate mark the main tendency and may lead to 
a final agreement. One idea is that the employer's business 
to which the employee is attached must be in the state, the 
other that the worker must do his regular work in the state. 
(b) Place of employment. The localization rule of 
Minnesota has acquired some repute, whereby the place of 
the employer's business prevails rather than his main office 
even though the worker may be hired at the latter place. 
Where the work, as for instance the construction of an 
airport, is carried on, there is the decisive location. 42 This, 
in a frequent expression of New York constitutes a "status 
of employment," more important than the fact of hiring 
the worker at a particular place.43 The localization of the 
industry justifies application of the police power of the 
state to regulate that industry; originally aimed at prevent-
relation of employer and employee. Enunciation of the theory, however, did 
not settle all the questions." 
3 7 E.g., Ontario: Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 204 s. 5· 
38 Germany: Reichsversicherungsordnung §§ 153 ff.; NEUMEYER, 2 Int. 
Verwaltungs R. 514 and cit.; Trib. Arb. Mixte Germano-Belge (April 25, 
1924) 4 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 319; (April 10, 1925) 5 id. 348. 
39 Switzerland: BG. (March 4, 1892) 18 BGE. 354· 
40 GEMMA, Dir. Int. del Lavoro 241 f.; BALDONI, SCERNI, cited supra n. 20. 
41 In France, the statute of the normal place of working was advocated by 
MAHAIM, cited by BALDONI, Rivista 1932, 441, n. 6 at 442. 
42 De Rosier v. Craig (1944) 217 Minn. 296, 14 N. W. (2d) 286, Note, 28 
Minn. L. Rev. (1944) 335· 
43 Note, 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. ( 1933) 518, 522. 
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mg accidents, it has been extended to provide accident 
compensation. 44 
Illustration. "Where air route between Minnesota and 
Illinois was operated by a foreign corporation (a Dela-
ware corporation) from Minnesota where all runs were 
started, business offices maintained, mechanical work done, 
payrolls distributed, and pilots and copilots lived and re-
ceived all instructions, copilot injured in crash was subject 
to Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act so as to pre-
clude a common-law negligence action, notwithstanding 
crash occurred in Wisconsin and regardless of whether 
contract of employment was made in Iowa, on theory em-
ployer's business was 'localized' in Minnesota."45 
Other statutes approach this conception. But it appears 
useless to look for an absolutely unequivocal localization. 
Provided that both the contract is made and the business 
located in the state, the employment is sure to be considered 
domestic. 
(c)Regular work in the state. The bulk of discussion 
in the American practice concerns the distinction between 
the case where the employee works regularly and where he 
does only transitory, "incidental," "occasional," or "tem-
porary" work in a state. 
There seems to exist agreement that a claim otherwise 
founded is not prejudiced by the fact that the injury occurs 
in transitory work outside the state. This maxim is often 
applied, since usually the transitory nature of out-of-state 
work is liberally affirmed. 
44 Minnesota: Chambers v. District Court (1918) 139 Minn. 205, x66 N. W. 
185; Ginsburg v. Byers ( 1927) 171 Minn. 366, 214 N. W. 55· 
Nebraska: Watts v. Long (1928) n6 Neb. 656, 218 N. W. 410. 
45 Severson v. Hanford Tri-State Airlines (C. C. A. 8th 1939) 105 F. 
(2d) 622, headnote summary. See other airline cases, GoLDBERG, 36 Cal. L. 
Rev., supra n. x, at 50 n. 33· 
The 1948 Supplement to the Restatement § 400 recognizes that a state 
may confer a right of action within the terms of its statute even though it is 
not the place of injury or place of contracting. The interest of the state in 
the employer-employee relationship is considered sufficient to justify such 
an extraterritorial effect of the statute. 
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The cases of multiple claims of employees are thereby 
even more increased than in the other systems. It would 
seem logical and equitable to accord optional compensation 
also when an employee is hired by a firm for out-of-state 
work but suffers an accident within the state while tempo-
rarily employed there.46 
Some statutes have, however, limited the time of out-
side employment to ninety days47 or required that the 
injury should not happen six months or more after leaving 
the state48 or set up additional requirements for awarding 
compensation for outside injuries. 49 
Similar provisions are to be found in the Treaty between 
France and Great Britain, of July 3, 1909,50 and many 
subsequent treaties. 
On the other hand, great variety or doubt exists as to 
work regularly divided between two state territories and 
work prevailingly done out of the state which, viewed from 
the standpoint of the employer, is incidental to his business. 
It has been maintained that the New York courts have 
reached a system covering the entire ground, as summarized 
in the footnote. 51 
4 6 To this effect, evidently, GooDRICH, "Five Years of Conflict of Laws," 
32 Va. L. Rev. ( 1946) at 320, criticizing House v. State Industrial Accident 
Commission (1941) 167 Ore. 257, 117 Pac. {2d) 611, noted, 5 U. of Detroit 
L. J. ( I94I) 67. 
47 Delaware, Pennsylvania: 57 Harv. L. Rev. (I943) 244 n. I5· 
48 Ontario: Rev. Stat. I937, c. 204, s. 5 (I). 
49 Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1943) at 244· 
50 See Int. Labour Code, 307 n. I, and Reports on the Application of Con-
ventions { 1949) supra n. 5, at 142 and 145, on recent treaties between France 
and Great Britain, and of France with Belgium, Italy, and Poland. 
51 Mr. WILLIAM SPRAGUE BARNES, in agreement with the Note, 28 Cornell 
L. Q. ( 1943) 206, submits the following statement: 
The New York statute contains no provision as to extraterritorial effect. 
The courts have followed a consistent approach in recent cases. The nature 
of the work in the course of which the employee was injured is the decisive 
factor. 
If the "employment" is of a fixed or permanent nature at a definite loca-
tion outside the state, recovery under the New York Act is denied, regardless 
of such New York contacts as the principal office of the employer, the resi-
dence of the employee, or the place of hiring; Copeland v. Foundation Co. 
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(d) Self-sufficiency of the test. However the "place of 
employment" may be understood, it can obviate additional 
requirements. Considering the strong effort to extend work-
men's compensation to employees in domestic business who 
are not primarily employed outside the state, it is not 
strange that § 400 of the Restatement, asserting that "No 
recovery can be had under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act of a state if neither the harm occurred nor the contract 
of employment was made in the state," was amended (I 948) 
by adding "unless the Act confers in specific words, or is 
interpreted to confer, a right of action because of the extent 
of the activities of the employer or employee within the 
(1931) 256 N. Y. 568, 177 N. E. 143; Amaxis v. Vassilaros, Inc. (1932) 
258 N. Y. 544, 18o N. E. 325; Zeltoski v. Osborne Drilling Corp. ( 1934) 
264 N. Y. 496, 191 N. E. 532; or compensation insurance in New York, 
Bagdalik v. Flexlume Corp. (1939) 281 N. Y. 858, 24 N. E. (2d) 499; all 
these claims were dismissed, reversing the lower court on the ground of the 
decision in Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co. (1930) 252 N.Y. 394, 169 N. E. 
622. 
The place of "employment" is located in New York as a matter of law, 
if the injury-producing work is confined to a definite location in the state 
regardless of foreign residence or hiring, Bauss v. Consolidated Chimney 
Co. (1945) 270 App. Div. 70, 58 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 717, even though there is 
no office in New York and no New York compensation insurance. Adams v. 
Max Solomon Co. ( 1943) 265 App. Div. 427, 39 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 492; 
Grasso v. Donaldson-Reynolds, Inc. (1938) 279 N.Y. 584, 17 N. E. (2d) 449· 
If the work is not fixed at a definite location but is temporary, Berman 
v. Hudson Amer. Corp. (1946) 271 App. Div. 847, 65 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 
676, or transitory in nature, Alexander v. Movietonews, Inc. (1937) 273 
N.Y. 511, 6 N. E. (2d) 604 (cameraman), a place of business in New York 
to which employee is attached is sufficient to allow New York recovery even 
though he is injured outside the state. White v. H. J. Heinz Co. (1936) 
248 App. Div. 654, 287 N. Y. Supp. 951. 
The courts will also allow claims under the New York law on the ground 
that the work outside is: under the supervision of the New York head-
quarters, Farrigan v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1945) 269 App. Div. 872, 56 
N. Y. Supp. (2d) 103; incidental to New York business, Rendt v. Gates 
(1945) 269 App. Div. 1007, 58 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 438; based on New York 
union wage scale, Carp v. Gladstone Raines, Inc. (1942) 264 App. Div. 962, 
37 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 146. 
If the employee of a foreign business is injured while working in the 
state, claims under New York law are precluded where the New York 
work is incidental to foreign "employment," Eurbin v. Prud. Ins. Co. of 
Amer. (1937) 250 App. Div. 868, 295 N. Y. Supp. 247; or temporary, Proper 
v. Polley (1932) 259 N. Y. 516, 182 N. E. 161; or transitory, Whitmire v. 
Blaw-Knox Constr. Co. (1934) 263 N. Y. 675, 189 N. E. 753· 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 219 
state." We may take it, just to the contrary of the original 
rule, that both tests included are undesirable for a main 
rule and as such antiquated by the current development. 
As the Wisconsin court said, "Where the employer under 
the act engages a person to perform services in this state 
under a contract of hire, express or implied, no matter 
where or when such contract may have been engendered, 
such employee is under our act and is entitled to its benefits, 
and this is so even though he is injured while outside of the 
state, rendering services incidental to his employment within 
the state. Whether the employee be a resident of this state 
is not material. The controlling and decisive factor is 
whether he had a status as an employee within this state."52 
This is an unusually clear formulation of the modern 
tendency. 53 
4· Social Insurance System 
The German pattern of insurance54 under public law is 
based on a network of regulations, including duties of the 
employer to report on employments, to contribute premiums 
on his own and the worker's account, and many other obli-
gations facilitating administrative control. The natural 
criterion determining the connection with the state in this 
system is the situation of the employer's establishment in-
volved, viz., the place where he carries on that independent 
part of his undertaking to which the worker is attached 
(Betriebsort). Nationality and domicil of the employer 
and the employee are immaterial except in a few special 
situations. The place of the undertaking, thus, is decisive 
for enrollment of the parties to the insurance as well as 
52 McKesson-Fuller-Morrisson Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 
(1933) 212 Wis. 507, 512, 250 N. W. 396. 
53 See also HANCOCK, Torts 212. 
54 For Germany, see NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 514 ff.; STIER-
SOMLO, 2 Kommentar zur Reichsversicherungsordnung (1916) 31 ff., 988. 
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for claims for benefits. Consequently, when workers are 
sent to work in another country, it depends on the nature 
of the foreign establishment, whether a new undertaking 
is formed subject to the territorial statute or the occupa-
tion of the individual worker is only incidental, temporary, 
or ac::essory, a so-called "radiation" of the domestic under-
taking. Examples of the latter category have been the send-
ing of employees to install machines, to construct a bridge, 
to give theatrical performances, to load vehicles, and the 
various activities of interstate transportation. 
The Canadian pattern exemplified by the Ontario statute 
includes temporary work outside Ontario for less than six 
months where the residence and usual place of employment 
of the workman are in Ontario; temporary work, if only 
his residence is out of Ontario; and work for some casual or 
incidental purpose outside the province, if the employer's 
place of business or chief place of business is outside, but 
the worker's place of employment is within Ontario.55 The 
text underlines the rule that no compensation shall be pay-
able where the accident to the workman happens while he 
is employed elsewhere than in Ontario. 
The present Italian view is not known to me. But in 1939 
it was agreed that application of the workmen's compensa-
tion statute, having territorial character, should be based 
either on the place of the accident, or that of the enter-
prise, or that where the work is done, with the accent on 
the last test. 56 It would seem that the German doctrine 
eliminates this doubt. 
55 Ontario: Rev. Stat. I937, c. 204 s. 5 (I) to (3); s. 5 (5). 
56 See MARMO, Note to Cass. (Jan. I, I939) Foro !tal. Mass. I939, 67 in 
8 Giur. Comp. DIP. (I942) I79 No. 99, summarizing a book by VENTURINI. 
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5. International Treaties 
Article 2 of the above-mentioned Equality of Treatment 
(Accident Compensation) Convention, I 9 2 5, expressed the 
following recommendation: 
"Special agreements may be made between the members 
concerned to provide that compensation for industrial acci-
dents happening to workers whilst temporarily or inter-
mittently employed in the territory of one Member on be-
half of an undertaking situated in the territory of another 
Member shall be governed by the laws and regulations of 
the latter Member." 57 
The influential Treaty between Germany and Austria, 
of I926/I93058 decided that the law of the state where the 
head office of an employer is situated is applicable to a 
temporary employment in the other state for a period of 
one year. The provisions of the same law relating to other 
claims on account of the same accident are also applied. 
Another model Treaty, concluded between Denmark and 
the Netherlands, of October 23, I926,59 follows the general 
rule that the insurance law of the country in which the work 
is performed shall apply. But the legislation of the state 
where the undertaking carries on its main operation extends 
to work of short duration and performed in a subsidiary 
manner in the other country by workers not permanently 
domiciled there. It is likewise applicable when workers are 
sent out to perform inspection or supervision or any other 
special duties. 
In the absence of such treaty agreements, the Interna-
tional Labour Office is of opinion that according to Article I 
57 Int. Labour Code 305, art. 485. 
58 League of Nations, Leg. Ser. 193o--Int. 10, reproduced Int. Labour Code 
308, note, art. 2 (I) (a), ( 3). 
59 League of Nations, Leg. Ser. 1926-Int. 6; Int. Labour Code ibid. notes 
that it contains the fullest provisions of date subsequent to 1925 which are 
not based on the Austro-German model. 
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of the Convention, the laws and regulations of the country 
in which the accident occurred should be applied. 60 
IV. CONCURRENCE OF CLAIMS 
We shall first deal with the conflicts rules irrespective 
of the United States Constitution. 
1. Compensation and Tort Actions 
It seems settled in this country that if the state of injury 
in its compensation act has barred alternative remedies 
based on common law tort no other state will allow the 
employee to avail himself of such remedies. 61 Since the 
lex loci delicti refuses a tort action, there is none anywhere, 
whether at the court of the place of contracting62 or at the 
court of the place of employment.63 This thesis thus dis-
regards the possibility that these latter courts interpret 
their own compensation statutes as not exclusive. On the 
other hand, it is regarded as settled that replacement of 
common law suits by the statute of the state where suit is 
brought, does not bar tort actions flowing from injuries 
received in another jurisdiction.64 The latter theory acknowl-
edges that the substitution of statutory workmen's com-
pensation for tort has exclusive effect only for the awards 
made in the state, whereas extraterritorial effect is given 
60 Answer to the Japanese Government (10th Session, Int. Labour Con-
ference (1927) Report of the Directors, vol. 2, 99) Decennial Report (1937) 
27. 
61 Mr. Justice Brandeis in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper (1932) 
286 U. S. 145, 154 takes this for granted. 
The 1948 Supplement to the Restatement § 401 confines this doctrine to 
the place of injury recognizing that the place of contracting cannot deprive 
a victim of his right of action if the place of injury finds such a provision 
obnoxious to its public policy. 
62 Pendar v. H. & B. American Mach. Co. ( 1913) 3 5 R. I. 321, 87 Atl. 1; 
Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co. (1914) 87 Misc. 156, 149 N. Y. 
Supp. 1035; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Turner ( 1933) 188 Ark. 177, 65 
S. W. (zd) 1. 
6 3 Restatement § 401 ; GooDRICH 244 and n. 90. 
64 Reynolds v. Day ( 1914) 79 Wash. 499, 140 Pac. 681. 
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to the similar foreign provision of another state. Apparent 
logic has once more misled the lawyers. Both propositions 
are mistaken. The reason why in many jurisdictions liability 
without fault, though with a limited measure of damage, 
exclusively replaces unlimited tort liability based on inten-
tional, or at least unintentional fault, 65 is simply that a 
broader scope of liability is balanced by a milder compensa-
tion standard. Additionally, the employer, in the thought 
of some legislators, should not be sued twice. A state 
reasoning thus within its own compensation system does 
a strange thing in allowing suits for foreign tort beyond 
its domestic awards of workmen's compensation, although 
it has no interest in restricting cumulations of claims in the 
case of foreign awards. The result, hence, should be just 
opposite to that commonly accepted. Whether an award 
of accident compensation without fault may be supple-
mented by other remedies, ought to be determined by the 
legal system of which the workmen's compensation is a 
part. Exactly to the analogous effect, the prementioned 
Austro-German Treaty provides that the law of the state 
whose insurance statute is applied, has to decide whether 
additional rights arise out of the same accident. It is in-
consistent with the policy of a workmen's compensation act, 
barring common law suits, that a common law suit should 
be brought under a foreign tort law in respect of the same 
injury. Where, on the other hand, workmen's compensation 
is granted pursuant to a statute combining statutory re-
stricted liability without fault and full liability under com-
mon law for fault, there is no reason why the tort law of 
the place of injury should not be applied, although it would 
not be available to increase workmen's compensation of the 
65 The German R. Versicherungs 0. § 898 leaves standing the ordinary 
action in excess of the compensation award when the employer has caused 
the accident intentionally, which fact normally must have been stated by 
penal judgment. 
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state of injury. Objections to these claims until they are 
satisfied or waived, should only arise insofar as the em-
ployer is subrogated into the claim against the tortfeasor, 
or his liability is reduced by the latter's payment. The North 
Carolina court in a case involving injury in Tennessee, find-
ing the common law action forbidden by the Tennessee 
Workmen's Compensation Act, allowed recovery in tort 
under the common law of North Carolina.66 The court 
should have applied the Tennessee tort law, abrogated in 
workmen's compensation cases only for the use of Tennes-
see, not North Carolina courts. 
Curiously, in a recent Ontario decision, the court found 
it against public policy that the dependents of a Michigan 
employee killed as a passenger in an airplane crash near 
St. Thomas, Ontario, could have a remedy against the 
wrongdoer in one state, and workmen's compensation against 
his employer in another.67 
2. Several Compensation Acts 
Before the Supreme Court of the United States com-
mitted itself to a novel application of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause with regard to workmen's compensation, the 
Constitution did not preclude a workman from obtaining 
compensation in two states up to the higher amount granted 
by either statute68 where the statutes made this possible. 
The Restatement, § 403, maintains this proposition, which 
has been adopted by the courts with very few exceptions, 
66 Johnson v. C. C. & 0. R. Co. (1926) 191 N. C. 75, 131 S. E. 390; HAN-
COCK, Torts 218 n. 3 cites a similar decision of a Quebec court, Johansdotter 
v. Canadian Pac. R. Co. ( 1914) 47 Que. S. C. 76. 
67 Scott v. American Airlines Inc. (Ont. High Ct.) [1944] 3 D. L. R. 27. 
The decision should have been based on the fact that all rights were termi-
nated by release. Compare the recent decision in Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. 
v. Henson (Tex. 1943) 172 S. W. (2d) II3, stating that the claim of an 
injured person in one state and that of his dependents after his death in 
another state are two separate actions. Cf. Note, 22 Tex. L. Rev. ( 1944) 246. 
68 GooDRICH 243 n. 88; Restatement § 398, 399· 
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although rarely confirmed by statutes. 69 The plaintiff may 
choose freely which statute seems proper and according to 
some of the authority, he may switch even after an award.70 
But apart from the constitutional issues, some courts denied 
compensation proceedings when an award was given in 
another state. 71 
3· American Constitution 
(a) Legislative power. The Supreme Court of the 
United States, in a decision formulated by Mr. Justice 
Brandeis, extended the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 
the Constitution to legislative state acts, and applied this 
thesis to workmen's compensation statutes. The decision is 
generally understood as recognizing the power of only one 
state to regulate compensation for accidents in the case of 
a specific contract of employment. The contract was made 
between residents in Vermont, which has an optional statute; 
the employee was killed while working temporarily in New 
Hampshire. On these facts it was held that the statute of 
New Hampshire was excluded by the statute of Vermont.72 
Opinions may be divided on the problem whether for 
humanitarian reasons an injured worker should have free 
option among compensation statutes offering him redress, or 
whether the parties should have foreknowledge of the 
applicable statute, so as to be able to ascertain the risks to 
be covered or the fund to which contributions should be 
69 See Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 246. 
Canada: The independence of the provincial statute is emphasized in 
Desharnais v. C. P. R. [ 1942] 4 D. L. R. 6os. 
The amendments in the 1948 Supplement to the Restatement except the 
case where the act of the state of award precludes recovery under any other 
act. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt ( 1943) 320 U. S. 430. 
70 GooDRICH 238. 
71 HANCOCK, Torts 228 n. 5· 
72 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper ( 1932) 286 U. S. 145. The 
optional character of the Vermont Act emphasized by the defendant was 
not urged. 
226 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
made. The above-mentioned decision, in its effect rather 
than its reasoning, favors the latter view and joins the 
modern efforts to give the main employment place prefer-
ence over an accidental work assignment. Nevertheless, the 
circumstances of employment and the policies of the differ-
ent states are too heterogeneous for efficient regulation of 
power from the standpoint of a superstate. Although a 
federal compensation law, of course, would be feasible in 
its sphere and with its own policy, it is inconvenient to weigh 
critically the legitimacy of territorial connections which 
state legislatures may find sufficient. In addition, Mr. Justice 
Brandeis borrowed the test of legitimate power from the 
mechanical conflicts rule of lex loci contractus instead of 
emphasizing mainly the work in Vermont. 
This decision was too radical to stand. The theory 
of an exclusively controlling workmen's compensation 
statute was soon "tactfully explained away," 73 and the 
criterion was radically changed by Supreme Court decisions 
influenced by Mr. Justice Stone.74 The ancient conflicts rule 
was replaced by an appraisal of the legitimate public in-
terest which a state has in granting workmen's compensa-
tion. In a leading case, California was approved for having 
applied its act, although the parties had stipulated for 
Alaskan law and all facts except the place of hiring pointed 
to Alaska. The main ground was equitable; it would have 
been a great hardship for the worker to seek compensation 
in the faraway territory, and he might have become a public 
charge to California. 
The California statute was again permitted to operate 
in the inverse case where the injury happened in that state, 
though the work was temporary and Massachusetts law 
73 CHEATHAM, "Stone on Conflict of Laws," 46 Col. L. Rev. (1946) 719, 723 
n. 16. 
74 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Commission (1935) 294 U. S 532. 
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governed the employment.75 Finally the legitimate interest 
has been declared not to turn on the fortuitous circumstance 
of the places of work or injury.76 "Rather it depends upon 
some substantial connection" between the jurisdiction and the 
particular employment relationship. 
Much effort has been spent in the American literature 
to evolve fragments of a legal system out of these inco-
herent pieces. Perhaps it will be finally conceded that Stone's 
idea is no more conclusive than that of Brandeis. 
In no event, however, should we be influenced by the 
numerous authors who seem to hope for better conflicts 
rules to be gained from these decisions. From the point of 
view of conflicts law, it is a plainly illusory proposition to 
hold that the state where a worker is injured in temporary 
business, as in the case of New Hampshire, has no "interest" 
sufficient to apply its own law, while California has an 
interest sufficient to exclude the Alaskan law. It is also im-
material that in the first case, New Hampshire seemed not 
necessarily to refuse giving effect to the Vermont act under 
conflicts principles,77 and that in the other case, Massachu-
setts assumed exclusive applicability of its own law.78 
When two states make their administrative or judicial 
machineries available to an injured workman, this may be 
done for different reasons, but never really without some 
reasonable consideration. Apart from the nature of a 
federal state, there is neither occasion in such cases to 
75 Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission 
( 1939) 306 u. s. 493· 
The 1948 Supplement amends § 401 of the Restatement by omitting the 
power of the place of making the contract of employment to abolish tort 
actions extraterritorially. 
76 Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (1947) 330 U. S. 469 at 476. 
77 Mr. Justice Stone based his concurrent vote on this fact; see FREUND, 
"Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws," 59 Harv. L. Rev. (1946) 
1210, 1220. 
78 This Mr. Justice Stone himself declines to consider for conflicts law, see 
CHEATHAM, supra n. 73, 722, 723 n. 16. 
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supervise their judgment in taking jurisdiction nor, much 
less, to select a contact and impose it on all states. 
Co-ordination and equitable treatment of the employer 
must be secured through interstate, if not federal, arrange-
ment. Models are contained in the numerous international 
treaties. That an employer should have to pay the same 
damages twice, as happened once in European practice, 79 
is a rare occurrence also in this country.80 
(b) Force of awards. In the Magnolia decision, rendered 
by a five to four majority,81 it was held that a final award 
of Texas, equivalent by statute to the judgment of a court 
of competent jurisdiction, is under the protection of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, irrespective of any "interest" 
of other states. The state in which the contract was con-
cluded was forced to give the award of the state of injury 
exclusive force, and to reject the claim of the employee 
for additional compensation. This theory treated work-
men's compensation on the footing of a transitory tort 
action, and failed to evaluate precisely the particulars of the 
Texas procedure.82 Although this decision has sometimes 
been praised, the Supreme Court itself has recently reduced 
its bearing to the least possible scope. It has been stated 
recently that to be exclusive the award must be final and 
conclusive, intended to preclude another judgment not only 
in the state but also under the laws of other states; and 
such an interpretation was held not readily to be reached.83 
79 See NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 726. 
so See ScHNEIDER's Workmen's Compensation, supra n. 1, 470. 
81 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt { 1943) 320 U. S. 430. 
82 CHEATHAM, "Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause etc.," 
44 Col. L. Rev. ( 1944) 330; FREUND, supra n. 77, 1229. 
83 Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin (1947) 330 U. S. 622. 
In this case, the first awards under the Illinois workmen's compensation 
statute stipulated that "this settlement does not affect any rights that appli-
cant may have [in] Wisconsin." But the majority of the Supreme Court 
seems to have modified its general proposition, cf. DEAN, in 1947 Annual 
Survey of American Law 61 f. 
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V. CoNCLUSIONS 
The development of conflicts law in workmen's compen-
sation cases has amply demonstrated that the tests borrowed 
from the general rules regarding tort and contracts are 
equally impracticable. The choice of the applicable law lies 
among the places with which the work rather than the con-
clusion of the contract or the accident is connected. Further-
more, European and international efforts suggest that de-
cisive influence should be accorded the place of the em-
ployer's business supervising the employee's work. This 
result entirely agrees with the most desirable principle gov-
erning labor contracts. 
If the contract is made at the headquarters of the firm, 
it has been claimed in the United States that with respect 
to optional compensation statutes the parties are presumed 
to agree on the law of that place. In Europe, a similar 
preference for the law of the headquarters has been based 
on the integration of the worker into the employer's organi-
zation. It would seem that the more closely the state takes 
the indemnization of the workers in hand, especially by 
making it a public or semipublic institution of social insur-
ance, the more distinctly attention is turned to the mere 
territorial connection of the business place to which the 
workman is attached. 
In the United States, this leading idea, more or less 
consciously living, might well be generalized and achieve 
uniformity. Even so, competition among the state laws 
would remain unchecked in the various cases of temporary 
employment in a state other than where the controlling 
business place is situated. Whether a total elimination of 
such an overlapping jurisdiction is desirable, except in the 
interest of the employer, is uncertain. If complete unification 
is wanted, the agreements made on the basis of the Geneva 
Convention would be a natural model. So long, however, 
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as no uniform statute or agreements among the states with 
federal support are in existence, past experience eventually 
ought to teach that judicial interference in order to define 
the proper spheres of state legislation on this subject has 
not proved helpful. 
CHAPTER 43 
Maritime Transportation of Goods 
J. INTRODUCTION 
I. Conflicts and Unification 
UNTIL the nineteenth century, the ancient modes of carrying persons and goods on the seas and on the 
highways did not cause many problems of conflict of 
laws; carriage by sea because universal conceptions had 
achieved a general maritime law, and carriage on land be-
cause territorial boundaries separated the laws. In modern 
times, this situation has changed. The transformation of 
marine commerce by powerful and costly vessels, by the 
enormous increase of traffic, and the many modern innova-
tions in communication, just when the policies of national 
seclusion segregated the laws of the various countries, has 
multiplied and aggravated the conflicts of law.1 Equally 
cumbersome were the legal complications arising from inter-
state and international operation of railways. Sensitivity to 
these obstacles to commerce has been such that the unifica-
tion of laws concerning carriage has been accomplished 
more readily than in most other fields. Railroad transporta-
tion has been unified in the United States by federal statutes 
and in almost all states of Europe by the Bern Convention 
on international carriage of goods, which upon its revision 
in I 924 was accompanied by a convention concerning car-
riage of persons and luggage. In the maritime and aero-
nautic fields, the technical rules of navigation have been in 
1 See BERLINGIERI, Verso l'unificazione del diritto del mare, seconda serie 
(1.933) 20. 
23 I 
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great degree unified; the almost universally enforced Con-
vention of Brussels, that of Warsaw, and the Rome Con-
vention (still in course of ratification) all mark a vigorous 
impulse towards uniform private law. These and other 
significant efforts await final success. 
Conflicts law remains awkwardly married to a worn-out 
scheme of lex loci contractus and lex loci solutionis, which, 
at least apparently, does not differentiate between the mani-
fold means of transportation, its objects, and the types of 
related agreements. Similarly, the writers, as a rule, do 
not attempt to consider such distinctions, despite their 
indulgence in various opinions regarding the most appro-
priate single local connection for this whole congeries of 
contracts. In fact, the most recent enactments have served 
to destroy rather than to foster international uniformity. 
Most discussion, judicial and literary, has been devoted 
to carriage of goods in maritime cases. For this reason we 
commence with this topic. 
2. Types of Contracts Involved 
In the various systems of transportation, contracts are 
classified differently, and even analogous types are often 
given different names. If all such categories were decisive 
for "characterization" m conflicts law, the rules would be 
illusory. 
Fortunately, there are favorable influences: traditions 
inherited from a past more satisfactorily unified, similarity 
of habits in the international trade, and the support afforded 
by the prevalence of British shipping. Only recently have 
the codes begun to recognize the main types of contracts 
created by a long development. The following kinds of 
contracts must be distinguished, in order to be adequately 
classified in conflicts law. 
(a) Lease of vessel. The Roman jurists distinguished 
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the hiring of a ship, viz., of a thing, a locatio conductio rei, 
from the contract of carriage, that is, for doing a job, 
locatio conductio operis. 2 In the first case, there is no con-
tract of transportation, and opinion is divided whether it 
IS a maritime contract at all. 
Demise. In the Anglo-American countries, the hiring of 
a vessel, termed the demise charter, has been defined for 
certain purposes, such as fixing the liability of the ship-
owner for the acts of the master and crew, or the statutory 
limitation of liability. In a demise, the owner agrees to 
transfer possession and control of the vessel to the char-
terer.3 The former remains only the "general owner" for 
the period of the charter, during which the charterer, who 
is to "man, victual and navigate" the vessel, is deemed to be 
the owner pro hac vice. 4 This may be the case, even though 
the general owner appoints and pays the wages of the 
master and crew. This type of agreement is never presumed 
to have been made; it is less frequent in peacetime, though 
not extinct.5 It would seem to transcend the ordinary scope 
of the usual conflicts rules respecting "transportation" or 
"carriage." The parties are not in the relation of carrier 
and shipper. 
Bareboat lease. The same is true of the transaction, well 
2 In SCAEVOLA, Dig. 19,2,62 § II, when a vessel was hired for a voyage from 
Cyrenaica to Aquileja and was retained after loading at the port of dispatch 
for nine months, the rent for this time had to be paid by the lessee (con-
ductor rei). In LABEO-ULPIAN, Dig. 19,2,13 § I, the skipper assumed transpor-
tation of a cargo by voyage charter (he is the conductor, i.e., operis). The 
latter type included carriage of goods (eod. 13, § 2) and of persons (eod. 
I 9> § 7) • 
3 SCRUTTON, Charterparties 4; WILLISTON, 4 Contracts 3001, 3003 § 1074· 
4 United States: Rev. Stat. § 4286, 46 U. S. C. § 186. 
To the same effect, Canada: Shipping Act 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. V., c. 44, 
p. 245, s. 653. 
5 Banks v. Chas. Kurz Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 61, 66 in 
the case of the usual oral demise of lighters without motive power. It is 
not at all so "very rare" as the often repeated words of Vaughan Williams, 
L. J., in Herne Bay Steam Boat Co. v. Hutton [1903] 2 K. B. at 689 would 
indicate. Cf. the Indices to American Maritime Cases. 
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known in civil law, where a ship is leased so as to give the 
lessee full nautical as well as commercial control. In the 
simplest case, the vessel is not equipped for transportation 
of goods, or it is delivered without master and crew, in 
consideration of compensation for a term or a voyage. Such 
bareboat charter, services to be furnished, is certainly a 
contract alien to transportation. In the German doctrine, 
it was formerly sometimes contended that all contracts 
giving the charterer control of navigation should be ex-
cluded from the category of maritime contracts,6 while most 
French writers and their followers include them under 
affreightment.7 
In any case, as between the two parties to a demise or 
bareboat charter, the applicable law is more appropriately 
determined by the conflicts rules concerning leases of mov-
able chattels than by those concerning transportation. Of 
course, if the law of the flag is invoked to cover all contracts 
regarding the use of a vessel, as in recent Italian notions, 
it operates also here.8 
(b) Charter party (affreightment by charter). Under 
a traditional type of agreement, the shipowner furnishes the 
ship as a whole, with master and crew. He agrees to deliver 
the cargo in good condition, dangers of the sea excepted, 
and assumes the marine risk as to the ship; the charterer 
determines the ports for loading and discharging the cargo 
to be delivered by him to the ship. The essentials of all 
charter parties are full control of navigation by the owner 
and directions for proceeding by the charterer. Although 
6 German Schiffsmiete in contrast with Frachtvertrag, see PAPPENHEIM, 
3 Seerecht 87; this view is abandoned in theory, see Wi.isTENOORFER, 13 
Annuario Dir. Comp. (1938) I at u6. 
7 DANJON, 2 Droit Marit. §§ 744 If. 
LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 533 § 622 distinguished this affretement-louage 
from affretement-transport, but in the treatment starting in § 627 the com-
prehensive concept of affreightment is underlying. 
Belgium: I SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN § 272. 
s C. N avig., Disp. Pre!. art. xo. 
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oral contracts are not excluded by usage and the codes, there 
is normally a written contract, originally a deed, a carta 
partita (whence the name comes), at present one of the 
printed standard forms of English · origin. Constructive 
analysis of these forms has finally led to the assumption 
that they combine elements of hiring of things and hiring 
of services in a "mixed" contract. 9 
The use of the ship and equipment may be granted for a 
time (time charter) 10 or for a voyage. A promise of a pro-
portional part or specific quarters in the vessel is sometimes 
included in this category, where the other characteristics of 
charter parties are present. It is so classified in the German 
Commercial Code, § 55 7, because charter party documents 
are usual in such cases. But these cases seem to have become 
rare. In the United States, usually "charter" carriage is 
distinguished from common carriage by the fact that the 
charterer engages the whole of the ship's capacity.11 
Charter parties are in wide use in many branches of 
trade for reasons of organization and geographical con-
siderations. Thus, for instance, American steel concerns 
shipping ore from remote South-American ports commonly 
enlarge their fleets by chartering "tramp" vessels.12 
(c) Carriage by general ship (Stiickgiiter-Frachtvertrag; 
affreightment with bill of lading). Under the ordinary 
contract of marine transportation, the shipmaster is under 
the exclusive control of the carrier, whereas the shipper has 
merely a right similar to that in rail transport of merchan-
9 For certain purposes of mercantile law, analysis is required for ascer-
taining which element prevails; see PAPPENHEIM, 3 Seerecht 87. 
10 German: (Eigentlicher) Zeitfrachtvertrag, e.g., "Baltic Time Charter;" 
similar names in Scandinavian and Dutch languages; French: alfretement 
a temps; Italian: noleggio a tempo. 
11 ROBINSON, Admiralty 593 § 83. 
12 Other articles are sugar, wheat, rice, potash, bauxite, lumber, coal, oil 
etc. See C. D. MACMURRAY and MALCOLM M. CREE, Charter Parties of the 
World ( 1934) 4 ff.; JOHNSON-HUEBNER-WILSON, Principles of Transporta-
tion ( 1932) 467 ff., 560, 569 ff. 
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
dise. The contract may include conditions obligating the 
carrier to load the goods in certain types of compartments, 
but though stowage is not necessarily at the discretion of 
the vessel, it is always under its responsibility. 
The Netherlands Code, in treating this type of contract, 
distinguishes tramp and line steamers/3 while the recent 
Italian law, apart from charter parties, somewhat obscurely 
differentiates transport of shipload or partial shipload from 
that of identified objects. In the Russian Law of I 929 (art. 
7 3) charter parties are contracts in which the whole vessel, 
or a part of it, or identified spaces in it, are put at the dis-
posal of the charterer, in contrast to contracts without such 
conditions. 
(d) Purpose of the distinction. Many further types can 
be differentiated.14 However, thus far except for time 
charters, differentiation of all the variants included in 
groups (b), charter party, and (c), bill of lading, has been 
slow and somewhat difficult.15 This fact may have caused 
the remarkable phenomenon that in the common law and 
in the Latin laws, charter parties and other forms of trans-
portation have been prevailingly treated together under 
the general term of affreightment or carriage of goods, 
while German commercial law doctrine has consistently 
distinguished the two above groups, the technical name of 
S tuckgiitervertrag (contract relating to single packages p 6 
being employed for group (c). The Brussels Convention 
on bills of lading also distinguishes this latter contract 
although it extends its effects to negotiated bills of lading 
issued under a charter party.17 
13 C. Com. arts. 517e·517Y (special rules for carriage in line shipping) ; 
52og-52ot (for carriage not by line boats). 
14 This regards especially the peculiarities in the services of privately 
operated or industrial carriers and the contracts, not of agency but of 
transportation, made by the United States Shipping Board for government-
owned vessels. 
15 PAPPENHEIM, 3 Seerecht 103. 
16 Germany: HGB. § 556 No.2. 
17 Art. I (b), see infra n. 27. 
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In conflicts law, however, the two groups are quite com-
monly merged without any discrimination. This is true of 
the United States18 as well as of France19 and Germany.20 
By way of exception, the Dutch Law of 1924, in the absence 
of a contrary intention of the parties, applies to time char-
ters the law of the flag, instead of the usual law of the place 
of contracting. 21 
Under these circumstances, it would not be suitable 
further to divide the materials relating to carriage of goods 
by sea. Ultimately, it will nevertheless be easy to see that 
such failure to discriminate is improper. Not only must the 
lease of vessels be excluded but neither time nor voyage 
charters can be brought simply under the criteria appro-
priate to ordinary carriage by liners. 
3· Carrier 
"Carrier" includes the owner of the vessel and the 
charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with the 
shipper. 22 
Private carrier. The important common law distinction 
between common and private carriers has some bearing on 
the application of the Harter Act and more recent federal 
legislation in American courts. 23 But no consequence is 
known to have been drawn in conflicts law from the dis-
tinction. 
Forwarding agent (French ((commissionaire," German 
uSpediteur"). The services of independent merchants oper-
ating as intermediaries in effectuating transportation, are 
1 8 Cf. MINOR § 169; BEALE § 346.7; see also DICEY, Rule 165. 
19 BATIFFOL 257 § 284 implies this. 
20 2 FRANKENSTEIN 573; NUSSBAUM, D. JPR. 281. 
21 The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 518g. 
22 Convention of Brussels on bills of lading, art. 1 (a). 
23 On this difficult subject, see as to the Harter Act, AuSTIN T. WRIGHT, 
"Private Carriers and the Harter Act," 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1926) 6o2; 
and with respect to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936, RoBINSON, 
Admiralty 506 f.; Note, 54 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1941) at 667 and n. 33; KNAUTH, 
Ocean Bills of Lading 144· 
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brought under very different categories in the various sys-
tems. Moreover, doubts exist almost everywhere concern-
ing their treatment insofar as the rules of agency and the 
rules on carriage conflict. It would be disastrous if the 
conflicts rule should follow the variety of these domestic 
characterizations. 
A model of international characterization may be found 
in the simple words of Scrutton, L. J., interpreting the con-
cept of "carrier" for the specific narrow purpose of the 
Convention as one which "might include a freight agent or 
forwarding agent or carriage contractor in cases where by 
issuing a bill of lading he enters into a contract of carriage 
with the shipper."24 
Whenever, we might say, any person, not a servant of 
either party, contracts with the shipper for carriage, whether 
by his own or another's services, the conflicts rules involving 
contracts of transportation ought to apply exclusive of 
those regarding agency inasmuch as they lead to different 
results. 
4· Transportation Contract and Bill of Lading 
It is elementary to distinguish between the contract of 
affreightment and the obligations flowing from a bill of 
lading. In theory, the relationships in the two sets of obli-
gations are so differently shaped that two entirely different 
conflicts rules seem to be required. In practice, however, 
the picture appears modified. In the great majority of cases, 
there is either a written contract or a bill of lading, but 
not both. The former in almost every case involves a 
charter party, while in the modern conveyance of goods 
bills of lading are almost unfailingly used and usually in-
corporate the contract of carriage.25 The Hague Rules 
24 ScRUITON, Charterparties 481. 
25 Cf. PAPPENHEIM, 3 Seerecht 221: failure to issue a bill of lading may 
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adopted in the Brussels Convention of 192426 illustrate the 
situation. They envisage in the first place the rights based 
on bills of lading issued in connection with ordinary car-
riage but also include, in the case of a charter party, bills 
issued to a charterer and endorsed to a holder. They exclude 
the relationship created by the charter party itself. 27 
Although the systems vary in the details of the protec-
tion granted to an innocent holder, as for instance, whether 
the bill of lading constitutes prima facie or conclusive evi-
dence, the bill everywhere dominates the relation between 
the carrier and a consignee who is a holder in due course. 
It follows that the bill of lading must prevail also for the 
purpose of conflicts law. Instinctively, the American and 
many other courts, as we shall see, are anxious to subordi-
nate the law of the affreightment contract to that of the 
port where the bill of lading is issued. They endeavor also 
to eliminate such conflicts as may arise. 
Transfer of title in goods by transfer of the bill of lading 
is not in question here. In regulating this function, the law 
governing the creation and effect of bills of lading is sub-
ordinate to the law of the situs of the goods but never to 
the law governing the contract. 
II. MAIN SYSTEMS OF CoNFLICTS LAw 
1. Choice of Law by the Parties 
Remarkably, apart from restrictions on stipulations ex-
onerating the carrier from liability/8 the usual attempts 
occur when goods are shipped on the account of the shipowner, in case of 
urgent dispatch and in coastwise shipping; 1 VAN HASSELT 363 f. 
26 Hague Rules, art. I (b); in the United States, Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act, 1936, 46 U. S. C. A. § 1301 (b). The same exclusion of charter 
parties in the relation between shipowner and charterer was assumed for 
the Harter Act, see ROBINSON, Admiralty 506. This subject does not include 
of course the common phenomenon that charterers issue bills of lading to 
their customers. 
27 On this situation, cf. the cases cited by PooR, Charter Parties § 25, and 
in England, The Njegos [ 1936] P. 90, 155 L. T. R. 109. 
2s Vol. II p. 421. 
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to restrict the efficacity of party autonomy in the determina-
tion of the general law of the contract, are all but absent. 
Probably due to the age-old conceptions of maritime inter-
course, an appropriate stipulation or, in the absence of 
express agreement, the so-called presumable intention of 
the parties, universally justifies application of foreign law.29 
Even the Soviet Maritime Law expressly states the right of 
the parties to modify the normal conflicts solutions; al-
though the imperative Soviet rules are excepted, this ex-
press permission is in full contrast to the general Soviet 
legislation.30 
This result is exactly the opposite of what the adversaries 
of party autonomy expect of a contract bound to such 
stringent provisions as those contained in the Harter Act 
and the Hague Rules. 
2. United States 
Not the law of the flag. The vast majority of American 
cases involving carriage are concerned with interstate trans-
portation by rail or water. The simultaneous treatment of 
land and maritime shipments, therefore, serves to explain 
why the law of the flag has never been stressed.31 The fact 
29 See e.g.: 
United States: The Ferncliff, infra n. 3 5; Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown 
(I9I3) 2I4 Mass. I96, IOO N. E. I025 (express clause, in contrast with the 
law governing the endorsement). 
Belgium: I SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN 39I § 277. 
England: Lloyd v. Guibert (I865) L. R. I Q. B. II5, I3 L. T. R. 602. 
Denmark: Trib. marit. Copenhague (May I7, I889) I6 Rev. Autran 
( I900-0I) 249• 
France: LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 785 § 844; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. 422. 
Germany: 68 RGZ. 209; I22 RGZ. 3I6; ScHAPS 305. 
Greece: 2 STREIT-V ALLINDAS 2 54 and n. 42. 
Italy: C. N avig. Disp. Pre!. art. IO; C. C. ( I942) Disp. Pre!. art. 25; SCERNI 
I93· 
C6digo Bustamante, art. 185 cf. 285; cf. BusTAMANTE, Der. Int. Priv. 
(ed. 3) 332 § I449· 
30 Soviet Maritime Law of I929, art. 5; FREUND, Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der 
Sowjetunion (I93o) 39, 58. 
On the restrictions by public policy, see infra p. 267. 
31 The decision in The Titania (D. C. S. D. N. Y. I883) I9 Fed. IOI, I03, 
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that American ports were prevailingly served by foreign 
vessels may have contributed to this same result that in no 
case has the law of the flag been decisive. The most influ-
ential decision of the Supreme Court investigated the law 
of the flag in the light of a thorough review of the English 
cases and flatly rejected it.32 
General maritime law? In two significant cases of old 
standing, the federal courts resorted to the general mari-
time law as administered in the United States, in each case 
on the ground of the presumed intention of the parties. In 
the first case, the domicil of the shipowner in Baltimore was 
expressly discarded; it was deemed of no importance since 
local connections of the carriage were at a considerable 
distance. 33 In the second case, the fact that the contract was 
concluded in New Orleans was declared immaterial be-
cause the contract was between an American and an English-
man for an ocean voyage of an English ship (to Europe) .~ 4 
In other decisions extending to a recent date, "our general 
maritime law" or "mercantile law" has been applied in lieu 
of foreign law recognized as governing, but not proved in 
the suit. 35 This is but another name for the lex fori. 36 No 
other use seems to have been made of this device, although 
is nominally based on the English law of the flag, but at the same time ship-
ment in England is emphasized. 
The ground on which British law would have been applied in Franklin 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1931) 
54 F. {2d) 807, if it had been proved, is unknown. The cases cited in 
2 WHARTON 1067 n. 14 for occasional application of the law of the flag are 
exclusively English. 
32 Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. {1889) 129 U. S. 397, 
449-453. See also The Brantford City (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886) 29 Fed. 373, 
381, 384 {defending general maritime law against the law of the flag). 
33 Naylor v. Baltzell {C. C. Md. 1841) 17 Fed. Cas. 1254 No. 10,061. 
34 Watts v. Camors {1885) 115 U.S. 353· 
35 The Ferncliff (D. C. Md. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 728, 1938 Am. Marit. Cas. 
206; Blumenthal Import Corp. v. Brocklebank (C. C. A. 3d 1945) 148 F. 
(2d) 727, 1945 Am. Marit. Cas. 635; The President Monroe (1935) 156 
Misc. 432, 286 N. Y. Supp. 990. 
36The President Monroe (1935) 286 N.Y. Supp. 990· 
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admiralty jurisdiction covers a very large field37 and com-
monly is said to imply federallaw. 38 
Evidently, the above-mentioned old decisions are no 
longer authoritative. As the editor of Wharton has noted, 
whereas once the courts resorted to general maritime law 
in order to eliminate foreign law, it is now possible for the 
law of the place of contracting (or what they so term) 
to govern, since all matters of public policy are being taken 
care of by the growing body of Congressional statutes on 
maritime law.39 
Lex loci contractus. Although the Harter Act and the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ( 1936) apply to inward as 
well as outward maritime carriage, this extension of scope 
does not affect the problem of what law governs a contract 
of transportation in general. Characteristically, the Pom-
erene Act of 19 r6 has never been applied to bills of lading 
issued abroad for transportation to the United States. In 
fact, apart from the questions of liability imperatively 
regulated by the Acts of 1893 and 1936, it is commonly 
recognized that the law of the place of contracting has 
fundamental force in all contracts of transportation accord-
ing to the great majority of American decisions. However, 
more accurate inquiry is necessary. Just how strong is the 
rule? And if the ancient approach through a general con-
tracts rule is no longer attractive, is the rule in this par-
ticular field supported by special considerations? No direct 
answer can be expected from the decisions; they are seldom 
articulate on policy.40 
37 James Richardson & Sons v. Conners Marine Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1944) 
141 F. (2d) 226. On the discretionary jurisdiction on a charter party between 
foreigners made abroad, see The Wilja, Dreyfus v. Wipu (C. C. A. 2d 1940) 
II3 F. (2d) 646, and for nonadmiralty cases, Kaufman v. John Block & Co. 
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1945) 6o F. Supp. 992. 
38 ROBINSON, Admiralty 27 § 5· 
39 2 WHARTON 1069 f. 
40 As BATIFFOL 240 n. 1 notes, the cases, excepting two named by him, even 
express their solutions as though they were simply applicable to any kind 
of contract. 
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The original authority for the application of lex loci con-
tractus, it is submitted, is a decision dating from 1843, 
which justifies itself merely by the allegedly well-settled 
general rule, citing three cases not involving transporta-
tion.41 Since then, this test constantly appears as the normal 
connection, sometimes as a "strong presumption," not easily 
rebuttable.42 But close inv'estigation reveals additional 
factors. Attempts at such an analysis have already been 
made by Wharton, whose result, however, that the true 
criterion adopted by the courts was the domicil of the 
shipowner, has been refuted by the editor of his own work, 
Parmele.43 The latter suggested the importance of the com-
mencement of the voyage. 44 Reviewed at present, the de-
cisions of the last hundred years demonstrate that in the 
opinion of the courts the presumable intention of the parties 
governs and that this normally points to the place where, 
in the usual phraseology, "the contract was made." More 
accurately, the applicable law depends upon one of the fol-
lowing four situations: 
( i) In most leading cases, the place of contracting is 
identical with the port of dispatch.45 Statements of Ameri-
can courts may be found purporting to apply a supposedly 
well-settled rule: "The contract of carriage was entered 
into in Roumania and performance began there, but was to 
41 Hale v. New Jersey Steam Navig. Co. (1843) 15 Conn. 538, 546, 39 Am. 
Dec. 398. 
42 Grand v. Livingston (1896) 4 App. Div. 589, 38 N. Y. Supp. 490 (the 
case belongs to group (i) infra. 
43 2 WHARTON 1055· 
44 2 WHARTON 1063, 1072. 
45 Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1889) 129 U.S. 397; The 
Majestic (C. C. A. 2d 1894) 6o Fed. 624; O'Regan v. Cunard Steamship 
Co. (1894) 160 Mass. 356, 35 N. E. 107o; China Mutual Ins. Co. v. Force 
(1894) 142 N. Y. 90, 36 N. E. 874; M. & T. Trust Co. v. ExportS. S. Corp. 
(1932) 143 Misc. I, 256 N. Y. Supp. 590 (still stressing only the place of 
contracting); The Iristo (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 29, 1941 Am. 
Marit. Cas. 1744, aff'd (C. C. A. 2d 1943) 137 F. (2d) 619, 1943 Am. Marit. 
Cas. 1044, cert. denied, 320 U. S. 8o2. 
Interstate: The Henry B. Hyde (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1897) 82 Fed. 681. 
10 
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be completed in this country, and therefore the contract 1s 
governed by the law of Roumania." 46 
( ii) In some cases, the law of the flag coincides with the 
above law.47 
(iii) In others, the law applied was that of the port of 
dispatch alone, expressly without reference to the lex loci 
contractus.48 
(iv) In a few decisions, other points of the journey arc 
relied upon, these being regarded as places where per-
formance occurs. 
(a) In such connection, the place where the goods are 
damaged or lost appears decisive in several cases.49 In one 
case, expressly, in others presumably, the court was anxious 
to reach the law of the forum. This view ought to be entirely 
46 The Constantinople (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 97, 98, con-
cerned with a passenger's contract but citing the Liverpool Case, supra n. 45· 
47 The Carib Prince (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1894) 63 Fed. 266; The Titania 
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1883) 19 Fed. 101; The Frey (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1899) 
92 Fed. 667. The first two decisions apply English law, the third, French 
(though restricted by the Harter Act). The Dartford, Warren v. Britain 
S. S. Co. (C. C. A. 1st 1938) 1938 Am. Marit. Cas. 1548, applied English 
law to a bill of lading issued to the charterer; in addition the English form 
of a charter party was used. 
4SThe Pehr Ugland (D. C. E. D. Va. 1921) 271 Fed. 340; The Cypria 
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 816, 1942 Am. Marit. Cas. 985, aff'd, 
137 F. (2d) 326, 1943 Am. Marit. Cas. 947,-both expressly rejecting the 
foreign lex loci contractus. In the Cypria Case, the court could, however, rely 
on the express incorporation of the American Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 
49 Most remarkable was the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
in Hughes v. Pennsylyania R. Co. (1902) 202 Pa. 222, 51 At!. 990 invali-
dating a New York exemption clause under the law of the forum, a decision 
strongly criticized by PARMELE in 2 Wharton 1056 n. I, 1060 n. 2, 1063 n. 6, 
but followed in a railway case, Zahloot v. Adams Exp. Co. (1912) 50 Pa. 
Super. Ct. 238, where an exemption clause of Pennsylvania was declared 
valid under the law of New York, the place of loss of the goods by negligence 
in delivery. 
Analogous, Carstens Packing Co. v. Southern Pacific (1910) 58 Wash. 239, 
expressly applying lex fori; The Steel Inventor (D. C. Md. 1940) 35 F. 
Supp. 986 under the peculiar circumstance that the bill of lading referred 
to the Indian Act (as of dispatch) as well as to the United States Act (as 
of destination); the court chose the latter, for a loss by unloading in Balti-
more. Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F. 
(zd) 824 reaches a similar result by adopting the splitting theory of the 
Restatement. This view is in the minority, cf. e.g., The Miguel di Larrinaga 
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 217 Fed. 678. It is expressly rejected in Carpenter 
v. U.S. Exp. Co. (1912) 120 Minn. 59, 139 N. W. I54· 
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abandoned; it is due to a confusion between contract and 
tort. 
(b) In one case, 50 a vessel went from India to New York; 
part of the cargo was shipped in Colombo, Ceylon, and part 
in British India. Under the circumstances, the court dis-
carded the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and without 
further motivation applied American law, i.e., the law of 
the forum, which was also the law of the port of destination. 
(c) Apart from federal or New York public policy at 
the American port of destination with respect to clauses 
limiting carriers' liability, 51 certain special problems have 
been considered, here as in other countries, as most closely 
attached to the port of arrival.52 
3· Great Britain 
For a long time, numerous Continental writers have been 
accustomed to point to an English rule that carriage is 
governed by the law of the flag the vessel flies. 53 They still 
regard this as an important confirmation of their analogous 
postulate. But the English authors who have contributed 
to this mistake have been more cautious.54 
In fact, the English decisions have applied the law of 
the flag to the extent of the authority given by the ship-
owner to the master so as to subject the shipowner as well 
as the cargo owner to liability.55 Apart from this, there is 
50 Duche v. Brocklebank (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 184. Against 
this argumentation, see infra p. 264. 
51 Treated at length, Vol. II Ch. 33· 
5 2 See infra Ch. 44 n. 94· 
53 This same mistake also happened to Duff, }., in the Canadian Supreme 
Court, in Richardson v. "Burlington" [1930] 4 D. L. R. 527, [1931] S.C. R. 
76, while the majority emphasized the lex loci contractus and the domicil of 
the parties, the result being the same. 3 jOHNSON 475 hence should not have 
made an exception from the lex loci contractus prescribed in art. 8 of the 
Quebec C. C. 
54 Especially, FooTE 429 and DICEY 687 Rule 166. 
55 The Karnak ( r869) L. R. 2 P. C. 505, and The Gaetano and Maria 
(r882) 7 P. D. r, 137. Formerly, Duranty v. Hart (1863) 2 Moo. P. C. Cas. 
(N. S.) 289, {r864) B. & L. 253, 260, 272, invoked "the ordinary maritime 
law," in the Privy Council "the General Maritime Law." 
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only one case of somewhat doubtful bearing. In its famous 
decision of I 8 6 5, the Court of Exchequer Chamber ex-
tended the law of the flag to the question whether the char-
terer and cargo owner who had paid the deficiency amount 
on a bottomry bond burdening ship, freight, and cargo, 
could recover from the shipowner.56 This not only involved 
the master's authority to issue a bottomry bond on the 
cargo but concerned also the liability to bear the burden 
so caused in the internal relationship between the owner and 
the cargo. It seems, therefore, a little optimistic for English 
judges subsequently to reduce the precedent of Lloyd v. 
Guibert to "such contracts as the master may be driven to 
make by necessity in the course of the voyage." 57 In addi-
tion, the decision of the Exchequer Chamber proclaimed 
a far-reaching rule subjecting all liability for sea damage 
and its incidents to the law of the flag, and an advocate of 
this solution has contended that it could not be overruled 
by a decision of the Court of Appeals. 58 
Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that the English courts 
do not feel bound by the rash pretensions of this old de-
cision. This has been formally stated by Lord Merriman: 
"As regards the contract of affreightment as a whole, there 
is no necessary presumption that the law of the flag ap-
plies."59 Thus, not even the often alleged presumption, 
easily displaced by counterinferences, 60 exists. This result 
is also amply supported by the cases, as pointed out by the 
56 Lloyd v. Guibert ( 1865) L. R. 1 Q. B. us, 128. Under the French law 
of the flag, the shipowner was freed by abandon of the vessel; under the 
other laws involved, he was not. 
57 Lord (then Sir Boyd) Merriman, in The Njegos [ 1936] P. 90 at 107, 
on the ground of the distinction made by the Court of Appeals in The 
Industrie [ 1894] P. 58. The opinion on the proper law is given, although 
the parties did not expressly request it (p. 107) "in case it may be of 
assistance" to them. 
58 I forget the name. 
59 Supra n. 57· 
60 M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 441 § 416. 
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Supreme Court of the United States as early as 1889.61 
From the time when general maritime law was replaced 
by conflicts law, the English courts in reality have never 
considered any basic test other than the intention of the 
parties. It was most emphatically invoked in Lloyd v. 
Guibert itself and despite this precedent in all later cases.62 
And in the other celebrated carriage case, In re Missouri, 
where the English law of the flag was applied, this was 
regarded as expressly intended, being supported by the 
terms of the contract and of the bill of lading as well as 
by the English port of destination; the Court of Appeals 
confirmed the decision on these grounds only.63 The lack 
of preference for any fixed criterion has occasioned the 
complaint of an English admiralty judge tha.t "there is 
abundance of authority for practically every proposition 
that has been put forward." 64 Nevertheless, there is a cer-
tain pattern in the prevailing decisions. 
Courts have relied: 
( i) On the English forms used in the charter party or 
the bill of lading. 65 Some decisions have expressly rejected 
inferences from the flag66 and disregarded the place of 
contracting.67 Others have mentioned only the English 
language or English documents in connection with the Eng-
lish port of destination. 68 It is recognized in England as 
6l Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. {1889) 129 U. S. 397 at 
449"453· 
62 See esp. Lindley, L. J., in Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. 
Netherlands India Steam Nav. Co. {1883) 10 Q. B. D. 521 at 540. 
63 In re Missouri Steamship Co. (1889) 42 Ch. D. 321. 
64 Langton, J., in The Adriatic [x93x] P. 241 at 244. 
65 The lndustrie [ 1894] P. 58, 73; Aktieselskab August Freuchen v. Steen 
Hansen (I9I9) I Ll. L. Rep. 393; The Adriatic [I93I) P. 24I; The Njegos 
[ I936] P. 90, 106 f. 
66 The Industrie and Adriatic cases, supra n. 65. 
67 The Adriatic and Aktieselskab etc. cases, supra n. 65. 
68 The Wilhelm Schmidt {I87I) I Asp. Marit. Cas. (N. S.) 82; The San 
Roman (I872) L. R. 3 A. & E. 583, 592; semble, Woodley v. Mitchell (1883) 
II Q. B. D. 47, 51. The first two decisions have been criticized insofar as 
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well as everywhere else that language itself is no useful 
criterion. Such references presumably meant and at least 
today would have to be understood to mean the English 
style of maritime affreightment. 
At least in one case the English form alone seems to 
have been decisive.69 
A judge of the Exchequer Court of Canada has applied 
American law, that is, the Harter Act, to a carriage of 
grain shipped from Buffalo, N. Y., to Montreal on a Nor-
wegian ship on the ground that the contract was made in 
the United States and contained the "Jason Clause" neces-
sary in this country but not necessary under Canadian or 
English law. 70 
(ii) On. the law of the place of contracting, either be-
cause the contract was made in England between domiciled 
parties or agents, 71 or simply because the bill of lading was 
issued in an English port. 72 
The preceding review of leading and other cases may 
show a certain preference for the application of English 
law, but they favor the lex fori even less than most other 
they involve agency of the master by necessity, which should have been 
determined by the flag, see editors of SCRUTTON, Charterparties 24. 
69 Aktieselskab etc., supra n. 65. 
70 Bunge North American Grain Corp. and Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. 
SS. Skarp [ 1932] Ex. C. R. 212. In regard to the (plaintiff) fire insurance 
association, it is added that its insurance certificates contain an express 
reference to the Harter Act. The law of the flag is eliminated. 
71 Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Navi-
gation Co. (1883) 10 Q. B. D. 521 (English port of dispatch and English 
parties); The Industrie [1894] P. 58, 72 (charter party made in London 
between an English broker of the German shipowner and a London 
charterer, in the usual form of English charter parties) ; The Njegos [1936] 
P. 90 (charter party made in London in the "Centrocon" form between the 
English agent of a Yugoslav steamship company and the English branch 
of a French firm, agent of an Argentinian shipper); the bill of lading 
follows the presumable law intended in the charter party. 
72 The St. Joseph (1933) 45 Ll. L. Rep. 180, 28 Revue Dor (1933) 180: 
the shipowner contracts by accepting the goods against the bill of lading. 
Hence where this operation occurs, there the contract is made. 
Canada: Melady v. Jenkins S. S. Co. (1909) 18 0. L. R. 251 (standard 
of pounds contained in a bushel). 
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countries. They do not justify in the least the astounding 
pronouncement of Dicey that a contract for the carriage 
of persons or goods from or to England or by a British ship 
is prima facie governed by English law, 73 a statement that 
may have stimulated much particularism in other countries. 
In the light of a comparison with other courts, the English 
follow policies remarkably analogous to the general habits 
of courts elsewhere. 
4· France and Belgium 
Many decisions of the Court of Cassation and the lower 
courts have with unusual consistency applied the law of the 
place of contracting.14 This covers not only the form of 
charter parties and bills of lading but also the performance 
of the contract. 75 Originally this rule was declared impera-
tive, 76 but it persists as a regular conflicts rule, susceptible 
of being replaced even by a presumable intention of the 
parties. 77 
In a series of older cases, it is true, in France and still 
more so in Belgium, the law of the port where the goods 
arrive or should arrive, has enjoyed a more or less wide 
application. 78 It seems certain, however, that this tendency 
73 DICEY 686 ff. 
74 Cass. civ. (Feb. 23, 1864) D. 1864.1.166, S. 1864.1.385; Cass. civ. (June 
12, 1894) D. 1895.1.161, Clunet 1894, 8o6, 10 Revue Dor 147; Cass. req. 
repeatedly; Cass. civ. {Dec. 5, 1910) S. I9II.1.129, Revue 19II, 395, Clunet 
1912, II56 {on principle); for the many decisions of lower courts, see 
RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. §§ 1453 ff.; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 785 ff. §§ 843 ff.; 
1 Repert. 275-278; VAN SLOOTEN 17-22. Recently, Trib. com. Seine (Jan. 22, 
1942) Nouv. Revue 1943, 77 applied the French law of the place of con-
tracting as a matter of course. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 6, 1900) 16 Rev. Autran {1900-01) 694; 
Trib. com. Antwerp (July 2, 1906) Jur. Port Anvers 1906.1.307; (Jan. 30, 
1907) id. 1907, 180 etc. 
75 See BATIFFOL § 284. 
76 Cass. civ. (Feb. 23, 1864) supra n. 74; cf. BATIFFOL 258. 
77 Cass. civ. (Dec. 5, 1910) supra n. 74· 
78 The law of the port of actual discharge was proclaimed as a rule gov-
erning performance in Antwerp (Jan. 14, 1891) Jur. Port Anvers 1893.1.19; 
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has been overcome, and the place of performance has signifi-
cance merely as a device for special problems.79 
The reasons for emphasizing the place of contracting 
are inarticulate in the decisions, since the rules directly derive 
from the inherited general contracts principle. But the 
writers are conscious that this place is usually identical with 
the place where the goods are dispatched. If in rare cases 
the two places differ, the courts have been divided, but in 
the opinion of the lawyers expert in commercial law, the 
port of lading has been preferred.80 The contrary choice of 
law is not supported by a decision of 18 8 5181 although it 
declared that the contract was completed in Norway by 
acceptance of an offer; in fact, Norwegian law was also 
indicated by the Norwegian flag and, above all, because 
the vessel was chartered for a transport from Norway to 
England. 
The only significant doubt concerns the case where the 
parties are of common nationality. This the older writers 
were inclined to emphasize.82 But the practical inconveni-
ences of discriminating among customers according to their 
nationality are particularly pronounced when goods are 
shipped by the same vessel or on the same voyage.83 There 
is no case supporting such exceptional treatment.84 
App. Gent (May 2, I90I) Clunet I902, 390, I6 Rev. Autran (I9QO-OI) 
842 (as dated April 27, I90I); a very faulty decision, 2 FRANKENSTEIN 
5I5 n. 66; Trib. com. Antwerp (Jan. 7, I903) I8 Revue Autran (I902-o3) 901. 
79 See infra Ch. 44 pp. 28I-283. 
8° FROMAGEOT, I8 Revue Autran ( I902-03) 754 f.; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 
792 § 85o; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. 423 f. § I465; VAN SLOOTEN 30. Contra: 
CRouvE:s, I Repert. 268 n. I8 for the sake of the "general principle." 
81 App. Douai (Nov. 10, I885) I Revue Autran (I885-86) 360. 
82 I FOELIX §§ 83, 96; I FIORE § I I4; WEISS, 4 Traite 355, and others. 
83 Thus the experts on the subject, FROMAGEOT, I8 Revue Autran (I902-03) 
749; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 848. 
84 Of no concern in this connection is Trib. com. Rauen (April 23, I888) 
4 Revue Autran (I888-89) 3I, cited by CRouvE:s, I Repert. 267 § I3, where 
the parties also signed a bill of lading in their country. 
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5· Germany 
In this field, the German courts have rarely employed 
their theory of splitting the contract.85 But they have de-
duced from their principle of lex loci solutionis the rule that 
maritime affreightment contracts of all kinds are governed 
by the law of the port of destination. This rule has been 
claimed to possess the widest possible scope. 86 Nevertheless, 
after the practice of the Reichsgericht had been subjected 
to stringent criticism, 87 experience also considerably modi-
fied this questionable theory. At present, the force of the 
principle may be regarded as seriously challenged, despite 
repeated contrary assertions in the German and interna-
tional literature. 
This does not include, of course, the application of special 
laws to certain problems, e.g., of the law of the port of 
dispatch to questions connected with lading, but is the 
result of actual replacement of the official criterion. Often 
enough, the contract has been subjected to a law other than 
that of the port of destination: 
( i) Contracting by ship brokers or other agents in Lon-
don who use an English charter party form has consistently 
been recognized as indicating submission to English law, 88 
quite as in the English case of The lndustrie. This is not 
controverted by the fact that a contract of carriage made 
in London by the London branch of a Hamburg firm with 
85 Such a case is RG. (May 22, 1897) 39 RGZ. 65. 
86 ROHG. (May go, 1879) 25 ROHGE. 192; RG. (March 21, x88g) 9 
RGZ. 51; (May 25, x889) 25 RGZ. 104. 107; (Oct. 24, 1891) 49 Seuff. Arch. 
No. 36; (May 2, 1894) 34 RGZ. 72, 78; and other old decisions; RG. (July 
8, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, 51 (principle). 
87 2 BAR 219 n. 82; id., Int. Handelsrecht 439; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. 426 
§ 1468; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 517 f. 
88 RG. (Jan. 5, x887) 19 RGZ. 33 (English law); OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 
30, 1893) 14 Hans. GZ. 1893 HBI. 301, 4 Z. int. R. (1894) 353 (English 
law); RG. (April 4, 1908) 68 RGZ. 203, 209 (form of the Rio Tinto Com-
pany, Ltd. in London for its usual ore shipping from Huelva, Spain) ; RG. 
(Nov. 24, 1928) 122 RGZ. 316 (English law, intended by public policy based 
on HGB. § 614). 
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the London broker of another Hamburg firm was deter-
mined under the German law. The form employed was 
printed in Hamburg, though in English, without references 
to English law, as was the usual document of the steamship 
agent in Hamburg whose name was carried at the head.89 
In one case, where a German form of a Nitrate charter 
party was used in a contract made in Germany, German 
law was applied, with the excuse that the port of destina-
tion, to be determined by the charterer, was uncertain.90 
In another case, a charter party made in Germany concern-
ing a voyage starting in Germany was regarded without 
hesitation as subject to German law. 91 
(ii) When persons of common nationality contract in 
their own country, the Reichsgericht is satisfied with their 
intention to have such country's law applied. 92 
(iii) When an English ship was chartered in a German 
port for a voyage to Vladivostok, German law was applied. 93 
The place of contracting and dispatch thus prevailed over 
the port of destination. In another case, the place of con-
tracting and the nationality of the shipowner were theo-
retically mentioned as criteria. 94 
(iv) Other exceptions have been unavoidable when the 
89 RG. (Oct. 27, 1904) Hans. GZ. 1905 HBI. No. 28, 15 Z. int. R. (1905) 
293-297· 
9oRG. (May 6, 1912) Leipz. Z. 1912, 548. 
91 RG. (Jan. 2, 1911) 75 RGZ. 95· The ship was English and the destina-
tion Vladivostok. 
92RG. (Sept. 27, 1884) 13 RGZ. 122 (German law); (April 29, 1903) 
Hans. GZ. 1903 HBI. Nos. 102, 229, 231, 20 Revue Autran (1904-05) So 
(English law; also the flag was English; English law implicit, although the 
right of the German holder of the bill of lading is distinguished); (Dec. 14, 
1910) JW. 1911, 225, 22 Z. int. R. (1912) 182; 24 id. (1914) 319 (German 
law; also the port of destination was German); (Oct. 5, 1932) 137 RGZ. 301 
(German law; German parties, through bill from a German place to 
another German place via Holland). 
93 RG. (Jan. 2, 1911) 75 RGZ. 95, 96, affirming OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 10, 
1910) Hans. GZ. 1910 HBI. No. 76, correctly commented on by BATIFFOL 
253 n. 2 against 2 FRANKENSTEIN 514. 
94 OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 13, 1934) Hans. GZ. 1934 Part B, 303 No. 94-. 
IPRspr. 1934, 82 No. 38. 
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port of destination is uncertain. In the very frequent case 
where the port of destination is indicated optionally so as 
to include several places situated in different countries, such 
as a port in the United Kingdom or on the Continent be-
tween Le Havre and Hamburg, or on the North American 
and Canadian coast, not less than six solutions have ap-
peared.95 No port of destination is given in time charter 
contracts; the port of dispatch or the flag must substitute. 
Forwarding agents. German law accentuates the particu-
lar nature of freight agents contracting with carriers in 
their own name, in contrast with selling and buying agents 
or carriers. It \s noteworthy that again the application of 
lex loci solutionis raises doubt. For the place where a Spedi-
teur is to perform his duties to the shipper is in one view 
where he accepts and dispatches the goods, 96 and in another 
his commercial domicil. 97 
6. The Nether lands 
The Law of 1924 amending the Commercial Code on 
the occasion of introducing the Hague Rules sought to 
enlarge and assure its own force. 
The law declares a great number of its prov1s10ns as 
compulsory for all ships leaving a Dutch port and with a 
certain exception regarding clauses of exemption, even for 
ships destined for Dutch ports.98 In addition, charters are 
subjected to certain provisions if the ship flies the Dutch 
95 SCHAPS n. 26 before § 556 rejects connection with five advocated places, 
viz., the presumable port of destination, the port of distress, the order port, 
the place of contracting, and the domicil of the debtor, and accepts the law 
of the flag. 
96 RG. (Dec. 5, 1896) 38 RGZ. 194; Warn. Rspr. 1925, No. 33; STAUB-
GADOW in 4 Staub (ed. 1933) 588 § 407 n. 24 (where also two opinions are 
reported on the question concerning the place where the goods are redeliver-
able on request of the shipper). 
97 OLG. Kalmar (Feb. 12, 1914) 39 Els. Loth. J. Z. 603 as cited in 
LEWALD 220. LEHMANN in Di.iringer-Hachenburg § 383 n. VII. 
98 C. Com. (Wetbook van Koophandel) arts. 517d, 517Y, 52ot. 
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flag even though they carry freight entirely outside of the 
Kingdom. 99 Only time charters are allowed to change this 
effect by selecting a foreign law.100 This attitude exceeds 
even the maritime reservations of the United States laws, 
and in its extraterritorial scope covers duties newly imposed 
by the law. 
Nevertheless, even this exercise of public policy is an 
exception and not the main rule involving carriage.101 So 
far as can be seen, the courts have quietly continued to apply 
the customary principles of conflicts law.102 If the parties 
have not expressly agreed on an applicable law, their so-
called intention is sought. The foremost theoretical criterion 
has remained the place of contracting, which, however, is 
used in at least two combinations, viz., ( i) when the parties 
are of the same nationality and contract in their country,103 
or ( ii) when a charter party is signed in London by the 
parties or their authorized agents, with English forms, the 
forms being more important than other criteria.104 
9~ Arts. 5 I 8g, 52of. 
1oo Art. 5I8g. 
101 Informative: Rb. Amsterdam (June I9, I93I) W. I24IO, N. }. I932, 
I77; I VAN HASSELT 4I4· 
102 See the long lists in I VAN HASSELT 36Iff. 
103 Rb. Rotterdam (March I5, I922) N. J. I923, 245, 248: bill of lading, 
the cargo was received in the United States on a United States-owned vessel, 
American law. Rb. Rotterdam (Feb. 23, I932) The Aslang, W. I2537, 28 
Revue Dor ( I933) 370: charter party concluded in Paris between the Paris 
agent of the Danish shipowner and a French company, French law; Rb. 
Amsterdam (Dec. 23, I932) N. }. I933 1 953: English insurance company suing 
a Dutch carrier for damages is barred by Dutch limitation of action because 
the insured shipper was a Netherlander, evidently contracting in Holland. 
In Rb. Amsterdam (June I9, I931) supra n. 101, Dutch law applied, as the 
Dutch parties contracted in the Netherlands for a Dutch vessel destined for 
a Dutch port. 
104 Hof s'Gravenhage (Nov. 14, 1913) W. 9615, N. }. 1914, 429; id. (June 
19, 1914) N. }. 19I4, 1256; Rb. Rotterdam (Dec. 14, 1928) N. }. 1930, 622: 
only the carrier was English, the charterer being the Soviet Corn Export 
Co., Ltd. in Moscow, but the ship was English and both charter and bills 
of lading were in English style. Rb. Rotterdam (}an. 14, 1929) N. }. 1929, 
1361, reversed on other grounds, App. Hague (April 25, 1930) N. }. 1930, 
IIII: the captain of a United States-owned vessel letting it while in Antwerp 
harbor to an Antwerp firm for a voyage from Antwerp to a British port; 
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7· C6digo Bustamante 
The C6digo Bustamante distinguishes between two types. 
Contracts concluded by a carrier under his own conditions 
which the customer may only "accept totally," fall under 
the rule that "contracts of adhesion" are subject to the law 
of the carrier (art. I 8 5). 
An affreightment not being of this category is governed 
by the law of the place from which the goods are dispatched 
(art. 2 8 5). But "acts of performance" are placed under 
the law of the intended place of performance (art. 28 5 
par. 2). 
Localla ws and regulations are reserved (art. I 99) . 
8. Latin-American Public Policy 
Law of the place of performance compulsory. In im-
portant codes, the idea that a contract performable in the 
territory must be treated under the domestic law/05 has 
been repeated106 for special application to contracts of trans-
portation.107 The place of making the contract108 and the 
nationality of the ship are immaterial for this purpose, 
although the texts strangely speak only of "foreign" ships, 
the parties must have had the English law in view, as the charter party 
was in the typical English maritime contract form; Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 29, 
1930) W. 12729, N. }. 1934, 631, I VAN HASSELT 423: voyage charter, a 
German coal concern hiring from an Italian shipowner, through London 
brokers, the vessel shall take the coal in Rotterdam and carry· it to Ancona. 
Contrarily, Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 16, 1935) N. J. 1936, No. 59 correctly dis-
cards American law but fails to justify why Dutch rather than English 
law should govern the charter party. • 
105 Vol. II p. 421. 
106 Thus, art. 1091 of the Argentine Commercial Code is only a special 
application of art. 1209 C. C. (new 1243) ; MALAGARRIGA, 7 Cod. Com. 
Coment. 137. 
107 Argentina: C. Com. art. 1091; S. Ct. (Nov. 5, 1870) 9 Fallos 492, 495· 
Brazil: C. Com. art. 628. 
Paraguay: C. Com. art. 1091. 
Uruguay: C. Com. art. 1270. 
10BBrazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 23, 1930) 16 Arch. Jud. 5, 99 Rev. Dir. 
287 (foreign bill of lading). 
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which could mean that contracts involving domestic ships 
are all under an imperative lex fori. In the prevailing view, 
the parties can not validly agree on a foreign court.109 
Law of the place of contracting compulsory. In Chile, 
the domestic law is forcibly applied to affreightment "on 
foreign ships" made in a port of the Republic although the 
master be a foreigner. 110 
109Argentina: The majority of the Cam. Fed. Cap. (June 6, 1906) Saens v. 
Mala Real, affirmed the right of prorogation, although a dissenting vote 
allowed it only where delivery and payment are agreed to be made abroad. 
But S. Ct. {Nov. 16, 1936) 36 Revue Dor {1937) 100 has decided for the 
prohibition. 
Brazil: Not allowed, Sup. Trib. Fed. {May 6, 1925) 83 Rev. Dir. 327 
No. 269. 
11o Chile: C. Com. art. 975 par. I. 
CHAPTER 44 
Maritime Carriage of Goods: Comparative 
Conflicts Law 
I. THE CoNTAcTs 
I. Obsolete Connections 
(a) General maritime law. The modern English cases 
no longer mention general maritime law with respect to 
transportation of goods. In the United States its only 
remaining role seems to be to substitute for foreign law 
that is not proved; so the term is just another word for 
lex fori. 1 
(b) Place of accident. Another connecting factor no 
longer seriously to be considered is the place where the 
goods are lost, destroyed, or damaged. This local connec-
tion enjoyed some favor in American2 and other3 courts, 
but has nothing to recommend it with respect to a voyage 
contractually assumed by one carrier on one vessel. Only 
by confusion of tort and contract could such a view originate 
in actions sounding in contract. 
The following local connections are used in the absence 
of a law agreed upon by the parties which is respected 
everywhere, at least in principle (supra p. 239). 
1 Supra Ch. 43 pp. 241, 246. 
2 Supra Ch. 43 p. 244 at n. 49· 
a Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (April 26, 1939) Rechtskund. WB. 1939, c. 409 
No. 82: a stipulation limiting to 10 centimes per kilogram the liability of 
the carrier, cannot be applied in case of negligent maintenance of the ship 
according to the Dutch C. Com. art. 470 (applied through reference in 
art. 748), the Belgian law being replaced by the law of the country where 
the damage occurred. 
257 
258 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
2. The Flag 
The often-assumed preference of English courts for the 
law of the flag to govern affreightment contracts, if it ever 
existed, disappeared long since.4 Much less has it been a 
feature of American5 and other laws until very recently. 
Even the reference to the nationality of the ship as an 
additional clue to the presumable intention of the parties, 
once popular, 6 has practically vanished. 
It is difficult for me to ascertain to what degree the stipu-
lations in bills of lading for the law of the flag flown by the 
ship have remained in usage. Such clauses may be reason-
able and useful to a certain extent, although courts have to 
view the problem under quite different considerations in the 
absence of a party agreement. 
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the principle aban-
doned by the courts has encountered increasing favor with 
writers of various countries. 7 They had restricted success 
in the Dutch law reform of 1924, but quite recently two 
Italian writers advocating the law of the flag8 scored a full 
victory in the present Code of Navigation ( 1942) providing 
that "contracts of hire, charter, or transport are governed 
by the national law of the vessel or the aircraft, in the 
absence of a different intention of the parties." 9 
The arguments advanced for this view have always 
4 Supra pp. 245-247. 
5 Supra p. 241 n. 32. But see for Denmark, BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 
225 No. 91. 
6 England and the United States: See supra pp. 244 n. 44, 247, infra p. 259. 
Canada: Moore v. Harris (1876) I App. Cas. 318: bill of lading made in 
England and English ship. 
Germany: RG. (April 14, 1920) 98 RGZ. 335· 
7 France: FROMAGEOT, 18 Revue Autran (1902-03) 742,766 f.; RIPERT, 
2 Droit Marit. 384 § 1468; J. EYNARD, La loi du pavilion (1926) 164; 
BATIFFOL 247 f. 
Germany: BAR, Int. Handelsrecht 439; SCHAPS 515; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 518, 
523. 
Italy: See next note. 
s ScERNI 208; MoNAco 135. 
9 Art. 10, Disp. Prel. to the Codice della Navigazione of 1942. 
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culminated in two incontestable advantages. In the first 
place, this principle avoids differentiating goods delivered to 
the same ship on one voyage according to the nationality or 
domicil of each shipper, or to the individual places of ship-
ping or arrival. In the second place, the law indicated by 
the flag, besides being uniform, is easy to recognize for all 
persons interested and usually regarded as the only one 
familiar to the master. This assuredly means superiority 
over the many uncertainties connected with the place of 
destination. For the Italian solution, it has been added that 
this principle secures each of the national maritime laws its 
application in exact proportion to the respective country's 
participation in the world traffic-an argument truly remi-
niscent of the ideals once proclaimed by Mancini's theory 
of the national law. Would Italy, without this antecedent, 
have been converted to the law of the flag? 
However, if the virtues of this device are so obvious, how 
could they have escaped the attention of the courts in prac-
tically all countries? Why did the Anglo-American judges 
desert this temporarily much-considered rule? One answer 
was given as early as 18 8 6 by an American admiralty judge. 
"Practically," he said, "the extreme rule (of the law of the 
flag) would require all merchants to acquaint themselves, 
at their peril, with all the details of the municipal law of 
every nation with whose ships they might deal, even in 
ordinary commercial transactions; certainly a most onerous, 
if not impracticable, requirement. 1110 This, it is true, has 
only the merit of making us aware that every test, including 
that of the flag, burdens some of the parties involved with 
the dangers of ignoring the applicable law. Why the courts 
prefer the law of the port of dispatch to that of the flag, 
is a matter of guessing but the fact itself shows that the 
1o Brown, J., in The Brantford City (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886) 29 Fed. 373, 
385. 
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nationality of the vessel is not regarded as eminently im-
portant. With the modern expansion of shipping, the major 
ports have a constant stream of incoming and outgoing 
vessels; great uniformity of conditions and tariffs prevails 
in the shipping pools; and nautical skill appears in com-
parable equivalence. The date and place of sailing, adequate 
space facilities, and personal acquaintances are of greater 
weight than the registration of the ship. Freight may be 
handled by a broker without naming a ship or even a line. 
A maritime agent may announce to his clientele the next 
outgoing vessels and their destination but issue the bills 
of lading on his own form for an unnamed shipowner.11 
Or, acting for a shipping pool, he may accept the goods 
without determining which line will take care of the car-
riage.12 All this confirms an insight taught by the history 
of commercial law. In our time, by a complete change from 
ancient economic organization, an enterprise of transporta-
tion on the sea is an entity almost independent from the 
individual ships and the persons performing navigation and 
carriage. If a particular vessel is agreed upon at all, pro-
viding the vessel has become a collateral rather than a 
principal duty.13 
These may be speculative reasons for an irrefutable phe-
nomenon. But there is one certain disadvantage of applying 
the law of the flag in foreign countries, which the courts 
must have felt in some way. If the law of the ship governs 
the contract and the bill of lading as a whole, its provisions 
are added to the imperative prescriptions of the lex fori. 
Moreover, prohibitions such as those directed against 
clauses of exemption from liability have to be applied inter-
11 The Iristo (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 29 at 35, supra Ch. 43 
n. 45, calls this a "haphazard manner of conducting such a large business." 12 See for the same situation in air carriage, LEMOINE, Traite de droit 
aerien ( 1947) 396. 13 See the forceful summary of development by GARRIGUES, Curso de derecho 
mercantil, II, 2, esp. 740. 
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nationally if they are the law in the country of the port of 
dispatch. In the United States and a few other countries, 
a court would also have to observe, in addition to the law 
of a foreign place of dispatch and the law of the flag, large 
portions of its own law if the goods are deliverable in the 
country. Business and courts do not even consider compli-
cating the situation in such a manner. The simplicity im-
agined by the advocates of the flag does not materialize. 
Except for its lighthearted adoption in the hasty Italian 
compilation of 1942, the law of the flag is positively perti-
nent only by express agreement and in such problems as 
the authority of the master14 and the limitations on the 
shipowner's liability.15 It has been deliberately disregarded 
in the Brussels Convention on bills of lading, with the result 
that shipping in foreign trade even in vessels registered in 
the United States is not subject to the law of the flag. 
3· Domicil of the Shipowner 
Some writers have expressed sympathy with the personal 
law of the carrier, that is, his domicil, rather than that of 
the ship.16 The shipping companies, it is argued, are vitally 
interested in a uniform legal treatment of their affreight-
ments, and uniformity cannot be guaranteed except by the 
law of their headquarters. This view has been adopted 
by some German decisions and writers,17 artd the Swiss 
14 England: The Industrie; The Njegos; and for other countries, see 
supra p. 146. 
Denmark: Trib. marit. and com. Co penh ague (Dec. 23, 1931) 28 Revue 
Dor (1933) 215 applies the Greek law of the flag simply to the authority of 
the master in deciding how to protect the cargo. 
1 5 France: 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 268. 
16 2 MElLI 369; BAR, 2 Int. Handelsr. 438 (as to the carrier's duties). 
RoLIN, 3 Principes 259 § 1243; RAAPE 260; cf. on land transportation, the 
unanimity of the European doctrine, BATIFFOL 104 § u8. Inst. of Int. Law, 
22 Annuaire (1908) 291, art. 2 (j). 
17 See NussnAU.\1, D. IPR. 231 and n. 2. 
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Federal TribunaU8 The same opinion, in the terms of the 
theory of contrats d' adhesion, appears in the C6digo 
Bustamante.19 
The logic of this theory is challenged as usual by the 
American antimonopolistic tendency. Above all, it is true 
for affreightment what in I 84 I Judge Taney said with less 
foundation about the law governing the authority of a 
master to make a charter.20 He refused to take into con-
sideration that the shipowner resided in Maryland, for one 
thing because Baltimore had no part in the conclusion of a 
charter in Chile for carriage to England, and again, because 
the domicil of one party is not competent to determine his 
own rights and duties in a contract. As in this case, the main 
office of the owner or carrier may be far distant from the 
scene envisaged by the acting persons. With what justifica-
tion can a contract made in Argentina with the Argentine 
agent of a French shipping company be subjected to French 
law ?21 The courts in Argentina are certain not to follow 
this law. 
These objections are avoided by the international com-
mercial Treaty of Montevideo, of I 889, article 9, making 
affreightment dependent on the domicil of the maritime 
agency that concludes the contract. If, however, the mari-
time agency is situated at the port of dispatch, or in the same 
country as this port, the result is adequate not because of the 
location of the agency but because the port is situated there. 
For if, on the other hand, the provision should mean that 
Argentine law governs when an agent in Buenos Aires con-
tracts for transportation from Montevideo to Brazil, this 
does not make sense. 22 
18 BG. (July 12, 1922) 48 BGE. II 281 f.; cf. OsER-SCHOENENBERGER 1608 
n. II; 2 ScHNITZER 515; BG. (Jan. 2o, 1948) 74 BGE. II 81, 85. 
19 Codigo Bustamante, art. 185 
20 Naylor v. Baltzell (1841) 17 Fed. Cas. 1254 No. 1o,o61. 
21 This remark is borrowed from LEMOINE 395· 
22 BUSTAMANTE, Manual 372. 
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The section is remarkable only in the fact that in this 
instance the Treaty of Montevideo abandons its tenaciously 
predicated lex loci solutionis. 
4· Place of Contracting 
The law of the place of contracting is the prevailing 
principle in the American courts, 23 the declared French 
rule, 24 and probably the favorite approach in many coun-
tries, 25 including Italy until its recent legislation. 26 It is also 
sometimes resorted to in individual embarrassing cases. 27 
Yet, the familiar objections to the mechanical lex loci 
contractus are increased in this special application by the 
absurdity of a maritime contract naturally governed by the 
tradition of the seafaring nations, depending on the law 
of an inland shipper who happens to be in the role of accept-
ing the offer sent by a shipping agent.28 On the other hand, 
in the inverse case where a carrier through his local agent 
in the usual course of business accepts applications for trans-
port written on his own standard form, the law of his 
23 Supra pp. 242-245. 
24 Supra pp. 249-250. 
25 E.g., Belgium: Supra p. 249 n. 74· 
Brazil: Implication of C. Com. art. 628, cf. Sup. Trib. Fed. (May 6, 1925) 
83 Rev. Dir. 326. 
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 498 (old), changed from former systems, 
see VAN SLOOTEN 15; at present prevailing rule of the courts, see supra p. 254· 
26 Italy: Cass. (Oct. 15, 1929) Riv. Dir. Com. 1930 II 529; Cass. (June 8, 
1933) Rivista 1933, 492; App. Genova (June 17, 1932) Monitore Trib. 1932, 
86o, 9 Z. a us!. PR. (1935) 217; App. Trieste (May go, 1933) Rivista 1933, 
25o; Trib. Livorno (March 29, 1941) Dir. Int. 1941, 275 (expressly against 
the law of the flag). 
27 England: Supra p. 248. 
Germany: Supra p. 253· 
28 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 793 § 850 and, following them, authors who 
advocate the law of the flag, have availed themselves of this convincing 
argument by illustrating it with Swiss shippers not having any maritime 
law. During the last war, however, Switzerland used a fleet of its own and 
provided it with an emergency legislation drawn from the international 
conventions and usages. But this change rather confirms that the natural 
governing law is not inland. 
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country is favored not because his agent there completes the 
contract by signing, but because he will dispatch the goods 
therefrom. 
5. Port of Destination 
Under the guidance of Savigny's lex loci solutionis, the 
German courts proclaimed the law of the port of destination 
for charter parties as well as ordinary affreightments. 29 This 
doctrine, as seen above, could not be maintained,30 and with 
the exception of Greece, has only sporadically been followed 
in other countries.31 The Treaty of Montevideo has re-
pudiated it.32 
Under a one-sided public policy, it is true, certain Latin-
American codes impose themselves on foreign-governed 
carriages to domestic ports. 33 The motives are very similar 
to the true background of the German practice. This, either 
in the resule4 or by intention,35 protects the German con-
signees in overseas trade against foreign rules less favor-
able to innocent holders of bills of lading. 
Technically, the alleged rule has often been criticized 
as impracticable whenever the ship sails with optional or 
uncertain orders or when it does not reach its destination. 
From a commercial point of view, the situation should not 
differ for a particular ship's journey, possibly for the same 
shipper, according to the various foreign places to which 
29 Supra Ch. 43 p. 251. 
30 Supra Ch. 43 pp. 251-253. 
31 E.g., Belgium: App. Gent (May 2, 1901) Clunet 1902, 390 (lex fori) 
and other cases; supra p. 249 n. 78. 
Greece: See 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 252 n. 38. 
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 498 (old); Rb. Rotterdam (Jan. 23 1907) 
Clunet 1912, 291. 
32 Aetas de las Sesiones 560, allegedly because there is no one place of 
performance, cf. SEGOVIA, El derecho internacional privado y el Congreso sud-
americano de Montevideo (1889) 78. 
33 Vol. II p. 421 n. 123; supra p. 255 n. 107. 
34 NussBAUM, D. IPR. 283. 
35 RAAPE, D. IPR. 260. 
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the goods are sent. Although the intended place of delivery 
may have importance in certain respects for the rights of 
the consignee or holder of the bill of lading, it certainly 
does not deserve to qualify the entire contract. 
6. Port of Dispatch 
Much of our preceding survey has shown the sound 
tendency of practice to localize carriage in the port where 
the goods are brought into the custody of the carrier and 
the bill of lading is issued.36 The introduction of the Hague 
Rules has furnished an important, though scarcely noticed, 
support to this theory. To illustrate the attitude taken by 
most member states of the Brussels Convention, the British 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, section I, applies 
the Hague Rules to "the carriage of goods by sea in ships 
carrying goods from any port in Great Britain or Northern 
Ireland to any other port whether in or outside Great 
Britain or Northern Ireland." Since the Rules themselves 
are restricted to "contracts of carrying covered by a bill 
of lading or any similar document" (article I b), the Eng-
lish Act is applicable under two conditions, viz., that car-
riage starts in England and that it is covered by a bill of 
lading. It is immaterial at what place the contract of 
affreightment may legally be regarded as concluded. This 
method of viewing affreightment is just what the courts must 
have in mind when they emphasize the place of contracting 
in the same breath with the port of dispatch. 
Furthermore, the Dutch law demands application of 
numerous provisions to carriage from Dutch ports rather 
than to affreightments made in Holland.37 And a strange 
provision of the Soviet law is only explainable by the same 
idea. The Maritime Code applies (in the absence of party 
36 Supra Ch. 43 ns. 45 ff., 71 f., So, 93, 98; C6digo Bustamante, art. 285. 
37 The Netherlands: C. Com. arts. 470, 47oa, 517d, 520t. 
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
agreement for a foreign law) to all transports from Russian 
ports, but to those from foreign to Russian ports only in 
suits before Soviet courts. 38 This means evidently that 
foreign judgments applying the law of the port of dispatch, 
if no party is a Soviet national, will be recognized. 
Sometimes this same port has been fitted into the con-
ventional pattern by terming it the place where, in addition 
to the contracting, the commencement of the performance 
by the carrier occurs.39 In other cases, doctrinal appear-
ances were saved by emphasizing the beginning of trans-
portation as the most important part of the performance. 
On the other hand, legal construction seems to have helped 
some writers to prefer the port of dispatch to the place of 
contracting if situated in different countries; they have fol-
lowed the theory reminiscent of the Roman receptum nau-
tarum, which conceived the contract of affreightment as a 
kind of real contract, requiring for its formation the de-
livery of the goods to the carrier.40 All these overly tech-
nical considerations are beside the point. The administrative 
provisions of all kinds imposed on outgoing vessels also 
affect the business of shipping and the activities of maritime 
agents. The stricter policy of the maritime states has been 
implemented by imperative rules of private law such as 
those restraining exemption clauses in carriage from their 
ports. This is the background on which the entire operation 
is deemed to be centered at the place where the goods are 
delivered for carriage by sea and the all-important bill of 
lading, or possibly a bill of receipt for lading, is issued. 
The most serious objection to this solution might be 
borrowed from the old argument against the law of the 
38 Soviet Union: Maritime Law of June 14, 1929, art. 4 (b); FREUND, 
Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion ( 1930) comments that probably the 
port of dispatch is thought to be usually identical with the place of con-
tracting. 
39 E.g., The Pehr Ugland (D. C. E. D. Va. 1921) 271 Fed. 340. 
40 Thus, probably 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 792 § 850. 
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place of contracting: goods loaded on the same ship in 
several ports should not be subjected to different laws. But 
this disharmony is easily remedied by a clause in the bills 
of lading stipulating for the same law. Furthermore, dis-
patch is at least an indisputable fact, whereas the place of 
contracting is not, and it is in the nature of a sea voyage 
touching several countries that the law under which goods 
are accepted may vary. 
7· Subsidiary Lex Fori 
The Soviet Maritime Law resorts to the law of the forum 
in the absence of an express party agreement on the ap-
plicable law in any of the following cases: whenever the 
transport is between Russian ports or from Russian to 
foreign ports; if both or even only one of the parties is a 
Soviet citizen or juristic person, even though the transport 
may run between foreign ports; and if the suit is decided in 
a Soviet court, with respect to transport from a foreign to 
a Russian port.41 The last provision gives the foreign law 
of the port of dispatch a slight concession.42 
8. Public Policy 
The law of the forum is prescribed for certain problems 
with respect to outgoing vessels everywhere; with respect 
to outgoing and incoming vessels in the United States,43 
Holland,44 and Belgium ;45 for the entire contract with re-
spect to outgoing vessels in Chile ;46 and to incoming vessels 
41 Soviet Law of June 14, 1929, art. 4 (b); cf. FREUND, Das Seeschiff-
fahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion ( 1930) 59, 70. 
42 Supra n. 3 8. 
43 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, § 13, cf. Vol. II p. 420. 
44 C. Com. art. 517d, cf. Vol. II p. 420 n. 122. 
45 C. Com. art. 91, cf. Vol. II p. 420 n. II9. 
46 C. Com. art. 975 par. 2. 
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in Argentina and Brazil.47 This list is not exhaustive, of 
course. 48 The climax is reached by the Maritime Code of 
French Morocco; all its provisions concerning the rights 
and duties of the parties to a carriage "apply to every trans-
port destined to or originating in the ports of the French 
zone of Morocco," even though the bill of lading or docu-
ment of carriage is issued abroad, between foreigners, or 
the parties stipulate that the contract of transport should 
be governed by a foreign law. Any stipulation of this kind 
is null and void.49 
9· Conclusion 
Comparative observation results in some positive con-
clusions on the subject. 
(a) Ordinary carriage. In the first place, the legislative 
situation of the maritime countries and the circumstances 
of the modern line steamers have promoted a universal 
tendency of the courts towards a conflicts rule that gives 
prevalence to the law of the port of dispatch. The law of 
the flag is no longer important, even in England. In Ger-
many the law of the port of destination has been practically 
abandoned as the general law of the contract. The few 
remains of the mechanical conception of lex loci contractus 
can easily be assimilated to the really significant rule. 
(b) Charter parties. In the second place, it follows that 
all conflicts rules of the world used on this subject are wrong 
when they are applied as in the current theories, to all con-
tracts of transportation, if not even to demises. The above 
assumed rule has justification only when a bill of lading or 
47 Argentina: C. Com. art. 1091. 
Brazil: Introd. Law, art. 9; C. Com. art. 628, and see supra p. 255 n. 107. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Navigation (1940) art. 26. 
4 8 For the normal application of the Hague Rules, in case of outgoing 
vessels, see Vol. II, pp. 420, 425. 
49 French Morocco: Dahir of March 31, 1919, art. 267; LoUis RIVIERE, 
3 Traites, codes et lois du Maroc ( 1925) 88o. 
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"a similar document" is issued. It does not have any bearing 
on charter parties. 
The question of the law adequate to charter parties has 
in fact given rise to most of the litigation reviewed above. 
Actually, the method regularly followed by the courts, 
American, English, German, and others, is always the same, 
the so-called method of cumulating connecting factors. Fre-
quently, the courts indulge in another common tendency, 
the inclination toward the lex fori. But we also encounter 
a common preference for the English law when the parties 
are represented in the great center of vessel chartering in 
London, and the contract is made there on a standard form 
of the trade. 
It would seem that in otherwise doubtful cases it is again 
the formulary from which the charter has been printed 
that decides to which country's legal environment a charter 
party belongs. But when the same blank form is uniformly 
used in several countries, or throughout the world, as has 
been achieved by successful efforts for unification in our 
time, this argument loses its value.50 
Negatively, it is also certain that in a charter party the 
ports are totally immaterial, 51 except when a vessel lying 
in a foreign port is let by the master to a local charterer. 
Indeed, if an English firm in Calcutta charters a Norwegian 
ship lying in the port of Calcutta for a voyage from the 
Straits Settlements to San Francisco, the latter locations 
do not support conflicts consideration; the place of con-
tracting ought to prevail. 
50 This point of view would justify, for instance, the Appeal Court of 
Memel (Oct. u, 1934) 10 Z. ausl. PR. (1936) 142, applying the law of the 
forum to a charter party concluded in Memel on the "Baltwood" form of 
1926 between a Danish and a French firm, both represented by a local 
broker with loading and dispatching to be in Memel. 
51 "While bills of lading are ordinarily given at the port of loading, 
charter parties are often made elsewhere," Willes, J., in Lloyd v. Guibert 
(r865) L. R. r Q. B. us, 127. 
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A new problem arises when a charter party is governed 
by a law other than that of the country in which a bill of 
lading is issued. In this case we shall see that if possible 
the former law is deemed to extend to the bill. 
II. ScoPE oF THE LAw oF THE CoNTRAcT 
I . In General 
On principle, the law governing any maritime transporta-
tion of goods covers conclusion, effects, and termination of 
the contract. These include such problems as the common 
law presumption that a charter party is not a demise, the 
nature of warranties and conditions, the liability of the 
shipowner and of the charterer for delay in delivery, dam-
age and loss of the goods, the exemption clauses, the obli-
gation to pay freight, the remedies for breach or recovery 
accorded by law or agreement, and the question whether 
an action is in rem or in personam.52 "Particular average" 
is nothing else than damages, subject to the law of the 
contract. 53 
The most important of all clauses, the stipulation elimi-
nating or lessening the carrier's legal liability, as earlier 
discussion of this subject has shown, is also subordinated to 
the law governing the contract in general.54 
Illustration. Cotton was shipped on an English vessel 
from New Orleans to Le Havre. The bill of lading con-
52 Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Com. Law (1889) art. 22. 
That limitation of liability, so differently organized at present, should be 
classified as substance, but is unfortunately treated as a procedural inci-
dent, has been indicated in the discussion of torts, Vol. II p. 351. For a 
case demonstrating the monstrous effects of the procedural theory, see 
KNAUGHT, "Renvoi and Other Conflicts Problems in Transportation Law," 
49 Col. L. Rev. ( 1949) 3· 
53 Cf. The Constantinople (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 97, 98 
(regarding a passenger's suit for breach of contract). 
54 Vol. II pp. 418 ff. 
Cf. United States: Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (C. C. E. D. 
N. Y. 1889) 129 u. s. 397· 
France: Cass. civ. (June 12, 1894) S. I895·1.I6I; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 
791 n. I. 
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tained a clause that delivery of the goods should be taken by 
the consignee along side board. When fire destroyed a part 
of the goods piled on the quay, the effect of the clause was 
tested under American and French law.55 In the prevailing 
and correct view, the American law alone should have been 
decisive. 
This liability of the shipowner based on the contract and 
covered by the law of the contract, as may be recalled, ts 
concurrent with his liability for tort.56 
The following applications deserve discussion. 
2. Formalities of Contracting 
Although the charter party derives its name from the 
deed on which it was written, neither this contract nor an 
agreement of carriage need be in writing to have legal 
existence. But writing is often required for evidence57 and 
as such is subject to the conflicts rules on form, mainly the 
rule locus regit actum in its various shades. 
In the absence of recognized usages, however, the gov-
erning law alone decides whether the shipper is entitled to 
demand a bill of lading (as in the United States and Ger-
many) ;58 how many parts a set of bills should have; whether 
the costs of the bill are common or whom they burden. 
Significantly, the German courts, contrary to their main 
rule calling for the law of the port of destination, are forced 
55 Trib. Le Havre (April 18, 1899) 15 Revue Autran (1899-1900) 101. 
56 Vol. II pp. 290 ff. 
See especially RG. (May 28, 1936) 151 RGZ. 296. 
57 E.g., France: C. Com. art. 273, cf. 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 553· 
Italy: Cass. (July 14, 1938) 40 Revue Dor 354; C. Navig. (1942) arts. 377, 
385, 420. 
Peru: C. Com. art. 66 5: form of the "poliza de fletamento." 
Soviet Russia: Maritime Law of June 14, 1929, arts. 75, 121, cf. FREUND, 
Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion (1930) 37· 
58 United States: Harter Act, § 4; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, 
§ 3 (3)· 
Germany: HGB. § 642. 
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to determine by the law of the port of dispatch whether 
the master has to issue a bill of lading. 59 
In the Soviet Union it is prescribed that affreightment 
contracts must be registered; if they are made abroad, they 
have to be registered with the Soviet consul. This provision 
is sanctioned not by nullity of the contract but by the pro-
hibition for the vessel to enter or leave a Russian port.60 
Hence, this is no formality; failure may be a cause of non-
performance. 
3· Interpretation of the Contract 
"Construction" of the contract as a whole, of course, is 
subject to the law governing the latter. 61 For example, the 
frequent clause in an English charter party saying that the 
master will sign the bill of lading as presented by the shipper 
without prejudice to the charter party, has been construed 
in a German court according to English law. 62 
But also in respect to certain terms, courts have developed 
detailed presumptions which apply in connection with and 
apart from usages. Thus, the French doctrine expounds 
that the law of the place of contracting which governs the 
contract also determines what is meant by "tons," although 
if freight is measured by "tons delivered," the law of the 
port of destination is competent to complete the meaning.63 
As to usages, apart from the local customary rules for load-
ing, unloading, and delivery, customs of trade are con-
tinuously admitted to "explain ambiguous mercantile ex-
pressions"64 under the general conditions for reading them 
59 RG. (Dec. 5, I887) zo RGZ. 52, 6I. 
so FREUND, Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion (I930) I3, 67 f. 
61 ScRUTTON, Charterparties I9 ff., art 7, treats the conflicts law under 
this denomination. 
62 OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 9, I9IO) 26 Revue Autran (I9Io-n) 2I5· 
63 App. Rouen (Dec. 30, I874) Clunet I875, 430; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 
790 n. 2; for th-e term "management," see Trib. com. Marseille (May 6, 
I 892) Clunet I 892, II49; cited by all writers. 
64 ScRUTTON, Charterparties 25. 
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into the contract. We may repeat that the universal use of 
English clauses is not a reference to English law. 65 
Illustration. A charter between German parties held to 
be governed by German law contained the familiar English 
cesser and lien clauses. What the combination of these two 
clauses means, was investigated by the German Reichs-
gericht66 under the rule of the BGB., § IJJ, prescribing 
search for the true meaning of terms, although the result 
conformed to the interpretation of the clause found in 
Carver's Carriage of Goods by Sea. 
4· Rights Flowing from a Bill of Lading 
The relationship between an affreightment and the bill 
of lading is rarely examined in conflicts law, perhaps be-
cause the subject is not all too clear in most municipal 
systems. Attention is focused if not exclusively on the gen-
eral doctrine of negotiable instruments, preferentially on 
the function of commercial instruments in the transfer of 
title in the goods rather than their obligatory aspect. Our 
solution can merely be tentative. 
(a) Formalities of issue and endorsement are undoubt-
edly governed by the rule, locus regit actum. Whether the 
bill is special, to order, or to bearer should simply be de-
termined on the same principle; but this is a controversial 
matter of more general nature. 
(b) The authority of the master. It is universally settled 
that the master's power to determine the conditions for a 
bottomry on the cargo, or even to pledge the credit of the 
cargo owner, etc. are subject to the law of the flag. But 
does this law also decide who is bound by the master's sign-
ing the bill of lading? 
Illustration. A New York corporation, time charterer of 
a Norwegian vessel, let it under subcharter to the Canadian 
Ocean Dominion Corporation. The vessel took cargo in 
Gs Vol. II p. 534· 
os RG. (Dec. 14, 1910) JW. 1911, 225. 
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Halifax, N. S., and later in St. Joseph, N. B., and the master 
signed bills of lading by a formula causing litigation on 
the question who was obligated by them, the shipowner, 
the charterer, or the subcharterer. The American court 
held, correctly, that Canadian, not Norwegian nor Ameri-
can, law decided and therefore under the circumstances only 
the shipowner was liable to the holder.67 
(c) The effects of endorsement are determined by the 
law of the place of endorsement, according to the principles 
of negotiable instruments. 5 8 When a bill of lading was issued 
and endorsed in blank in Czarist Russia, and so sent by the 
shipper to the buyer in France, the French court recognized 
that under the then Russian law a blank endorsement did 
not protect any holder against defenses which the carrier 
could oppose to the shipper.69 
(d) Remaining problems. What law, however, decides 
the main body of questions, such as the conditions of hold-
ing in due course? Or the extent to which the right of an 
innocent holder, or the right of the carrier for the payment 
of the freight, stipulated in the bill, is independent of a pre-
ceding contract between consignor and carrier not referred 
to in the bill? What law determines the effect of the much-
employed abbreviated references in the bill to a charter 
party? Is it the law of the contract? The problem is not the 
same as in the case of a bill of exchange or promissory note. 
The rights embodied in a bill of lading are nowhere re-
garded as independent of the consideration given therefor; 
at most, as in German law, they are isolated from the 
affreightment by the formal writing, and in many jurisdic-
tions even this theory is not accepted. 70 
Law of the port of destination. For a court presuming 
67 The Iristo (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 29. 
68 E.g., Greece: App. Athens ( 1925) No. 418, 37 Themis 378. 
69 App. Bordeaux (Jan. 24, 188o) Clunet 1881, 358. 
7° For recent treatment in Italy, see MESSINEO, 2 I titoli di credito 173; 
ScoRZA, 2 La polizza di carico (1936) 218 § 265. 
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that the law of the port of destination is intended by the 
parties, a part of the problem is removed. The most justi-
fiable feature of the "German port of destination doctrine71 
is the argument that the rights of the holder ought to be 
safeguarded by the law of the country where he is entitled 
to request delivery of the goods. In a French appreciation 
of this doctrine, 72 it has been observed that the successive 
, 
parties not involved in the original transaction are interested 
only in the place of prospective delivery. The effects of 
the instrument on transfer of title and the right of obtaining 
physical possession of the goods, are thus united under the 
same law. 
Likewise, if the right of the carrier against the receiver 
for payment of the freight, is assigned to the law of the 
port of destination, it may simultaneously be based on the 
bill of lading and on the contract or the acceptance of the 
goods. The Reichsgericht needlessly construed the rights of 
the carrier towards the consignee as flowing from the accep-
tance of the goods rather than from the contract and there-
fore as subject to a separate conflicts rule.73 However, the 
criticism that the right of the carrier, flowing from accep-
tance according to § 614 of the German Commercial Code, 
is not independent of but substantially identical with the 
right created between the original parties, is a domestic-
minded theory.74 The conflicts rule should cover any rights 
accruing to and against third beneficiaries, however the 
municipal theory construes them. 
It may be appreciated that by such method the same law 
71 Last decision (according to the "General Register," vols. 161-170) 169 
RGZ. 257, 259, with the understanding that the bill of lading may refer to 
another law such as that agreed upon in the affreightment contract. 
Also the Greek practice before the Code of 1940 shared this doctrine, see 
2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 253 f. n. 41, on the basis of lex loci solutionis. 
72 BATIFFOL 255 § 281. 
73 RG. (April 29, 1903) Hans. GZ. 1903 Hbl. No. 102, 20 Revue Autran 
(1904-05) So. 
74 2 FRANKENSTEIN 523, arguing on the German HGB. § 614. 
II 
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will control the effects of both contract and bill of lading, 
in defining the position of a person who is consignee and 
holder. But the unity of law so gained is lost in another 
respect. 
For it has admittedly been impossible to extend the law 
of the port of destination to the creation of bills of lading. 
Even the German courts determine the substantive con-
ditions for the formation of such bills under the law of the 
place where the instrument is issued/5 The Reichsgericht 
has also admitted that the laws of the contract and of the 
bill may differ on the ground of the intention of the parties. 76 
But this is true under any theory. 
Law of the port of dispatch. When the governing law of 
the affreightment is taken from a place where the con-
tractual relationship begins, the solution is less easy. Ameri-
can decisions do not answer the question squarely, but it is 
safe to assume that they apply the same law, termed lex 
loci contractus in affreightment, also to the creation and 
effects of bills of lading. The Italian practice before the new 
Code of Navigation was outspoken to this effect. 77 
It was again the odious privilege of the German Reichs-
gericht to deviate from this natural idea. In an old case/8 
a bill of lading was signed by the master of an English ship 
at Bombay, himself and the shippers being Englishmen. 
75 ScHAPS § 642 n. g1; STAUB-HEINICHEN in 4 Staub 424 Anhang zu § 382 
ns. 62 f. 
76 RG. (Nov. 24, 1928) 122 RGZ. g16. 
77 Cass. (May 25, 1926) Rivista 1927, 112 (limitation of action); App. 
Trieste (May go, 1933) Rivista 19gg, 250 (validity of clause of jurisdiction). 
78 RG. (May 2, 1894) g4 RGZ. 72. No such preoccupation is visible in the 
earlier decisions of ROHG. (March 28, 1879) 25 ROHGE. 9g (English law 
for the charter party because of the form used; fire exemption clause in both 
the charter party and the bill of lading, but English construction prevails 
over (old) German HGB. art. 659). But ROHG. (May go, 1879) 25 ROHGE. 
192 in a case of goods in fact not shipped, rejected an alleged usage in 
Wilmington, N. C., allowing the signing of bills of lading before embarka-
tion of the goods on the ground of German law; RG. (Dec. 5, 1887) 20 RGZ. 
52, in view of an analogous usage of New Orleans, held it pertinent whether 
the holders acquiring the bill knew that in fact it was only a bill received 
for shipment. 
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There was no question but that English law governed the 
contract. The bill stated the loading of a certain cargo and 
promised to deliver it in Hamburg. But through a fraud 
for which one of the shippers subsequently was jailed, the 
goods were not ·bra.ught on board. The court refused to 
apply the English rule that the master cannot bind the ship-
owner by signing bills of lading for goods that were never 
shipped at all/9 and other English defenses of the owner. 
It asserted the German protection of an innocent purchaser 
of the bill, whenever the destination is a German port. This 
result was precariously based on the old fiction of the 
debtor's spontaneous submission to the law of the foreign 
place of performance, simply by his agreeing to perform at 
that place. But the court went farther and placed the Ger-
man rule under a compulsory public policy, namely the rule 
that the bill of lading constitutes, as between the owner and 
the holder in good faith, obligations independent of the 
carriage contract and unconditionally performable, when-
ever delivery is due in Germany.80 This one-sided policy, 
though approved by certain authors, 81 and not overruled, 
is an erratic element in the recent practice of the German 
courts.82 
Rationale. For the holder of the bill of lading, the goods 
are of primary concern. Where the goods will be, or ought 
to be, when discharged from the vessel and delivered at 
the end of the maritime voyage, is eminently important for 
him. But consignees and holders of the bill are not the only 
interested persons. In the eyes of the insurance company in 
the country of dispatch and of the banker financing the 
79 SCRUTI'ON, Charterparties 72 and n. (b). The contrary German rule 
prevails also in the United States, Uniform Bills of Lading Act, 1909, § 23; 
Pomerene Act, 1916, § 22, cf. KNAUTH, Ocean Bills of Lading 130 f.; and 
e.g, in Italy, see Cass. (March 22, 1934) Foro Ita!. 1934 I 929. 
80 34 RGZ. at 79; RG. (Sept. 24, 1910) 74 RGZ. 193, 194. 
81 Lastly, NussBAUM, D. IPR. 284 n. 1. 
82 In RG. (Nov. 24, 1928) 122 RGZ. 316, 319 embarrassment is recog-
nizable. 
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seller, the port of arrival may be a very far distant place, 
often an uncertain one, and ordinarily not a familiar contact. 
At any rate, the law governing the contract of carriage 
should extend to the bill of lading in the following cases: 
( i) An express reference in the bill of lading to a specific 
law takes care of the question for everyone concerned. 
( ii) Where the bill of lading refers to the conditions in 
use by the carrier, or to a charter party, concluded either 
between the parties to the bill or between the shipowner and 
the carrier, it is natural that one law ought to govern the 
entire relationship. Such a reference effectively lessens the 
independence of the instrument, allowing the holder to 
oppose defenses outside the bill of lading. The problem has 
arisen in the English cases. 
An English decision of 1933, though strangely compli-
cated, shows the tendency to subject a charter party and 
the ensuing bill of lading to one law, "in deviation from 
the law where the goods were exchanged against the bill of 
lading," which would normally have governed the relation-
ship between the shipowner and the holder. 83 
A thorough study, however, was given to the question 
by the admiralty counsel and judges in The Njegos. 84 The 
charter party was clearly subject to English law-made in 
London by agents of the parties (Yugoslav shipowners and 
a French company) in English on the Chamber of Shipping 
River Plate ("Centrocon") form, and in addition containing 
the usual English arbitration clause. The bills of lading, in 
83 The St. Joseph (1933) 45 Ll. L. Rep. 18o, 28 Revue Dor (1933) 180. 
As far as I understand, Belgian law, in principle, as the law of the port of 
dispatch and issuance of the bill of lading, would govern the relationship 
between the Norwegian shipowner and the holder, the Guatemalan govern-
ment. But the charter party between the owner and the French charterers 
did not refer to Belgian law and the bill was declared nonnegotiable; the 
Hague Rules were not even implicitly referred to in the bill, therefore the 
Belgian limitation of the shipowner's liability (Hague Rules) was not 
applied. 
84 The Njegos [ 1936] P. 90. 
MARITIME CARRIAGE OF GOODS 279 
English form and English language, were issued in Buenos 
Aires for destinations in Norway and Denmark. The bills 
incorporated "all the terms, conditions, and exceptions" of 
the charter party, "including the negligence clause," but 
were not deemed to include the arbitration clause. The re-
ceivers of the goods, Norwegian or Danish nationals, ac-
quired the bills. The President, Sir F. B. Merriman, speak-
ing for the court, held that "the sensible business man must 
be assumed to intend that the contract shall be read with 
the English interpretation which admittedly attaches to 
the charter party as such, though that interpretation is 
nowhere expressly stated, but it is to be inferred from 
several indications. . . . " 85 
A recent Italian writer, Scerni, has given attention to the 
subject. He also thinks that where the parties enjoy full 
freedom in selecting the law, their intention is that the 
reference in a bill of lading to a charter party includes the 
applicable law.86 
Where the bill of lading fails to refer to a previously 
written document, so as equitably to justify extension of 
the law concerned to the bill, it is logical to keep the choice 
of law for both sources of obligation separate. The parties 
may easily remove this by any clause admitting uniformity. 
85 I d. at 105. 
86 SCERNI 219. Assuredly, SCERNI denies party autonomy to the then Italian 
commercial law (art. 58 C. Com.), a wrong thesis in my opinion, and inade-
quately requires an express stipulation for the applicable law in the charter 
party or the model bill of lading printed in the charter. 
A relevant argument is to be found in a Dutch decision, Rb. Rotterdam 
. (Oct. 16, 1935) N. ]. 1936, No. 59, upholding an obligation of the holder of 
the bill to pay the freight at the value of gold dollars before the American 
depreciation. The charter party made in London with a clause for arbi-
tration in London evidently was governed by English law. But the bill of 
lading issued in a Dutch port by a Dutch line to an American corporation 
referred merely "to all the conditions and exceptions and liberties contained 
in the charter-party"; this was not to be extended either to arbitration or 
to English law, and Dutch law applied. The court, however, argued on 
the basis of the presumable intention of the parties. 
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4· Distance Freight 
Under English and American basic conceptions, the 
carrier has to perform an entire undertaking for a specific 
sum.87 Freight is owed only on proper delivery. Conse-
quently, in case of disaster at sea, if no goods are salvaged, 
no freight is due. Of course, more recently, usual clauses, 
such as "freight to be deemed earned, ship or goods lost 
or not lost," reverse the situation.88 In most civil law 
countries, on the contrary, at least the part of the freight 
proportional to the voyage accomplished at the place of 
loss, is regarded as earned. 89 This distinction is very well 
recognized and has been a subject of drafts of unification 
from I 907.90 It has been unanimously understood in the 
courts of the world that the solution depends on the law 
governing the contract of affreightment which is prevail-
ingly the law of the "place of contracting."91 
This is a perfect example of universal agreement. 
87 Blackburn, J., in Appleby v. Myers ( 1867) L. R. 2 C. P. 650 at 661, as 
used by ScRUITON, Charterparties art. 143. 
88 On the broader meaning of this clause in a case including all freight 
due at destination, see Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Guernsey-Westbrook Co. 
(C. C. A. 9th 1947) 159 F. (2d) 139, 141. 
89 E.g., France: C. Com. art. 296 par. 3· 
Italy: C. Com. (1882) art. 570; C. Navig. (1942) art. 436 is interpreted 
to the same effect by BRUNETII, C. Navig. Marit. ( 1943) a057 n. IX. Cf. Trib. 
Livorno (March 29, 1941) Dir. Int. 1941, 275 (applying the Italian lex loci 
contractus on the ground of the former art. 58 C. Com. against the different 
German law stipulated. 
Spain: C. Com. art. 623. 
Argentina: C. Com. art. 1088. 
Mexico: C. Com. art. 73 7, etc. 
Germany: C. Com. §§ 630, 631, 641. 
Japan: C. Com. art. 613; new C. Com. (1938) art. 760. 
Sweden: Marit. Law, art. 129, the measure of the freight conditioned 
by the circumstances. 
90 BERLINGIERI, Verso l'unificazione del diritto del mare (1932) 142. 
91 United States: China Mutual Ins. Co. v. Force ( 1894) 142 N. Y. 90, 
36 N. E. 874. 
England: The Industrie [1894] P. 58; The Adriatic [1931] P. 241. 
France: App. Douai (Nov. 10, 1885) 1 Revue Autran (1885-6) 36o; 5 LYoN-
CAEN et RENAULT§ 849. 
Germany: RG. (April 4, 1908) 68 RGZ. 203, 209. 
Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (Oct. 14, 1927) 7 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes 432, 434· 
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5. Right of Payment for Freight after Delivery 
Whether a lien on the cargo should be ·regarded as a 
property interest, remains subject to the lex situs or depends 
on the law of the flag, according to theories not to be dis-
cussed here. But commercial liens in favor of the freight 
are always based on obligatory rights. A case in the Italian 
courts furnishes an excellent illustration. 
An Italian firm, subsequently in bankruptcy, chartered by 
contract made in London a ship of the Italian shipping com-
pany "Garibaldi." The cargo was unloaded on the dock in 
Genoa. According to Italian law (C. Com., r882, art. 58o), 
the captain was not entitled to retain the goods but could 
enforce a claim for the freight. Under English law, how-
ever, a master waives the lien by delivering the goods with-
out requiring payment. The Appeal Coure2 and the Supreme 
Court" 3 did not hesitate to apply English law as the lex loci 
contractus. The Italian ship should hence have retained the 
goods contrary to the Italian legal provision, considered 
imperative in municipal law. It was also immaterial that 
the act in question was closely connected with delivery. 
III. SPECIAL LAWS 
I. Port Regulations 
There seems to be universal agreement that local pro-
visions and usages in both the port of dispatch and that of 
arrival are determinative of the rights of the parties with 
respect to the technical operations of loading and un-
loading.94 
92 App. Genova {June 17, 1932) Monitore 1932, 86o, 9 Z. ausl. PR. (1935) 
217. 
93 Cass. (June 8, 1933) Foro Ita!. 1933 I 938, Rivista 1933, 492, 28 Revue 
Dor ( 1933) 349· 94 United States: The Dartford (C. C. A. 1st 1938) 1938 Am. Marit. Cas. 
1548, 1555 (whether Saturday is a half holiday in Boston), citing Holland 
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This rule extends to the formalities to be fulfilled with the 
authorities ;95 the beginning, interruption, and speed of load-
ing and unloading, 96 in particular the lay days, when the con-
tract is not specific ;97 the method of stowage ;98 the compu-
tation of weighing expenses and allowance of expenses, 
when loading is difficult ;99 the procedure for formal ascer-
tainment of damage, etc.100 The local standards also govern 
the rights of the carrier against a shipper who fails to de-
liver the goods to the vessel on time.101 Such rights to de-
murrage102 do not depend on the question whether the duty 
to pay for delay in loading or unloading beyond the per-
mitted period is construed as a supplement to the freight 
Gulf S. S. Co. v. Hagar (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1903) 124 Fed. 460, 463; Pool 
Shipping Co. v. Samuel (C. C. A. 3rd 1912) 200 Fed. 36. 
England: The Thortondale, Hick v. Tweedy ( 1890) 63 L. T. R. 765-C. A., 
6 Revue Autran (1890-91) 474, 7 id. (1891-92) 327: lex loci contractus 
governs, but the usages of the port where the charter party ought to be 
performed determine such questions as at what moment a vessel is ready 
for loading, provided that the usages are recognized also by the foreigners 
using the port. 
France: 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 851. 
Germany: ScHAPS n. 21 before § 556. 
Italy: DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 358 § 167; ScERNI 209. 
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 517d par. 2 cf. art. 458 (old) of the C. Com. 
95 CRouvF:s, I Repert. 269 No. 24; Cass. civ. (April 12, 1938) D. H. 1938, 
369. 
96 Quebec: C. C. art. 2460. 
97 Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (Nov. 15, 1905) 22 Revue Autran (1906-
07) 537: whether the excuse of torrents of rain is allowed for delayed action; 
25 id. (1909-10) 404. 
France: FROMAGEOT1 18 Revue Autran (1902-03) 742; 5 LYON-CAEN et 
RENAULT§ 851; 2 DE VALROGER § 69o; but see as to certain citations of 
cases, VAN SLOOTEN 23 f. 
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Nov. u, 1889) 45 Seuff. Arch. 258; (March 
27, 1913) Hans. GZ. 1913, RBI. 181 No. 86. 
98 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 851. 
99 Italy: Cass. (Oct. 15, 1929) Riv. Dir. Com. 1930 II 529, cf. VALERI, 
5 Z. ausl. PR. (1931) 845. 
100Trib com. Bordeaux (April 19, 1888) 4 Revue Autran (1888-89) 299; 
see VAN SLOOTEN 30. 
101 Germany: Handelsg. Hamburg (July 24, 1872) HGZ. 1872 RBI. No. 
226. 
102 In U. S. v. Ashcraft-Wilkinson Co. (D. C. N. D. Ga. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 
977, reversed on other grounds (1929) 29 F. (2d) 961, the suit involving 
demurrage is decided without hesitation under American law, the vessel, 
probably Italian, having arrived in Savannah. 
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(as in the French courts) or as damages (according to the 
prevailing conception) .103 
Since, however, the contract may dispose of all these 
questions, it may also, under certain circumstances, be 
deemed to refer these to the law governing the contract in 
general. 104 
2. Lex Loci Solutionis 
(a) Modalities of performance. According to its usual 
role, the law of the place of performance governs modali-
ties of delivery of the goods105 and of payment of the 
freight. 106 The currency of payment is also included.107 
Whether the master has to give notice before unloading/08 
and in what manner the bill of lading has to be tendered,109 
belongs to the same category. 
The law in force at the port of arrival thus serves as 
lex loci solutionis to the same effect as in its function just 
mentioned sub ( r ) . Other formulations are more doubtful. 
(b) Broader statements. In one formulation, the law of 
the port of arrival embraces everything involving discharge 
of the vessel, receipt of the goods, and measures regarding 
damage and deficiencies.110 The German Reichsgericht, re-
stricting its old rule of the law of the port of destination, 
still favors it as a special law for various problems.111 
1 0 3 See on the controversy, 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 728 § 797· 
104 Swedish S. Ct. (May II, 1939) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1939, 247 No. 69: 
charter party made in Sweden between Swedish parties, lay days in a Ger-
man port, Swedish law; cf. SCHMIDT, Revue Crit. 1948, 430. 
105 Trib. Marseille (March 8, 1838) Jur. Mars. 1838.1.246. 
106 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 851. 
107 3 DESJARDIN 658 § 840; Trib. com. Marseilles (June 25, I895) Jur. 
Mars. 1895.1.262, cited I Repert. 277 No. 89. 
108 I VAN HASSELT 364. The question is answered in the negative in England 
in the absences of stipulation, ScRUTTON, Charterparties 141, 153. 
109 Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 16, I935) W. I936 No. 59· 
110 I SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN 393· 
111 Germany: RG. (Nov. 24, I928) 122 RGZ. 3I6 defines the scope of the 
law of the port of destination, when the contract is generally governed by 
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The C6digo Bustamante provides that "The acts of per-
formance of the contract (of affreightment) shall be 
effectuated in conformity with the law of the place where 
they should be performed." (art. 285 par. 2) 
It is uncertain, however, whether this formula really 
intends to include more than the rules expressed supra (I) 
and ( 2) (a). But it does not go so far as a new section of 
the Montevideo Treaties submitting the "contract" to the 
law of the place of performance if the latter is in a member 
state.112 
Finally, some writers, followed temporarily by a few 
decisions, have applied the theory by which the contract is 
divided into conclusion and performance.113 Under the 
former Italian Commercial Code, this was the doctrine of 
the courts,114 until the Court of Cassation liberally recog-
nized the foreign lex loci contractus.115 
Although the Restatement utilizes the same divisive 
method, Judge Learned Hand in his well-known judgment 
in a carriage case,116 has been less outspoken in defining the 
scope of the law of the place of performance. Repeating the 
alleged rule that the initial validity and interpretation of a 
another law, as including: the provisions conforming to the mercantile con-
venience of holders of bills of lading (thus bowing to 34 RGZ. 72, So, see 
supra p. 276 n. 7S) ; the modalities of discharge; and the provisions involving 
the conditions under which rights and obligations accrue between carrier and 
consignee in the meaning of the German C. Com. §§ 614 ff. It would seem 
that all these problems are still treated as subject to public policy. Whether 
this would be the attitude at present, I venture to question. 
112 Montevideo Treaty on Navigation (1940) art. 26, supra n. 47· 
113 AssER-RIVIER, Elements § 33; FROMAGEOT, rS Revue Autran (1902-03) 
744; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ S51; I Repert. 269 No. 21. 
Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (Jan. 14, 1S91) Jur. Port Anvers 1S93.1.19; 
and App. Gent (May 2, 1901) Clunet 1902, 390. In both cases, loss on the 
open seas, law of the Belgian port of destination or discharge, respectively; 
Trib. com. Antwerp (Jan. 7, 1903) infra. 
114 Italy: C. Com. (1SS2) art. 5S; App. Trieste (May 31, 1932) Rivista 
1934, 5S3, 2S Revue Dor (1933) 349: maritime carriage from France to 
Italy; notice of damage in Italy has to observe Italian C. Com. art. 415. 
115 Cass. (June S, 1933) supra. 
116 Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F.· 
(2d) S24, S26, cf. Vol. II pp. 465, 540 n. So. 
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contract are governed by the law of the place of making the 
contract, but that any breach or nonperformance is governed 
by the law of the place of performance, he nevertheless 
started his own investigation by the observation that "th,e 
boundaries of this doctrine are not easy to find." The issue, 
moreover, was whether a grain shipment from Duluth to 
Montreal with transshipment in Pt. Colbourne was subject 
to American law with respect to the entire distance or was 
governed by the Canadian Water-Carriage of Goods Act 
with respect to a loss occurring in the Canadian port. The 
decision derives the latter answer from the fact that the 
carrier117 was in the course of performing his duty in Canada 
when the negligence of his servant occurred. But this for-
malistic language reveals the idea that the carrier, by 
promising transportation to be made first in the United 
States and then in Canada and stipulating for exoneration 
from negligence was subject to the American public policy 
invalidating the clause only so long as the goods were moving 
to the border. This idea is certainly not far from the inten-
tions of the carriers in through routes, as we shall observe. 
Personally, I think the decision, as to the result, is right. 
Of course, from such a point of view, the contrary con-
struction is not excluded, viz., to the effect that the entire 
contract is subject to the American law because it was cen-
tered here. This conclusion would be nearer to the tendency 
of the great majority of American decisions applying the 
lex loci contractus to every problem. 
However, which construction to prefer is evidently a 
matter of interpretation of the contract, and this interpreta-
tion is a legal matter belonging without doubt to the law 
governing the contract or, in the language of the American 
117 The second ship, carrying the goods from Pt. Colbourne was chartered 
by the defendant's agent, and therefore the defendant carrier was liable 
for the ship "as for his own." 
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judges, including Judge L. Hand, to the law of the place of 
contracting. 
Unfortunately, no such justification can be furnished for 
a subsequent decision of the Second Federal Circuit Court,118 
which comprises within the scope of "performance" the 
question whether the carrier's misdelivery of the goods is a 
breach, and whether this excuses the cargo owner from 
giving notice of nondelivery within five days after discharge, 
as stipulated. The court assigns these questions in the instant 
case to German law, a decision that is in all too perfect 
harmony with the ill-reputed German doctrine. The effect 
of a contractual clause in the case of events not foreseen by 
the parties is a problem of contractual construction and has 
nothing to do with the place of performance. In this case 
the rules and regulations of Hamburg properly determined 
only the conduct of the carrier's agent for the purpose of 
delivery; no question of this sort was involved. 
A firmer grip on these exceptions to the general law of 
the contract is urgently needed. 
The overwhelmingly prevailing conception extends the 
unitary law of the contract to the existence, excusability, 
and effects of nonperformance. It would seem also that a 
stipulation exempting the carrier from damages under cer-
tain circumstances on the ground of misdelivery belongs to 
this scope.119 
(c) Custody in case of refused acceptance. A case de-
cided by the German Supreme Court is a good illustration. 
A German, having sold 2000 pairs of bicycle pedals to a 
buyer in Birmingham, England, contracted with an agent 
in Hamburg for their carriage which was performed through 
118 Bank of California, N. A. v. International Mercantile Marine Co. 
(C. C. A. 2d 1933) 64 F. (2d) 97· 
119 To this effect, M. & T. Trust Co. v. Export S. S. Corp. (1932) 256 
N. Y. Supp. 590, reversed, 259 N. Y. Supp. 393, re-aff'd (1932) 262 N. Y. 
92, applies American federal law as lex loci contractus, as against the law 
of French Morocco as lex loci destinationis. See also infra n. 124. 
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the Hamburg agent of the General Steam Navigation Com-
pany by steamer to Norwich, from there by the Great 
Eastern Railway to the station at Curzon Street. The buyer 
refused to accept the goods, and the railroad notified shipper 
and consignee that the goods were stored at the sender's 
risk at the railway depot. Delivery was finally delayed by 
servants of the railway. The Court, applying English law, 
stated that the duty of custody owed by the carrier on the 
ground of the affreightment contract was terminated when 
the buyer refused to accept the goods in a reasonable time, 
and hence the Hamburg agent was not liable for subsequent 
events.120 
(d) As imperative law. We have encountered the law of 
the place of performance as necessarily governing the lia-
bility of carriers in transports to the ports of the United 
States, Belgium, and, conditionally, the Netherlands ;121 the 
entire contract in Argentina and Brazil ;122 and various prob-
lems in Germany.123 
Chile, where affreightments made in a Chilean port are 
subject to the lex fori, moreover, imposes its domestic law 
"as to everything regarding the unloading or any other act 
that should be done on Chilean territory." (C. Com. art. 
975 par. 2) 
None of these last three extravagances is compatible with 
international reciprocity. 
IV. Loss oF RIGHTS oF THE CoNsiGNEE 
1. Failure to Give Notice of Loss or Damage 
Legal provisions. Before the introduction of the Brussels 
Convention concerning bills of lading, an informative con-
troversy arose in France on the application of article 435 
12o RG. (April 10, 1901) 48 RGZ. 108. 
121 Supra p. 267. 
122 Supra pp. 255, z68 n. 47· 
12s Supra p. 283 n. III. 
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(par. I) of the French Commercial Code which barred all 
actions against the master and the insurers for damage done 
to the goods if the goods have been accepted without pro-
test. In one view, this provision was classified under the 
incidents of discharging, governed by the law of the port of 
arrival, and therefore applied to all ships arriving in French 
ports.124 But the Court of Cassation always .idopted the 
opposite theory that the law intended by the parties, or 
other general law of the contract, includes time and for-
malities to be observed by the consignee.125 This certainly 
is the sounder view. To the contrary, an Italian decision 
regarded the analogous provisions of the former Italian 
Commercial Code, article 4 I 5, as pertaining to the incidents 
of delivery; yet this rested on the construction of the then 
conflicts rule of the same Code, article 58.126 
The Brussels Convention has been less rigorous. If the 
notice of loss is not given at the time when the goods are 
removed into the custody of the person entitled to delivery, 
only prima facie evidence of acceptance is constituted.121 
Rebuttal by proof to the contrary being possible, the notice 
is no longer a necessary prerequisite to suit.128 In accordance 
with our view expounded earlier the new rule ought to be 
applied in all courts when the Convention is adopted in the 
state of the port of departure.129 In the United States, of 
course, it is applicable also to homeward bills of lading. 
The conflicts problem is thereby eliminated in American 
courts but remains unsettled for shipments to all other 
countries from those which have not adopted the Rules. 
124 Trib. com. Marseilles (Dec. 29, 1920) 33 Revue Autran (1922) 93, 
Clunet 1922, 10u; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. § 1466 n. 4 and in II Revue Dor 
( 1925) 289; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 793 § 852. 
125 Cass. civ. (June 19, 1929) S. 1929.1.309. This opinion has been advo-
cated by DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 408. 
1 26App. Trieste (May 31, 1932) 28 Revue Dor (1933) 349· 
127 Art. 3 (6); Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U. S. C. § 1303. 
128 The Southern Cross (1940) 1940 Am. Marit. Cas. 59· 
129 See Vol. II p. 426 and supra p. 26 5· 
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Stipulation limiting the time for claims. Clauses in bills 
of lading requiring that notice should be given to the 
carrier and claims brought within a certain period of time, 
in principle depends on the law of the contract. This has 
been recognized by American courts.130 
Under the Brussels Convention, a clause limiting time to 
less than one year is ineffective.131 On this ground such 
clauses have been rejected in American decisions as to both 
outward132 and homeward133 bills of lading. Longer periods 
are permitted.134 
Apart from such modification by public policy, the law 
of the port of departure ought to govern. 
It is a different consideration when public law is declared 
to intervene. In a Canadian through bill, the time for claims 
after delivery was restricted to four months, and such 
stipulation was held inoperative after the shipment passed 
the Canadian border into the United States, because a pro-
130 Before the introduction of the Brussels Convention, in The President 
Monroe ( 1935) 286 N. Y. Supp. 990, the clause would have been determined 
under the expressly stipulated law of the Strait Settlements, if this had been 
proved. 
In The Carso ( 1937) 1937 Am. Marit. Cas. 1078, it seems that the gov-
erning law was English, but the court did not find a reason for distinguish-
ing English and American authorities holding the clause to be valid. 
The decision in M. & T. Trust Co. v. Export S. S. Corp. (1932) 256 N. Y. 
Supp. 590, supra p. 243 n. 45, implies the same view. 
Recently the clause was upheld in an interstate shipment not considered 
subject to the Carriage Act of 1936, Newport Rolling Mills v. Miss. Valley 
Lines (1943) 50 F. Supp. 623, 1943 Am. Marit. Cas. 793· 
Opposite solutions appeared in Bank of California N. A. v. Int. Mercantile 
Marine Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1933) 64 F. (2d) 97 criticized supra n. u8, where, 
however, American law was substituted, no proof of German law being 
offered; and in Duche v. Brocklebank (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 
184, applying American law as that of the port of arrival. 
131 Convention, art. 3 (6); 49 Stat. 1207, § 3, 46 U. S. C. § 1303. 
132 The Argentino, Buxton Limitida S. A. v. Rederi (1939) 28 F. Supp. 
440, 1939 Am. Marit. Cas. 815. 
133 The Zaremba (C. C. A. 2d 1943) 136 F. (2d) 320, 1943 Am. Marit. 
Cas. 954· 
134 U. S. v. Gydnia American Shipping Lines, Ltd. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1944) 
57 F. Supp. 369. 
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vision of the Interstate Commerce Act required a minimum 
period of nine months.135 
2. Limitation of Actions 
The legal provisions restricting the time during which a 
carrier may be sued for nondelivery or defective delivery, 
are regarded as substantive in Continental laws. For they 
affect the right, although only the action is barred.136 
Although the French writers share this view,131 the 
French Supreme Court disagrees. This court once, precisely 
in a case of affreightment, announced the theory that the 
domicil of the debtor governs limitation138 and in another 
such case has reiterated this questionable idea.139 N everthe-
less, the period of limitation is characterized as substantive. 
An American court, however, disregarded the French 
limitation to one year of the action against a carrier and 
applied the lex fori, when the holder sued upon a bill of 
lading issued at the French port of departure and stipulating 
for French law; this follows the usual approach of common 
law lawyers.140 
135 Goldberg v. Delaware etc. Ry. Co. (1943) 40 N.Y. Supp. (zd) 44· 
136 See Vol. I pp. 64-67 and infra Chs. 52 and 53; for an action against 
a carrier see, e.g., App. Bologna (June 2, 1913) Riv. Dir. Com. 19I4 II 43· 
1 3 7 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ 854; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE § 358; I Repert. 
269 § 25; BATIFFOL § 584. 
138 Cass. civ. (Jan. I3, I869) D. I869.I.135, S. I869.1.49; followed in Trib. 
com. Anvers (Jan. 7, I903) I8 Revue Autran (I902-o3) 90I, under the 
theory of lex loci executionis. 
139 Cass. civ. (Jan. 9, I934) S. I934·I.20I, D. I934.1.22, Revue Crit. I934, 
9I5, Clunet I934, 672; Cass. civ. (July I, 1936) Revue Crit. I937, I75, Clunet 
I937. 302. 
140 A. Salomon, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (I929) 32 F. 
(zd) 283. 
CHAPTER 45 
1 Other Transportation Contracts 
l. MARITIME TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS 
CARRIAGE of persons by sea, because of certain features, has become a separate topic in the more 
recent municipal enactments. Conflicts law has not 
given it much special attention. Some writers, it is true, have 
urged the significance of the flag, with more insistence than 
for carriage of goods, because a passenger boards the ship 
in person, stays under the captain's discipline, and is sub-
ject to the national penal jurisdiction of the ship's country.1 
However, not until the Dutch rule for time charters2 and 
the Italian law of 19423 did any decision or law declare for 
the law of the flag. 
Passenger tickets often refer to the law of the vessel, but 
this still leaves the subsidiary rule open. 
I. Lex Loci Contractus 
In addition to the usual advocates, 4 a few American 
decisions have characteristically employed the law of the 
place of contracting. A Massachusetts decision before the 
Harter Act, under the lex loci contractus, enforced an 
English exemption clause to which the Cunard Line referred 
in the ticket for a voyage from England to the United 
1 SCERNI 243; BATIFFOL 260 § 287. NussBAUM, D. IPR. 286 risks the assertion 
that the law of the flag governs "without doubt." Most plausibly, this view 
is advocated by ToRQUATo GIANNINI, II passaggiero marittimo istruito 
(Milano 1939). 
2 The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 533 p. 
3 Italy: Disp. Prel. C. Navig. art. xo. 
4 DIENA, 3 Dir. Com. Int. 376 and cit. n. 5· 
29I 
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States.5 The same court, however, again sanctioned the ap-
plication of English law to a voyage from Ireland to 
Massachusetts, although the passage was booked in Boston. 
For justification the court construed the contract made in 
Boston by the passenger's daughter as a mere preliminary 
to the "contract ticket" received in England. 6 A better reason 
would have been that the embarking rather than the booking 
was decisive. In a more recent case, a ticket was bought 
in the United States for a voyage from Alaska to Seattle. 
The passenger, an Indian girl, was attacked, probably in 
the waters of British Columbia, by two negroes of the crew. 
Tort action against the company according to the law of 
this Canadian province, was excluded for procedural rea-
sons. But action for damages according to general maritime 
law was granted because the carrier had the contractual 
duty to protect passengers against violence of its own crew. 7 
In this case it would have been immaterial if the ticket 
had been bought in British Columbia, or if the vessel had 
flown the Norwegian or the Japanese flag. The only con-
sistent theory was expressed by one court when it applied 
the law of the place where the journey begins.8 
2. Other Contacts 
Repetitiously, we may briefly note that a few European 
writers think that the passenger, subject to the carrier's 
fixed conditions, must also be under its law, 9 to which the 
C6digo Bustamante agrees.10 The Treaty of Montevideo 
5 Fonseca v. Cunard Steamship Co. (1891) 153 Mass. 553, 27 N. E. 665. 
6 O'Regan v. Cunard Steamship Co. ( 1894) 160 Mass. 356, 35 N. E. 1070. 
7 Pacific S. S. Co. v. Sutton (C. C. A. 9th 1925) 7 F. (2d) 579; The Admiral 
Evans (1925) 1925 Am. Marit. Cas. 1335. 
8 Wiley v. Grand Trunk R. of Canada (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1915) 227 
Fed. 127, 130. 
9 FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 481; SCERNI 244 f. 
1o C6digo Bustamante, art. 185. 
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points to the place of the maritime agency,11 and some 
German authors to the port of destination.12 
I 
Soviet law declares itself applicable whenever one party 
is a citizen.13 
3· Special Laws 
The passenger's coming on board and leaving the ship 
are subject to local laws, if these are different from the 
governing law. Thus, the Dutch law provides that the 
(Dutch) provisions including those applicable before or 
at embarkation and those applicable at or after disembark-
ing, always apply if the embarkation takes place in a Dutch 
harbor.14 
That many local administrative rules are to be observed 
by a vessel in leaving and landing and that they have 
compulsory force, are facts which the contracting parties are 
deemed to contemplate. Emigration laws are not the only 
ones so to be observed. 
4· Conclusion 
As American courts correctly see it, it is no convincing 
argument that the monopoly of a carrier points to the tacit 
acceptance of his domiciliary law. Nor has the law of the 
flag any natural claim to regulate the contractual rights 
and duties of a person alien to the ship's nationality. How-
ever, it has been persuasively said that it is more awkward 
to discriminate among passengers than to differentiate goods 
on board a vessel. Is there an objective criterion outside the 
ship for establishing a sound local connection? 
11 Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Commercial Law (1889) art. 14. 
12 SCHAPS, before § 664 n. 8; contra: BAR, Int. Handelsr. 442; 2 FRANKEN-
STEIN 536. 
13 Law of June 14, 1929, art. 4(2), see FREUND, Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der 
Sowjetunion ( 1930) 70. 
14 Dutch C. Com. art. 533c par. 2. 
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The port of destination must be excluded. An American 
acquiring a ticket for China cannot be considered by any 
argument to have contracted under Chinese law. But it is 
no less a mistake to freeze the applicable law at the technical 
point of completing a legally binding contract. Booking in 
Rio de Janeiro for a voyage from New York to South-
ampton, or accepting in Rio a stateroom for such a cross-
ing, offered by cable by a New York travel bureau, does 
not establish Brazilian law as dominant. 
Where the desirable stipulation for an applicable law is 
missing, the agreed port of departure may be accepted as 
the important center of the contractual relationship. The ob-
jection that the choice of this port is accidental, is not true. 
No passenger regards his point of embarkation as im-
material. He may think that he is allowed to board the 
ship at a subsequent landing place, in Montevideo instead 
of Buenos Aires, in Cherbourg instead of Southampton, 
but he will presume that this makes no difference in his 
contract, as he also will not expect to recover the price 
difference if his berth has remained unfilled. Nevertheless, 
as mentioned earlier with regret/5 New York applies Amer-
ican law on grounds of public policy where a ticket for 
passage between two foreign ports is purchased in the 
United States. 
The choice, therefore, is between the port of departure 
indicated on the ticket and the flag. The latter may be 
preferable. 
II. MARITIME TRANSPORTATION OF BAGGAGE 
The Continental literature has expounded that the ob-
ligation of carriers to transport baggage, at least when 
checked for this purpose/6 is a collateral pact annexed to 
15 Vol. II p. 421 f. 
16 Baggage taken by a passenger to his stateroom, in a traditional wide-
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the contract of passage; but it has been asserted at the 
same time that the rights and duties flowing from this agree-
ment are analogous to those relating to the carriage of 
goods.17 It follows in the municipal field that it does not 
matter whether the baggage is "free," that is, paid with 
the ticket, or must be paid---separately. In the conflicts field, 
the consequence is that the rules involving carriage of goods 
would be correctly applied. 
The well-known decision of the British Privy Council of 
r 8 6 518 concerning lost luggage has been considered a leading 
case for maritime and even for all contracts. The English 
law of the place of contracting was applied, but it happened 
to agree with both parties' domicil, the flag of both vessels 
engaged in the carriage, and the port of departure.19 Under 
analogous circumstances, an American court, before the 
Harter Act, declared valid under English common law a 
clause limiting liability of the vessel to a value of ten pounds. 
The vessel was English, went from England to the United 
States, and the ticket was bought in England.20 
The law of the flag, 21 in this case again, has much 
attraction. 
III. FLUVIAL TRANSPORT 
The much-needed unification of the law involving inter-
national transportation on rivers and canals has failed to 
spread opinion, is not subject to contractual obligation. But analogy to the 
liability of innkeepers has sometimes been advocated, and more recently the 
literature definitely prefers contractual liability for any baggage by sea 
or land. See for France, ]HAN lzE, Responsabilite en matiere de transport 
des baggages (Paris I936) 34, 38, 42. 
17 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 83I; Dutch C. Com. art. 533 par. I. Contra: 
T. GIANNINI, supra n. I. 
18 P. & 0. Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand (I865) 3 Moo. P. C, Cas. (N. S.) 
272. 
19 I d. at 29I. 
20 The Majestic (C. C. A. 2d I894) 6o Fed. 624, reversed (I897) I66 U. S. 
375, 38I on the same basis of English law, because the clause on the back 
of the ticket was not a part of the contract. 
21 Advocated by 2 FRANKENSTEIN 536, ScERNI 244, MoNACO I4I, adopted 
by Italian C. Navig. Disp. Pre!. art. IO. 
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materialize despite strenuous efforts before they were tem-
porarily ended by World War II. 22 Territorial law has, 
of course, paramount importance with respect to territorial 
waters, rivers, lakes, and canals. Nevertheless, many con-
flicts of laws are possible and should not all be left simply 
to the state where the waterway is situated. 
In the carriage on the great lakes, canals, and rivers 
between the United States and Canada, the conflicts prin-
ciples are taken without hesitation from the maritime model; 
this is an effect of the through bills recognized in both 
countries. The port of departure furnishes the applicable 
law. 23 
The matters not yet covered by international drafts such 
as limitation of liability, assistance and salvage, attach-
ment, and documents of transport, deserve unification, 
and at least an international clarification of the conflicts 
principle. 24 
IV. LAND TRANSPORTATION 
Carriage of goods is prominent in conflicts discussion, but 
no material difference attaches to the carriage of persons 
and baggage. 
22 On developments since the Vienna Congress and the more recent Barce-
lona Convention and Statute of 1921, which included nationality and regis-
tration of vessels, ownership, and collision, see OsBORNE MANCE, Interna-
tional River and Canal Transport (1944) 4, 21. Of the older literature: 
NIBOYET, "Etude de droit international prive fluvial," 5 Revue Dr. Int. 
(Bruxelles) ( 1924) 333· 
23 Grammer Steamship Co. v. James Richardson & Sons, Ltd. (D. C. 
W. D. N. Y. 1929) 37 F. (2d) 366, 368, aff'd (C. C. A. 2d 1931) 47 F. (2d) 
186: lake freighters from Ontario to Buffalo, under two charters and bills 
of lading, Canadian law. (The court speaks only of the Canadian place of 
making the contract.) See also Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. 
(C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F. (2d) 824 as to the main governing law, but see 
supra Ch. 44 p. 27 with respect to the law governing performance. As an 
example of an internal American carriage under the New York Produce 
Exchange Canal Grain Charter Party No. 1, see ] ames Richardson & Sons, 
Ltd. v. Conners Marine Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1944) 141 F. (2d) 226. 
24 See MANCE, supra n. 22, at 104; SEBBA, "Das Internationale Privatrecht 
der Binnenschiffahrt," 10 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. ( 1930) 107 ff., 
and proposals, 173 f. 
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Interstate commerce legislation in the United States and 
the Bern convention on the carriage of goods by rail, now 
accompanied by a convention on the carriage of persons and 
baggage, in their large scope have practically eliminated 
the conflicts of laws. Universally, some progress has been 
achieved by the very wide Acceptance of through transporta-
tion to the effect that a contract of carriage is considered 
"one contract" in certain situations involving successive 
earners. 
The outstanding model for such unity of contract is the 
case where a carrier undertakes transportation over a dis-
tance which he does not intend to reach within his own 
business. He concludes and signs the only contract to which 
the consignor is a party. The subsequent carriers are his 
agents in performing the contract. In the absence of an 
express provision, he is liable for loss or damage occurring 
on any part of the journey.25 A situation which is equivalent 
in many respects arises when the agent dealing with the 
consignor acts in his own name and as authorized agent for 
preceding or subsequent carriers or the latter are made 
liable by law. Where thus all carriers, or the first and the 
last, are considered liable, usually each carrier is only re-
sponsible for losses on his own line/6 but there are exceptions 
of joint and several liability for the whole carriage.27 
25 England: Great Western Ry. v. Blake ( z862) 7 H. & N. 987; Thomas 
v. Rhymney Ry. ( I87I) L. R. 6 Q. B. 266; ScRU'ITON, Charterparties 
84 n. (p). 
United States: See infra n. 79· E.g., Uniform Straight Bill of Lading, 
issued by a railroad for rail and water carriage from a point in one state 
to a point in another state, see Palmer et al., Trustees v. Agwilines, Inc. 
(D. C. E. D. N. Y. I94I) 42 F. Supp. 239, I94I Am. Marit. Cas. I556; 
Lyons-Magnus v. American HawaiianS. S. Co. (I94I) I94I Am. Marit. Cas. 
I29I (through bill from Italy to New York and by coast to San Francisco). 
Belgium: I SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN § 464. 
Germany: HGB. §§ 432 par. I, 449' ("Hauptfrachtfiihrer" and "Unter-
frachtfiihrer"); I37 RGZ. 301. 
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 5I7V. 
26 United States: E.g., Contracts, Terms, and Conditions on the back of 
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In view of the present scarcity of conflicts in the United 
States and Europe, Batiffol has referred to the numerous 
former American and French decisions. 28 
I. Carriage of Goods 
Law of the place of shipping. The ·vast majority of the 
American cases of the time previous to interstate regulation 
proclaimed the law of the state where the goods were 
shipped and the contract of carriage was made, 29 a duality 
of premises often stressed in the formulations of the courts. 
The same has been the constant position of the French 
courts throughout. 30 
The revised text of the Montevideo Treaty on com-
mercial law, abandoning the law of the place of destination, 
which generally governs, applies the law of the place of 
contracting31 to the form, effects, and nature of a unitary con-
the Uniform Through Export Bill of Lading,§ 2 (a) (b); and cf. New York 
Produce Exchange v. B. & 0. Ry. Co. ( 1917) 46 ICC. 666, 670. 
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 517W par. 2. 
Italy: For transport of persons, C. C. (1942) art. 1682; and as to usual 
clauses, BRUNETTI, Manuale del diritto della navigazione marittima e interna 
( 1947) 259· 
27 The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 517w par. I. 
Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 1700 cf. VIVANTE, 4 Trattato Dir. Com.§§ 2102 ff.; 
AsQUIN!, infra n. 43, 470 § 180 (as to the former C. Com. arts. 399, 4II). 
Argentina: C. Com. art. 171; cf. Cam. Ape!. La Plata (May 23, 1947) 
47 La Ley ( 1947) 32, 34· 
28 BATIFFOL 233 ff. 
29 See the cases in Beale's many notes recorded by BATIFFOL 23& n. 4 and 
in BATIFFOL 239 f. § 267. For example, see the much cited decisions, Grand v. 
Livingston (1&96) 4 App. Div. 589, 38 N. Y. Supp. 490; Powers Mercantile 
Co. v. Wells-Fargo & Co. ( 1904) 93 Minn. 143, 100 N. W. 735; Carpenter 
v. U. S. Export Co. (1912) 120 Minn. 59, 139 N. W. I54· 
3° France: A long series of identical decisions, Cass. (March 31, 1874) 
8. 1874·1.385 j (Aug. 25, 1875) S. 1875·1-426 j (Aug. 14, 1876) 8. 1876.1.478 
etc.; cf. BATIFFOL 243 f. An old decision App. Colmar (June 30, 1865) 
S. 1866.2.25 considered the (French) place of contracting rather than the 
Alsatian place of dispatch; but Trib. Ceret (April 22, 1921) D. 1921.2.I45 
is cited to the opposite effect. 
Argentine decisions to this effect and 4 Vrco 151 § 165, have been super· 
seded, see infra n. 37, but the Montevideo Treaty on Int. Com. Terr. Law, 
art. 14, adopts the law of the place of contracting. 
31 Montevi!Leo Treaty on Int. Com. Terr. Law (1940) art. 14. 
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tract of through carriage, affecting the territory of several 
countries. A contract that promises cumulated services of 
several carriers by a single and direct instrument of trans-
port,32 is recognized as unitary. 
Law of the place of loss. In a former minority view, 
the law of the place where the goods are injured or lost 
governed. This theory has been favored by some English 
and Continental writers and some French and American 
decisions.33 It was approved by Minor because the result 
achieves identity of solutions for tort and contract actions. 34 
Such a split may be intended by the parties, 35 and in fact 
is very frequently stipulated. But as a confusion of the 
spheres of contract and tort, the rule deserved its rejection.36 
There are, however, modern parallels. To some extent, 
the Argentine Supreme Court shares the view that each 
distance is governed by its own territorial law.37 
A comparable result is reached by the Dutch reform 
legislation of 1924. It has been taken for granted that the 
carrier contracting for through carriage on his own account 
is only responsible according to the laws obtaining in each 
territory passed. The same division, a fortiori, characterizes 
the liability of several carriers. 38 
32 I d. art. 15. A similar provision in art. 259 of C6digo Bustamante prob-
ably refers to the law of contracts of adhesion, art. 185. 
33 See FooTE 456; BATIFFOL 237 n. 1; for American cases, see 2 BEALE 1163 
n. 2 and BATIFFOL 235 n. 4• 
34 MINOR 381 § 160. 
35 France: Cass. civ. (June 12, 1883) S. 1884.1.164; (Dec. 4, 1894) D. 
1895·1.526; opposed by BATIFFOL 236, not rightly in my opinion. 
36 See, e.g., Faulkner v. Hart (188o) 82 N. Y. 413, 422; EcHAVARRI, 3 Cod. 
Com. 525; BATIFFOL 234 ff. §§ 262, 263. 
37 Argentina: S. Ct. (Sept. 28, 1931) 36 Jur. Arg. 839 (Molins & Cia. v. 
Ferrocarril Central de Buenos Aires) assumes a unitary enterprise of car-
riage from Paraguay to Argentina but emphasizes that this does not prejudice 
the application of the territorial laws of the states along the line of travel. 
This may have been an obiter dictum in a case where the assumption of 
delay of the transport depended on the speed territorially prescribed, but 
has been understood in a broader meaning. Cf. Cam. Com. Cap. (June 3, 1938) 
62 Jur. Arg. 792; Cam. Apel. Mendoza (May 10, 1941) 74 Jur. Arg. 793· 
ss The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 517v: The carrier makes himself liable 
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Law of the place of destination. While the place of the 
loss has sometimes been considered a place of performance, 
a few decisions, some of them involving lost baggage, ap-
plied the law of the place where delivery is due.39 
The prevailing criterion, disguised as lex loci contractus, 
has been defended against the emphasis on performance 
by arguing that the contract is one and the performance a 
continuous act not restricted to the final delivery ;•0 that the 
shipper is presumed to send the goods under the law he 
knows ;41 and that dispatching includes the commencement 
of performance,42 or, under certain theories is essential for 
the conclusion of the contract.43 More often, the plurality 
of the places of performance has been said to leave the law 
of the place of contracting the only available one. The truth 
is that a carriage contract has its only material center in 
the place of dispatch, which has little to do with contracting 
and more with the delivery to the carrier and his acceptance, 
the Roman receptum, than with performance. 
Special law. It would seem that the incidents of loading 
and unloading should have a special rule analogous to mari-
time carriage. The Montevideo text of 1940, in fact, es-
tablishes as a special rule that the law of the state where 
for the whole distance "in conformity with the law applicable to each part 
of the transport"; art. 517w par. 1: "Two or more carriers who accept 
goods ... are liable for the entire carriage in conformity with the law in 
force for each part of the transport." 
39 E.g., Brown v. Camden & Atlantic R. Co. (1877) 83 Pa. St. 316 and 
other cases cited by BATIFFOL 237 n. 1 and § 265. On baggage, Curtis v. Dela-
ware, Lackawanna R. Co. ( 1878) 74 N. Y. 116; Williams v. Central R. Co. 
of N. ]. ( 1904) 93 App. Div. 582, 88 N. Y. Supp. 434· 
40 Thomas, D. ]., in Wiley v. Grand Trunk R. of Canada (D. C. W. D. 
N. Y. 1915) 227 Fed. 127. 
41 Valk v. Erie R. Co. (1909) 130 App. Div. 446, 114 N.Y. Supp. 964. 
4 2 Cole, J., in McDaniel v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1868) 24 Iowa 412 
stressed that it was necessary to transport the goods consigned to Chicago 
on the territory of Iowa. See more cases in BATIFFOL 239 n. 2. 
43 See AsQUIN!, Del contratto di trasporto, in Bolaffio e Vivante, 6 II codice 
di commercia commentato (ed. 6, 1935) II 147 § 49· The Bern and Rome 
Conventions are considered to require the acceptance of the goods, see 
ARMINJON, 1 Droit Int. Pr. Com. 431 § 245· 
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the delivery is made or should have been made to the con-
signee, governs the questions concerning its performance 
and the form of the delivery.44 A decision of the French 
Supreme Court may really rest on such a consideration; 
it determines the formalitid and the time for protest as 
well as for the request for examination of the goods ac-
cording to the (foreign) law of French Morocco rather 
than according to the Algerian (French) law of the ship-
ping place. 45 
2. Carriage of Persons 
The transportation of passengers on railroads does not 
cause much conflict of laws at present. We may take it from 
the former practice of the American courts that here, too, 
the place of departure as indicated in the ticket supplies 
the law. 46 The reason, again, is not that the contract is a 
"real" contract needing performance for its completion, 
which is a minority opinion. In the majority view, the ticket 
is only evidence.47 
A case that has retained some actuality in the United 
States concerns "free passes," providing gratuitous trans-
portation but expressly excluding liability for accidents. The 
latter stipulation has been recognized under federal law/8 
44 Montevideo Treaty on Int. Corn. Law, art. 14 in fine. On the interpre-
tation, in part too broad as usual, see LAZCANO, "El trasporte terrestre y rnixto 
en el Derecho Internacional Privado," 6 Rev. Arg. Der. Int. (1944) ser. 2, 
VII, 252, 264, 343, 355, 357, 363. 
45 Cass. civ. (April 12, 1938) 5 Nouv. Revue (1938) 627, reversing a 
decision of the App. Cour of Paris which applied the lex loci contractus. 
The 1940 text of Montevideo on Corn. Terr. Law, art. 15 par. 2, adopts the 
special rule of the place of arrival for questions concerning delivery, see 
infra n. 84. 
46 Example: Ticket taken in Maine for transport of a person between two 
places in Manitoba; Manitoba law applies, Brown v. Can. Pac. Ry. (x887) 
4 Man. R. 396. 
47 DALLOZ, 1 Nouveau repert. de droit (1947) 770 No. 89. 
48 Francis etc. v. Southern Pacific Co. (C. C. A. xoth 1947) 162 F. (2d) 
813, aff'd, 333 U. S. 445, cf. Ins. L. J. 1947, 761 (pass issued under the Hep-
burn Act, 49 U. S. C. § x and based on federal law). A different situation 
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and in cases of multiple contacts under the law more favor-
able to the validity of the clause.49 It would be simpler and 
more satisfactory to realize that such a clause is perfectly 
justifiable under any law if, and only if, the grant of free 
transportation is a courtesy and not a part of wages. 
We may note here a Belgian decision50 elucidating the 
relation between contract and tort from a point of view 
not yet mentioned in this work. By judgment of a court in 
Rome, Italy, a streetcar company was declared liable 
simultaneously upon tort and breach of contract, for the 
damage done to the family of a man killed in Tivoli, near 
Rome. The action for enforcement in Belgium was denied 
for the reason that the damages were wrongly assessed in 
Italy. The family could sue only for tort since such claim 
is personal. In contract they could sue only for the damage 
suffered by the deceased himself, on survival of his action. 
To explain this curious case, it may be noted that Italian 
legislation did not hold railways responsible for damage 
without proof of negligence.51 
v. AIR TRANSPORTATION 
1. The Warsaw Convention 
In commercial law, air transport has essentially the same 
position as maritime transport. 52 Charters of planes and 
consignments are comparable to charters of ships and bills 
existed in Sasinowski v. Boston etc. Ry. (C. C. A. 1st 1935) 74 F. (2d) 628 
(a circus train); transportation was held to be agreed upon by the railway 
and the employer, a circus, and governed, with its exemption clause, by 
the Massachusetts law of the place of contracting because the railroad acted 
as a private carrier. 
49 Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Smith (1913) 38 Okla. 157, 
132 Pac. 494· 
50 App. Bruxelles (July 14, 1941) Bonacci v. S. A. Belprise, Jur. Com. 
Brux. 1942, 34· 
51 See VIVANTE, 4 Trattato Dir. Com. §§ 2167 f. 
52 MoNACO 146 with citations. 
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of lading. 53 Charters are distinguished as flight or voyage 
charter, time charter or lease, and charter hire.54 
It has been said that the document of carriage, either of 
goods or of persons, regularly CQntains a clause referring 
to a specific law, which is ordinarily that of the carrier.55 
In the absence of such clause, conflicts problems would 
be particularly hard to solve if the Warsaw Convention and 
its almost worldwide adoption56 had not eliminated the 
most conspicuous sources of trouble. Like the Hague Rules 
which inspired them, the provisions of the Convention, 
cutting through the opposing interests involved and smooth-
ing out the legal distinction of tort and contract, have found 
a middle road, more favorable to the air carriers than some 
preceding speciallaws.57 By such enactments as the British58 
and the Brazilian,59 the rules of the Convention have been 
incorporated into the national body of law, to be applied 
also with respect to nonmember states. 
The Convention fails to provide for the question whether 
the parties may choose their law. An English author has 
therefore asserted that they may do so. 60 So far as we can 
see, it seems certain that the Convention does not tolerate 
53 Cf., e.g., Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc. v. Glose (1933) 66 F. (2d) 
710; 1933 U. S. Av. R. 26, 30; cert. denied, 290 U. S. 696, 1934 U. S. Av. R. 
20. 
54 Thus, the U. S. Av. R. Indices. 
55 VAN HoUFFE, La responsabilite civile dans les transports aeriens in-
terieurs et internationaux ( 1940) 61. 
56 See Vol. II p. 342. A few words are due here to this international 
achievement, including tort and contract claims. On the reassumption of 
the prewar drafts and amendment proposals to the Convention, see KNAUGHT, 
1946 Annual Survey 771. 
57 This has been observed with some astonishment in Italy, App. Milano 
(April 29, 1938) Giur. Ital. 1939 I 2, 53· 
58 British Carriage by Air Act, 1932, 22 and 23 Geo. s., c. 36. 
59 Brazil: Codigo do Air, D. Lei No. 483, of June 8, 1938, art. 68 par. un; 
see HuGO SIMAS, C6digo brasileiro do air (1939) 164 . 
• 
60 N. H. MoLLER, Law of Civil Aviation ( 1936) 297; CONRADI£, "Interna-
tiOnal Private Law and The [South African] Carriage by Air Act, 1946," 
64 S. A. L. ]. ( 1947) 6o n. 28 repeats the question without answer. 
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any deviation by party agreement61 and being a worldwide 
compromise, has a role similar to the Hague Rules. The 
General Conditions of the former International Air Traffic 
Association, now International Air Transport Association 
(both known as lATA), implementing it, assure that the 
paramount clause referring to the Convention, if at all 
material, is practically never omitted. 
It has also been doubted whether the Convention covers 
contractual relations or only liability for tort. The Con-
vention, however, not only applies to air transportation 
without such distinction but determines its applicability ac-
cording to certain terms of the contract of carriage between 
the carrier and the individual passenger. 
2. Relation to National Laws 
The national rules have been reduced by the Convention 
to a somewhat obscure scope. The literature distinguishes 
between a carriage international in the meaning of the Con-
vention, which is a particular concept, 62 and international 
carriage in the "ordinary sense."63 But the latter is entirely 
unnecessary as a technical concept. 
The Convention's definition of its own applicability has 
recently raised doubts informative for studies of choice of 
law. The Convention includes carriage between the terri-
tories of two parties to the Convention and the case where, 
departure and destination being within the territory of one 
contracting power, a stopping place in the territory of any 
other power is agreed upon. In postwar discussion it has 
been recognized that this delimitation imposes an unwar-
ranted and possibly unenforceable burden upon aircraft of 
61 A similar opinion is expressed in Brit. Year Book Int. Law 1938, 254, 
and by LEMOINE 390 § 559· 
62 Art. 1 (2) of the Convention. 
63 Crossing of a border and a single document of transportation are re-
quired, cf. LEMOINE 387 § 555· 
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nonmember states (e.g., upon a Portuguese air line taking 
passengers from New York to Bermuda) and subjects air 
lines to different systems of liabilities according to the dis-
tances indicated in the tickets.64 In thf United States, more-
over, it has been complained that the maximum amount of 
liability, often inadequate for American standards, strangely 
differs from the superior compensation due in the same case 
of an accident within the United States, to other passengers 
with a domestic ticket.65 
Yet it has been replied: 
"On the other hand, to base the applicability of the 
Convention solely upon the nationality of the aircraft 
irrespective of the place of departure or destination, or the 
'lex loci contractus' (or, which may be the same thing, upon 
the proper law of the contract), would raise difficulties of 
jurisdiction, and also practical difficulties since aircraft of 
different nationality flying the same route might be operat-
ing upon a different liability basis . . . possibly a com-
bination of the two criteria may prove to be the solution."66 
The municipal laws raise questions respecting the relation 
of the Convention to federal and state statutes. The few 
American cases in point deal with the following questions. 
Death of passengers. The Warsaw Convention has been 
implemented in Great Britain by certain provisions set out 
in the Second Schedule of the Carriage by Air Act, 1932. 
Thereby, the liability is enforceable "for the benefit of 
such of the members of the passenger's family as sustained 
damage by reason of his death." With this complement, 
the courts have since applied article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention, stating that "the carrier shall be liable for 
damage sustained in the event of death or wounding of a 
64 See WILBERFORCE, "The International Technical Committee of Experts in 
Air Law," 1 The International Law Quarterly (1947) 498, 502. 
65 RHYNE, "International Law and Air Transportation," address of July 
r6, 1948, 47 Mich. L. Rev. (1949) 41, 56. 
66 WILBERFORCE, supra n. 64. 
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passenger. ."67 Accordingly, the British courts recognize 
a cause of action governed by the new law rather than by 
Lord Campbell's (Fatal Accidents) Act.68 Deprived of 
such statutory assistance, the American decisions thus far 
rendered have not determined "who may be thought to 
be injured by a death."69 It seems that these courts have made 
up their mind to the effect that the cause of action for the 
death of a passenger is determined by the law of the place 
where the death occurred, 70 including the Death on the 
High Seas Act. 71 Perhaps, a case could be made for the 
death statute of the lex fori; international draftsmen are 
likely to think of this first, and the British implementation 
rests on such an autarchic ground. But the lex loci delicti 
has doubtless a better claim in tort actions. 
In another case, 72 the Warsaw Convention was applied 
to a death on the high seas, but as the Convention says 
nothing about interest on the debt of compensation, the 
67 Schedule 2. Cf. for details, SHAWCROSS and BEAUMONT, Air Law ( I945) 
I94 § 358. 
68 Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd. [ I9371 I K. B. so, I936 U. S. Av. R. 
I84, and ibid p. 211 reversing the judgment of the K. B. 
69 Frank Choy, as Adm. of the Estate of Watson Choy, deceased v. Pan-
American Airways Co. (D. C. N. Y. I94I) I94I U. S. Av. R. 10, I94I Am. 
Marit. Cas. 483, I942 U. S. Av. R. 93· Apart from the question "whether the 
Convention confers rights or creates causes of action," the Convention is, 
of course, self-executing, Rifkind, D. ]., in Indemnity Ins. Co. of North 
America v. Pan-American Airways {D. C. S. D. N. Y. I944) 58 F. Supp. 
338, I945 U. S. Av. R. 52, 54 f. 
Garcia and Alvarez v. Pan-American Airways, Inc. and others (I946) 
I83 Misc. 258, 269 App. Div. 287, 55 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 317, aff'd, 295 N. Y. 
852, 67 N. E. (zd) 257. See for complete action, I946 U. S. Av. R. 496. 
70 The decisions in the cases Choy, Wyman, Garcia, and Indemnity In-
surance Co. {ns. 69, ]I, 72) are understood in this sense by ORR, "The War-
saw Convention," in 3I Va. L. Rev. (I945) 434 n. I8; RHYNE, Aviation 
Accident Law ( I947) 270; see also GoLDBERG, "] urisdiction and Venue in 
Aviation Accident Cases etc.," 36 Cal. L. Rev. (I948) 4I, 55 f. n. 59· 
71 Wyman and Bartlett v. Pan-American Airways (S. Ct. N. Y. I943) 
I8I Misc. 963, 43 N. Y. Supp. {zd) 420, I943 U. S. Av. R. I, aff'd, 267 App. 
Div. 947, 48 N. Y. Supp. {zd) 459, aff'd, 293 N. Y. 878, 59 N. E. {2d) 785, 
cert. denied, 324 U. S. 882. 
72 Ibid. 
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court looked to the Death on the High Seas Act which, 
however, is likewise silent on interest.73 
3. The Remaining Problems 
Most questions not covered by the Convention have been 
uniformly answered in the Genedl Conditions mentioned 
above. 74 One of these conditions prescribes that the consign-
ment should be printed in one of the official languages of 
the country of departure. This is a new hint in favor of 
the law of that country for the remaining questions. How-
ever, a Dutch court took it for granted that Dutch law 
governed an air passage concluded with the Royal Dutch 
Airways in Bankok, Siam.75 And the Convention itself 
seems to point to the law of the forum. 76 
VI. MIXED THROUGH CARRIAGE 
Mixed through routes in international trade, with alter-
nating transportation by railway, vessel, and aircraft have 
lacked adequate legal and organizational machinery, 77 with 
the main exception of the through bills in the traffic between 
the United States and Canada/8 and the American Ocean 
Bill of Lading ;79 the latter as used for export, issued by 
a railroad, includes the maritime carriage. Although sepa-
73 46 u. s. c. §§ 761, 762. 
74 Supra p. 304. Cf. Grein v. Imperial Airways, supra n. 68: if the carriage 
were not international in the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, it would 
be governed by the IAT A agreement. 
75 Rb. s'Gravenhage (Feb. 28, 1935) W. 12884. 
76 Vol. II 342 n. 32. 
HuGO SIMAS, C6digo brasileiro do air (1939) seems to understand art. 68 
par. 2 of the Brazilian Code to the same effect. 
77 See the excellent summary by BAGGE, "Der Durchfrachtverkehr," 10 Z. 
ausl. PR. ( 1936) 463; also in his article, "International Through Bills of 
Lading," Commercial and Financial Chronicle (New York 1945) 1340, 1362. 
78 See COYNE, The Railway Law of Canada (1947) 467 f. 
79 Uniform Through Export Bills of Lading, prescribed by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, first under the provisions of § 441 of the Trans-
portation Act of 1920 (§ 25 Interstate Commerce Act) see HOTCHKISS, A 
Manual on the Law of Bills of Lading etc. (New York 1928) 131 £. 
12 
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rate "local" bills of lading may be issued on the subsequent 
stages to the signer of the through bill, as shipper, the 
original bill is the document intended to represent the goods, 
in order to finance the transaction and to assure the right to 
delivery.80 Usually a clause provides that no carrier is liable 
for loss, damage, or injury not occurring while the goods 
are in its custody.81 Difficulties in foreign countries in recog-
nizing the American bill to its full extent have probably 
diminished. 82 
There have been other efforts to create appropriate facili-
ties for through carriage, however. Thus, the International 
Union of Railroads has concluded an agreement with the 
International Air Transport Association ( IA T A) on com-
bined international air-rail transportation, with implement-
ing accords.83 The recent Montevideo text extends the unity 
of a contract in case of a through bill to mixed transporta-
tion on land, sea, and air, but is neither ratified nor im-
plemented. 84 
Through bills of lading in any sense of the word very com-
monly contain a reference to the conditions usual in the bills 
of lading of the on-carrying steamer or other carrier. Such a 
clause in a maritime through bill of lading has been declared 
to be recognizable only insofar as it is consistent with the 
original bill.85 But with this restriction, particularly in mixed 
so SCRU1"I'ON, Charterparties 199· 
81 See, e.g., The lristo (D. C. S.D. N. Y. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 29. 
82 RG. (June 23, 1939) 161 RGZ. 210 refused to consider an American 
bill, termed through bill (under which the goods were shipped from New 
York to Hamburg to be delivered in Leipzig but not delivered there), because 
the bill was not issued in the name of the shipowner. This objection has 
been eliminated by the Hague Rules, HGB. §§ 642, 656, as amended by 
Law of August 10, 1937. 
83 LEMOINE 435 § 629. 
84 Montevideo Treaty on Com. Terr. Law (1940) art. 15 par. 2. 
85 The Idefjord, Blumenthal Import Corp. v. Den Norske Amerikalinje 
(C. C. A. 2d 1940) II4 F. (2d) 262, 266. Imperative rules of the original 
maritime carriage continue for continued sea carriage. Thus the British 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is considered applicable even though only 
the first part of a through bill of lading refers to a departure from a port 
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carriage, the measure of liability is separately determined 
for each kind of transportation. In the case of an ocean 
through bill, issued by a railway on the basis of the 
Pomerene Act, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936 
took care to provide that insofar as the bill relates to the 
carriage of goods by sea, the bill is subject to the new Act. 
This section has been repealed because it was obviated by' 
the federal legislation of I 940. 
Clearly, the provisions of the Bern Convention on the 
liability of railways do not extend to a continuation of the 
transport by sea.86 Conformably to this, where a cask of 
brandy (cognac) was shipped from Cognac to Le Havre 
by rail and from Le Havre to New York by sea, and 
breakage occurred during the land transit, the exception 
from liability for negligence of the servants or agents under 
French law was recognized. 87 
So far as the scattered attempts to solve the conflicts 
problem go, they reflect the present defective organization 
of combined international carriage. The consignee may be 
relieved by some provision from the necessity of receiving 
the goods at an intermediate place, but neither he nor the 
consignor is entitled to the benefits of the original bill as an 
exclusive embodiment of all rights. It seems to have been 
justifiably concluded therefrom in conflicts law that in this 
unorganized succession of carriers it is inevitable to let each 
part of the distance stand by itself. Hence, rights and 
liabilities are determined under the law of the territory 
where the individual facts completing the cause of action 
in the United Kingdom and transshipment is to be effected in a foreign 
port. SCRUTI'ON, Charterparties 476 f. On the other hand, art. I excludes the 
distance not by sea, SCRUITON, id. 483. 
86 Italy: Cass. (March 21, 1941) Foro !tal. Mass. 1941, 173, cf. MARMO, 
ro Giur. Comp. DIP. (1944) 128 No. 28: art. 28 of the Convention doe~ not 
provide for combined transportation. 
87 Baetjer v. La Compagnie Generale Trans atlantique (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 
1894) 59 Fed. 789. 
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occur, be it loss or damage during carriage or any incident 
of delivery. 
Contrarily, the perfection of interstate and export through 
bills in the United States and Canada eliminated the former 
division of opinions on the same question and has promoted 
the application of the law where the original through bill 
is issued. Under this approach and with all the usual pre-
cautionary stipulations, the exceptions needed in favor of 
local laws do not seem to require other consideration than 
in the case of ordinary bills of lading issued by one carrier. 
CHAPTER 46 
Insurance 
I. AMERICAN LAW 
T HE question of the law governing insurance contracts in the United States recurs in three different spheres. 
The state courts determine the private law applicable 
to insurance contracts, allegedly under the ordinary general 
rules for contracts. The state statutes regulate the conditions 
for licensing foreign insurance companies with more or less 
effect upon the content of the contracts. To what extent 
the power of the states to regulate insurance contracts is 
restricted by the federal Constitution, has been the object 
of a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court. The inter-
relation among these three levels offers rarely noted prob-
lems of its own that reach beyond the task of this work. 
1. Judicial Doctrine 
In treatises respecting conflicts law, the Restatement, and 
the overwhelming majority of judicial authorities-number-
ing many hundreds of decisions-, the law applicable to 
insurance contracts is determined by the ordinary general 
tests of contracts. Among them, the place of contracting 
is commonly regarded as the paramount factor. But this is 
not an absolutely exclusive rule, and the place where an 
insurance contract is located has given rise to a complicated 
system of rules of thumb. Complete surveys have been made 
by three outstanding writers. 
(a) Beale. Only Beale and the Restatement postulate 
an exclusive rule of lex loci contractus.1 The confusion in 
1 2 BEALE 1054 ff. 
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determining the place of contracting is resolved in the Re-
statement by a tripartite distinction: 
"§ 3I7. When an insurance policy becomes effective upon 
delivery by mail, the place of contracting is where the 
policy is posted. 
"§ 3 I 8. When an insurance policy becomes effective upon 
delivery and is sent by the company to its agent and by him 
delivered to the assured, the place of contracting is where 
it is thus delivered to the assured. 
"§ 3 I9. When an offer for an insurance contract is received 
by the company through a broker who acts for a client, and 
the policy is effective on delivery, the place of contracting 
is where the policy is posted or otherwise delivered to the 
broker." 
This scheme has been suggested by a great number of 
cases and has influenced more. Apparently, it furnishes 
objectively conceived contacts, favoring the insurer insofar 
as he may choose the way of sending the policy, determining 
the applicable law. Beale has been receptive to the argument 
that the company sends the policy to its agent in order to 
keep control of it until the condition is fulfilled which makes 
it valid. The courts have certainly assumed that the last 
act of contracting is deferred when the agent has still to 
ascertain the good health of the insured or to receive pay-
ment of the first premium. But the rule expressed in § 3 I 8 
has often been used where no continued control by the agent 
has been intended. 
Whether the obvious oversimplification of the decisions 
in this set of rules presents an advance or not is doubtful. 
But a cardinal defect is that the Restatement reproduces 
merely the ritualistic gestures of the courts. Other authors 
have looked to the practical results. 
(b) BatiffoP In his delicate research, the French scholar 
notes the application of the law of the place of contracting 
2 BATIFFOL §§ 330, 338 his, 341 ff. 
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in the vast majority of the American decisions, although 
in many cases this place coincided with the place of payment 
of premiums or with the location of the insured objects. 
Batiffol's statistics deserve attention: The place of con-
tracting was found in approximately 7 5 per cent of the 
cases at the domicil of the insured.3 The common law prin-
ciple that a contract is completed by the dispatch of the 
acceptance would stand in the way, whenever the company 
simply accepts the initial application (an observation con-
firmed by the theoretical admission in § 317 of the Restate-
ment quoted above). But the courts have used various 
devices to overcome this obstacle such as playing up small 
divergences in the policy as compared to the application and 
by insisting that the delivery into the hands of the insured 
is essential, when the policy is under seal and not mailed, 
or the agent has to exercise some control before he delivers 
the policy; at times the courts have given no explanation. 
Batiffol states expressly that the frequent justification that 
the agent had to check on the health of the insured at the 
time of the delivery, is rather farfetched. Many decisions 
bolster their arguments by defining the domicil of the insured 
as the place where the first premium has been paid. 
In the remaining 2 5 per cent of the published decisions, 
the contract has been held to be made at the home office 
of the insurer. This has sometimes been justified by the 
fact that the client sent the first premium with his applica-
tion, but often no reason has been advanced. 
The judges believe the insured best protected under his 
domiciliary law. In some cases, however, the mechanical 
rule has been followed so faithfully as to disregard an 
3 I d. § 336. The recent decisions follow the same pattern. Bradford v. 
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. (1943) 179 Misc. 919, 39 N. Y. Supp. {zd) 810 is par-
ticularly noteworthy; here the court sets a striking example how this practice, 
combined with the adventures of husband-wife tort liability, manages to 
establish an insurance liability not existing, for one or the other reason, in 
either of the two involved states, New York and Massachusetts. 
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express stipulation for the insurer's law more advantageous 
to the insured4 or to localize the contract at a place where 
neither party was domiciled.5 
(c) Carnahan.6 In the only monograph on the subject, 
a specialized voluminous treatise on the conflict of laws 
regarding life insurance, the expert author prudently dis-
tinguishes life insurance from other insurance and divides 
the problems involving life insurance into small compart-
ments. These are concerned with the form of writing in-
surance, the various modes and conditions of delivering the 
policy, the warranties and representations made in applica-
tions, the rights of beneficiaries, the assignment of policies, 
the various nonforfeiture provisions, the death of the cestui 
que vie, limitation of action, incontestability clauses, and 
statutory penalties and fees. Within these parts smaller 
segments are formed. The basic contention is that within 
such a section or segment the courts handle the cases "in 
one of a few limited ways." 7 Uniformity limited to these 
individual problems is claimed in the sense that there are 
majority rules.8 But the author reveals in the course of his 
investigation many more distinctions. Thus, the effectiveness 
of delivery for determining the place of contracting is 
allegedly decided by the query: Where is the last necessary 
act? Yet: 
"Actually one often suspects from the cases that selection 
was made with the consequence in view. The delivery con-
cept is only a tool and how that tool will be employed in 
relation to problems of life insurance cannot accurately be 
4 /d. 3II n. 2, citing Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hathaway 
(C. C. A. 9th 1901) 106 Fed. 815. 
5 /d. 3II n. 3, citing Hicks v. National Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1894) 
6o Fed. 690. 
6 CARNAHAN, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts (1942). 
7 CARNAHAN, supra n. 6, 38, 461. 
8 /d. 38. 
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determined merely by an inspection of the four corners of 
the insurance policy." 9 
The last act may be defined in such way that it occurs at 
the home office of the carrier [insurer], or at the place of 
physical receipt of the policy. But: 
"The courts adopt one or another connotation of delivery 
which will connect the policy with the law of the state where 
the applicant resided and manually received the policy. 
Consequently there is not the extent of uncertainty in the 
functioning of the delivery concept in conflict of laws as 
would at first appear."10 
For the law governing warranties and representations, 
"the courts have not consistently enunciated any single rule." 
The courts have decided conflict of laws cases as the result 
of a weighing and balancing of various factors in their 
relation to the laws of several states. 
"In six jurisdictions the opinions ... have stated incon-
sistent rules. But most courts have explained their decisions 
in terms of the rule of the place of making of the contract.11 
. . . The cases reveal that a liberal statutory or decisional 
rule of the forum will be applied if the court, by adopting 
that connotation of delivery which relates to physical receipt 
of the policy by the applicant, finds that the forum was the 
place of making of the insurance contract. . . . Thus the 
net effect is to apply the law of the insured's residence at the 
time he applied for the policy, at least when it is more 
favorable to him .... 12 To the extent that rules of the 
applicant's home-state are most liberal, it may be taken 
that courts will tend to determine that the contract was 
made there and to adhere, with at least verbal consistency, 
to the rule of the place of making the contract. 1113 
9 /d. 168. 
10 I d. 206. 
11 Id. 284. 
12 Id. 286. 
13 Id. 287. 
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Carnahan has summarized his findings in a forceful report 
in which he also asserts that 
"Examples of the tendency to disregard conflict of laws 
rules in interstate transactions occur in every phase of 
insurance law, even in instances where the policy was taken 
out in another state. All too frequently, the court of the 
forum adopts and enforces its internal rule .... " 14 
(d) Conclusion. Carnahan's well-founded criticism is 
rather restrained. Viewing the matter under the general 
aspect of conflicts law reform, we must state that atomiza-
tion of the contract by dissolving it into various incidents 
is totally unsound and that if conflicts rules are not binding 
on the court they are not legal rules. In sum, there is a 
certain stability in the method of handling the various situa-
tions, but practically no law on conflicts concerning insurance. 
This is all that the mechanical rules have achieved. 
In the search for the real objective of the courts operating 
these rules, one more point seems characteristic. The ques-
tion of where the contract is made, is largely replaced by 
the question of where the policy has been delivered, that 
is, the document is manually transferred to the insured; 
when this, too, cannot be ascertained, according to a rule 
adopted for instance in Pennsylvania, delivery is presumed 
to have occurred at the residence of the insured.15 
The courts have had before them an overflowing mass 
of litigation in life insurance and relatively infrequent cases 
of other types of insurance. To these they have extended 
their questionable rules. But differences are notable, and 
certain types of contracts, such as especially marine insur-
ance, fall out of the picture. Lex loci contractus and the 
14 CARNAHAN, "The Conflict of Laws in Relation to Insurance Contracts," 
American Bar Assoc., Section of Insurance Law, 1937-38, 58 to 59· 
15 White v. Empire State Degree of Honor (1911) 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 52, 
57; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Levine (C. C. A. 3d 1943) 138 F. (2d) 286, 
288; Pierkowskie v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 3d 1944) 147 F. (2d) 
928, 932· 
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casuistry of delivery are applied also to marine insurance, 
but its old history has preserved for it universal principles 
of maritime law serving for the construction of the contract 
in agreement with the other seafaring nations. The courts 
preferably interpret the contracts "in harmony with the 
manne msurance laws of England, the great field of this 
business. " 16 
2. Statutes 
In rare cases, decisions have pointed directly to the im-
portance of the statutes, even to those of the forum.17 If 
they do, it is usually in order to declare that the statutes of 
the place of contracting are a part of the contract, which 
idea leads to a denial of party autonomy.18 
In reality, most branches of the insurance business are 
very intensively regulated in the states and territories and 
the statutes have made various attempts to prescribe the 
application of domestic law to insurance contracts. 
These provisions, however, despite a trend to unification, 
still differ on the point here in question and, notwithstanding 
many improvements, still need reform.19 It is a rather ob-
scure matter, somewhat neglected in the literature. 
1 6 Queen Ins. Co. of America v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. (1923) 263 
U. S. 487, 493; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Houston Oil & Transport Co. (C. C. A. 
sth 1931) 49 F. (2d) 121, 124 states too pointedly that "it was a maritime 
contract, and therefore governed by the general admiralty law and not by 
the law of Texas," deserving correction as by The Anthony D. Nichols 
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 927. The international community of 
maritime insurance law must be kept in view in the problem of reform, as 
rightly suggested by KELLY, "Effect of Proposed Conflict of Laws etc.," 
American Bar Assoc., Section of Insurance Law, 1940-1941, 176, 177. 
17 As an exception, see, e.g., Yeats v. Dodson (1939) 345 Mo. 196, zo6, 
127 S. W. {zd) 652, 656 where the authorization to make insurance contracts 
at offices in Kansas City, Missouri and nowhere else is the principal llf four 
reasons to apply Missouri law, thus avoiding a clause. 
18 Cf. BATIFFOL 310 § 347; see Vol. II p. 395· 
19 Cf. 0RFIELD, "Improving State Regulations of Insurance," 32 Minn. L. 
Rev. ( 1948) 219. 
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
Tentatively, we may distinguish the following types of 
statutory provisions for governing insurance contracts. 
(a) In some states, all policies of insurance issued for 
delivery or issued and delivered within the state are declared 
subject to the provisions of the domestic law, either as a 
condition of licensing foreign insurers, 20 or by subjecting 
foreign and domestic insurers in one clause to the insurance 
statutes. 21 
(b) In some statutes all insurance contracts on the life 
of residents and property or other interests within the state, 
are deemed to be made within the state·and subject to its 
law. 22 Contrary stipulations are sometimes declared void.23 
It may be noted marginally that in the flood of statutes 
in 1947-1948 mainly regulating insurance rates it has ap-
peared natural to extend their scope to insurance on prop-
erty or risks located in the state.24 
(c) Many provisions prohibit specific contract stipula-
tions or prescribe certain clauses. 25 
Other statutes contain variations or are difficult to place. 
In particular, the meaning of many provisions indiscrim-
inately addressed to domestic and foreign insurers is 
ambiguous. 
The over-all result, however, is a broad claim not only 
to regulate insurance business by administrative prescrip-
tions but also to control insurance contracts of domestic 
and foreign licensed insurers by the domestic private law. 
20 E.g., New Mexico: Stat. (1941) § 60.408; Wisconsin: Stat. (1947) 
§ 201.32. 
21 E.g., Indiana: Ann. Stat. (1933) § 39-4206; Kentucky: Rev. Stat. (1948} 
§ 297.110; Nebraska: Rev. Stat. (1943) § 44.302. 
22 E.g., Minnesota: Ann. Stat. (1945) § 60.28; Mississippi: Code (1942) 
§ 5633; North Carolina: Gen. Stat. (1943) § 58.28; Tennessee: Code (1934) 
§ 6o86. Cf. CARNAHAN 100 ff. § 25. 
23 Massachusetts: Ann. Laws (1948} c. 175 § 22. 
24 See the list by ELY, "State Rating and Related Laws," Ins. L. J. 1947, 
at 877 n. 12. 
25 PATTERSON, "The Conflict Problems etc.," American Bar Assoc., Section 
of Insurance Law, 1937-38, 69 at 71 calls these statutes the "internal law 
group" and describes their criteria at 72 ff. 
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In this regard, the statutes are efficiently supplemented by 
supervision over the policy forms to be used. 26 Consultations 
between the commissioners or superintendents and the com-
panies about intended changes of legislation result, as I 
am told, in a satisfactory understanding as well as a vigorous 
influence by the state. 
Insurance carriers and state legislatures have considerably 
simplified the matter by establishing standard policies. These 
are nation-wide in the case of insurance against automobile 
liability and workmen's compensation, or are similar in all 
but a few states, as in fire insurance, or they are uniform 
for a group of states, as in theft and burglary insurance. 
But although it is possible for the companies to comply 
with the various requirements of financial security and 
investments in the different states by obeying the highest 
standards, 27 the heterogeneous private law provisions may 
not be easily satisfied. At the same time, a typical policy 
clause says in fact that "terms of this policy which are in 
conflict with the statutes of the state wherein this policy is 
issued are hereby amended to conform to such statutes." 
If this is the living law, working as a whole, it would 
appear without much question that the law of the books and 
of the decisions is very improperly correlated. How do both 
spheres co-operate? 
The answer should lie with the definitions of the contracts 
which the domestic law claims to govern, or at least of the 
contracts under its administrative supervision. 
We do not know, however, whether it is a singular pre-
tension or presents the rule generally in mind of the legisla-
tures, when the statute of Alabama prescribes : 
26 Michigan: 17 Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 24.266, 24.267. 
Kansas: Gen. Stat. (1935) § 40-216. 
South Dakota: Code (1939) § 31.160I. 
27 PA'ITERSON, "The Future of State Supervision of Insurance," 23 Tex. L. 
Rev. (1944) 18, 31. 
320 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
"All contracts of insurance the application for which is 
taken within the state, shall be deemed to have been made 
within this state and subject to the laws thereof," 28 
or what is the exact meaning of the Utah provision: 
"Every insurance contract made through an authorized 
agent . . . shall be deemed to have been made in the state 
of Utah irrespective of where the insurance contract was 
written." 29 
Usually foreign corporations are not considered doing 
business in a state when they maintain only soliciting agents 
there, but insurance is a special matter. We encounter, in 
fact, divided opinions.30 
The universal trend, of course, towards extension of 
government control, in the states of this country as well as 
in Europe, produces results such as in Canada. Insurance 
contracts "deemed to be made in the Province" will be 
assumed subject to its law when a local residence has been 
indicated in the policy or application, even though there 
is no actual residence in the state.31 However, the same 
result is reached by construction also if the contracts are 
2BAJabama: Code (1940) tit. 28 § 10. The Annotation declares that this 
is a constitutional provision, citing State Life Ins. Co. v. Westcott (1910) 
166 Ala. 192, 52 So. 344· 
North Carolina: Stat. (1943) § 58.28. 
29 Utah: Code (1943) tit. 43 c. 3 § 23. 
30 44 C. J. S. Insurance § 82: "A foreign company may be doing business 
in the state, if it actively solicits insurance and collects assessments ... "; 
to the same effect, 29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 41, Supp. 1948 p. 78 new par. 
But compare FLETCHER, 18 Cyc. Corp. § 8725: " ... the mere solicitation of 
insurance through agents in such state, and the mere receipt or collection 
of premiums ... does not constitute business there unless other activities 
are engaged in by the foreign corporation in the foreign state." 
In a case involving contribution to an unemployment fund, the Supreme 
Court, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U. S. 310, 320, 
found activities carried on through soliciting sales agents so systematic and 
continuous throughout years as to justify liability for contribution. This, 
certainly, is an exception to the rule. 
31 Re Duperreault (Sask.) [1941] I D. L. R. 38, discussing Rev. Stat. 
Sask., 1930, c. 101 s. 156. 
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really made in the Province.32 Thus, two jurisdictions are 
immediately in a positive conflict. 
For all connected questions, an exact definition of doing 
insurance business in a state is highly desirable but seldom 
afforded. An exception is Illinois where the following acts 
if performed within the state are declared to constitute 
transacting insurance business: 
" (a) Maintaining an agency or office where contracts 
are executed which are or purport to be contracts of insur-
ance with citizens of this or any other state; (b) maintaining 
files or records of contracts of insurance; or (c) receiving 
payment of premiums for contracts of insurance."33 
For describing the insurance contracts subject to super-
vision, the statutes usually emphasize issuance andjor de-
livery of the policy in the state. As Patterson has discovered, 
delivery, "the crucial word," is ordinarily supposed to occur 
at the residence of the applicant who is usually the insured, 
whereas domestic ins.1.1rers are normally said to have "is-
sued" the policy.34 
In the entire picture, the most clearly emerging ideas are 
that states desire to regulate, partially or wholly, insurance 
contracts when ( 1 ) the insured is a resident or ( 2) the 
insured property is situated in the state. The first case 
conforms to the majority of the decisions. The second point 
of view is in direct contrast to the court decisions that in 
apparent consistency, for one or the other reason, recognize 
the law of the place of contracting even for fire insurance, 
although the objects are in another state.35 
82 Re Mutual Benefit Accident Ass'n and Anderson (Ontario) [1941] 4 
D. L. R. 347, commenting on Ins. Act, Rev. Stat. Ont., 1937, c. 256 s. 130. 
33 Illinois: Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 73 § 733· 
34PATIERSoN, supra n. 25, at 74· 
85 To the same effect, Coffin v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co. (D. C. N. D. 
Ga. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 616, because "fire insurance is a purely personal con-
tract," but the court clearly construed the lex loci contractus as truly in-
tended by the parties, in order to maintain the validity of the contract. The 
Seamans v. The Knapp Stout & Co. (1895) 89 Wis. 171, 61 N. W. 757, 
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3· Federal Constitution 
The impact of federal restnctwns on state power to 
regulate insurance has been a controversial subject for a 
long time. The fluctuating views of the Supreme Court of 
the United States on this subject, often discussed,S8 have 
led ultimately to a minimum of interference with the state 
activity. Insurance may be regulated by any state as it 
sees fit, provided that the regulation is neither outrageous 
nor discriminating and can be justified in any reasonable 
manner.37 
The orbit of unchecked state regulation thus permitted, 
in turn must be defined. Since Paul v. Virginia, 88 the Supreme 
Court has simply used the customary criterion of the place 
of contracting. A contract made in Tennessee "was a Ten-
nessee contract. The law of Tennessee entered into and 
because insurance does not affect title; Western Massachusetts Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Hilton (1899) 42 App. Div. 52, 58 N. Y. Supp. 996, because the 
insurance was payable in Massachusetts; Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Beha 
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1926) 13 F. (zd) 500, 508, with constitutional argument; 
Vermont Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Van Dyke (1933) 105 Vt. 257, 165 Atl. 906, 
because of the "ordinary rule" of lex loci contractus. For comment see infra 
p. 338. 
The location of property is mentioned in addition to countersignature 
as supporting choice of law in George L. Squire Mfg. Co. v. Nat'! Fire Ins. 
Co. (D. C. W. D. N.Y. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 137. 
36 On the background of insurance regulation in the relationship of federa-
tion and state, see in particular Mr. Justice Rutledge in Prudential Ins. Co. 
v. Benjamin (1946) 328 U. S. 408, 413 ff. 
On the prehistory of this decision, see United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Association ( 1944) 322 U. S. 533· Note, "Congressional Con-
sent to Discriminatory State Legislation," 45 Col. L. Rev. (1945) 927; and 
subsequently the McCarran Act of March 9, 1945, c. 20, 59 Stat. 33, as 
amended July 25, 1947, c. 326, 61 Stat. 448, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1012-1015; and 
bibliography in "Insurance as Interstate Commerce," by the Insurance Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association, 1946-1947· The ensuing legislative 
activity of the states has been described by ELY, supra n. 24, at 867. 
37 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting vote, in Order of United Commercial 
Travelers of Amer. v. Wolfe (1947) 331 U. S. 586 at 63o: "I had considered 
it well settled that if an insurance company does business at all in a state, 
its contracts are 'subject to such valid regulations as the state may choose 
to adopt.'" 
38 Paul v. Virginia (1863) 8 Wail. 168. 
INSURANCE 323 
became a part of it." 39 Mississippi overreached its scope 
when it claimed control over a contract "made and to be 
performed in Tennessee. " 40 
However, the Due Process Clause, as in the last-mentioned 
case, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not operate 
so smoothly in other situations. In 1943, an event occurred 
of extreme importance for a basic contention of this work. 
The criterion for distributing state power over insurance 
was readily changed. Mr. Justice Black spoke for the court :41 
"In determining the power of a state to apply its own 
regulatory laws to insurance business activities, the question 
in earlier cases became involved by conceptualistic discussion 
of theories of the place of contracting or of performance. 
More recently it has been recognized that a state may have 
substantial interests in the business of insurance of its people 
or property regardless of these isolated factors. This in-
terest may be measured by highly realistic considerations 
such as the protection of the citizens insured or the pro-
tection of the state from the incidents of loss." (Reference 
to the opinions in the workmen's compensation case of 
Alaska Packers.) 42 
Accordingly in the instant case, the elements connecting 
the insurance contract with the state of New York were 
enumerated and held to prevail, including activities, visits, 
and consultations, prior to and subsequent to the making of 
the contract, and the location of the insured object. 
This abandoning of the formalized old contacts presents 
a progress of immeasurable value. Their replacement by a 
39 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken (1924) 266 U. S. 389, 399; New York 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U.S. 357· 
40 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. (1934) 
292 U. S. 143; cf. Vol. II p. 555 n. 15. The Supreme Court of Mississippi has 
accordingly revised its view, Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Lamarque (1938) 
180 Miss. 243, 177 So. 15. 
41 Hoopestone Canning Co. v. Cullen (1943) 318 U. S. 313, 316. 
42 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Ind. Accident Comm. of California (1935) 
294 u. s. 532, 542· 
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method of balancing state interests in every individual 
situation, it is submitted, may not be the last word. It is 
too much like the method of ascertaining the most closely 
connected law by grouping all local connections, an operation 
vastly superior to lex loci contractus, but a source of great 
uncertainty. Conflicts law, advancing further, may once more 
suggest improvements in the constitutional doctrine. 
4· Fraternal Benefit Associations in Particular 
The different approaches in the three different spheres 
mentioned above are apparent in the treatment of corpora-
tions, including insurance of the members among other 
social purposes. The ancient Roman collegia funeraticia 
have their analogy in the fraternities taking care of the 
funerals of their members. From modest beginnings, certain 
American fraternal benefit associations have developed into 
very powerful companies using the same methods of business 
as ordinary insurers. Therefore the problem arose whether 
the insurance relationship of the corporation to the members 
is governed by the law of the charter state conformably 
to the principle of personal law or follows the same law as 
an ordinary insurance contract. 
(a) The courts were divided. A minority applied the 
law of the home state of the corporation.43 For the most 
part, the lex loci contractus prevailed.44 
(b) The state statutes commonly have excluded fraternal 
associations from their main provisions on foreign insurance 
carriers and subjected them merely to a restricted super-
vision. Nevertheless, under the title of public policy the 
43 More recently, Van de Water v. Order of United Commercial Travelers 
of America (C. C. A. 2d 1935) 77 F. (2d) 331; Meyer v. Meyer (C. C. A. 
8th 1935) 79 F. (zd) 55; Modern Woodmen of America v. Crudup (1935) 
175 Okla. 183, 51 Pac. (2d) 718; Kohler v. Kohler (C. C. A. 9th 1939) 104 F. 
(2d) 38. 
44 Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Meyer ( 1905) 198 U. S. 508; for 
the other cases, cf. 2 BEALE 1056 n. 6. 
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home law has been disregarded in several cases which have 
raised the question of federal restraint.45 
(c) Recently the Supreme Court has declared by a narrow 
majority the prevalence of the charter state over the state 
where a member resides.46 An essential part of the reason-
ing, however, seems to rest on the argument that the state 
of South Dakota had licensed the association and thereby 
acquired full knowledge of the terms of its insurance con-
ditions ;47 "if a state gives some faith and credit" to the 
organization of a fraternal benefit society by another state, 
permitting its own citizens to become members of, and 
benefit from, it, "then it must give full faith and credit" to 
the burdens and restrictions inherent in the membership.48 
The practical significance of the decision is doubtful, 
since the plaintiff corporation itself subsequently changed 
the clause in issue (for a short limitation on members' 
suits) 49 and states are now expected to admit foreign fra-
ternal associations less easily.50 
5. A Reform Attempt 
In excellent reports to the American Bar Association in 
1937, it was explained that the conflicts practice concerning 
insurance contracts is defective, 51 and subsequently a com-
mittee under the chairmanship of Professor Patterson sub-
mitted a tentative draft of a Uniform Statute.52 Its first 
45 See Note, "Full Faith and Credit: Preferential Treatment of Fraternal 
Insurers," 57 Yale L. J. (1947) 139. 
46 Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe (1947) 
331 u. s. 586. 
47 /d. p. 624· 
48 /d. p. 625. 
49 See Note, supra n. 45, at 143. 
50 I d. at 144. 
51 American Bar Association, Section of Insurance Law, 1937-1938, Kan-
sas City Meeting, 58 ff. 
52 American Bar Association, Section of Insurance Law, Program and 
Committee Reports (for the Meeting at) San Francisco, July 10-12, 1939· 
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section was based on the principle that an insurance contract 
should be governed by the law of the state where the insured 
risk is situated. Life insurance should, for this purpose, be 
localized at the residence of the insured; insurance against 
loss or damage to property at the situation of the property; 
automobile liability insurance at the place where the vehicle 
is principally garaged, et cetera. Section 2 limits the ap-
plication of the domestic law to the contracts delivered or 
issued in the state. Section 3 exempts coverage of risks 
located in different states. 
The draft has been abandoned because of opposition 
from a number of representatives of insurance companies. 53 
Apart from certain amendments, they advanced the thesis, 
doubly astonishing in the mouth of insurers, that the present 
conflicts rules are all to the good and exclude any doubt. At 
the same time it was contended that the proposed local 
connections would provoke litigation. Force of habit is a 
strong force with lawyers! Professor Patterson's authority 
reinforces the conviction that in all three sets of American 
rules a change is maturing from legalistic tests to criteria 
indicating a connection with the scope of state supervision 
and with the risk insured. An analogous development of 
the European doctrines confirms the adequacy of the new 
method and contributes further suggestions for its use. There 
the conflicts literature has largely adopted the view of the 
specialists of insurance law that insurance contracts are of a · 
peculiar nature due to the extensive influence of the super-
vising state which "directs" or "dictates" the contents of 
the contracts. 54 
53 American Bar Association, Section of Insurance Law, Philadelphia 
Meeting I940-194I, 176 ff., reports by AMBROSE B. KELLY, RoBERT E. HALL, 
and HERVEY J. DRAKE. HENRY, id. 173 sub (1) recognizes that the companies 
"escape liability" only by exception. The apprehensive arguments of KELLY, 
id. 178 f. against Patterson on the ground of unconstitutionality of rules other 
than the law of the place of contracting have since quickly lost their value. 
54 See, e.g., LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIIlRE (ed. 4) 285 § 251. 
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II. FoREIGN LAws 
I. Traditional Tests 
Lex loci contractus. As in other contracts, the law of the 
place of contracting has exercised a strong hold on insurance 
contracts. This is true, not only of the United States, as 
well as France and Italy, countries professing this principle, 
but also of several other countries.55 Particularly for mari-
time insurance, lex loci contractus is favored. 56 
The C6digo Bustamante repeats this rule if it is not a 
contract "by adhesion," for all insurance contracts, except 
fire insurance between parties of different personal law.57 
But a group of writers have adjusted the law of the place 
of contracting to the phenomenon of contracts of adhesion. 
Because the application is on the standard form of the 
insurer, the contract is completed by the insurer at his home 
office. 58 
Law common to the parties. Nationality or domicil com-
mon to the parties has been stressed particularly if they are 
subjects of the forum, 59 but this is an awkward rule. 
55 Canada: Re Mutual Benefit & Accident Ass'n ( 1941) 4 D. L. R. 347· 
France: Cass. req. (Dec. 18, 1872) S. 1873.1.35, Clunet 1874, 235; Cass. 
civ. (Dec. 28, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 682: an English styled policy. 
Germany: RG. (Feb. 13, 1891) 47 Seuff. Arch. 3 (domicil of insurer); 
{Nov. II, 1928) 122 RGZ. 233· For other cases, see BATIFFOL § 350. 
Italy: Former C. Com. art. 58; C. C. Disp. Pre!. (1942) art. 25; CAVAGLIERI, 
Dir. Int. Com. 466 ff. 
56 See RIPERT, 3 Droit Marit. § 2377; 2 ]ACOBS § 681; (most cases cited 
supra n. 55 concern maritime insurance) ; 2 Repert. 180 n. 5· 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles {March 17, 1925) Jur. Port Anvers 1925, 97· 
France: Cass. req. (April 24, 1854) S. 1856.1.339; Trib. consulaire Alex-
and de (June 29, 1874), aff'd, App. Aix (April 15, 1875), 2 Repert. 183 
No. 29. 
Germany: RG. {April 13, 1898) JW. 1898, 371, Clunet 1899, 295. 
The Netherlands: See infra n. 63. 
57 Codigo Bustamante, art. 262, omits a reference to art. 185, but is con-
sidered to imply it by BusTAMANTE, La Commission de Jurisconsultes de 
Rio 147; id., 2 Der. Int. Priv. 294 § 1377. 
58 RIPERT, 3 Droit Marit. 434 § 2409; DE SMET § 36; DrENA, 2 Dir. Com. 
Int. 462; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 476 (thus evading art. 58 of the former 
Italian C. Com.). Cf. also Note, 22 Revue Dor (1930) 287. 
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Lex loci solutionis. A few decisions have localized in-
surance at the insurer's place, apparently as a place of 
performance,60 but they rest on the assumption that the 
prevailing circumstances point to this place. 
2. Proper Law 
The English doctrine has consistently maintained the 
force of express and presumptive party intention. "It is no 
doubt competent to an underwriter on an English policy to 
stipulate ... according to the law of any foreign state."61 
Subsidiarily, the circumstances of the case may supersede 
even the English law of the place of contracting.62 The 
prevailing Continental theory has been to the same effect. 
Express agreement, presumptive intention, or the law most 
closely connected with the contract have been looked for 
as a rule. 63 Particularly maritime insurance, naturally free 
59 England: DICEY, Rule I7o: where an English merchant ships goods 
from England and insures them with English underwriter, English law, 
despite a foreign flag. 
France: App. Aix (March 22, I923) S. I924.2.I24 (maritime insurance; 
common nationality and flag). 
Germany: RG. (Jan 27, I928) I2o RGZ. 70, 73 (German law for life 
insurance taken out in Vienna, Austria, by a German domiciled in Vienna 
from the local general representative of a German company; expressly 
overruling RG. (Feb. I3, I89I) 47 Seuff. Arch. 3· Contra: NussBAUM, 
JW. 1928, II98; BRUCK 30 n. 84; ]AEGER in 4 Roelli's Komm. 9I. 
Italy: Disp. Pre!. C. C. (I942) art. 25 par. I. 
60 Germany: RG. (Dec. 5, I902) 53 RGZ. 138; (Jan. I6, I925) 34 Z. int. R. 
(I925) 427; Bay. ObLG. (June 24, I93I) IPRspr. I931 No. s; OLG. Kiiln 
(Sept. 9, I934) IPRspr. I934, No. 94· 
Switzerland: BG. (Nov. z, I945) 7I BGE. II 287, 29I. 
61 Greer v. Poole (I88o) 5 Q. B. D. 272, per Lush, J., cited by DICEY 698 
as a general rule. 
62 Maritime Ins. Co. v. Assecuranz Union von I865 (I935) 79 Sol. J. 403, 
52 Ll. L. Rep. I6 per Goddard, J.: reassurance with a German reassurer, 
signed in Liverpool and Hamburg respectively; the English arbitration 
clause, though merely "an honorable agreement," points to English law under 
which the contract is void (an illustration to Vol. II p. 387 n. uS). 
63 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 6, I9oo) and other cases, see DESMET 49· 
France: PICARD et BESSON, I Traite § 303 (for contracts that are not forcibly 
French, see infra p. 335). 
Germany: RG. (Dec. 23, 193I) IPRspr. 1932, 61 No. 30 with respect to the 
consent of the parties in form (separated from the contract against the better 
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from intensive state supervision, has enjoyed a long tradi-
tion of free choice. Among the criteria of choice of law, use 
of a national standard form has much importance as m 
maritime carriage.64 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, however, seems only to 
recogmze an express agreement, formulated by at least 
one party.65 
3· The Law of the Insurer 
More recently a theory has found great favor which 
again starts by recognizing the group of "contracts of ad-
hesion," concluded on the terms of one party through 
mere acceptance by the other. The contract of insurance is 
certainly an outstanding example. The need for protecting 
the interests of the insured is evident and well known.66 
But this is a consideration of municipal policy everywhere. 
methods of the same court); (April II, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, 40 No. 21. 
OLG. Stettin {Feb. 22, 1932) IPRspr. I932, 79 No. 35 (party intention for 
the law of the German insurer according to all circumstances). 
Greece: FRAGISTAS, I Symmikta Streit at 347, proves full liberty of the 
parties to exist. 
The Netherlands: H. R. (June 13, I924) N. J. I924, 859, 8 Revue Dor 
319 {reversing the decision by App. den Haag cited in Vol. II p. 387 n. n8; 
see also p. 388 n. 120). App. den Haag (Oct. 19, 1934) W. 12889, N. J. 1934, 
1660 {two Belgians contract in the Netherlands on a Dutch policy for 
insurance of Dutch agricultural products). 
64 Congress of Antwerp on Commercial Law (I 88 5) Actes 129 quest. 52. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (May 13, 1936) 35 Revue Dor 96. 
England: The Penthames, Boag v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. (1937) 
57 Ll. L. Rep. 83 {implicitly). 
France: App. Aix (March 22, 1923) S. I924.2.124: goods shipped from 
the Philippines, where contract made, to Marseilles, English insurance form; 
contra: Cass. req. {Dec. z8, 1936) Revue Crit. I937, 682. 
Germany: RG. (Dec. 23, 1931) IPRspr. 1932, 6I No. 30: English law for 
a contract of participation in an insurance risk, because of policy clauses. 
OLG. Hamburg (Nov. 23, 1934) Hans. RGZ. 1935 B 31: insurance taken 
in Istanbul with reference to Lloyd's usages, no application of the General 
German Marine Insurance Conditions. 
65 BG. {Nov. z, 1945) 71 BGE. 287, 290 in this case acknowledges inten-
tion to apply German law. On the subsidiary rule, see infra p. 334 n. So. 
66 A book by A. MrssoL, L'assurance contrat d'adhesion, et Ie probleme de 
Ia protection de l'assure (Paris I934) is announced in 34 Revue Trim. D. 
Civ. (1935) 344 No. I6. 
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In conflicts law it has been inferred that the place of the 
insurer is the center of the contract. In addition to the 
authors mentioned above who to this effect construe the 
place of the insurer as the place of contracting, increasing 
authority has directly adopted this law.67 A sound formula-
tion has been achieved by the leading German scholar in 
insurance law, Ernst Bruck.68 He argues as follows: 
In exceptional cases, individual agreements may be con-
cluded in insurance of transport, vessels, credit, or against 
loss by money exchange. Other insurance contracts, however, 
usually follow a definite pattern, although some individual 
clauses may be modified or inserted. The totality of the 
contracts of one class form an economic unit conditioned 
by their essentially identical legal structure. To assume a 
risk requires technical as well as legal uniform planning. 
We must focus not on the isolated contract but on the group 
of similar contracts, when we look for adequate localiza-
tion. Consequently, the contract centers in the country where 
the insurer uses his particular technique under national 
supervisiOn. 
Or to quote a French author: 
It seems more normal to localize the contract at the 
seat of the insurer, because of the technical organization 
of insurance and the insurer's duty of basing statistics on 
similar conditions, in order to calculate with some certainty. 
Often the idea of protecting the assured is invoked for 
justifying the application of the law of the place of con-
tracting, but if the assured knows the law of his domicil, 
it is not shown that this law protects him better than the 
law of the insurer's domicil.69 
Nevertheless, the concentration on the domicil of the 
insurer, by this reasoning, turns to its exact opposite in case 
67 2 BAR I48, 226; 2 MElLI 375; DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 458, 3 id. 468; 
}riTA, I Substance 393; JosEPH, i. Z. int. R. (I9I3) 492. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 No. 5· 
68 BRUCK Io f.; id., Privatversich. R. 40 ff. 
e9 PicARD et BE880N, I Traite 624 § 304. 
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of a branch or agency established in a foreign country since 
it forms a partial nucleus of contracts. Even on this basis 
several systems are possible. But in the majority70 of Euro-
pean and Latin-American countries, insurance contracts made 
through the general representative of a foreign insurer are 
in a compulsory manner subjected to the domestic law. 
This seems to have been suggested by the particular nature 
of the license needed by any insurer, which includes a grant 
depending on numerous prerequisites. The subjection of 
the contracts to the domestic law has been inferred from 
their presumptive intention, or voluntary submission, or by 
implication from the grant of the license.71 
The impact of the territorial law on establishments of 
a foreign insurer is commonly very large in Europe and 
Latin America. The authority of the general representative 
whom foreign insurers must appoint, is broad, if not un-
limited and unlimitable as in Germany. Often a company 
is not allowed to make contracts otherwise than by the 
local agent with residents of the state or with respect to 
domestic immovables. 72 The local requirements of financial 
security and investment contribute to complete the division 
of an international insurer's business into separate territorial 
compartments. 
An illustration existed in the Peace Treaty of Versailles. 
An Allied or Associated Power could cancel the insurance 
contracts of its nationals with a German company, in which 
70 See, as an example, Brazil, Decreto-Lei of March 7, 1940, No. 2063 
art. 7· 
We do not hear much of the minority to which England belongs and 
in which FRAGISTAS, "The Contract of Insurance in Private International 
Law (Greek)" in I Symmikta Streit 341, 345 counts Greece. He maintains 
that a Greek license to do business subjects the foreign insurance carrier 
to the Greek laws but does not force application of Greek (private) law 
upon contracts made in Greece. 
71 BRUCK 30 n. 84. 
72 BRUCK, Privatversich. R. 112, II4. The method is familiar; see, for 
instance, Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Conn (D. C. S. D. Ohio 1925) 9 F. {2d) 
202, based on a provision of the Ohio Code respecting property in Ohio. 
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case the company had to hand over "the proportion of its 
assets attributable to the policies so cancelled." In the case 
of a branch in a victor country, subject to the latter's right 
to liquidation, conflicts rules were expressed: 
"Where contracts of life insurance have been entered into 
by a local branch . . . in a country which subsequently 
became an enemy country, the contract shall, in the absence 
of any stipulation to the contary in the contract itself, be 
governed by the local law .... 
"In any case where by the law applicable to the contract 
the insurer remains bound by the contract . . . until notice 
is given to the insured, etc."73 
The local state control over business establishments issu-
ing policies played a role also in other problems after the 
First World War. A well-known New York decision went so 
far as to attribute to the New York branch of a nationalized 
Russian insurance company a distinct personality sufficient 
to keep it alive.74 The Swiss Federal Tribunal, in analogous 
reasoning, mentioned the importance of the obligatory 
Swiss general representative of any foreign insurer and the 
security furnished by the latter, and held that where a 
German obtained a policy through the Swiss branch of a 
German company, his rights were inaccessible to a French 
war liquidation.75 The German Supreme Court similarly 
assumed that an insurance policy issued by an Indian branch 
of the New York Life Insurance Company, but later wholly 
transferred to the Berlin branch of the company, could not 
be validly seized by the British custodian in India: 
It may be left undecided whether the Berlin branch is 
an independent legal person. In any case it is represented by 
73 Treaty of Versailles, Part X, V, Annex III, MARTENS, Recueil Ser. 3, XI, 
580 ff., §§ 13, 14. In the Peace Treaty with Italy of 1947, Annex XVI, No. 4, 
insurance contracts are reserved for separate conventions between the Allied 
or Associated Power interested and the Italian Government. 
74 Lehman, J., in Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co. 
(1939) 280 N.Y. 286, 2o N. E. (2d) 758, aff'd (1940) 309 U.S. 624. 
75 Swiss BG. (Nov. 4, 1920) 46 BGE. II 421. 
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the general agent, entitled in its external relation to acquire 
rights independently and must therefore be treated like 
an independent legal person in domestic transactions/6 
Correspondingly, an American court, refusing jurisdiction 
in a test case for recovery of the cash surrender value from 
the New York Life Insurance Company, states that the 
policy was issued by the branch in Germany to a German 
resident and: 
"The agency in Germany was established as a distinct 
entity, a German creation under German law. A reserve 
fund was made and all premiums received were placed in 
that fund and invested in Germany under German official 
approval." 77 
Numerous consequences of this situation are perceptible.78 
The entire theory calling for the law of the insurer's head-
quarters or its branch office, respectively, has been endorsed 
by contemporary writers/9 German and Swiss courts,80 and 
the Montevideo Draft of 1940.81 
76 RG. (Nov. 26, 1920) JW. 1921, 245. 
77 Heine v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 9th 1931) 50 F. (2d) 382, 
385. The court says that 28,ooo policies executed in Germany were sought to 
be enforced in this country. 
78 E.g., Italy: Cass. (April 8, 1938) Foro Ital. I938 I 823, Giur. Ital. I938 
I 755, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. I938, 323: the Italian "general agency" of a 
foreign insurer is an independent enterprise, hence its assets in the country 
may be separately liquidated; Cass. (Jan. xo, 194I) Foro I tal. Mass. I94I, 
I2, IO Giur. Comp. DIP. (I944) I25 No. 25: hence, also, the Italian stock of 
insurances with reserves is a possible object of separate transfer. 
79 Argentina: HALPERIN, El contra to de seguro (seguros terrestres) (Buenos 
Aires I946) 64 § 57· 
Austria: ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, I Versicherungsvertragsrecht (I935) 47, Ill. 
France: PICARD et BESSON, x Traite 624 § 304, supra n. 69; ARMIN JON, 
Droit Int. Pr. Com. 47I § 281. 
Germany: BAR in Ehrenberg's Handb. 4I3; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 23I. An 
opponent has been criticized by MoLLER, 9 Z. ausl. PR. ( I935) 336; HAGEN, 
Z. f. d. Ges. Versicherungs-Wissenschaft (I935) 76. 
Italy: LORDI, I Istituzioni di diritto commerciale ( I943) 34, referring to 
his work, 2 Obbligazioni commerciali I032 § 831; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 
501. 
Switzerland: JAEGER in 4 Roelli's Komm. 9I No. 34; BG. (Nov. 2, 1945) 
71 BGE. II 287, 292. 
80 Germany: OLG. Konigsberg (Dec. 9, 1930) Bl. IPR. 1931, 2n; Bay. 
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If, however, the applicable law is to be dependent on 
the influence of state supervision, the delimitation of the 
administrative state supervision is of primary importance. 
In the same connection the situation of the insured risk 
requires consideration. 
4· State Supervision and the Situation of the Risk 
The European doctrine concedes great influence to the 
scope claimed by the state for administrative control of 
insurance contracts. 
In contrast to the traditional American emphasis on the 
legal completion of contract-making, the most thorough 
Continental authors have stated that doing insurance busi-
ness requires carrying on of insurance operations, whereas 
the making of contracts is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
In the German opinion, any activities preparatory to or 
subsequent to contracting such as soliciting, advising, cash-
ing of premiums, or watching the development of the risk, 
may be grounds for state supervision even though the con-
tract may be concluded in a foreign country.82 
Even taking this broad definition of the agent's co-opera-
tion in the individual contract as a criterion, delimitation 
of the scope of the domestic law requires additional facts. 
Definition of the scope of control in general is given by 
each state as it sees fit, and is often left to the controlling 
board of commissioners.83 But the laws leave gaps, and 
choice of law is sufficiently distinguishable from discretionary 
delimitation of the scope of supervision, to be subjected, 
for instance in Germany, to court jurisdiction.84 
ObLG. (June 24, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, 13; RG. (April u, 1933) IPRspr. 
1933, 40; see the comment by BATIFFOL 313 n. 6. 
Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 2, 1945) 71 BGE. 287, 291, referring to its inde-
pendently developed previous thesis, 51 BGE. II 409, that insurance of Swiss 
inhabitants by foreign insurers is subject to Swiss law. 
81 Montevideo Treaty on Int. Com. Terr. Law (1940) art. 12 sent. 2 for 
life insurance: where the company is domiciled or has its branch or agency. 
82 NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 329. 
83 NEUMEYER, id. 343 ff. 
84 This seems to be the true thesis of RG. (Feb. 21, 1930) 127 RGZ. 360. 
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The literature has sought a desirable method of defining 
the limits of state control for the purpose of choice of law. 
Among the numerous solutions,85 one has been prevailingly 
favored: In the insurance of persons their residence, in the 
insurance of property rights the situation of the property, 
and generally the place of the risk insured, are decisive.86 
The similarity of these results with the order of ideas 
leading in the United States to the recent theory of the 
Supreme Court and to the proposals of the Patterson 
Committee is obvious. 
A recent French development is of particular interest. 
First conceived for fiscal purposes, a theory emphasizing 
the locality of the risk has been extended to the application 
of private law. Foreign insurers submit reports on all con-
tracts "signed or performed in France or Algiers . . . or 
any contract of assurance accepted by them and concerning 
a person, an asset, or a liability in these territories." It is 
further provided that any contract of insurance not reg-
istered within a month from its date is void.87 According to 
authoritative writers, this recent law implies that all activ-
ities of foreign insurers in France are compulsorily subjected 
to all "imperative French laws."88 Hence French law is 
applicable, not only 'the fiscal but also the private law, 
85 NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 348 f. 
86 Montevideo Treaty on Int. Commercial Law (1889) art. 8 for insurance 
"on land" and transportation: where the object is at the time of contracting. 
NEUMEYER, id. 350 advocates localization of the risk as to movables at 
their ordinary place; and of liability and reinsurance at the center of the 
assets and liabilities of the insured. 
87 Decree-Law of October 30, 1935, amending art. 2 of the Law of Feb. 15, 
1917, complemented by Decree of Jan. 12, 1937 concerning the foreign enter-
prises or insurers doing business in France and Algiers. These provisions 
have been maintained in the Insurance Law, Decree-Law of June 14, 1938, 
art. 42. 
88 PicARD et BEssoN, I Traite 618 § 301 arguing particularly (1) as to 
life insurance, cf. Laws of March 17, 1905 and July 13, 1930, (2) as to 
workmen's accident insurance, cf. Decree of Feb. 28, 1899, (3) as to auto-
mobile accident insurance, cf. Decree-Law of August 8, 1935, and Decree of 
June 3, 1936, art. 6, and generally cf. Decree-Law of August 25, I937· For 
other literature to the same effect, see DALLOZ, I Nouveau repertoire de 
droit ( 1947) 313. 
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whenever the risk covered is situated in France. This means 
that life insurance or an individually agreed accident or 
health insurance is localized at the domicil or the habitual 
residence of the insured, if in France. A liability insurance 
is French, when the act involving responsibility covered 
should normally or principally occur in France. The object 
insured against fire, hail, and the like must be in France. 
In this view, French law does not necessarily govern 
marine, credit, or fluvial insurance and reinsurance if they 
have foreign elements, nor are contracts signed in a foreign 
country and covering a risk situated outside France, subject 
to its law. These contracts are said to be the only subject 
matters of conflict of laws which follow the lines designed by 
Bruck.89 
III. CoNCLUSIONs 
The basic problems of conflicts of insurance laws could 
not by any means be exhausted in the foregoing report. 90 
But the fundamental trend in the efforts to reach conflicts 
rules more adequate to the real situation, is rather obvious. 
The old rules clinging to the formation of the contract or its 
fulfillment are in this field particularly obnoxious, and in-
tensive state control over the insurance business is recognized 
as the most powerful force localizing insurance activi-
ties of all sorts. When the Canadian provinces adopted 
the Uniform Life Insurance Act, the fact was stated with 
regard to alien insurers "that the very natural intention 
of the parties, who live and who do business here, legalized 
and protected by our laws, is that the insurance law of this 
89 I d. 623 § 302. 
90 Still less are special problems discussed. See for Continental literature 
on double insurance, 2 BAR§§ 267, 335; BRUCK 48; 3 SMEESTERS and WINKEL-
MOLEN II § 940; DE SMET 369 § 402; and on reinsurance, BRUCK 15; 2 Repert. 
183 § 31; BATIFFOL 317 n. 4; ARMIN JON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 487 § 297· 
On the scope of the conflicts rule concerning insurance contracts, see 
BRUCK 16 f.; FRAGISTAS, supra n. 70, 356 ff. 
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country will govern the contract and rights which anse 
thereunder.'' 91 
I. Special Choice of Law 
It must be remembered even m this field that despite 
extremely large inroads of imperative norms into the con-
tractual law, 92 disposition by the parties is the primary 
principle and that the rules demanded are merely intended 
for use in the typical standard contracts. 
(a) Party autonomy. As a principle, the right of parties 
also to stipulate for the applicable law in insurance con-
tracts has been strictly affirmed in Europe.93 In the United 
States it has sometimes been denied.94 But apart from the 
philosophy of private law, admitting for the sake of the 
argument the very system of a compulsory law of the place 
of contracting, it must always be remembered that in this 
country a state cannot impose its insurance law on parties 
contracting in another state. 95 The forum, thus, is powerless 
91 FRANK HODGINS, 22 Can. L. T. (1902) r, quoted with approval by 
PIERSON, Am. Bar Assoc., Section of Insurance Law, 1937-1938, 8r, a lawyer 
connected with a New York life insurance company. 
92 On the compulsory rules applied to the contract, as a whole, and public 
policy opposing foreign law recognized as applicable in general, see in par-
ticular 44 C. J. S. 516 §54; BATIFFOL 310 § 347; BRUCK 26 ff., 37 ff.; }AEGER 
in 4 Roelli's Komm. 93 No. 37· 
An example of an illicit object of insurance, much discussed in Conti-
nental literature, involves the old prohibition against insuring the wages 
of master and crew of a vessel, still existing in German C. Com. § 780 but 
restricted in Belgian C. Com. art. 191; see 2 BAR 227 n. 109; 3 SMEESTERS and 
WINKELMOLEN 62 § 972 and cit. 
Another nice question: Is insurance with insurers in Johannesburg for 
transport (from Portuguese Africa to Belgium) of diamonds smuggled out 
of Transvaal, lawful? App. Bruxelles (May 13, 1936) Belg. Jud. 1937, 4· 
93 Inst. Int. Law, Florence, Resol. art. 2 n. f, 22 Annuaire (1908) 290. 
Germany: BRUCK, Privatversich. R. 39 § 5 n. 3; HAGEN, Seeversicherungs-
recht (Berlin 1938) 19 ("German conception"). 
Greece: FRAGISTAS, supra pp. 331 n. 70, at 347 and n. 2. 
Italy: DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 462. 
France: SUMIEN, 2 Repert. 151 Nos. 15, r6. Contra: ARMIN JON, Droit Int. 
Pr. Com. 478 § 288. 
Switzerland: }AEGER in 4 Roelli's Komm. 92 No. 35· 
94 See Vol. II p. 412, cf. the Mississippi case referred to id. p. 526 n. 38. · 
05 See, e.g., Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Beha (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1926) 13 F. 
(2d) 500. 
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to prevent the parties from eluding all of the applicable 
provisions of the forum, including its most vital "interests." 
It would be strange if they were not allowed to contract 
in the forum and stipulate for a foreign law, which never-
theless would not remove the imperative part of the domestic 
statute. This more considerate approach, under the present-
day practice, even preserves extraterritorial effect to the 
public policy of the forum. 
Now, as we are to abandon the system of mechanical 
rules, we have to discover the most suitable rules to replace 
them. But adequate conflicts rules for various types of 
insurance contracts cannot be stated except in a subsidiary 
function. The task would be forbidding, if these rules were 
to be imposed upon the parties with ironclad necessity. 
(b) Special situations. Analogous considerations are due 
to the atypical cases. If we, for instance, postulate as a 
sound rule that fire or windstorm insurance should be 
governed by the law of the state where the insured object 
lies, we must yet recognize that two parties residing and 
contracting in one state to insure a risk located in Japan 
may be subjected to the law of the place of residence, in 
contrast to the case where they contract through their local 
agents in J apan.96 This consideration is entirely different 
from those on account of which fire and windstorm insurance 
has been held not to fall under the law of the situs.97 
Dealing next with the subsidiary rule referring to the 
law of the residence of the insured, we shall concentrate 
on life insurance where this test points in an appropriate 
direction. 
96 See the analogous German reinsurance case, Vol. II p. 524; and BG. 
(Jan. 20, 1948). 74 BGE. II 81, 88: Italian parties to an insurance of a 
transport from Rotterdam to Basle, Italian law, including Italian subrogation 
in contractual claims. 
97 Supra p. 321 n. 35 and see the analogous situations in sales of immovables, 
supra p. 106. 
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2. Life Insurance: Law of the Residence of the Insured 
A majority of the American court decisions, by applying 
the law of the place of contracting in all insurance contracts, 
have reached the law of the domicil or residence of the 
insured. Many American statutes obtain a similar result 
through various formulas. European doctrines use the same 
criterion in restriction to insurance of persons, such as life, 
health, and accident insurance. 
Yet if the results seem similar, the ideas underlying the 
localization vary, and the exact choice of the decisive 
contact must be shaped accordingly. 
(a) Delivery of policy. American courts contemplate 
the place where the insured manually receives the insurance 
policy. As such, this place is so casual as to defy the purpose 
of conflicts law. The application of this test has been made 
tolerable only through added fictions. 
(b) Inhabitants. The statutes may certainly be presumed 
to extend their protection to the inhabitants of the state, 
in prescribing standards of fair dealing and fair competition 
between insurers.98 This formula seems to include citizens 
of the state, residents and also probably even. people tem-
porarily present in the state. 
Logically, the formula implies that the domestic law 
should govern all contracts of residents and exclude all 
contracts of nonresidents (at least, with foreign insurers). 
A proposal understood to this effect was opposed, advancing 
the example that life insurance has been obtainable only 
with exclusion of risk by flying, although some states pro-
hibited "aviation riders"; a resident of such a state would 
be prevented from going to another state where he may 
obtain the usual policy.99 This objection is of doubtful 
value, but such meaning should not be ascribed to the rule. 
98 PATTERSON, "The Conflict Problems etc.," supra n. 25, at 74· 
99 Amer. Bar Assoc., Section of Ins. Law I940-194I, 173 No. 2 and 185 
No.4· 
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In the United States, the constitutional restrictions on state 
power and, elsewhere, principles of reasonable interpreta-
tion require more than domiciliary or residential conditions, 
as shown in the following essentially different constructions. 
(c) Law of licensing state. If the applicable law is con-
ceived as that of the licensing state rather than that of 
the insured's domicil, two basic conditions are required, to 
which the personal location of the insured in the state may 
or may not be a precondition. One of these conditions is 
that the insurer must do business in the state so as to need 
licensing. The other is that the local agent whom every 
foreign insurer is bound to appoint must be in some way 
connected with the individual contract. 
The latter connection can be imagined in various manners. 
The minimum requirement has been indicated, for instance, 
in Germany and Alabama: any activity of a foreign corpo-
ration through its agent with respect to a contract suffices 
to justify the application of the domestic law, soliciting, 
receiving the application, delivering the policy, collecting 
the first premium, etc. Often making the contract is a con-
dition. The Patterson Draft (Section 2) requires in all 
cases of insurance that the contract should be: 
"Either delivered in this state by or through an agent or 
other representative of the insurer, or issued by the insurer 
in this state for delivery by or through a person other than 
an agent or other representative of the insurer, ... " 
which in case of life, accident, or health insurance is addi-
tional to the condition that the insured is a resident of the 
state when the contract becomes effective. (Section 1 a) 
In all these variants, a policy is not affected, if the local 
agent has no part whatever in its negotiation. Many statutes, 
seeking to avoid evasion, therefore declare that any insur-
ance concluded abroad with an insurer licensed in the state 
should be deemed as made in the state or declared void. 
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Whether challengeable or not/00 such provisions transgress 
the reasonable limits of state power. 
Insurance procured merely by correspondence with a 
foreign insurer, at least one not having a local agent, is 
left free. This agrees with the American practice101 and 
the German doctrine.102 
Thus far, however, we have presupposed that the con-
flicts rule selects its own criterion with respect to all life 
insurance contracts. 
(d) Law of the state supervising the contract. Since 
many states refrain from imposing the imperative part of 
their private law upon insurance contracts not "made" in 
the state, it is a possible solution to make the application 
of the local law dependent on the individual regulation 
of doing business in the state. This would avoid applying 
the law of a state which does not impose it and thus 
obviate some complications. But the uncertainty now pre-
vailing in many states with respect to what contracts are 
subject to supervision, would extend to private law. 
The least uncertain term for a permanent living center 
is "habitual residence." Whether temporary residence should 
suffice ought to be expressly stated in the statutes. 
3· The Law of Situs 
Insurance of immovables against risks such as fire, storm, 
or hail, damage to glass, machines, or waterpipes, manifestly 
100 As illustration, see for the United States supra pp. 320, 322; for Brazil, 
McDoWELL, "Contratos de seguro celebrados no estrangeiro," 26 Rev. Jur. 
252 (against the then existing decrees); and inversely in France, SUMIEN, 
"Des conflits de lois relatifs aux assurances sur Ia vie contractees irregu-
lierement avec des societes etrangeres," Revue Crit. 1934, so, against a 
liberal decision of Cass. req. (March 21, 1933) published ibid. On the 
corresponding German controversy, see BRUCK, Privatversich. R. 46 f. 
On the ground of a decision by the German Reichsgericht of 1930, }AEGER 
in 4 Roelli's Komm. 91 No. 34 and n. d recognizes in Switzerland that a 
Swiss insurer doing business abroad and contracting there even with a Swiss 
insured, is under foreign law. 
1o1 E.g., Huntington v. Sheehan (1912) 206 N.Y. 486, 489, 100 N. E. 41. 
102 BRUCK 33· 
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belongs to the sphere of the state of the situation. State 
care for agriculture, industry, and housing has become of 
such importance as to require intensive control over pre-
ventive policy as well as over the recovery of damage to 
domestic resources and investments.103 It is reasonable 
to apply the same test to movables "insured in a fixed 
location. " 104 
4· Various Kinds of Insurance 
It is interesting that the American proposals of 1939 
and likewise the French doctrine locate the center of lia-
bility for automobile accidents at the place where the car 
is principally garaged (or principally used, adds the Amer-
ican draft). Normally, this results in the law of the car 
owner's or user's residence and to that extent it does not 
justify the fear of uncertainty. But the residence by itself 
may well suffice for localizing all types of insurance not 
connected with another unquestionable central point. If 
it is the state control over territorial acts of the residents 
rather than the residence itself (as localizing the risk) 
that justifies the imposition of the state's law, a fidelity or 
surety contract, or a group insurance covering health or 
accident, is correctly centered at the headquarters of the 
insured enterprise, as courts have generally held. 
When workmen's compensation insurance is brought 
under the law of the state where "the principal place of 
employment" of the employee is when the contract becomes 
effective/05 this approach comes close to the localization of 
the employer's liability to which modern development tends, 
as discussed earlier .106 
103 NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 352; BRUCK, Privatversich. R. 47· 
This kind of consideration seems to have escaped the opponents to Professor 
Patterson's proposal, Amer. Bar Assoc., Section of Ins. Law, 1940·I941, 17S. 
104 Draft of the Patterson Committee, Amer. Bar Assoc., Section of Ins. 
Law, Program 1939, 51 s. I (b), supra n. 52. 
105 Draft, id. § 1 (d). 
106Supra pp. xSS (employment), 21S, 229 (workmen's compensation). 
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5. Proposals 
Continued studies by insurance experts will be needed 
to reconcile the possible differences of opinion on the precise 
local connections for various types of risks. But the desirable 
approach to the conflicts problem can scarcely be doubtful. 
As an attempt to show roughly the resulting principle, the 
following formulation is advanced with respect to life in-
surance and fire insurance, in the absence of a stipulation 
for the applicable law and of special circumstances. 
A contract of life insurance is governed by the law of the 
state where the insured has his habitual residence, provided 
that this state claims administrative supervision over the 
contract, and that an agent of the insurer in the state has 
participated in the negotiation of the contract. 
A fire insurance contract respecting immovables, mov-
ables, or other interests in a fixed location, is governed by 
the law of the state of the situation. 
CHAPTER 47 
Suretyship 1 
I. SuRVEY 
I. The Object of the Rule 
PAST and existing legal systems provide for various types of contracts in which a person promises either 
to perform another person's duty in case of noncom-
pliance, or to indemnify the creditor therefor. The basic 
types of suretyship and guaranty at common law are im-
pregnated by this contrast. But a rich variety of forms has 
overgrown the historic dualism. In civil law, the present 
representative types of transactions have developed from 
the late Roman categories from which, however, they differ. 
They include suretyship (fideiussio )-with certain aspects 
of common law guaranty-; mandate of credit (mandatum 
qualificatum) ; guaranty (different from the common law 
institution of the same name) ; and assumption of subsidiary 
liability as codebtor. The differences in the various kinds of 
promises reach from formalities to defenses and enforce-
ment. 
The terminology varies greatly in covering this wide and 
practically important ground. Also, its external boundaries 
1 LETZGus, "Die Biirgschaft" (in private international law), 3 Z.ausi.PR. 
( 1929) 837; K. RILLING, Die Biirgschaft nach Deutsch em IPR. (Thesis, 
Tiibingen 1935). 
Comparative municipal law: Articles, HANS SCHULZE, "Garantievertrag," 
and ANDREAS B. ScHWARZ, "Biirgschaft," in 3 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 
593-622; for the main South-American codes: RAMIRO NAVA, La fianza y Ia 
unidad en las legislaciones (Caracas 1927). 
On the modern "compensated surety" (Restatement of Security § 82 
comment i), see for the United States: G. W. CRIST, Corporate Suretyship 
(1939); for Switzerland and Germany: RAAFLAUB, "Die Solidarbiirgschaft 
im Bankverkehr," Gmiir's Abh. (N. F.) No. 73 (1932). 
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are not delimited on the same lines. The Restatement of 
the Law of Security, after thoughtful exploration of the 
diverse terms used in American legal language, decided to 
embrace the entire doctrine under the name of suretyship 
and to use guaranty as a synonym. This all-comprehensive 
concept is defined as : 
"The relation which exists where one person has under-
taken an obligation and another person is also under an 
obligation or other duty to the obligee, who is entitled to but 
one performance, and as between the two who are bound, 
one rather than the other should perform." ( § 8 2) 
Such broad terms are particularly suitable to conflicts 
law. For it seems to be agreed that conflicts rules do not 
discriminate among all the possible kinds of such promises. 2 
Far from any characterization according to the law of the 
forum, the terms suretyship, cautionnement, Biirgschaft, 
fiant;a, are used to cover every contract creating a personal 
obligation to the creditor, securing his claim against another 
person. 
The Restatement of Security ( § 83) includes, in addition 
to contracts with the creditor whereby the obligor directly 
intends to become a surety, other transactions having similar 
results. These situations and the various cases in which 
persons are treated by law as if they were sureties, may 
be passed over here. 
2. Independence of the Rule 
It was once assumed3 that because a surety's obligation 
is "accessory" to the principal debt, that is, depends on its 
validity and extent, it is necessarily subject to the same law. 
The only English leading case, seemingly still in authority, 
2 LETZGUS, supra n. I, 842. 
3 BoUHIER, I Observations sur Ia coutume du Duche de Bourgogne (I742) 
ch. 2I, 4I3 § I97, citing a decision of the Parliament of Toulouse of 1655. 
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is definitely to this effect/ and so are possibly a few American 
decisions.5 Some modern writers believe in this view.6 
The contrary opinion is undoubtedly correct. Quite as a 
surety or a guarantor is bound by his own agreement with 
the creditor, as distinguished from the undertaking giving 
rise to the obligation of the principal debtor, suretyship 
is governed by its own law independently, in principle, from 
that controlling the main debt. This theory is firmly main-
tained by consistent doctrine in Germany7 and other coun-
tries,8 and is dominant in the civil law literature.9 Story 
and Wharton thought along the same lines.10 The American 
decisions, in great majority though usually without express 
mention, are consonant when they apply the law of the 
place where the contract of suretyship is made, or that of 
the place where this contract, distinguished from the prin-
cipal debt, is performable.11 
The principle was adequately formulated by Zitelmann: 
The law governing suretyship determines the extent to 
4 England: Rouquette v. Overmann and Schou (I875) L. R. IO Q, B. 525, 
per Cockburn, C. J.; BuRGE, 2 Commentaries 39· 
5 United States: Cases cited by BATIFFOL 424 n. I. 
Also in Germany: RG. (Feb. II, I896) 7 Z.int.R. (I897) 262. 
6 Italy: 3 FIORE § I240; DE AMICIS, I contratti accessorii ( I909) 46, cited 
by FEDOZZI-CERETI 760. 
Recently to a similar effect, GuTZWILLER, 6 Z.ausi.PR. ( I932) 98. 
7 RG. (May 23, I883) 9 RGZ. I85, I87; (April 23, I903) 54 RGZ. 3II, 
Clunet I905, 1050; and many other decisions in constant practice. The 
literature is unanimous to the same effect, see e.g., NEUMEYER, IPR. 30; 
LETZGUS, supra n. I, 839; LEWALD 257; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 267. 
8 Austria: OGH. (June II, I929) Clunet I930, 740. 
France: The literature in the absence of cases, cf. 3 Repert. I65 No. IO. 
Switzerland: BG. (July I8, I927) 53 BGE. II 347, Clunet I928, 508 and 
passim,· 2 MElLI 42; 2 SCHNITZER 575· 
Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Campbells v. Blank, 8 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes I71 I9. 
9 See, in addition to the citations in n. 8, e.g., }ITTA 495; 3 FIORE § I237; 
FEDOZZI-CERETI 76o; BATIFFOL 423 § 52I. 
10 STORY 360 § 267; 2 WHARTON 934 § 427. 
11 See in particular, Cowles v. Townsend and Milliken (I86o) 37 Ala. 77; 
Tolman v. Reed (I897) II5 Mich. 7I, 72 N. W. uo4; Compagnie Generale 
de Fourrures v. Simon Herzig & Sons Co. (I9I5) 89 Misc. 573, I53 N. Y. 
Supp. 7I7-
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which the liability of the surety depends on the validity and 
content of the liability of the principal debtor.12 Aiming at 
the same idea, the Reichsgericht has often used the succinct 
but inaccurate formula, that the law of the principal debt 
decides what the surety owes, whereas the law of the surety-
ship indicates whether he owes.13 In fact, the contrast is not 
between existence and extent of the obligation, but is pre-
sented by the difference in the scope of the two obligations. 
Illustrations. (i) Campbell Renfroe, in delegating his 
paternal powers to a trustee, delivered a note to him for 
the support of his children, and Gates signed the note as 
surety. All this happened in Georgia, the law of which was 
applied by the Louisiana court. Gates, who had paid the 
note to the trustee without being sued, was unable to re-
cover from the debtor or his cosurety, either as surety or 
as holder of the note. The surety obligation did not exist 
because the debt was void.14 
(ii) A creditor in France agreed with the debtor that 
the sum due should be paid in pounds sterling instead of 
francs. The French Court of Cassation held that the modifi-
cation of currency was not a novation discharging the surety 
(C. C. article I 27 I No. I), but neither did it bind the surety 
to pay otherwise than in francs. 15 Both points pertain to 
the law of suretyship. 
(iii) Where someone wrongly believed himself to be a 
surety and paid the true creditor, the question was from 
whom he might recover. The Swiss Federal Tribunal held 
that in the first place the creditor was unduly enriched and 
owed restitution. But if an action against the creditor were 
12 2 ZITELMANN 388. 
13 RG. (April 23, 1903) 54 RGZ. 311, 315; (Jan. 21, 1926) IPRspr. 1929 
No. 30. Various criticism has been addressed to this formulation by 2 FRANK-
ENSTEIN 348 n. 79; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 268 (but see BATIFFOL 425 § 524); and 
especially RILLING, suPra n. 1, 13 ff. 
14 Gates v. Renfroe (1852) 7 La. Ann. s6<). In Louisiana C. C. § 3025 
(now § 3056) cited by the court, the surety is said to have no recourse 
against the principal debtor, if he pays without being sued and without 
informing the principal; but this is expressly subordinated to the condition 
that the debt did not exist at the time of the payment. 
1 5 French Cass. civ. (Dec. 17, 1928) Clunet 1929, 1286. 
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barred by limitation or waived by the surety, he was entitled 
to compensation from the debtor, who had been eventually 
discharged of his obligation.16 This interesting theory of 
unjust enrichment presupposes a relation based on an in-
valid suretyship and another resulting from discharge of 
the principal debt. Thus two laws may have to be ascer-
tained, both distinguishable from that governing the prin-
cipal debt. 
Yet, while the law need not necessarily be the same for 
the debt and its guaranty, it is a reasonable wish that it 
should be identical as often as possible. The problem of 
establishing the adequate local connection for suretyship is 
similar to that arising with respect to a contract to sell an 
immovable, for which situs is not a compulsory but a 
desirable contact. 
II. CONTACTS 
I. United States 
Apart from old cases applying the law of the forum, 17 
the courts in this country have generally adhered either to 
the law of the place of contracting18 or to the law of the 
place of performance.19 But, as usual, these are merely the 
labels. 
The largest group of decisions is characterized by the 
essential role of the creditor's domicil. The surety may 
have had his residence in the same jurisdiction20 or the 
written guaranty may have been mailed to the creditor and 
accepted by him, 21 thereby localizing the making of the 
16 Swiss BG. (Oct. 17, 1944) 70 BGE. II 271, 34 Praxis No. 33· 
17 Toomer v. Dickerson (r867) 37 Ga. 428. Expressly contra, Tenant v. 
Tenant (r885) no Pa. 478, r Ad. 532. 
18 2 WHARTON § 427s; BATIFFOL 423 § 522. 
19 BATIFFOL 423 n. 6. 
20 Walker v. Forbes (1857) 31 Ala. 9; Colston v. Pemberton (1897) 20 
Misc. 410, 45 N. Y. Supp. 1034; Hays v. King ( 1914) 44 Okla. r8o, 143 Pac. 
1142. 
21 E.g., Watkins Co. v. Daniel ( 1934) 228 Ala. 399, 153 So. 771. 
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contract; or performance by the surety allegedly was due 
at the creditor's place so as to call for the law of the place 
of performance. 22 A characteristic category was presented 
by the customary official surety bonds delivered to the fed-
eral government as security for the service of employees; 
they were localized at the seat of the government in Wash-
ington, D. C. 23 
Ordinarily, the law applied also governed the principal 
debt. 24 The courts sometimes stress this fact, 25 although at 
other times they do not mention it. 
Another notable situation may be mentioned, although 
some writers minimize its importance.26 Where a guaranty 
is written on the instrument embodying the principal debt, 
courts are probably inclined to let both be controlled by 
one law. 27 In one case, it was expressly declared immaterial 
that the surety signed the note of the debtor at a different 
place. 28 When a financial operation was negotiated in New 
York, the main contract executed in Nebraska, and the 
guaranty appended in Illinois, the gambling statute of Illi-
nois was eliminated.29 In twin cases, the wives of two 
22 John A. Tolman Co. v. Reed (1897) IIS Mich. 71, 72 N. W. 1104; 
Alexandria etc. R. R. Co. v. Johnson (1900) 61 Kan. 417, 59 Pac. 1063; 
Johnson v. Charles D. Norton Co. (C. C. A. 6th 1908) 159 Fed. 361; Fox v. 
Corry ( 1921) 149 La. 445, 89 So. 410. 
Canada: Scandinavian Amer. Nat') Bank v. Kneeland (Manitoba 1914) 
24 Man. R. I68, 16 D. L. R. s6s. 
23 Cox and Dick v. United States ( 1832) 6 Pet. 172; Duncan v. United 
States ( 1833) 7 Pet. 435· Cf. STORY § 290, commented on by 2 BAR IIO n. II: 
here the surety must know that his obligation is not accepted unless it con-
forms to the law at the seat of the government. 
24 Compagnie General de Fourrures etc. v. Simon Herzig & Sons (1915) 
89 Misc. 573, 153 N.Y. Supp. 717; Halloran v. Schmidt Brewing Co. (1917) 
137 Minn. 141, 162 N. W. 1082; Furst and Thomas v. Sandlin (1922) 208 
Ala. 490, 94 So. 740; Watkins Co. v: Hill (1926) 214 Ala. 507, 108 So. 244. 
25 See the collection of cases by BATIFFOL 424 n. 1. 
26 E.g., RILLING, supra n. 1, 95 before n. 2. 
27 Continental & Commercial Nat') Bank of Chicago v. Cobb (C. C. A. 1st 
1912) 200 Fed. SII, 516, 517; Fisk Rubber Co. v. Muller (1914) 42 App. 
D. C. 49· 
28Pugh v. Cameron's Adm'r (1877) II W.Va. 523. 
29 Richter v. Frank (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1890) 41 Fed. 859. 
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brothers and debtors, domiciled in Michigan, signed mort-
gage guaranties for property in Ohio. One note was signed 
by one defendant when she was temporarily there with her 
husband in the bank office; the other note was signed at 
home. But in both cases the contracting was held to have 
occurred in Ohio. 30 
The bulk of the decisions may be summarized, notwith-
standing their varying formal terms, to the effect that con-
tracts of guaranty or suretyship are preferably subjected to 
the law of the principal debt, especially when the latter is 
governed by the law of the domicil of the creditor. 
2. Other Countries 
Apart from the abandoned test of nationality of the 
surety, 31 most Continental opinions have been divided be-
tween the domiciliary law of the surety32 and the law of the 
place of his performance.33 The law of the place of con-
tracting which is provided in so many laws as a general 
rule, 34 does not app~ar often in practice. 
The law of the domicil of the surety has been justified 
by the Swiss Federal Tribunal as suitable to the nature of 
his unilateral and onerous obligation, 35 because such an 
obligor ought to be considered bound to a minimum, i. e., 
30 Butzel, J., in State of Ohio v. James N. Purse and State of Ohio v. Artie 
Purse (1935) 273 Mich. 502, 507, 263 N. W. 872 and 874 although speaking 
in terms of lex loci contractus and of the Restatement. 
31 2 ZITELMANN 366; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 123 ff., 349· 
32 3 FIORE § 1243 (but see § 1238 for lex fori); ]ITTA 495; 2 BAR 24; 
NEUMEYER, IPR. 27; WALKER 496; 3 ROLIN § 1412. 
Denmark: Copenhague (Feb. 2, 1885) Clunet 1887, 223. 
Germany: Decisions of the temporary sixth senate of the RG., see (Oct. 
12, 1905) 61 RGZ. 343· 
Switzerland: See n. 3 5· 
33 Germany: RG. (Oct. 4, 1894) 34 RGZ. 16 and constant practice; see 
list of decisions, LETZGUS, supra n. I, 837, 840; LEWALD §§ 314-317; RAAPE, 
D. IPR. 294· 
34 Italian writers mention Disp. Prel. C. C. (1865) art. 9 par. 2; (1942) 
art. 25. 
35 53 BGE. II 344. 347; 61 id. II 181; 63 id. II 308; 67 id. II 215, 220. 
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to not more than his own law indicates. Where a guaranty 
is given for consideration, such as by a bank in the course 
of its business, the circumstances and particularly the con-
nection with the entire financial arrangement are decisive.36 
The comprehensive treatment in the German cases as-
sumes that suretyship is governed by the law of the place 
of its performance, but since according to the general Ger-
man principle the surety like any debtor owes performance 
at his domicil, the result is regularly the same as in the 
view mentioned above. 37 
Through this emphasis on the domicil of the person 
giving the guaranty, it happens more often and more strik-
ingly than in other systems that principal debt and guaranty 
are controlled by different laws. 
Illustration. In a case where creditor, debtor and a surety 
lived in Luxembourg, the Reichsgericht did not doubt that 
all their relationships were governed by the law of Luxem-
bourg (substantially French law). This included the question 
whether the surety was to be subrogated by payment to 
the creditor's rights. But at the time of the original trans-
action, the wife of the debtor assumed (I) cosuretyship 
with the surety to the creditor and ( 2) countersecurity to 
the surety. She expressed both these obligations simply by 
signing the loan instrument "as cosurety and countersurety" 
( als Mitburge und Ruckburge). When the surety later 
sued the woman, the Reichsgericht determined the recovery 
under German law because the woman had always lived in 
Germany and therefore had to pay there.38 
This surprising conflicts· decision could have been avoided 
by presuming a unitary law. The practical result may be 
strange. Supposing the first surety paid and was subrogated, 
according to his own law, to the creditor, the cosurety, 
reimbursing him partially, may not be subrogated under 
36 BG. (Sept. 23, 1941) 67 BGE. II 215, 220, reported Vol. II p. 435· 
37 Cf. NussBAUM, D. IPR. 268 n. 2. 
ss RG. (Oct. 12, 1905) 61 RGZ. 343, 16 Z.int.R. ( 1906) 324. 
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his law. The debtor would be discharged to such extent, 
contrary to the law governing debt and suretyship. 
3. Conclusion 
Although the legal situation of an accessory codebtor 
may be independently defined in conflicts law, in most cases 
it would be desirable to subordinate it to the law of the prin-
cipal debt.39 More recently, study of the American decisions 
has suggested to Batiffol a general presumption in favor of 
this law. 
At least, in the spirit of the American decisions, we may 
propose such extension when no counterindicia appear in 
the individual cases, in the following situations: 
(a) Where surety and principal enter into obligation, by 
signing the same instrument, or otherwise in common; 
(b) Where the principal debt is governed by the law of 
the creditor's domicil; and we may add as a suggestion-
( c) Where an accessory debtor intervened upon agree-
ment with the principal debtor, to the knowledge of the 
creditor. 
Finally, it may be assumed that, likewise as in the United 
States, 40 bonds required by a state to secure the fidelity or 
aptitude of its servants or compliance with the laws of the 
state by a foreign corporation are exclusively subject to 
the law of that state as are the principal obligations.41 
III. ScoPE oF THE RuLE 
Apart from formalities 42 and capacity, 43 presenting the 
usual problems, the validity, effects, and extinction of guar-
39 FEDOZZ!-CERETI 761; LEWALD 258 advocates the law of the principal 
debtor's domicil. 
40 BAT!FFOL 424 § 523. 
41 See for the United States, supra n. 23, and the observations by 2 MElLI 
44· 
4 2 United States: Allshouse v. Ramsay (1841) 6 Whart. (Pa.) 331; Hallo-
ran v. Schmidt Brewing Co. (1917) 137 Minn. 141, 162 N. Y. 1082. 
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anty or suretyship are controlled by the governing law.44 
Some particulars have been elaborated and may be men-
tioned. We should also notice some intricate questions con-
nected with the fact that statutory regulations of collateral 
obligations usually include the use of defenses belonging to 
the principal debtor and the recourse against the latter. 
Apparently a part of the law of suretyship, these provisions 
go substantially beyond its primary scope. 
1. Extent of Liability 
The law of the guaranty or suretyship, as said before, 
determines the extent to which the legal effect of the prin-
cipal debt influences the liability of the obligor. It decides 
whether an obligor accedes to the debt merely to the extent 
of the debtor's liability, or more independently, either as a 
subsidiary or as an original promisor. Sued by the obligee, 
the promisor may (like a typical guarantor) or may not 
(like an ordinary surety) be entitled to object that the 
creditor should have first attempted enforcement against 
the principal debtor (beneficium excussionis personalis), 
that he indulged in neglect, or that he failed to give notice 
or written notice of the debtor's default to the defendant, 
according to the contract made between the parties and the 
law governing it.45 For it has been universally recognized 
Germany: 9 RGZ. 176; 61 id. 343· 
On intricate special problems cf. MANNL, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 802. 
43 United States: See the well-known decisions on guaranty by married 
women, such as Milliken v. Pratt (1878) 125 Mass. 374, 28 Am. Rep. 241; 
Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Marshall (1899) 108 Ia. 518, 79 N. W. 282; Free-
man's Appeal (1897) 68 Conn. 533, 37 Atl. 420. Cf. Vol. I pp. 103, 182. 
Germany: RG. (July 7, 1903) 13 Z.int.R. (1903) 442, Clunet 1905, 1049. 
44 United States: See lists of cases in 50 C. J. 14. 
Germany: LETZGUS, supra n. 1, 844. 
45 United States: Walker v. Forbes (1857) 31 Ala. 9: guaranty in Louisi-
ana, defense of failure of due diligence dismissed; Toomer v. Dickerson 
(1867) 37 Ga. 428: presumably South Carolina contract, promisee lost a 
pledge of slaves by negligent failure to register them in Georgia, the court 
regards the enforcement against the surety as remedy; Johnson v. Charles 
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since Stort6 that it is a substantive, not a procedural, ques-
tion whether the creditor may sue the principal and surety 
jointly or severally and whether he has to comply with a 
prescribed order of suits. Obviously, it is the contract be-
tween creditor and surety, rather than the contract between 
creditor and debtor, that decides whether the surety bears 
an absolute or conditional liability. 
If the burden of proof regarding the diligence of the 
obligee is regulated in the law of guaranty, this provision 
is also binding. On the same theory, the law of suretyship 
determines whether the surety may assert against the cred-
itor the defenses of the principal.47 
This is obvious but for one point, viz., the faculty of 
the surety to set off a counterclaim belonging to the principal 
debtor. Under the prevailing opinion in the J]nited States, 
a surety sued alone by the creditor is not entitled to such 
setoff except in certain cases, 48 although contrary statutes 
exist. Analogous differences are found in Europe. Like the 
American reasoning that the setoff claim of the debtor can-
not be brought to final decision without his consent, 49 the 
German Code50 is motivated by the consideration that a 
surety may not use another's right without his consent. If 
the contract of suretyship is under ordinary American law, 
"setoff" is undoubtedly excluded. But can it be considered 
to be permitted to a surety bound under French law accord-
D. Norton Co. (C. C. A. 6th 1908) 159 Fed. 361, 363: guaranty executed in 
Ohio but centered in Pennsylvania whose law decides whether it is con-
ditional on pursuing the principal to insolvency. 
Denmark: Landesiiverret Copenhague (Feb. 2, 1885) Clunet 1887, 223. 
Germany: 9 RGZ. 185, 188; 10 id. 282; 34 id. 15; 54 id. 3II, 314. 
4 6Howard v. Fletcher (1879) 59 N.H. 151; STORY§ 322 b; RoLIN, 3 
Principes §§ 1410, 1417; 2 BAR 109. 
47 Germany: RG. (July 6, 1910) 74 RGz: 46. 
48 Note, 46 Yale L. ]. (1937) 833, 842. 
49 Restatement of Security § 133 comment b. 
50 BGB. § 768; Swiss C. Obi. art. 502 (as amended 1941). The surety 
may, however, suspend payment, at least if the creditor can compensate 
against the debtor. See RG. (June 16, 1932) 137 RGZ. 34· 
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ing to the French Code51 when the principal debt follows 
American law? The difficulty is twofold. One involves the 
disposition over the debtor's ownership of a claim. It is 
scarcely possible to leave this question to the law governing 
the suretyship; it rather belongs to the law controlling the 
relationship surety-principal. The other difficulty arises on 
the fundamental theoretical problem which law or laws 
have to be consulted for permitting setoff between persons 
not identical with the original parties to a claim. This prob-
lem of setoff is discussed further in Chapter 51 on setoff. 
2. Paying Surety as Assignee 
According to Roman law and a series of codes, a surety 
is entitled to require, as a condition of his payment to the 
creditor, that the latter assign him the principal debt, com-
monly with the securities attached to it (beneficium ceden-
darum actionum). In common law as well as in the French 
law which is followed by practically all modern codes, the 
debt is transferred to the paying surety by operation of 
law (subrogation) .52 
Either effect of the payment, tending towards a succession 
to the creditor's claim rather than its -discharge, pertains 
to the law governing the suretyship. German decisions are 
precise on this point.53 But doubt arises when such a sub-
rogation is not simultaneously supported by the law of the 
principal debt. This problem must be referred to the doctrine 
of legal assignment.54 
51 C. C. art. I294 par. I. 
Italy: C. C. (I86s) art. I290 par. I, (I942) art. I247 par. x. 
Spain: C. C. art. 1197, etc. 
52 For civil law, see BrAsiO, Der tlbergang der Gliiubigerrechte auf den 
Biirgen und dessen Regressrechte, Gmiirs Abh. (N. F.) No. 211 (I944). 
53 Germany: RG. (April 23, 1903) 54 RGZ. 311, 316, Clunet 1905, 1050; 
and constant practice. On related German and Swiss decisions, see infra 
p. 436 and n. 3· 
54 Infra pp. 436-438. 
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3· Termination 
Extinction of the principal debt, for instance, by setoff 
or release,55 or a bar of limitation on the principal debt, as 
a defense for the surety, 56 affects the latter's obligation in 
correspondence with the law governing the debt. 
Moreover, of course, suretyship has its own limitation 
of action.57 
4· Retribution and Exoneration 
When a surety, after payment to the creditor but without 
obtaining from him subrogation or assignment, seeks to 
recover from the principal debtor, it seems logical that this 
is not part of the law governing suretyship. His claim to 
be discharged after the principal obligation has matured 
is on the same footing. Ordinarily there is a contract be-
tween the debtor and surety such as agency or partnership. 
However, it would often be desirable to have the same law 
govern the recovery as that under which the surety must 
pay. An example of how such a result may be reached was 
set a century ago. 
Illustration. Thomas, a resident of Kentucky, brought an 
alleged slave to Louisiana and there authorized Beckman 
to sell the slave with guaranty of title. This the latter did 
under his own guaranty, but the purchaser was evicted by 
a suit for freedom and had to pay 450 dollars for services 
of the illegally detained person; Beckman was bound to 
5 5 Cf. Howard v. Fletcher (1879) 59 N.H. 151: deferment of maturity of 
the principal debt (in the instant case all three parties resided in Vermont) ; 
RG. (Dec. 17, 1907) 33 Els. L. Z. 314 cited by LEWALD § 317. 
That discharge of the principal by federal bankruptcy proceedings does 
not extend to the surety either under federal or Louisiana surety law, was 
stated in Serra e Hijo v. Hoffman & Co. ( 1878) 30 La. Ann. 67, and with 
respect to a Norwegian bankruptcy and a German surety in OLG. Hamburg 
(Feb. 12, 1903) 6 ROLG. 365. 
56 RG. (July 6, 1910) 74 RGZ. 46: the surety liable under German law 
may invoke the limitation having run for the principal under French law. 
5 7 OLG. Karlsruhe (Nov. 10, 1927) IPRspr. 1928 No. 32. 
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make restitution under Louisiana law, including the dam-
ages. Thomas was held liable to Beckman to the same extent, 
notwithstanding a limitation of liability under the law of 
Kentucky, which was the law of the forum, Thomas "having 
sanctioned the contract, as made." 58 
If the surety intervenes as a voluntary agent, he may 
sue in quasi contract (negotiorum gestio or unjust enrich-
ment), Security Restatement§ 104 (2). Under which law 
he may do so will be mentioned in the next chapter. 
IV. PLuRALITY OF SuRETIEs 
r. Law Common to Cosureties 
Where several obligors contract by common contract, 
they are ordinarily liable under the law of the principal 
debt. Furthermore the law defining their liability to the 
obligee is generally extended to their internal relationship. 
Both propositions are not necessary but convenient, and 
evidently favored by the courts in the case of cosureties. 
Illustrations. ( i) The Alexandria Railroad advanced 
money for construction of a road in Louisiana, whereas its 
partner, the Kansas City Railroad also of Louisiana, pro-
cured an agreement from their members to indemnify the 
Alexandria if the Kansas failed to pay. Although all the 
signers of the guaranty were residents of Kansas, the 
forum, their liability was determined under the law of 
Louisiana, "where the delinquency indemnified against was to 
occur and did occur."59 
(ii) Where three guarantors signed a bond jointly and 
severally for a bank in Laurel, Mississippi, in agreement 
with the cashier, to secure loans made by that bank to a 
Mississippi company, the Louisiana court applied Missis-
58 Thomas v. Beckman (1840) I B. Mon. (40 Ky.) 29. 
59Alexandria, Arcadia & Fort Smith R. R. Co. v. Johnson (1900) 61 
Kan. 417, 59 Pac. 1063, 1064. Cynically, one might note that in thi~ manner 
the residents of the forum were spared the common law liability in solidum. 
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sippi law to determine rights and duties among the co-
guarantors, without further investigation.60 
(iii) A resident of Winnipeg, Manitoba, signed jointly 
with others a written guaranty, dated and apparently ex-
ecuted in Minnesota, to secure a credit given by a Min-
neapolis bank to a corporation doing business there. The 
bank released one guarantor after partial payment. The 
Manitoba court decided according to Minnesota law and 
contrary to its own law that even in the case of joint ob-
ligors release of one of them did not discharge the others. 61 
The German Supreme Court has taken an identical at-
titude to the effect that when the cosureties are bound 
under one law to the creditor, they are presumed to be bound 
under the same law as to contribution among themselves. 62 
2. Different Laws 
Codebtors in the absence of a common source of obliga-
tion, are considered to be subject each to his own law. 63 
According to this principle, the situation of cosureties may 
become complicated. 
In the relation to the creditor, this principle leads to a 
different treatment of the cosureties. 
Illustration. The Swedish Supreme Court had to decide 
the extent of liability of two cosureties, one domiciled in 
Sweden and one in Germany. Determining the applicable 
law according to the places of performance and identifying 
them with the domicils of the debtors, the court held the 
Swedish cosurety liable for a part and the German liable 
jointly and severally for the entire debt.64 
6° Fox v. Corry { 1921) 149 La. 445, 89 So. 410. 
6 1 Scandinavian Amer. Nat') Bank v. Kneeland (1914) 24 Man. R. 168, 
16 D. L. R. 565. 
62 RG. (May 13, 1929) IPRspr. 1929 No. 3· 
63 PARMELE in 2 Wharton 930 A; 2 ZITELMANN 389; 0SER-SCHOENEN-
BERGER, Allgemeine Einleitung No. 92. 
64 See SODERQUIST, Revue 1923, 465. 
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This method of measuring each codebt under its separate 
law, has been declared to be consistent and natural.65 
If this may be taken as the correct view, what is the 
law controlling contribution by cosureties if they are not 
connected by agreement among themselves? A German 
court resorted to the law of the place where the duty of 
contribution should be fulfilled.66 The solution may depend 
on the conflicts rule suitable to extracontractual legal 
obligations. 
V. CuRRENCY REsTRICTIONs 
Can a surety avail himself of the defense that legal or 
factual impossibility of payment has been caused by currency 
restrictions applying either to him or to the principal? The 
question has come up repeatedly and the answer lies, apart 
from stringent public policy, in the dominant role of the 
law governing the debt, 67 which in the case of a surety 
means the law governing suretyship as an independent con-
tract. Correctly, therefore, the Austrian Supreme Court 
has decided for an Austrian surety against the Belgian 
creditor on the ground of the restrictions in the German 
law of Devisen because the suretyship was contracted 
along with the principal debt under German law. 68 The same 
court likewise followed the principle when it did not allow 
a suretyship obligation governed by Austrian law to be 
65 3 FIORE § 1243; 2 MElLI 43 ; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 349 n. 86. Likewise, as it 
seems, RG. (Dec. 6, 1884) 1 Bolze No. 88, cited in the literature, not avail-
able here. 
66 OLG. Hamburg (May 5, 1933) IPRspr. 1933 No. 17. 
In Frew v. Scoular (1917) 101 Neb. 131, 162 N. W. 496, one cosurety seems 
to have been subject to Scottish law, while the court had no opportunity to 
say whether the other, the defendant, was under Nebraska law. The Scottish 
limitation of action had not run its 40 years when the Scottish cosurety paid 
the local creditor; the Nebraska court applied the domestic statute of limita-
tion but assumed that its s-year period began only with the payment. 
67 Supra p. 48. 
68 Austria: OGH. (April 24, 1936) 18 SZ. 211 No. 72. 
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affected by the German restrictions excusing the German 
debtor. 69 
The Swiss Federal Court forcefully sustained this solu-
tion, explaining that the faculty of a surety to use the de-
fenses of the principal debtor is limited to normal excuses 
and does not extend to the abnormal interference of a 
foreign state in political and economic emergency.70 Even 
though a German debtor were discharged under the Ger-
man currency laws, a Swiss surety would be liable according 
to the law of his Swiss place of performance.71 This court, 
moreover, in pursuance of its absolute public policy re-
jecting any resort to foreign measures of economic warfare, 
enforced claims against a surety even when his obligation 
was governed by German law.72 In view of repeated criti-
cism, more recently the court seems to reserve an ultimate 
formulation. 73 It distinguished the case of a discharge ob-
tained by the Italian principal debtor in the clearing pro-
cedure operated between Italy and Belgium in accordance 
with a treaty. Since credit in these proceedings is considered 
full payment, the Swiss surety was entitled to avail himself 
of the defense.74 
69 Austria: OGH. (Sept. 5, 1934) 16 SZ. 447 No. 162. 
70 Switzerland: See the discussion in BG. (Sept. 21, 1937) 63 BGE. II 303, 
3 I I. 
71 BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II 294, 304 ff. 
72 BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II 294, 311 ff; (June 19, 1935) 61 BGE. 
II 181, Revue 1936, 692, S. 1936, 415. 
73 BG. (Sept. 21, 1937) 63 BGE. II 303, 311. 
14 lbid. 
CHAPTER 48 
Extracontractual Obligations 
SOME codifications have stated as a general rule that all obligations arising without contract are governed by the law of the place where the act creating the obli-
gation is done.1 This rule is either trite or wrong. Our con-
flicts rule determines whether we recognize a foreign law 
as the origin of an obligation and the law so recognized 
decides what elements create the obligation. 
Nothing better is achieved by general rules placing "quasi 
contracts" under the law of the place where the obligating 
act is done.2 Quasi contract is not a useful term. From its 
range, three topics require a report on the actual state of 
the doctrine. 
I. VoLUNTARY AGENcY (NEGOTIORUM GEsrw) 3 
In the old doctrine of civil law derived from Roman and 
Byzantine sources, altruistic intervention in the interest of 
another person is considered as a praiseworthy activity, 
suitable to Christian readiness to help. English courts have 
taken the contrary attitude in damning "officious meddling." 
In the United States, this hostility to voluntary taking care 
1 Italy: Disp. Prel. C.C. (1942) art. 25 par. 2. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. II par. 1. 
Rumania: C. C. ( 1940) art. 42. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law (1889) art. 38. Contra, e.g., 
BEVILAQUA, Dir. Int. Priv. 372. 
2 Belgian Congo: C. C. art. II par. 3· 
Spanish Morocco: Dahir of 1914, art. 21. 
Tangier: Dahir of 1925, art. 16 par. 2. 
C6digo Bustamante, art. 222. 
3 Comparative municipal law, American and Roman laws: HEILMAN, 
"Rights of the Voluntary Agent Against His Principal in Roman Law and 
in Anglo-American Law," 4 Tenn. L. Rev. (1926) 34-54, 76-95. 
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of the business of another has been maintained in principle, 
but it is riddled with a great many exceptions. Occasion-
ally, American law has been more generous than certain 
civilian doctrines. Where there is a duty implied by law to 
preserve human life or property, the work and labor spent 
to this end may be compensable in American courts, a result 
not always reached by German courts. 4 
Due to the contrasts in history and development, it is 
understandable that the conflicts problems of this subject 
have been discussed almost exclusively in the Continental 
literature. 
1. Usual Conflicts Theories 
The traditional doctrine, basically territorial in its origin, 
has split on a systematic question. Roman law establishes 
two actions. The actio directa belongs to the person in 
whose business or sphere the intervention occurred, the 
dominus negotii, and is directed to recovery of the gain the 
gestor may have made and of the damage he may have 
caused by negligence. By the actio contraria, the acting 
person, if conditions are present, sues for restitution of ex-
penses. Writers regarding the existence of these two actions 
as the only effect of voluntary intervention concluded that 
each action had its own law. The direct action would be 
localized at the place where the act of interference is done, 
and the counterclaim would be governed by the law of the 
principal. When, to the contrary, the medieval construction 
4 HEILMAN, supra n. 3, at 83 ff.; American Law Institute, SEAVEY and 
ScOIT, Notes on Certain Important Sections of Restatement of Restitution 
171 ff. § 117. 
Germany: The problem whether more than expenses is recoverable, has 
been controversial. OLG. Celie (Nov. 10, 1905) 12 ROLG. 272 and OLG. 
Kiel (Oct. 9, 1906) 18 id. 22 granted physicians' fees, characterizing labor 
spent by a professional man as expenses. In ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN, 2 Derecho 
de obligaciones (Recht der Schuldverhiiltnisse, translation by PEREZ 
GONZALES y ALGUER, 1933) 353, note to § 164, it is noted that in Spain 
probably all useful expenditures may be recovered. 
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of the actions as flowing from a phenomenon similar to a 
contract, a quasi contract, was followed, the entire effects 
were subjected to a single law.5 With various motivations, 
the modern theory has preferred the latter result. The ap-
plicable law has been ·found in the place where the agent 
accomplishes his intervention. 6 
In one opinion, however, exceptions are made in case 
the agent takes care of an entire unity of assets; in the 
absence of a single place of acting the law of the principal 
should be stressed. 7 
On the other hand, the domicil of the principal has been 
indicated as the dominating contact because his interest 
prevails in the institution.8 
2. Distinctions 
Some authors have noticed that the circumstances of the 
cases must be considered.9 In this view, where a contractual 
relation connects the principal and agent, the law governing 
the contract must extend to the effects of acts by the agent 
that exceed his authority.10 This is the correct point of view 
and should be enlarged to include any preceding contractual 
or legal relationship. 
5 For the first opinion, REGELSBERGER, Pandekten I75 and n. (g); 2 MElLI 
86; WEISS, 4 Traite 4I3; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 395· Contra: PILLET, 2 Traite 3IO f. 
(nationality of the principal); POULLET 352 f.; PACCHIONI 332 f.; SAUSER-
HALL, 44 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (I925) 296a. The same result is based on 
the presumptive intention of the agent by RoLIN, I Principes §§ 358, 362; 
3 id. § I059 f.; contra: 2 ARMIN JON § II8, e.g., BusTAMANTE, 2 Der. Int. 
Priv. 3I2. 
6 China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 24. 
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. II par. I. 
C6digo Bustamante, art. 220. 
See e.g., FIORE, Clunet I900, 458; Note, RICCI-BUZATTI, I Rivista ( I906) 
213; PILLET, 2 Traite 3I0 § 547 bis. 
7 PILLET, 2 Traite 3II; 2 ARMINJON § II8. 
8 NussBAUM, D. IPR. 295 and n. 3 in fine; Swiss BG. (Nov. 25, I905) 3I 
BGE. II 662, 665. 
9 NEUMEYER, IPR. 32; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 394 n. 44· 
10 See in particular, M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 507 § 48I. 
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After the First World War, it was a situation familiar to 
the mixed arbitral tribunals that a contract involving some 
kind of custody-sale, agency, bailment, etc.-was deemed 
retroactively dissolved by the Treaty of Versailles as of 
the time when the parties became enemies, but the custodian 
had continued to act during the war. This was done either 
in his own interest on the basis of the contract or to safe-
guard the interest of the other party. In the latter case, his 
acting, deprived of its contractual foundation, could be con-
strued as voluntary agency. Acting in self-interest could 
possibly constitute a so-called quasi negotiorum gestio, that 
is, intervention of a person in the business of another person 
in the belief that it is his own.11 The mixed arbitral tribunals 
were first inclined to deny a German party any excuse for 
continuing to act, but finally considered the war period of 
suspension as a sequel to the contract. Hence, the law gov-
erning the contract extended to the additional relationship. 
The same result obtained ex fortiori when the contract 
remained in force by exception. 
Illustration. A Rumanian firm before the war deposited 
ten oil tank cars with a German firm. This contract was not 
dissolved by the Treaty. At a time when it seemed reason-
able, the cars were sold in the interest of the owner but 
with loss. The court justified the application of German 
law to the contract of deposit and concluded without any 
question that the German provisions on negotiorum gestio 
should be applied.12 
If the German firm would have had to sell the cars in 
Belgium, it would be absurd to apply Belgian law. Suppose 
the contract had been dissolved by the war. The extension 
11 Germany: BGB. § 687, applied by Gerrnano-Belgian Mixed Arb. Trib. 
(May 27, 1924) Pres. Moriaud, Sturbelle v. Netter, 4 Recueil trib. arb. 
rnixtes 342, 345· 
12 Rurnano-Gerrnan Mixed Arb. Trib. (Jan. 11, 1929) Pres. Fazy, 8 Recueil 
trib. arb. rnixtes 917, 921. 
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of the law governing the former contract would be equally 
satisfactory. 
3· Maritime Assistance and Salvage 
When in a famous dictum, Lord Bowen formulated the 
aversion of common law to voluntary agency, he contrasted 
the principle, "liabilities are not to be forced upon people 
behind their backs," with the recognized exceptions of mari-
time law as to salvage, general average, and contribution.13 
Despite the universal background of general maritime law, 
however, national differences in the treatment of assist-
ance and salvage were numerous, and conflicts theories 
abounded,u while very few laws attempted a solution.15 The 
multilateral Brussels Convention of September 23, 1910, 
adopted by the United States and many other countries,16 
has eliminated most, though not all, conflicts among the 
participant powers and is applied in member states even 
though the other state involved is not a member.17 Some 
conflicts rules are included in the Convention.18 
Remaining problems seem to be considered subject to the 
lex fori as general maritime law when jurisdiction is taken 
in an English or American admiralty court. In civil law 
they are at present prevailingly treated by the law of the 
flag if it is common to both parties,19 and otherwise by the 
13 Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co. (I886) 34 Ch. D. 234, 248. 
14 For surveys, see 2 Repert. (I929) 69 ff.; 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 338 ns. 2-7; 
2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 268; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 553 ff. 
15 Portugal: C. Com. art. 690 is known as an exception. 
16 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating 
to the Salvage of Vessels at Sea, 37 Stat. I658, I667; The Salvage Act, I9I2, 
37 Stat. 242, 46 U. S. C. §§ 727-73I, BENEDICT, 6 American Admiralty 200. 
17 Art. I5. 
On the distinction between contractual and extracontractual duties, see 
LE BRUN, "Assistance, sauvetage et obligation de service," I Revue Trim. D. 
Com. ( I948) 388. 
18 Arts. 6 par. 1, 9 par. I, 10 par. 2, I5 par. 2. 
19 Germany: RG. (June I5, I927) II7 RGZ. 249. 
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
national law in force in territorial waters.20 But where 
the act occurs on the high seas, or begins there and termi-
nates in a port, the opinions are extremely divided. 21 
A convention on assistance and salvage of aircraft, of 
Brussels, 1938, has not gathered sufficient ratifications.22 
The efforts to fill the gaps of unification are being continued. 
II. UNJUST ENRICHMENT 23 
A. IN GENERAL 
Restitution of enrichment obtained without just cause, 
a favorite of Justinian's compilators and of the Continental 
common practice at the time of the natural law, has found 
its most complete development in the German Civil Code 
and comments, and recently in the American Restatement 
of Restitution. An enormous mass of apparently hetero-
geneous situations is covered thereby. In France and other 
20 Portugal: C. Com. art. 690. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Com. Navigation ( 1940) art. 12; DIENA, 3 
Dir. Com. Int. 396; WEiss, 3 Traite 413 n. 2. 
21 Particularly: Law of the salvaging vessel, or of the salvaged vessel, 
or [ex fori. See for France, DESPAGNET 931; 2 ARMIN JON (ed. 2) 338; RIPERT, 
3 Droit Marit. § 2207; 2 Repert. 72 f; NIBOYET, 54 Traite 506. 
For Germany: NEUMEYER, IPR. 33, incorrectly opposed by 2 FRANKENSTEIN 
558 n. 226. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Com. N avig. ( 1940) art. 12 applies the law 
of the flag of the salvaging vessel. 
22 See 1 Int. L. Q. ( 1947) 505, and the Convention Draft of September 28, 
1938 in BENEDICT, 6 American Admiralty 203. 
Guatemala has ratified, see MATOS 566. 
23 Comparative writing on municipal laws: FRIEDMANN, Die Bereicher-
ungshaftung im anglo-amerikanischen Rechtskreis ( 1930) ; id., "The Prin-
ciple of Unjust Enrichment," 16 Can. Bar Rev. (1938) 243, 365; GuTTERIDGE 
and DAVID, "The Doctrine of Unjustified Enrichment," 5 Cambr. L. J. (1934) 
204. Instructive with respect to the divergence of American and English laws, 
ScoTT and SEAVEY, "Restitution," 54 Law Q. Rev. (1938) 29. A compre-
hensive, comparative article in 7 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch is not 
available. 
Comparative conflicts law: surveys of literary opinions have been afforded 
by GuTTERIDGE and LIPSTEIN, "Conflicts of Law in matters of Unjustifiable 
Enrichment," 7 Cambr. L. J. ( 1941) So; Anon., xo Repert 776; FICKER, 4 
Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch (1929) 387; and most Continental and Latin-
American treatises. There is not even accord among these reports about the 
views attributable to the sketchy treatment by writers. 
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civil law countries, the codes have prevailingly restricted 
their attention to condictio indebiti, the recovery of a pay-
ment not due, which is therefore alone considered in the 
bulk of the conflicts literature, while the more recent French 
doctrine using the name of action de in rem verso 24 has been 
scarcely noted. The English action of indebitatus assumpsit 
produced in an early period the actions for money had and 
received and quantum meruit, with an important though by 
no means exhaustive scope. 
Heavy problems burden not only the less advanced 
theories of unjust enrichment; new problems arise with 
elaboration of the system. At the same time the slowly 
growing popularity of the subject multiplies the cases re-
vealing divergent solutions. 
The differences are caused much more by legal intricacies 
of technique than by contrasting ideas of justice. But there 
exist also divergencies of the latter kind. Although the entire 
institution rests everywhere upon equity, the concept of 
equity varies. If, for instance, someone in the mistaken 
belief that he owns a motor car, causes it to be painted, in 
this country it is thought unfair to let him have compensa-
tion for the plus value of the car ;25 in this special case 
Romanistic doctrine does not even need the action for 
unjust enrichment since compensation is provided by the 
principles of vindication.26 
In conflicts literature, including the Restatement, the 
subject has often been discussed, but in an offhand manner 
until very recently when the real problem was discovered. 
But only tentative propositions in illustrative cases have 
been advanced. A promising study on the same basis of 
24 With more justification, the Austrian doctrine has taken § 1041, Allg. 
BGB. as the starting point for developing a modern actio de in rem verso 
different from the action based on enrichment. (A good illustration of the 
distinction: 97 RGZ. 61 at 65.) 
25 ScOIT and SEAVY, "Restitution," 54 Law Q. Rev. (1938) 29 at 36. 
26 German BGB. § 996; cf. § 818 par. 2. 
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comparative research as underlies the present work is 
announced, 27 and should provide the needed monograph 
for which the following remarks are no substitute. 
Judicial decisions have been declared missing m the 
United States and England.28 Few are available on the 
Continent. 
At least it is certain that however narrow the domestic 
scope of unjust enrichment may be, foreign application of 
this institution is definitely recognized. With regard to the 
peculiar English treatment of foreign tort actions, it has 
been noted that recovery of values based on an applicable 
foreign law of unjust enrichment is enforceable without 
requiring an English parallel. This thesis finds support in 
a decision of the Court of AppeaU9 
B. THE CONFLICTS THEORIES 
1. Connection with a Fact 
(a) Place of enriching act. In Belgian and French litera-
ture it has often been proclaimed that the decisive place is 
where the defendant completes the acquisition said to be 
his enrichment. Thus the law of the place where a sum not 
due is paid governs its recovery. This widely held,30 though 
27 By Professor KoNRAD ZwEIGERT in Tiibingen who defines his method in 
an article "Bereicherungsanspriiche im internationalen Privatrecht," 2 Siid-
deutsche J uristen-Zeitung ( I947) 247· 
28 2 BEALE I429; GUTTERIDGE, 7 Cambr. L. ]., supra n. 23, at 82. Universal 
Credit Co. v. Marks (I933) I64 Md. I30, I63 At!. 8Io, 8I6 does not speak 
of an obligation but only of a burden to pay unless a lien be lost under Mary-
land law. 
29 Batthyany v. Walford (I887} 36 Ch. D. 269; GuTTERIDGE, supra n. 23, 
83 f. (the case mentioned awakens my early personal memory since my father 
was one of the plaintiff prince's experts heard by the court on the law of 
family fideicommisses). 
BO Belgium: RoLIN, I Principes 568 § 362; POULLET § 3 I5. 
Brazil: BEVILACQUA 371. 
France: I FOELIX 238; BARTIN, I Principes 187; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 
§ 252; BATIFFOL, Traite 564 § 564. 
Italy: CERETI, Obblig. § 76. 
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. II par. 1. 
Switzerland: BG. (June 5, I886} I2 BGE. 339, 342, Clunet I889, 350; (April 
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by no means overwhelmingly supported, 31 rule has Been 
readily adopted by Beale and the Restatement. In two 
obscurely related sections the Restatement32 asserts, re-
garding "benefits or other enrichment,"33 that the law of 
the place where a benefit is conferred or unjust enrichment 
is rendered, determines compensation or repayment. The 
illustrations show that this means the place of a physical act. 
In England, Gutteridge, as the first to take a stand in 
that country, 34 has adhered to this view. 
Various codifications include this rule in their broader 
provisions. 35 
It should be noted that in the few known cases decided 
by courts, all possible theories usually coincide in the result. 
But the basis of this idea is obvious. Trying to localize the 
action of enrichment and missing another purely material 
attachment to a territory, the authors believed that they 
were compelled to select the place of the act of enrichment. 
Territorialism so practiced was naturally attractive to 
Beale. 
A Belgian-French group of writers has argued that resti-
tution of payment of money not due, as based on a "quasi 
contract, " 36 or "rather a quasi delict, " 37 allows a presump-
tion of party intention for an applicable law. This, again, 
has led to the place where the sum is paid. 
(b) Other connections. Many contacts have been con-
28, 1900) 26 BGE. II 268, 272; (Nov. 25, 1905) 31 id. II 66o, 665; 2 MElLI 
86; 2 BRaCHER 138; FRITZSCHE, 44 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (1925) 243a; 
SAUSER-HALL, id. 295a; 2 ScHNITZER 549· 
C6digo Bustamante, art. 221. 
31 This is also the conclusion of ESPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 534 § 236: "Niio 
existe acordo"; 3 Vrco 128 § 146: "Son diversas las soluciones propuestas . 
. . . " Otherwise, LIPSTEIN, 7 Cambr. L. ]., supra n. 23, at 86 and n. 11. 
32 Restatement §§ 452, 453· 
33 Thus 2 BEALE 1429 § 452.1 formulates the common topic of §§ 452, 453· 
34 Supra n. 23. 
35 See supra ns. 1 and 2. 
36 8 LAURENT 8 j WEISS, 4 Traite 415 n. I. 
37 DESPAGNET 934 § 321. 
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sidered such as the nationality common to both parties,38 
or the nationality39 or the domicil40 of the defendant, or the 
place where he has to make restitution of the enrichment, 41 
which is usually both his domicil and the place of enrich-
ment. The lex fori has also found an advocate.42 
All these haphazard theories have no following. Their 
feeble justification, however, consists in the grave doubt 
inherent in the theory under (a), concerning exactly what 
event should make the alleged territorial contact. It is 
generally assumed that it is the enrichment of the defendant 
rather than the impoverishment of the plaintiff which must 
be localized. But when in a case before the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal a draft was paid in Paris by mistake of the local 
cashier43 of a certain bank, the enrichment of the defendant, 
a Swiss bank, must have occurred at his domicil, the center 
of his assets, and not in Paris as the court assumed. In fact, 
a subsequent decision of the same Swiss court applies "the 
law of the place where the enrichment is said to have oc-
curred, hence, as a rule, at the place of the domicil of the 
acquirer. " 44 
2. Law of the Relationship Causing Enrichment 
Should it not be feasible to localize internationally the 
duty of restitution by contemplating the legal origin of the 
enrichment, rather than its territorial origin or the vicissi-
38 LAURENT and WEiss, supra n. 34· RoLIN, I Principes 566 § 36o; PoULLET 
467; C6digo Bustamante, art. 22I (common personal law); 2 PoNTES DE 
MIRANDA I 84. 
39 2 ZITELMANN 528. 
40 GEBHARD in Niemeyer, Vorgeschichte I 56; WALKER 546. 
41Germany: RG. (Nov. 8, I9o6) I8 Z. int. R. (I9o8) 159; (July 5, 1910) 
74 RGZ. I7I; (March 16, I928) 82 Seuff. Arch. 205 No. IZI, IPRspr. I928, 58 
No. 37; (July 7, I932) IPRspr. I932 No. 39; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 384, 392; 
NussBAUM, D. IPR. 294. 
42 VALERY 970 § 67I; Cour Paris (May I8, 1893) Clunet I893, 827; App. 
Alger (May 5, I896) D. I899.2-4I2. 
43 BG. (April 28, 1900) 26 BGE. II 268. 
4 4 BG. (Nov. 25, 1905) 3I BGE. II 662, 665. 
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tudes of its future development? Despite all the variety 
in the laws respecting the conditions of a duty of restitu-
tion, there is a common pattern. Whatever else motivates a 
law to recognize a claim for unjust enrichment, the aim is 
always to disallow on account of some initial or subsequent 
vice an acquisition duly made in accordance with the formal 
laws. Following this common idea and neglecting the tech-
nical differences by which the systems of law operate, our 
attention moves back to the various situations that need 
correction. No mechanically ascertainable contact is ade-
quate for all cases. Choice of law must depend on the nature 
of the source from which the enrichment stems. 
This experience has slowly emerged from frequent though 
casual observations that all legal obligations cannot be 
bound to one territorial connection, 45 and gradual aware-
ness that in particular the law governing a frustrated con-
tract should extend to the actions enforcing the return of 
a performance made on the contract. Niemeyer and N euner46 
in Germany, and with respect to undue payment Pillet and 
Arminjon47 in France, have prepared an appropriate theory, 
now tentatively but with increasing assurance expressed by 
the most recent German authors, particularly Martin 
Wolff, Raape, and Zweigert.48 Various German decisions 
have followed the same view.49 At the same time, the 
British Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, has 
instinctively chosen an identical method. The new law pre-
scribes restitution of all sums paid in pursuance of a con-
tract discharged by impossibility of performance or other 
45 E.g., z ARMIN JON (ed. z) 335; xo Repert. 776 No. z. 
46 NIEMEYER, Vorschliige und Materialien zur Kodifikation des IPR. ( 1895) 
244;NEUNER, z Z.ausi.PR.(x928) 122 n. 1. 
47 PILLET, 2 Traite 311 § 547a; z ARMINJON (ed. 2) 338. 
48 GUTZWILLER 1623; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 295 n. 2; M. WoLFF, D. IPR. 104; 
id., Priv. Int. Law 505 If.§ 481; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 267; RAPPE, 2 D. 1PR. 
296 f.; ZWEIGERT, supra n. Z7· 
49 Bay. ObLG. (Nov. x6, x88z) 38 Seuff. Arch. z6o; RG. (June 18, x887) 
4 Bolze No. 26 (unavailable); and citations of recent decisions below. 
14 
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frustration, and applies to contracts "governed by English 
law." The place where the sum is paid, thus, is without 
importance. Although this deviation fr9m the orthodox 
criterion has been criticized by some writers, it has been 
welcomed and extensively interpreted by Falconbridge.50 
Also, the draftsmen of the revised draft of the Monte-
video Treaty (art. 43) in 1940, must have felt in a similar 
way. To the rule that obligations arising without contract 
are governed by the law of the place where the "licit or 
illicit fact" occurs, they add the words: "and in an appro-
priate case, by the law governing the legal relations to 
which they correspond." 
This approach will doubtless be improved by thorough 
exploration. Here we may briefly contemplate the theo-
retical ground and a few typical applications. 
C. RATIONALE 
1. Theoretical Approach 
It is generally agreed that the question whether an en-
richment is justified must be determined by the law under 
which its acquisition takes effect.51 It is submitted that the 
same law governs the action for restitution as a whole. 
Suppose a seller has delivered the goods but rescinded 
the contract because of the buyer's default. This means in 
American and German laws the destruction of the contract. 
If he, then, sues for the return of the goods on the theory 
of unjust enrichment (rather than of ownership), the pro-
visions on enrichment of the legal system governing the 
contract must apply. It is quite true that the enrichment is 
50 See Vol. II pp. 540 f.; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 355, 366; MoRRIS, 
"The Choice of Law Clause in Statutes," 62 Law Q. Rev. (I946) I7o, I8o 
in case of frustration of a contract. 
51 GEBHARD in Niemeyer, Vorgeschichte I 56 n. I; PILLET, 2 Traite 3II; 
ROLIN, 3 Principes 62; 2 ZITELMANN I94, 525; NEUMEYER, IPR. (ed. I) 32; 
2 FRANKENSTEIN 392 n. 32. 
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unjust only because the contract has ceased to exist. But if 
it has been therefore objected that it is "illogical" to extend 
the law of the former contract to its sequelae, 52 this is the 
typical wrong logic by which it has been declared impossible 
that the formation of a contract should be governed by the 
law applicable if the contract is valid.53 
Any comparison of the municipal systems shows that 
restitution on the ground of failure of consideration is 
afforded by different technical means, such as a claim of 
ownership reverting to the seller; a "condictio" or claim 
for unjust enrichment properly termed; an action inter-
mediate between those for enrichment and breach; or a 
remedy sounding purely in contract. Even the elaborate 
German Civil_Code has failed to make it clear to what cate-
gory exactly the action based on recission belongs.54 It is 
imperative to subject all of these-merely with certain 
reservations concerning property-to one conflicts rule. 
Where ownership is transferred irrespective of the validity 
of the sales or other contract, as may occur under German 
law, the absence of the presupposed cause leads to unjust 
enrichment. Since the transfer was caused by the contract-
one might say, was done to satisfy the law of the contract-
this law ought to determine what should happen to restore 
balance. The law of the place of transfer has no importance 
whatever. 
Even when a contract is termed void ab initio or by annul-
ment, this is proper juridical language, but it should not 
be stressed too literally. There may be an aftereffect, such 
as when damages for fault in contracting or innocent rep-
resentation are recoverable; without any doubt they are 
subject to contract rules.55 There is no obstacle in theory to 
52 2 SCHNITZER 549 verbally followed by LIPSTEIN, 7 Cambr. L. J., supra 
n. 23, 86. 
53 Vol. 1 p. 69; Vol. II p. 521 n. 17. 
54 See the commentaries to BGB. §§ 327, 348. 
55 RABEL, 27 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 291. 
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applying the law of such a contract t? actions for return 
of performance. The common law doctrine of constructive 
trust is commonly applied where there is a violation of a 
fiduciary relationship. The unjust enrichment of the agent 
should therefore be subjected to the law governing the 
relationship and not necessarily to that of the place of the 
enriching act. 
That a contractual debtor pays more than he finally is 
found to owe, is an analogous occurrence. Where a seller 
delivers more goods than he should and the surplus quantity 
is finally rejected, ownership may or may not have passed, 
according to the system and the circumstances. No distinc-
tion in this respect can be made in a conflicts rule concerning 
the obligatory claim. We may, however, even go farther. 
A claim for violation of a legal or beneficial property 
right is commonly regarded in isolation; and therefore, no 
local contact seems possible other than the lex situs. But 
the relationship between the parties may not be so simple. 
A distinct example is the resulting trust at common law; a 
legal transfer of property in the absence of consideration is 
understood to create, by a tacit agreement, an obligation to 
return the beneficial interest therein. Is the lex situs com-
petent to govern this construction or rather the law con-
trolling the transaction of the parties? 
Inversely, ownership or any property interest may vanish, 
leaving an obligation for restitution. Of such nature is in-
nocent conversion at civil law where it is conceived as unjust 
enrichment rather than as tort. For instance, Justinian-
to show himself as the protector of art-ending an old 
school controversy, adopted the opinion that a table used 
for painting but belonging to another person, should become 
the property of the artist who, however, ought to pay the 
value of the table to the former owner. 56 These are two 
56 Inst. Just. 2, I, 34, incorporating Gai. Inst. II 78, cf. GArus, Dig. 4I, I, 9, 
§ 2; PAULUS, Dig. 6, I, 23, § 3· 
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parts of one solution and cannot be divided between two 
laws. The lex situs, indispensable for the disposition of 
property, hence, must also furnish the rule on enrichment. 
If goods have been shipped to Rio de Janeiro and there 
delivered to a wrong address, viz., to the local agent of a 
New York firm, enrichment is probably deemed to occur in 
New York, but Brazilian law must govern. It decides 
whether, at what time, and to whom, property passes and 
ought also to determine what duty of restitution burdens 
the new owner. 
2. Historical Reminder 
It is a curious observation that juridical elaboration of 
our system may tempt us to overestimate the value of the 
differentiation of categories brought about by our pro-
fessional development. We should not forget that all direct 
and indirect effects of agreement have originated upon one 
basis, first of tort, later of contract. The Roman classic 
process formula of actio certae creditae pecuniae served 
for the recovery of a valid loan but, if the contract was 
void, for instance, because the borrower was a lunatic, or 
because he was in error about the person of the lender, 
the same formula was good for the repayment of the enrich-
ment. 57 The same formal writ used for ages in England to 
enforce repayment of a loan was employed when the money 
given appeared to belong to the plaintiff without a recog-
nized type of contract or tort.58 The primitive notion that 
the lender may claim "my money," recurs to this day. "Debt" 
is really detinue, as the Roman condictio is based on non-
justified habere. Our ineluctable division between property 
and obligations is not meant to establish barriers separating 
naturally connected problems. Conflicts law must rigorously 
strive to avoid this danger. 
57 ]ULIANUs, Dig. 12, I, I9, § I (despite interpolation); CELSUS, Dig. 12, 
I, 32. 
58 8 HoLDSWORTH 88, 92. 
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D. ILLUSTRATIONS 
1. Family Law 
A German recognized in Switzerland his paternity of 
certain children. He sued for revocation of the recognition 
as unjustly obtained by deceit ( BGB. § 8 12 par. 2). A Ger-
man court correctly applied Swiss law to this claim.59 
2. Rescission and Avoidance of Contract 
( i) A buyer not paying the price has to restore the goods 
on the request of the seller, because the return is implied 
in the synallagma, that is, the exchange of price and de-
livery, essential to sale. Hence, the law governing the sales 
contract extends to the action for restitution, however it 
may be legally construed. 
(ii) Dissolution of contracts by war. The Treaty of 
Versailles dissolved contracts between persons having be-
come enemies, with certain exceptions. What became of a 
partial performance by one party? Judge Algot Bagge as 
president of a division of the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal ascertained that under German and Scotch laws 
an action would lie for recovery as unjust enrichment, but 
that in England under the rule of Chandler v. Webster60 
the acts of performance done before the dissolution were 
not recoverable. To escape such different results, under the 
Treaty, Bagge decided that the Treaty must have intended 
to recognize and maintain a money obligation for restitu-
tion every time the parties had not distributed the risks 
otherwise. 61 Thus he rightly took it for granted that resti-
tution of a performance is essentially connected with the 
law destroying the basis of the obligation. In several de-
cisions by another Swedish president, a division of the same 
court turned to the application of the national law of un-
59 LG. Frankfurt (Aug. 17, 1932) IPRspr. 1933, 105 No. 48. 
60 [1904] r K. B. 493-but overruled by the Fibrosa Case and the Act of 
1943, see Vol. II p. 541. 
61 Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (Jan. 19, 1926) Burroughs Wellcome 
& Co. v. Chemi'sche Fabrik auf Aktien, 6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 13, r6. 
Followed by British-Turkish Mixed Arb. Trib. (Dec. 19, 1928) Gouv. Turc 
v. Armstrong Whitworth & Co. Ltd. et Vickers Ltd., 8 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes 996, 1001. 
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just enrichment, but this, again, was in all cases taken from 
the system governing the contract. 62 The same question 
of whether a claim for the repayment of advances made in 
performance of contracts is implied in the peace treaty 
dissolving contracts or to be based on the applicable na-
tional law, has recurred under the obscure texts of the five 
peace treaties of 1947.63 
3· Performance Without Just Cause-Upon an Assumed 
Pre-existing Obligation 
( i) Suppose a legacy left by a testator domiciled in 
Argentina to a citizen of New Orleans is paid to him in 
New York. The Argentine law of inheritance competent 
to state whether a valid legacy obligation exists, is the right 
law also to determine the effects of payment in case of 
avoidance of the legacy. What import has the place of pay-
ment or the domicil of the receiving person ?64 
(ii) Before 1900, A, in a place under Prussian law, hav-
ing bought a house in Brunswick from a vendor domiciled 
there, paid more than he owed, by a payment in Magde-
burg, a place under common law. The sale was naturally 
governed by the lex situs (Brunswick) and rightly the 
Reichsgericht applied the same law to the limitation of 
action for the repayment of that which was not due. It 
should not have invoked the place of performance, but it 
was right in pointing to the connection between the seller's 
duty to repay and his contractual obligations.65 The place of 
payment was immaterial. 
(iii) A German company, owner of a German-registered 
steamer, created a first mortgage in Dutch currency to a 
Dutch firm. The vessel was sold at auction in England, and 
62 Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. President Klaestad (July 21, 1926) 
Alexander Davidson v. Gebriider Dammann, 6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 
588; (Oct. 20, 1926) Arnold and Foster, Ltd. v. J. W. Erkens, 6 id. 6o6; 
(Dec. r, 1926) The Dunderland Iron Ore Co., Ltd. v. Friedr. Krupp A. G. 
6 id. 639; and in 7 id. 372, 375, 379, 418, 493; 8 id. 7, 283. 
6a For the first construction, MARTIN, "Private Property etc. in the Paris 
Peace Treaties," 24 Brit. Year Book Int. Law 273, 297 n. 6; for the second, 
ERNST WoLFF repeatedly, and most recently in his book, Vorkriegsvertrage 
in Friedensvertragen ( 1949) ror. 
64 RAAPE, D. IPR. 296 (2) b. 
65 RG. (July 5, 1910) 74 RGZ. 171. 
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the Dutch mortgagee-under an English rule deemed to 
be substantive-received the amount of the mortgage by 
conversion of the guilders into pounds according to the 
exchange rate of the day of the creation of the mortgage. 
The Hamburg Appeal Court stated that the loan and mort-
gage contract expressly stipulated for German law and as 
this law included a rule for conversion according to the date 
of payment, it extended to the claim for unjust enrichment 
to recover whatever excess had been paid in England.66 
4· Without an Assumed Pre-existing Obligation 
(i) A German firm assigned all its claims, arising from 
sales to Dutch customers, to a German bank for security 
of credit, but subsequently assigned one of the Dutch drafts 
involved to another German firm. The first assignee ob-
tained restitution from the second under a German rule 
applicable, as the court said, under all conflicts theories 
concerning enrichment.67 But the decision could not have 
been different, if the second assignee had received the draft 
by indorsement in Holland or had cashed it there. Nor is 
the circumstance that both assignees were nationals and 
domiciliaries of Germany of any significance. The real rea-
son for acknowledging the right of the plaintiff was the 
priority of his claim against the debtor (according to the 
law of the assignor's domicil) 68 effective in the field of en-
richment even after he lost the claim. 
( ii) If a surety has entered into his obligation without 
agreement with the principal debtor and by payment is not 
subrogated in the principal debt, he may have a claim on 
the ground of unjust enrichment against the debtor-accord-
ing to what law? The traditional opinions point to the places 
either where the surety paid or wherever he could pay, or 
where the debtor is enriched by liberation, probably at his 
domicil.69 But as generally in suretyship matters, it is de-
66 OLG. Hamburg (May IS, I9Z9) Hans. RGZ. I9Z9 B No. 227, IPRspr. 
I929, 74 No. 51. 
67 RG. (July 7, I932) IPRspr. I932 No. 39, cf. BGB. § 8I6 par. 2. Cf. an 
analogous case of wrong delivery of a cargo, OLG. Hamburg (July I, 1932) 
id. No. 40· 
ss Infra Ch. 49· 
69 Thus FEDOZZI-CERETI 764. 
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sirable to apply the law under which the surety is liable, 
which wherever feasible70 is to be identified with the law 
of the principal debt. 
III. GENERAL AvERAGE 
From ancient times the sacrifice of goods carried on the 
seas in order to save other goods and particularly the 
vessel has produced rules for equitable distribution of the 
loss. The underlying idea is at present regarded as the 
community of risk involved in a sea carriage rather than 
unjust enrichJTient. 71 A common legal history has not pre-
vented, however, a great many differences of regulations, 
accompanied by a chaos of conflicts rules. Unification was 
therefore early sought by the International Law Association 
at the Congresses of York, r 864, and Antwerp, 1877, with 
the resulting rules, reformed at Stockholm, 1924.72 These 
"York-Antwerp Rules" have obtained almost universal 
force by insertion or reference in bills of lading and con-
tracts of affreightment. Such a clause may run as in the 
Argentine governmental form: General average is subject 
to the York-Antwerp Rules, 1924, and insofar as these do 
not decide, to the Argentine Commercial Code and usage. 
The place of the adjustment will be Buenos Aires and the 
carrier will appoint the adjuster or adjusters. 73 
Unfortunately, some forms still refer to the older draft 
of the Rules, and even the rules of 1924, though more com-
70 Supra Ch. 47, III, I, I'· 352. 
71 L. MassA, 2 Derecho mercantil (1940) 549 (Spanish ed. of Diritto com-
merciale) and cited authors. 
72 Reports of the 33rd Conference (1925) 670 ff.; BENEDICT, 6 American 
Admiralty 334; CROUVES, 2 Repert. 269 ff. Revision of the Convention was 
begun at the Conference of the Comite Maritime in Antwerp, on September 
24> 1947· 
73 Rep. Argentina, Ministerio de Marina, Admin. Gen. de la Flota Mer-
cante del Estado, s. 34, printed in MALVAGNI, Curso de derecho de la nave-
gacion ( 1946) (Pocket Ann.). For analogous clauses recommended in the 
United States, see BENEDICT, 6 American Admiralty 346; KNAUTH, Ocean 
Bills of Lading (ed. 3) 253· 
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plete, have left gaps and are not used for every carriage. 
Hence there is still great force in the age-old principle that 
the adjustment of the claims should be made at the port 
of destination, or in case the voyage cannot be carried to 
its end, the port of refuge where ship and goods are sepa-
rated.74 Some formulations use less distinctive indications, 
such as the Portuguese Code referring to the port "where 
the goods will be delivered.m5 
Many writers have attacked this very old practice and 
favored the law of the flag or the law of the contract. 76 
Their arguments are rather deceptive. Nor is the customary 
rule to be explained as lex loci solutionis or on some other 
theory. It is simply the practical need that points to the 
14United States: Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, Jones & Tidy (I930) 
28I U. S. SIS; and cases cited by 2 BEALE I332 § 411.2; 2 WHARTON 962. 
England: Lloyd v. Guibert ( I865) L. R. I Q. B. 115, 126; WESTLAKE 
§ 220; DICEY 696 Rule I68; LOWNDES and RUDOLF, Law of General Average 
and the York-Antwerp Rules (ed. 7, I948) 223. 
France: RIPERT, 3 Droit Marit. 2I9 §§ 2227 ff., CRouvF:s, 2 Repert. 287 
No. 88. 
Germany: WAGNER, Seerecht I42; ScRAPS, Seerecht § 700 No. 30 and n. 2. 
Greece: App. Athens (April 8, I895) Clunet I897, I92. 
Italy: Former practice, see SCERNI 278. 
The Netherlands: C. Com. arts. 722, 723, 745 (distinguishing several 
cases); H. R. (June 22, I928) 22 Revue Dor 434· 
Norway: S. Ct. (March 25, I886) Clunet I888, ISI. 
Portugal: C. Com. art. 6 so. 
Spain: C. Com. art. 847 par. 2. 
Brazil: Sup. Trib. (Sept. 10, I926) 82 Rev. Dir. III; (April 27, I927) 
ss id. 460. 
Guatamala: C. Com. art. 96I; MATOS 56 I § 402. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Com. Navig. (I940) art. I7 (excepting the 
formalities and conditions of the stipulation on average reserved for the 
law of the flag, in accordance with the restriction on locus regit actum, see 
GoWLAND, Report in Republica Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano 
at 303. 
75 Portugal: C. Com. art. 650. Often "port de reste" and "port de destina-
tion" are used synonymously, which is confusing. 
76 Survey of laws and literature in CROUVES, 2 Repert. 265 ff.; Note, 22 
Revue Dor 46I; cf. 2 BAR 22I2; MElLI 369; LYON-CAEN, Clunet I882, 593; 
EYNARD I8o; Inst. Droit Internat., 8 Annuaire (I886) I24; 6 LYON-CAEN et 
RENAULT § 983; DESPAGNET 930; BONNECASE, Dr. Com. Mar. 700 § 791. 
Montevideo Treaty on Int. Commercial Law (I889) art. 2I (reversed by 
the text of I94o) ; C6digo Bustamante, art. 288. 
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place where the last remaining goods are discharged. 77 As 
an English judge said in I 8 24: "The place at which the 
average shall be adjusted ... is the place of the ship's 
destination or delivery of her cargo," and the shipper of 
goods "by assenting to general average, must be understood 
to consent also to its adjustment, according to the usage 
and law of the place at which the adjustment is to be 
made." 78 The adjuster is not expected to study the laws 
of all the parties concerned, nor is there a reason why the 
law of the vessel which is a party to the community of 
interests, should be preferred to the other laws. The persons 
primarily interested are the consignees and the insurers. 
The binding force of foreign adjustment, undoubted as 
to the coadventurers, has been subject to certain questions 
with regard to the underwriters. But legal provisions and 
the revised clauses of the insurance policies have taken care 
of the doubts.79 
The scope of the local law of the port is not always easy 
to trace. English and American discussions seem to be 
missing. In the Continental literature, the doubts have been 
increased by the frequent claim that the law of the flag 
should control, if not the whole matter, at least special prob-
lems. Of course, the law of the flag may adequately dete;--
mine whether the master has to consult the crew before 
sacrificing goods, 80 and in what cases he obligates the ship-
owner. But the relation between the shipowner and the 
cargo owners is the subject of the carriage contract, com-
plemented by usages. 81 
77 Excellent, Note, 22 Revue Dor at 465. See also MONACO, Studi per Ia 
codificazione ( 1940) 142. 
78 Abbott, ]., in Simonds and Loder v. White ( 1824) 2 B. & C. 8os, 8n, 813. 
79 For a comprehensive discussion, see ARNOULD, On Marine Insurance 
and Average {ed. 12, 1939) §§ 99+ ff. 
8o France: Cass req. (Feb. u, 1862) D. 1862.1.247· 
81 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (June 12, 1922) Hans. RGZ. 1922 No. 175, 
78 Seuff. Arch. No. 96, approving ScHAPS, Seerecht § 700 n. 29; Note, 22 
Revue Dor at 468. 
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Other questions discussed are: the meaning of maritime 
voyage in the average doctrine; who ought to contribute 
and to what extent (if not covered by the York-Antwerp 
Rules) ; and whether the obligation of the ship owner is 
personal or only ad rem. 
The German courts apparently resort indiscriminately to 
the law of the port of destination, applied by them to 
affreightment. All other courts, in the true meaning of the 
tradition, look to the law applied by the adjuster. His con-
clusions are internationally respected, provided-and this 
should never be forgotten-that they are vested with the 
judicial authority of the country where the port lies. Thus, 
the Dutch courts, construing their new code provisions as 
the consecration of the universal custom, have recognized 
that a Swedish adjustment following the local law, had 
authority not only as respects the damage and the amounts 
assessed, but also in determining the parties liable.82 
B2 H. R. (June 22, 1928) The Thabetta I, 22 Revue Dor 458. On connected 
doubtful questions in England, see DICEY (ed. 6, 1949, by Morris et al.) 677. 
PART TEN 
MODIFICATION AND DISCHARGE 
OF OBLIGATIONS 
CHAPTER 49 
Voluntary Assignment of Simple Debts 
I. THE PROBLEM 
1. Municipal Differences 
T HE full transfer of choses of action has become recognized in almost every municipal system. But the 
methods of dealing with the specific problems of this 
institution are not identicaU These problems arise out of 
the coexistence of three interested parties, the assignor, 
the debtor, and the assignee, and the additional possi-
bility of conflicts between two or more assignees and their 
creditors. The influences coming from the bordering fields 
of attachment, garnishment, and bankruptcy, least favored 
by international co-operation, further complicate the matter. 
Most of the legal diversity is caused by residua from 
former periods. There is, however, a difficult conflict be-
tween the interest of the debtor whose situation should not 
be altered by the act of two other parties· without his consent, 
and the modern desire for unhampered mobilization of 
values. A creditor ordinarily may vest any other person 
with his right, not only without the debtor's consent but 
without his knowledge. Notice, essentially required in the 
older codes, such as the influential French Code, in modern 
systems is only a means for improving the position of the 
assignee. Particulars in the protection of the debtor, on one 
hand, and of the assignee and his successors, on the other, 
vary and are often obscure. 
1 For comparative municipal law, see KARL ARNDT, Zessionsrecht, 7 
Beitrage zum auslandischen und internationalen Privatrecht (Berlin, Leip-
zig, 1932). 
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The involved and delicate structure of the municipal rules 
has caused a peculiar contrast in classifying the incidents 
of assignment. This diversity demands a thorough investi-
gation before definitive conclusions are reached with respect 
to the advisable conflicts rules. 
The American decisions in point are numerous but mostly 
confined to life insurance policies. Appointment of a bene-
ficiary to insurance is not an assignment of the policy but 
has been adequately treated in conflicts law in an analogous 
manner. On the other hand, cases concerning bills and notes 
have been mixed into the discussion, which we must strictly 
avoid. Transfer of rights through the endorsement of 
negotiable instruments follows special principles in munici-
pal law as well as in conflicts law, although the differences 
are not equally accentuated in all systems. In some situa-
tions, endorsement has the effect of assignment, but even 
then the distinction is useful. 
To introduce the reader to the conflicts arising from the 
variety of municipal laws despite the modern tendency to 
uniform development, the following examples may serve: 
(i) Capacity of parties. Cabrera, President of Guate-
mala, deposited a sum of money with a London bank and 
later requested the bank to transfer this sum to Nunez, his 
illegitimate minor son. The English courts held the transfer 
void under Guatemalan law under which the son could not 
accept the assignment, although it would have been valid 
by English law.2 In the concurring, though entirely diverse, 
opinions, the former law was applied either as lex loci actus, 
or the proper law of the assignment, or the lex domicilii of 
the assignor and assignee. English law was considered as 
the lex situs of the debt and as its proper law. 
(ii) Assignability of the debt. Carr, injured in a railway 
accident in Iowa, assigned his claim for damages on the 
ground of tort by an assignment made in Illinois. The claim 
could be transferred in Iowa but not in Illinois where tort 
2 Republica de Guatemala v. Nufiez, see infra n. 23. 
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obligations were nonassignable under common law. The 
Iowa court applied its own law as that under which the debt 
arose.3 
(iii) Requirement of notification. The English creditor 
of a French debtor assigns in Switzerland the debt to an 
American, without giving the debtor notice through formal 
signification, as required by the French Civil Code, art. 
1690, although not in Switzerland. Supposing that French 
law governs the debt, most European courts hold the trans-
fer incomplete, either because French law governs the debt 
(Swiss conflicts rule) or because the debtor is domiciled 
in France (French conflicts rule). In the most frequently 
expressed American view, however, the transfer is perfected 
because made in Switzerland. 
(iv) Warranty of solvency of the debtor. German parties 
once made an assignment in Niirnberg of a debt governed 
by Austrian law. The German courts denied liability of the 
assignor for the debtor's solvency according to the Austrian 
Code, following the Roman law in force in Niirnberg. 4 
( v) Priority between successive assignees. A firm in the 
state of New York assigned its accounts receivable as 
security for a loan to a finance corporation in Philadelphia. 
The debtors in numerous states were not notified. After-
ward, the firm assigned one of these debts in payment to 
another creditor, who collected the money. At the time 
(before 1945) in Pennsylvania failure to n·otify allowed a 
subsequent bona fide assignee by giving notice to the debtor 
to acquire a right superior to that of an earlier assignee. Ac-
cording to the "New York rule" (similar to German law) 
however, a prior assignee is not only to be preferred before 
payment of the debt but may recover from the subsequent 
assignee what the latter collects from the debtor. In the 
United States, under the theory of law of the place of assign-
ment, it is uncertain which law would be applied. The English 
and French conflicts rules call for neither of these laws but 
for those of the various domicils of the debtors. The Ger-
3 Vimont v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1886) 69 Iowa 296, 22 N. W. 906, 
aff'd, 28 N. W. 612, infra n. 75· 
4 RG. (Dec. 3, 1891) 2 Z.int.R. (1892) 162, Clunet 1892, 1039. 
See infra p. 413 n. 106. 
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man conflicts rule points to the laws governing the individual 
single debts assigned. 
2. The Nature of Assignment 
Since in ancient laws obligations were strictly personal, 
neither in English nor in Roman law could a creditor put 
another person in his own place as holder of an obligatory 
right. The auxiliary practices developed in both laws for 
approaching this purpose were exactly the same. The 
creditor appointed the intended assignee as his agent for 
enforcing the claim and retaining the proceeds (mandatum 
agendi to a procurator in rem suam). Reflections of this 
stage of history persist in the Anglo-American literature. 
Notably, the question whether an assignee may sue the 
debtor in his own name has preserved an anachronistic 
importance. 5 Also, the distinction between legal and equi-
table assignment is still significant in common law, although 
it should not affect the structure of the conflicts rules.6 Full 
and present transfer of the complete right of the creditor 
is the basic form of assignment. Modern efforts, to be sure, 
have tended to split the right into segments such as legal 
and beneficiary ownership, or substance of the right and 
its exercise. These differences are included in what is termed 
assignability in conflicts law. 7 
It is opportune, however, to be clearly aware of the 
elements of a voluntary transaction in the course of which 
a chose in action is transferred from the owner to another 
person. The Romans spoke of the sale of a debt (emptio 
venditio nominis) or of an estate ( hereditatis). N everthe-
less, only a century ago, the German literature had to be 
5 See 2 WHARTON 1482 § 735; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 614 f., 842-843; ROBERTSON, 
Characterization 273, 278. 
6 2 BEALE §§ 348-3 50, 3 53 (by implication). 
7 2 BEALE 1251 § 348.2. E. g., if the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust assigns 
his interest, he constitutes only a revocable power of attorney, GRISWOLD, 
Spendthrift Trusts 378. 
VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENT OF SIMPLE DEBTS 389 
admonished to observe the duality of an obligatory con-
tract containing a promise to assign and a quasi-real con-
tract effecting the assignment. The distinction even now is 
not very familiar to many lawyers, 8 and sometimes a court 
in this country thinks it necessary to recall it to the readers 
of its decision. But the distinction between sale or security 
arrangement and actual assignment is so well known9 that 
it may be surprising that no such distinction appears in any 
discussion of the conflicts problems. American courts and 
the Restatement ( § 350) seem to consider only a law gov-
erning the assignment, and German courts and writers 
speak exclusively of the law governing the underlying re-
lationship. The Restatement illustrates its rule exactly by 
mentioning warranty of the "assignor" for the existence 
of the debt, although in the modern doctrine (if not in the 
codes) this particular liability has always been the most 
characteristic incident, not of assignment, but of a promise 
to assign for value. 
The American attitude is the more striking, as in the 
most frequent language "assignment" evidently does not 
mean the entire contract, including the promise to transfer 
and the transfer, but is thought of as a unilateral mani-
festation of transferring the right, hence as a part of the 
all-inclusive transaction. Its definition in the Restatement 
of the Law of Contracts suggests the same idea.10 Never-
theless, common law assignment is a bilateral transaction, 
a true contract, requiring acceptance, actual or presumptive, 
8 According to the original doctrine laid down in French C. C. art. 1583, 
sale or gift of a debt includes assignment. Only its effects as to third persons, 
including the debtor, depend on notice, C. C. art. 1690. However, in modern 
theory and practice, the situation is very similar to the rules of American 
statutes requiring notice. Therefore, the transfer of the debt in French law, 
even though simultaneously with the sale etc., is not a transfer by law, as 
GuLDENER 89 construes it, naturally without French confirmation, but rests 
on the presumed intention of the parties. 
9 See the cases in 6 C. }. S. 1048 n. 50 distinguishing sale and assignment. 
10 Restatement of Contracts § 149· 
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or better said, constructive. The language mentioned may 
have originated from the ancient appointment of an agent 
for enforcing the debt and at present may refer more pre-
cisely to the customary and useful separate instrument of 
assignment, evidencing the transfer especially to third 
parties. 
Scope of discussion. Although in the United States and 
most Latin-American countries assignment is distinguished 
from conventional subrogation, the kind of subrogation 
whereby the creditor and a voluntary payor agree on trans-
fer of the debt, is very nearly related to assignment. The 
practical analogy is so great that the assignment rules are 
generally applied.11 The same must be true of conflicts rules. 
In American conflicts treatment, the subject is sometimes 
termed assignment of contracts, which is too broad, since the 
transfer of an entire contract, occurring in modern com-
merce, cannot be adequately explained by a mere division 
into transfers of claims and debts.12 We must be satisfied 
with the transfer of single or several claims. On the other 
hand, the Restatement is not justified in restricting the topic 
to the transfer of contractual rightsP The source of an 
obligatory claim is immaterial so long as the claim is 
transferable. 
The term "debt" is used in the broad sense of common 
usage, not restricted to monetary obligations nor to the 
duty to pay a fixed amount. It means here the right to 
claim that which is due (French creance, German Forder-
ung), rather than the corresponding duty. 
11 WENGLER, "Surrogation," 6 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch at 493 f. 
12 See. recently, also for the literature, FRUH, Die Vertragsiibertragung im 
schweizerischen Recht, Ziircher Beitriige zur Rechtswissenschaft, N. F. Heft 
III (1945). 
13 Restatement §§ 348 If. 
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3· The Relationships Involved 
Simplification is always desirable in conflicts laws. Yet 
before deciding to what extent it may be reached through 
rules covering more than one of the relationships involved, 
we have to note them exhaustively. Although we limit our 
discussion to those assignments of debt that rest on volun-
tary obligatory contracts to assign, we have to distinguish 
four aspects of the problem: 
( 1) The original debt between C ( reditor) and D ( ebtor), 
doubtless governed by its own law (lex obligationis) ; 
( 2) The contract containing the promise to assign (causa 
cessionis) between C and P( urchaser), following its own 
law according to its nature as sale, gift, security, substitu-
tion for payment, etc.; 
( 3) The assignment between C and P, the present trans-
fer of the debt; 
( 4) The relation between P and D which may be altered 
by new events, such as payment, release, setoff, etc. between 
C and D. 
II. THE MAIN CoNFLICTS SvsTEJ,VIS 
1. Situs Doctrine 
The statutists felt constrained by their territorial dogma 
to subject even intangibles to the statute real and had, there-
fore, to give them a local situation in a territory.14 Assign-
ments of debts were sometimes localized at the domicil of 
the debtor/5 but the vast majority of authors, particularly 
of the French scholars of the eighteenth century, accentu-
ated the situs of the property which a debt represents and 
located it at the domicil of the assignor as the party dis-
posing of his property.16 
14 Fundamental: z LAINE 265-278. 
15 GuY CoQUILLE, Questions et responses etc. ( 1634} quest. 237. 
1a See 2 LAINE z65 f. 
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This past has left its traces in the conflicts doctrine of 
the nineteenth century. In England and the United States, 
the domicil of the owner of a claim has been characteris-
tically identified with the situs of the claim, in analogy to 
his other movables.17 Notably in the French and Italian 
literature, the same old view has found expression18 with 
some effect on codification.19 Sometimes the domicil has 
been replaced by nationality.20 
The modern French doctrine has taken the side of the 
small minority of statutists and consistently favored the 
law of the debtor. Also in this view the basis of the situs 
theory may sometimes be recognized.21 The Treaty of 
Montevideo declares the situs of the debt generally to be 
at the place of performance. 22 
Nevertheless, in the present literature it is universally 
settled that chases in action do not really have any situs, 
and that if some fictitious situs must be construed in such 
matters as taxation, jurisdiction, seizure, or administration 
17 United States: STORY§§ 397 ff; I WHARTON 792 § 363; Vanbuskirk v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. (I842) I4 Conn. 582: personal property in contemplation 
of law has no situs but follows the person of the owner. Speed v. May ( I851) 
I7 Pa. St. 9I for general assignments: the actual situs of personal property 
protects local creditors only against transfer by operation of law. Otherwise, 
the personal property follows the domicil of the owner, effective against 
attachment by resident creditors (at the debtor's domicil). This reasoning 
recurs in Cole v. Cunningham (I889) I33 U. S. at I29 and Barnett v. Kinney 
( I893) I47 u. s. 476. 
England: 4 PHILLIMORE 611 § 759, with citations. 
18 France: I FOEL!X § 6I; DEMOLOMBE, 9 Cours § 6I; SuR VILLE, "La 
cession et Ia mise en gage des creances en droit international prive," Clunet 
I897, 67I, 673 (for the cessibility of the claim); SuRVILLE 280 § I7I and n. 3; 
ROGUIN, Regie de droit (I889) I4I· 
Norway: The law of the creditor's domicil (perhaps not as lex situs) is 
adopted according to CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 580 No. I6I. 
Germany: OLG. Frankfurt (March 4, I892) 2 Z.int.R. ( I892) 477· 
19 Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 12. 
Belgium: Draft of I887, tit. pre!., art. 5, I9 Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp. 
(I 889-90) 449· 
20 E.g., 2 ZITELMANN 394; 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 222. 
21England: In re Queensland Mercantile & Agency Co. [I89I] 1 Ch. 536, 
per North, ]. ; aff'd [I892] I Ch. 2I9. DICEY, Rule I 53· 
France: WEISs, 4 Traite 43 I f. 
22Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law (I889) art. 29; (I940) art. 33· 
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of estates, the voluntary transfer of debts needs no such 
fixed relation to a territory. In fact, there is no reasonable 
ground for denying the parties to an assignment the full 
freedom in choosing the law applicable to it. 
Where the domicil of the debtor has been taken as de-
cisive in the modern literature, ordinarily other reasons 
have prevailed. But the old doctrine did include an insight 
into the subject matter that should not be entirely forgotten. 
The creditor's domicil must be important, in the absence of 
more weighty connections, as the center of the assignor's 
assets, in relation to his act of surrendering a right, part of 
these assets. A subsidiary rule, exclusively based on the 
domicil of the debtor, is condemned thereby. The dilemma 
of the old and still active controversy, whether the domicil 
of the creditor or that of the debtor of the assigned debt 
is decisive, is wrong in itself. 
2. England 
In the principal English leading case, it was declared that 
no clear statement of the law applicable to assignment was 
available ;23 the four jurists, namely, the first judge and the 
three justices of the Court of Appeal, advanced no less than 
five different theories on the law determining the validity 
of, and the capacity to make, an assignrrient. 24 
Falconbridge offers three theories for choice,25 and Foote, 
Cheshire, and Wolff have suggested to supersede the present 
confusion by a rule similar to the German, extending to the 
assignment the law that governs the debt assigned. 26 
23 Scrutton, L. J., in Republica de Guatemala v. Nufiez [ 1927] 1 K. B. 
669 at 688. 
24 See the satirical remark by FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules 
of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84, 94· 
25 F ALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 423. 
26 FOOTE 426, 296; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 599 ft.; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 
§§ 511 fl. 
CHESHIRE, 51 Law Q. Rev. (1935) 76, 85 and Priv. Int. Law 6o2, 610 reads 
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Doubtless, the authorities are entirely inconclusive. We 
may find only some preference for two theories, one that a 
voluntary transfer of a chose in action is governed by the 
law of the debtor's domicil,27 and the other that it has its 
own proper law, 28 which is presumably to be found at the 
place of assigning, either by mechanical rule29 or with better 
reason m case both parties are domiciled in the same 
jurisdiction. 30 
The judicial indecision is moderated, however, by the 
incipient insight that the three parties involved in an assign-
ment of rights are connected by different relationships. 
Thus, the assignment of an English life insurance as a gift 
from a husband to his wife in Cape Colony was correctly 
subjected to their domiciliary local law.31 And in Canada 
it was clearly distinguished that a life insurance policy was 
under the law of Ontario, but the "assignment of or dealing 
with the benefits of the policy made by the assured in Mani-
toba" belonged to the law of the latter province.32 
to this effect a dictum by Warrington, ]., in Kelly v. Selwyn [I905] 2 Ch. 
u7; against this argument, M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 548 § 5I2. But this 
decision concerns the question of notification, on which see infra II, 7· 
2 7 Lawrence, L. ]., in Republica de Guatemala v. Nufiez, supra n. 23, at 
697; approved by FREDERIC POLLOCK, 43 Law Q. Rev. (I927) 296. 
28 Lee v. Abdy (I886) I7 Q. B. D. 309, 3I3; Greer, J., and Scrutton, L. J., 
in Republica de Guatemala v. Nufiez ( I926) 42 T. L. R. 625, 629, 95 L. ]. 
Q. B. 955; [I927] I K. B. 669, 688; Chaugham, J., in In re Ansiani [I930] 
I Ch. 407, 420. 
29 See CHESHIRE ( ed. 3) 6o8 who therefore emphasizes the "retrogression 
to the days when Private International Law of contracts was still inchoate 
and undeveloped." 
so Bankes, L. ]., in Republica de Guatemala v. Nufiez [ I927] I K. B. at 
686; Luxmore, J., in Finska Angfartygs A/B v. Baring Brothers & Co. 
(I937) 54 T. L. R. I47, I48. The case was, however, finally decided on the 
finding that the Russian proceeding was an unfinished direction by the 
government rather than an assignment not completed under the domiciliary 
Russian law, H. L. [ I940] I All E. R. 20, 65 Ll. L. Rep. I89. 
s1 Lee v. Abdy, supra n. 28. 
32 Headnote of Nat'! Trust Co. v. Hughes (I902) I4 Man. R. 4I concerning 
an analogous situation, quoted with approval in In re Sawtell [ I9331 
2 D. L. R. at 399· 
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3· United States 
During the nineteenth century and sometimes even at 
present,38 the law applicable to assignment has been re-
garded as a very uncertain matter, as in England. But now 
the courts are more often said to have settled upon a short 
and definite formula: voluntary assignment is governed by 
the law of the place where the assigning takes place, except 
that the question whether the debt is assignable is deter-
mined by the law of the place where it is made.84 In various 
instances, however, the need for amplifying this formula 
has been evident. We may take an appropriate suggestion, 
for instance, from a remarkable dictum of Peaslee, C. J., 
in the New Hampshire Superior Court. A life insurance 
policy in a Massachusetts corporation was assigned for 
security by the insured, a resident of New Hampshire, to 
a New Hampshire bank, despite the fact that his daugh-
ters were beneficiaries. Massachusetts law was held not 
applicable: 
"The rights of the insurer, or of any party against the 
insurer, are not involved. Nor is there any question as to 
the power of the assured to take this insurance from his 
children and give it to. his creditors, or make it a part of 
his estate. The issue is whether his dealings with the policies 
in this state amounted to such action. The extent of the 
assignment made by the pledge of the policies as collateral 
security is the controlling factor in the case. This pledge 
was made in this state by and to local residents, and the 
designated beneficiaries also resided here. Such an undertak-
ing is to be dealt with according to locallaw."35 
sa See KoESSLER, "New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing 
of Accounts Receivable," 44 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1946) 563, 614. 
34 See, e.g., LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 319 § 183 and in Cases (ed. 5) at 496; 
GooDRICH 292; PUTMAN, 1945 Annual Survey 44; 6 C. J. S. 1053 § 7; 
FREUTEL, 56 Harv. L. Rev. (1942) at 68 n. x6o. 
See also references in RG., 87 Seuff. Arch. 161 ff. 
SG Barbin v. Moore (1932) 85 N. H. 362, 364, 159 Ad. 409. 
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This distinction between the rights of any party flowing 
from the insurance contract and "the extent of the assign-
ment" ought to be remembered. 
The Restatement has made an attempt to establish more 
specific rules. Only assignability of the debt, again, is men-
tioned in § 348 as subject to the law of the place where the 
assigned contract was made; § 350 determines "the effect 
of an assignment of a contract right as between the assignor 
and the assignee" by the law of the place of assignment. 
Capacity of the assignor and formalities are subjected to 
the same law (§§ 351, 352). Finally, in application of the 
broad scope of the law of the place of performance in 
Beale's scheme, the law of the place where the assigned 
contract (sic) should be performed, decides "whether the 
right of an assignee can be destroyed by payment to the 
assignor" ( § 353), and "whether payment by the obligor 
to a second assignee destroys the right to performance of 
the first assignee" ( § 35 3). Beale later changed his mind 
with respect to §§ 353 and 354· In his treatise he advocates, 
for all questions involving priority among successive assign-
ees, the law of the place of assignment. 36 
Both these attempts at classification are incomplete and 
doubtful. The local contacts employed to localize both the 
debt assigned and the assignment, are the familiar and 
misleading mechanical references. No regard is given to 
the promise to assign. Even so, the American doctrine has 
the notable merit of giving the transfer of debt a clearly 
independent function, if an exaggerated one. 
4· Germany and Switzerland 
The most comprehensive system has been developed and 
unanimously adopted by the courts and writers in Ger-
36 2 BEALE § 354.1 j cf. MALCOLM, Jetter published by KUPFER and LIVINGS-
TON, 32 Va. L. Rev. (1946) at 925. 
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many.37 It is contained in two rules. On the one hand, the 
law governing the obligation assigned determines not only 
whether the debt can be transferred, but also all other re-
quirements of a transfer, and even the effect of the assign-
ment on the debt. As the most important consequence, which 
forms the issue in the great majority of the numerous cases, 
the law of the debt assigned determines whether notice of 
the assignment is essential to the change of the person of 
the creditor. Therefore, a debt of a French domiciliary, 
governed by German law, does not need the formal signifi-
cation, prescribed by the French Civil Code, article 1690,38 
regardless of where the assignment is made. Conversely, if 
a debt is governed by French law, the assignment wherever 
made needs signification (or a formal acknowledgment by 
the debtor) as an essential condition.39 The law of the debt 
also governs a number of other problems which we shall 
examine later. 
On the other hand, the law that governs the relationship 
motivating the assignment (causa) such as sale, giving in 
payment, security, determines the rights and duties arising 
as between the assignor and assignee. An often-mentioned 
consequence concerns the liability of a seller of a right for 
the existence of the debt and possibly for the solvency of 
the debtor. 40 
The Swiss doctrine has espoused these rules.41 
37 FoRSTER-ECCIUS, Preussisches Privatrecht § II n. 33; GEBHARD, Ma-
terialien 160 If.; 2 ZITELMANN 304; NEUMEYER, IPR. § 3 3; GUTZWILLER 
1616; LEWALD 270 §§ 328 ff.; NussBAuM, D. IPR. 265; M. WoLFF, D. IPR. 94· 
38 OLG. Koln (Oct. 14, 1890) 2 Z.int.R. (1892) 161; (Nov. 4, 1892) 
4 Z.int.R. (1894) 65; OLG. Colmar (June 23, 1905) Clunet 1908, 536. 
39 RG. (June 2, 1908) 18 Z.int.R. (1908) 449, Revue 1909, 298 with 
French exequatur, App. Paris (June 24, 1909) Clunet 1910, 162; RG. (March 
23, 1897) 39 RGZ. 371, Clunet 1900, 634 (debt under Egyptian law, assign-
ment under then French law of Cologne). 
40 RG. (Dec. 3, 1891) 2 Z. int. R. (1892) 162, Clunet 1892, 1039. 
41 BG. (Sept. 17, 1892) 18 BGE. 516, 522; (Oct. 8, 1935) 61 BGE. II 242, 
245; (Feb. 19, 1936) 62 BGE. II 108, no, Clunet 1938, 963; 2 ScHNITZER 
530. 
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5· France 
The decisions,42 none of which were rendered by the 
Court of Cassation, share the often-proclaimed opinion that 
the law of the debtor's domicil at the time of the suit gov-
erns assignment. The once almost solitary precursor of 
this theory, Guy Coquille (A. D. 1523-1603)/8 considered 
debts localized with the debtor because by his honesty or 
fraudulent manipulations, by the care or carelessness ap-
plied to his business, the obligor makes the claim valuable 
or fruitless. 44 The outstanding problem to which most 
decisions and literary utterances have been devoted, how-
ever, concerns the application of the French provisions 
prescribing notification of the assignment to the debtor. 
The contemporary authors agree, without believing in a 
fictitious situs, that the effects of an assignment for third 
persons, including the debtor, are made dependent by the 
Code on measures procuring publicity in the interest of 
"public credit." Technically, these provisions are regarded 
as prescribing formalities, subject to the law of the place 
where they should be performed.45 These statements have 
often sounded as though assignments were governed en-
tirely by the domiciliary law of the debtor. But the litera-
ture has become conscious of the importance of the law 
42 Trib. Nancy (Mar. 25, 1890) Clunet 1891, 923; Trib. com. Seine (Mar. 
5, 1892) Clunet 1893, 166; Cour Paris (Feb. 16, 1910) S. 1912.2.276, Clunet 
1913, 555; Cour Paris (Nov. 18, 1927) Clunet 1928, 972, Revue Crit. 
1934. I2I. 
43 CoQUILLE, Questions et responses etc. ( 1634) quest. 237; I LAINE 297; 
2 id. 263. 
44 2 LAINE 265, in an often-cited passage, approves. 
45 WEiss, 4 Traite 431; DESPAGNET 1140 § 396; BAR TIN, Etudes 197; 
BARTIN, Principes 3 I § 374; PILLET, Principes 409; PILLET, Traite 760 § 371; 
NIBOYET 820 § 702; 2 ARMIN JON §§ 141 f.; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE § 357; 
ARMINJON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 505 § 308. 
For Belgium, POULLET § 280. 
For Japan, YAMADA, "Le droit international prive du J apon," Clunet 
1901, 637· 
Institute of International Law, Draft 1927, art. 2, 33 Annuaire (1927) 
III 198, 217. 
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governing the debt, citing German decisions, and in prin-
ciple also recognizes that the validity and effect of the 
assignment, i.e., the relation between assignor and assignee, 
must have its own domain. The law of the debtor's domicil 
seems to be retained for the relation between the assignee 
and the debtor.46 This includes, e.g., the right of the debtor 
to set off a counterclaim that arose against the assignor.47 
Niboyet, finally, has advocated that the law of the domicil 
of the debtor be neatly restricted to the question of noti-
fication.48 
6. The Netherlands 
While the last-mentioned theory combines elements of 
the French and German conceptions, the Dutch courts have 
lately combined regard for the debtor, as in French law, 
with an independent status for the transfer. They hold the 
transaction between assignor and assignee governed by its 
own law. Due to the argument, however, that a Dutch debtor 
cannot be subject to a foreign law by an act in which he 
does not participate,49 the effect as to the debtor is deter-
mined by the law of his own domicil.50 
46 See BEQUIGNON, 5. Repert. 334 No. 7 and Note, Clunet 1937, at 784; 
BATIFFOL, Traite 541 f. § 540, who, however, extends further the Jaw govern-
ing the debt. 
4 7 This has been assumed by App. Colmar (Nov. 16, 1935) Clunet 1937, 
781 and approved by the author of the Note, ibid., although he criticizes that 
the decision (as usual) asserts the law of the debtor's domicil as the general 
principle of assignment. Cf. infra n. 95· 
48 NIBOYET 819 § 70z; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 669, 679; see also DESPAGNET 
1139 § 398. 
49 Rb. Utrecht (April 11, 19z8) W. 11898; KosTERS 803 ff. 
50 See the five cases in 1 VAN HASSELT 135 and the three in id., Supp. 40, 
where assignment was in Germany between Germans and the debtor was 
in the Netherlands. In Rb. Haarlem (Feb. 22, 19z7) W. 11664, German law 
was applied to the assignment as between a German assignor and a Dutch 
assignee, see infra p. 4IZ n. 102. 
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7. Comparison 
Leaving aside the uncertain English choice of law and 
the abandoned situs theories, three systems are recogniz-
able. If adequately developed, they agree in distinguishing 
the relation, Assignor-Assignee, from that of Assignee-
Debtor. But they disagree with respect to both the decisive 
contacts and the classification of problems. The American 
doctrine emphasizes the law of the place of assignment and 
gives it wide scope; the German doctrine resorts to the 
usual individualized contacts and broadly extends the in-
fluence of the law governing the original debt; and the 
French prefer the law of the place of the debtor's domicil 
at least with respect to the problems concerning notice of 
the assignment. Moreover, between assignor and assignee 
the Germans and Swiss emphasize the underlying contract 
(causa) in contrast to the theoretically abstract act of trans-
fer, whereas in the Latin countries little distinction is made, 
and in the United States the promise to assign disappears 
behind the act of assignment when the choice of law is made. 
All three systems are visibly defective, which explains 
the existing uncertainty. Roughly speaking, only in the 
United States and Germany has the doctrine developed 
shape. But the American formulations are inexhaustive and 
use the vague and mechanical contacts of lex loci contractus 
and the like. The German and Swiss conception has com-
mitted the mistake of determining who is the creditor in 
all respects by the law governing the debt merely because 
the debtor must be assured against a change in the govern-
ing law which might injure his situation. The governing law 
may, indeed, prevent the debt from being assigned at all 
or preclude assignment to the particular purchaser, which 
is, by the way, not a frequent occurrence in present business 
law (as compared with marital law and succession). Yet, 
where the debt is assignable, since modern law has adopted 
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the institution of full transfer of debts either without knowl-
edge of the debtor, or at least without his consent, the 
debtor has no legitimate interest whatever in the motive, 
form, and effects of an assignment. As a Dutch court said 
quite adequately, the debtor may challenge a plaintiff be-
cause there was no valid assignment, but he has nothing to 
do with the events underlying the assignment.51 Hence, while 
the defenses of the debtor inherent in his contract must be 
preserved, nevertheless the debt may be transferred any-
where in the world and to anybody, without his consent as 
well as without interference from the original law of the 
debt. 
III. CLASSIFICATION 
r. Formalities 
Although older requirements of form have vanished, the 
laws are divided in some respects, as on the effect of oral 
assignments. Writing is required, for instance, for an as-
signment at law in England, generally in Switzerland, and 
in many Latin jurisdictions. In the United States, except 
for local statutes of frauds, ordinary oral assignments for 
value are practically operative and irrevocable, although 
more doubts prevail when the transfer is made without con-
sideration. The general conflicts rule, asserted by Beale, 
would strictly invoke the law of the place of ·the assignment 
on the question of form. 52 But although this was the rule 
followed in old cases of general assignments for the benefit 
of creditors, 53 there is no corresponding authority for single 
assignments. 54 An analogous dictum by an English Judge 
has been justly criticized. 55 
51 Rb. Maastricht (Feb. 7, 1935) N. J. 1936, No. 550. 
52 2 BEALE 1255· 
53 Speed v. May (1851) 17 Pa. St. 91; Birdseye v. Underhill (1888) 82 
Ga. 142. Cf. Barnett v. Kinney ( 1893) 147 U. S. 476 and 2 BEALE 987 § 263.1. 
54 Of BEALE's (1255 n. 6) two American decisions allegedly in point, neither 
is concerned with simple debt. In Capital Finance v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
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In the countries following the optional principle of locus 
regit actum, the transfer of a claim may comply with the 
formalities (or formlessness) either of the law of the place 
where it is made or of the law governing its contents. A 
number of Continental writers, however, make the applica-
tion of the principle dependent on its adoption by the law 
of the debtor as identified with that governing the assigned 
debt.56 Hence, a French-governed debt would be transfer-
able in the United States according to French formalities, 
even though the principle were not recognized here. This 
contention is one of the exorbitant inferences from the 
alleged paramount role of the law of the debtor or of the 
debt, but may be refuted also on the ground that the prin-
ciple locus regit actum operates on its own merits at the 
forum itsel£.57 
It has been insisted, however, that the formalities pre-
scribed by the law of the debt should always be observed 
in the interest of the debtor, so as to give him an easy 
opportunity to ascertain his creditor. A debtor owing under 
Swiss law should be able to rely only on a written assign-
ment in accordance with article 16 5 of the Code of Obliga-
tions.58 But this formality is merely one of the conditions 
for acquiring title. What the debtor needs in order to 
obtain certainty about the right and the identity of a claim-
ant, is a different matter and may be conveniently left to a 
local law, either of the debtor's domicil or of the place of 
performance. 
Formalities to be observed in an assignment, or in the 
Co. (1926) 75 Mont. 46o, as BEALE notes (n. s), the assignment was made 
at the place also considered determining the law of the assigned insurance 
policy. 55 Scrutton, L. J., in Republica de Guatemala v. Nuiiez [1927] I K. B. 
at 689. See contra, CHESHIRE ( ed. 3) 6os, also against the dicta by Lawrence, 
L. J., in the same case. 
56 2 ZITELMANN 394; VALERY 905; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 258. 
51 In this respect, see RAAPE, D. IPR. 45 f., 279 illus. 1. 
58 GULDENER 34 f. 
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appointment of a beneficiary, are often stipulated in in-
surance contracts. These agreements naturally participate 
in the law governing the contract;59 they are no concern of 
locus regit actum. 
The French provision (Civil Code, article I 690) that 
the debtor must be notified by signification or must accept 
the transfer in an acte authentique, has been consistently 
characterized in French conflicts law as constituting a 
formality, 60 without, however, subordinating it to the prin-
ciple locus regit actum. In Germany, the question whether 
it is really a formal requirement and therefore is replaceable 
by domestic formlessness has been much discussed and 
unanimously answered in the negative.61 The requirement 
goes to the substance of the assignment and as such causes 
an outstanding problem,62 important because the French 
provisions are the model for numerous enactments and 
certain minority rules in the United States. Only the details 
of the intimation to be performed under French law by a 
huissier or the public recognition of acceptance by the debtor 
are subject to substitution by local equivalents. 53 
An analogous question arises on the characterization of 
the various provisions for regulating priority of claims by 
means of recording, registration, or annotation in the 
ledgers of the assignor. Also, these provisions are certainly 
no mere formalities. 64 
59 Infra p. 407. 
60 WEiss, 4 Traite 425; VALERY 5I7. 
61 RG. (June I, I88o) I RGZ. 435; (March 20, I883) IO RG.Z 273 and 
many times thereafter. 
62 Infra pp. 420 ff. 
aa RG. (June 2, I«JJ8) IS Z.int.R. (I9o8) 449· 
64 Cf. infra p. 432. In an English decision, In re Pilkington's Will Trusts 
[I937] Ch. 574, cf. 9 Giur. Comp. DIP. (1943) No. 64, a deed of assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors in Scotland was exempted from the 
duty of registration under the English Deeds of Arrangement Act, 1914, 
despite the English domicil of the debtor company. The court applied Scottish 
law as the law intended by the parties. If the court had considered registra-
tion as a formality, it would probably have only emphasized the Scottish 
place of executing the deed. In fact, the assignor was in Scotland, ·rvhich 
would be decisive under the approach submitted infra p. 432. 
IS 
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2. Capacity 
In principle, the capacity required for the assignor and 
assignee has no relation to the original debt. While in most 
countries the personal law governs, American decisions have 
generally preferred the law governing the assignment to 
that of a party's domicil.65 
New York, however, has sometimes claimed supremacy 
for its insurance statutes over the laws of the state of 
assignment. Thus an old New York statute provided that 
a married woman could not assign without the written con-
sent of her husband a policy of insurance upon the life of 
her husband for her sole benefit if issued under the laws 
of New York. 66 In such case, it was held that her capacity 
should be governed neither by the state of the assignor's 
domicil nor by that of the place of assignment. 67 On the 
other hand, the Connecticut court, by unusual reasoning, 
avoided the application of this statute in a case where New 
York was the domicil of the husband and wife, and the 
policy was delivered to them there by the New York agent 
of the Connecticut insurance company. The court tenuously 
declared that either the law of New Jersey where the 
assignment was "completed and delivered" or the law of 
Connecticut where the contract of insurance was perform-
able, governed, and under either law the assignment was 
valid.68 The true choice should have been between New 
65 Thus, Miller, Executor v. Campbell ( 1893) 140 N. Y. 457 (married 
woman, lex loci cessionis against law governing insurance); Newcomb v. 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1879) Fed. Cas. No. 10,147 (lex loci cessionis, also 
of the domicil of both parties, against the law governing insurance). 
66 New York: Laws 1879, c. 248. 
67 Hanna Milhous v. Johnson (1889) 21 N.Y. St. Rep. 382, 4 N.Y. Supp. 
199: married woman, in Ohio, beneficiary of a New York policy, assigned 
it in Ohio for security without the express consent of her husband; the New 
York court declares the act void under its own statute, applied under 
peculiar criteria. 
68 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Westervelt (1884) 52 Conn. 586, 
592. The case wrongly goes under the head of "cessibility." 
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York law protecting its domiciliary and New Jersey as the 
alleged center of the assignment. 
Under the French Civil Code, judges, prosecutors, 
sheriffs, solicitors, etc. cannot be assigned choses in action 
that might be in the jurisdiction of the court in whose 
forum they exercise their functions. 69 This is a provision 
of exclusively domestic application. 70 
How is the requirement of an insurable interest, by 
which American statutes restrict the persons able to acquire 
life insurance policies by assignment, to be classified? The 
American decisions treat it as a part of the law of the 
"place of assignment." 71 This may be based either on the 
normal classification of capacity under the law of the con-
tract, or on the idea of protecting the assignor who in every 
case was domiciled in the state of the assignment. Consider-
ing that the doctrine of this requirement is "a complex of 
rules of public policy designed to avert a number of harm-
ful social and economic tendencies," 72 it may turn up pri-
marily as an obstacle to assignability because of the nature 
of the debt, and pertain to the law of the original contract. 
Yet in any case, the states establishing the requirement may 
feel impelled to enforce their public policy.73 
69 C. C. art. 1597; see ARNDT, supra n. r. 
70 See 2 BAR 85 n. 14. 
71 Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen (Tex. Civ. App. 19u) 139 S. W. 51, 
aff'd ( 1914) 234 U. S. 123: law of the place of assignment, also of the 
making of the insurance and the domicil of the assignor, against the domicil 
of the insurance company and the domicil of the assignee. Haase v. First 
Nat' I Bank of Anniston ( 1920) 203 Ala. 624, 84 So. 761: place of assignment 
and domicil of both parties to it. 
7 2 EDWIN W. PATTERSON, "Insurable Interest in Life," 18 Col. L. Rev. 
( 1918) 421. 
73 See Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313 U. S. 498: public policy of Texas, 
domicil of the insured, may refuse to enforce the rights of beneficiaries who 
have no insurable interest despite the New Y ark law of the insurance con-
tract recognized by the lower Texas federal courts. HARPER, "Policy Bases 
of the Conflict of Laws," 56 Yale L. J. ( 1947) at II75 n. 63, stresses the 
conflict with New York law and the interest vested under this law, but is 
sympathetic to the decision. On certain earlier decisions, see CARNAHAN, 
Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts ( 1942) 429 § 87 with a 
strong argument for the liberal attitude. 
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3· Assignability 
As noted before, the American doctrine concedes, appar-
ently as the sole exception to the law of the assignment, 
that the transferability of a debt is controlled by the law 
governing the debt. Hence, it may be stated that on this 
classification all conflicts systems agree.74 
(a) Legal restrictions on assignment. Hostility to the 
institution of assignment or to the full transfer of obliga-
tory rights has all but disappeared. But prohibitions are 
frequently imposed, whether on account of the special nature 
of certain debts, or for the protection of legal policies, or 
through contractual limitations, which are prevailingly held 
valid in the United States and abroad. 
Thus we may note cases extending the law governing the 
debt to such questions as-whether a tort action may be 
assigned ;75 whether an unconditional beneficiary of an in-
surance policy rna y be replaced, 76 or replaced without his 
consent ;77 in particular, under what circumstances a wife as 
beneficiary of a life insurance policy acquires a vested 
right ;78 whether an insurance policy may be assigned with-
out the consent of the insurer and may be pledged79 to the 
74 WESTLAKE § 237; RG. (Nov. 28, 1887) 20 RGZ. 234; GEBHARD, Ma- · 
terialien 160; DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 26o; 2 ZITELMANN 394; NEUMEYER, 
IPR. 29; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 260 n. 8 5. 
75 Vimont v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1886) 69 Iowa 296, 22 N. W. 
906, aff'd, 28 N. W. 612. 
Switzerland: Similarly, for an alimony claim, BG. (Feb. 13, 1897) 23 BGE. 
I 136, 140. 
76 Wilde v. Wilde ( 1911) 209 Mass. 205. 
Canada, Sask.: In re Duperreault [ 1940] 3 W. W. R. 385. 
Switzerland: App. Zurich (Nov. 23, 1934) and BG. (March 7, 1935) 
10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 587. 
77 Haven v. Home Ins. Co. ( 1910) 149 Mo. App. 291, 130 S. W. 73· 
Contra: Fourth Nat') Bank of Montgomery v. Norfolk (1929) 220 Ala. 
344, probably to protect the woman, a citizen, but without invoking public 
policy. 
78 N. W. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Adams (1914) 155 Wis. 335, 144 N. W. 
1108 grants the vested right to the husband; incidentally, the court elimi-
nates classification of the problem as one of family law depending on the 
domicil. 
79 For the legal prohibitions in Italy, see VIVANTE, Trattato Dir. Com. 
§ 1877; in Argentina, I. HALPERIN, El contrato de seguro (1946) 522. 
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company ;80 and whether an employee may assign his right 
to wages,81 once wrongly subjected to the law of the place 
of assignment.82 
Conversely, an analogous classification is suitable to a 
legal provision that the debtor cannot avail himself of a 
contractual agreement not to assign the debt, as against an 
assignee who did not know of this agreement at the time 
of the assignment.83 Although the assignee is protected 
thereby, the debt is so directly affected that its law should 
govern. 
(b) Formalities or conditions stipulated. The law gov-
erning an insurance contract applies when the policy requires 
written notice of assignment,84 or when the by-laws of an 
insurance company make a change in the beneficiary void 
unless certain formalities are observed.85 The gold bonds 
of the United States Treasury have been an outstanding 
illustration. The text printed on the bonds indicated as 
creditor a named person or his assignee registered in the 
books of the Treasury, and provided for the making of 
assignments in a foreign country before a diplomatic or 
consular officer of the United States. On the occasion of 
the assignment of such gold bonds by notarial instrument 
in Germany, the Reichsgericht had difficulty in interpreting 
these clauses and co-ordinating them with the German con-
flicts rules.86 It is quite certain, however, that American 
so Eagle v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1911) 48 Ind. App. 284. 
81 Coleman v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. (1936) 2 N. E. (2d) 349 
(statute of Indiana); see also St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Crews (1915) 51 Okla. 
744, 151 Pac. 879. 
82 Monarch Discount Co. v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. of Indiana 
(1918) 285 Ill. 233, in fact applying the law of the forum, and deciding 
against the loan corppany on other grounds such as usury. I do not regard 
this decision as justified by the lack of specifying the place of performance, 
as BATIFFOL 430 n. 4 suggests. 
83 Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 1260 par. 2. 
84 Colburn's Appeal (1902) 74 Conn. 463. 
85 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Adams (1928) 222 Mo. App. 689. 
86 RG. (Nov. 5, 1932) 87 Seuff. Arch. 161 No. 87, IPRspr. 1933 No. 20, 
criticized by M. WoLFF, 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 794· 
408 MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 
law governed the entirety of the effects of these stipulations 
and, according to the prevailing opinion, recognized their 
force as against third persons. If it were true that in the 
United States the law of the place of assignment governs 
such question, this would include a renvoi to the German 
law of the locus contractus. 87 But it is submitted that Ameri-
can law, as governing the original debt on every possible 
theory, extends to the contractual restrictions on its transfer. 
(c) Under the lex Anastasiana, which continued in force 
in various parts of Germany before I 900, the assignee of a 
debt was not allowed to collect more from the original 
debtor than the consideration stipulated in the assignment. 88 
By constant court practice, this rule was applied when it 
was included in the law governing the original debt.89 The 
French Code, article I 699, and many codes following it, 
have maintained the late Roman rule with regard to debts 
in litigation. Continental conflicts literature is extremely · 
divided in this regard, mainly because it is not clear whether 
the retrait litigieux serves primarily to protect the debtor 
against a virtual deterioration of his situation, to discourage 
unsound law suits, or to avoid exploitation of creditors by 
professional traders in dubious debts. Moved by this doubt, 
Pillet has preferred the lex fori. 90 In my opinion, this doubt 
should lead to the law of the assignment, since technically 
the effects of the transfer are modified. 
(d) Partial assignment. Finally, whether a debt can be 
divided and partially transferred, is subject to the law of 
the debt. Thus, it was decided as early as I 840, in the case 
of a claim payable by a debtor in Maryland and assigned 
in Tennessee, that the assigned claim was enforceable in 
87 Thus, M. WoLFF, ibid. 
88 Cod. 4, 35, 22; 23. 
89 Oberapp. Ger. Mi.inchen (]an. 7, I845) I Seuff. Arch. No. 402; Prussian 
Obertribunal (Nov. I6, I858) 30 Striethorst 353; 2 BAR § 276; 2 ZITELMANN 
394; WALKER 43I; 2 BROCHER I99· 
90 PILLET, I Traite 763 ; 2 id. 499 § 646. 
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equity in Louisiana to the extent that it would be in 
Maryland.91 
4· Relation between Assignee and Debtor 
An assignee has no more rights than his assignor. Hence 
the debtor can use defenses that would be available to him 
as against the assignor, in addition to those which he may 
have against the new creditor. The German doctrine is 
unanimous in declaring that, since the law under which the 
obligor owes cannot be changed by the act of other parties, 
all his defenses are determined by the law governing the 
debt.92 
It is scarcely believable that under American conflicts 
rules the law of the debt should be restricted to the question 
of its "assignability." In the above-quoted dictum of 1932, 
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire referred to the law 
of the original insurance debt in considering the rights of 
the insurer andjor any party claiming rights against him 
as well as the right of changing the beneficiary.93 Defenses 
of lack or failure of consideration, of frustration of a condi-
tion or breach of contract,94 are obviously determined by the 
same law. This law ought no less to govern defenses against 
the assignee on the ground of his own behavior or of setoff 
(if characterized as substantive) of the debtor's own 
counterclaims. 
Compensation, setoff, and recoupment available to the 
debtor against the assignor at the time of assignment or 
before notice of it to the debtor, are clearly in the same 
91 Jackson v. Tiernan (1840) 15 La. 485. The place of the payment was 
also the place of the debtor's domicil but not of the assignment, as BAT!FFOL 
430 n. 4 thought. 
92 WALKER 490 and n. IZ simply concludes: the law controlling the debt also 
governs the relation between assignee and debtor. 
93 Barbin v. Moore, supra n. 35· 
94 No confirmation, though, seems to be afforded by Bankers Life Co. v. 
Perkins (1936) 284 Ill. App. IZZ, I N. E. (zd) IIZ, mentioned by BATIFFOL 
431 n. z. • 
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class, provided they are considered to be substantive. Such 
counterclaims, hence, are subjected to the law of the debt 
by the Germans, to the law of the debtor's domicil by the 
French, and probably to the law of the forum in jurisdic-
tions where they are regarded as merely procedural means 
of defense. 
Illustration. Buschel in Berlin assigned a claim against 
a buyer in Strassburg to a bank in Berlin. The buyer 
countered the action of the assignee by claiming une exception 
de compensation against the assignor. The court of Colmar 
assumed that primarily under the French doctrine the law 
of the domicil of the debtor governed the problem; the de-
fendant, having recognized the assignment by letter, would 
not be permitted to resort to compensation (C. C. art. 
1 29 5). The parties seemed to agree on the application of 
German law which perhaps governed the debt and allowed 
the debtor compensation (BGB. § 404); this right, how-
ever, was waived, as the court held.95 
The German doctrine includes in the law of the debt also 
the rules permitting the debtor in good faith to pay to the 
assignor or a wrong assignee, or to transact with him to the 
detriment of the assignee. We shall have to examine this 
point specifically. 96 
5. The Promise to Assign 
Limiting our discussion to cases where the assignment 
is based on an obligatory contract rather than on obliga-
tions ex lege, we have to deal with such transactions as sale 
of a debt, agreement to assign for accord and satisfaction 
or for security of payment, agency and partnership includ-
ing the duty to confer claims acquired upon the principal 
or partner, etc. According to the distinction discussed in 
the beginning of this chapter (p. 389), the validity of 
95 App. Colmar (Nov. 16, 1935) Clunet 1937, 781, cf. supra n. 47· 
96 Infra pp. 417 ff. 
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such contracts is tested by their governing laws, not that 
of the assignments. The American decisions have not faced 
the question. They inquire into the efficacity of assignments 
in view of usury, 97 gambling,98 and absence of valuable con-
sideration, 99 or the lack of insurable interest.100 But in the 
cases decided, the places of the promise to assign and of 
assigning were indistinguishable. 
In the German doctrine, it has been characteristically 
regarded as a matter of course that the law governing the 
9 7 In Runkle v. Smith (1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 103, an interest in a trust in 
New Jersey was assigned as security for a loan to a loan company in 
Pennsylvania. It seems that the court localized both the loan and the assign-
ment in Pennsylvania, although the court speaks only of the latter. The 
interest was excessive under both laws. In In re Eby (1929) 39 F. (2d) 76, 
the parties, in contracts including assignment of book accounts, stipulated 
for the law of Delaware although the Commercial Credit Co. was incor-
porated and had its home office in Maryland. The court localized "the 
contracts" either in Maryland ("last act") or Delaware, both having no 
usury law. It would seem that if the court incorrectly emphasized the 
assignment as such, it should reasonably have considered the law of North 
Carolina where the assignor was a merchant and kept his books. Cf. infra 
IV, 3· 
Personal Finance Co. v. Gilinsky Fruit Co. (1934) 127 Neb. 450, 255 N. W. 
558, 256 N. W. 511, LoRENZEN, Cases 472 deviates by declaring the excessive 
interest on the loan for which the assignment was made as security, contrary 
to the settled public policy of the forum, the domicil of the debtor; perhaps 
the court had a hidden feeling that wages should not have been assigned 
for a small loan at 3!% a month. But juridically the dissenting vote was 
right. 
9 BManhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen (1911) 139 S. W. 51: assignor, citizen 
of Texas, and the agent of the assignee made the agreement as to the assign-
ment of two life insurance policies in Texas, also place of the insurance 
company. Under Texas law, it was a gambling contract. Cf. Phillips v. 
Green ( 1922) 194 Ky. 254: draft given in a gambling house to carry on 
gambling; Bernstein v. Fuerth ( 1928) 132 Misc. 343, 229 N. Y. Supp. 791: 
check endorsed on board a ship moving along the coast for a gambling loss, 
but no place of endorsement where gambling was illegal "was proved." 
99 Glover v. Wells {1891) 40 Ill. App. 350: assignment for security for a 
pre-existent loan which was held to be a sufficient consideration under Iowa 
law; evidently the entire arrangement took place in Iowa. Colburn's Appeal 
( 1902) 74 Conn. 463: while the policy was governed by New York law and 
the prescribed written notice was observed, the question whether the transfer 
of the interest of the insured to his wife was for valuable consideration, 
depended on the law of Massachusetts where the couple was domiciled. 
Contra, for the law of the debt: GULDENER 59, stressing the basic nature 
of consideration in common law, but forgetting that it regards only the 
relation Assignor-Assignee. 
10o Supra n. 71. 
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original debt should decide whether a change of creditor 
requires the existence of a valid underlying cause (e.g., prom-
ise) between assignor and assignee. The law governing the 
promise to assign (the "cause" of assignment), then, should 
determine whether this requirement is fulfilled. Since the 
Dutch courts are firm in classifying the conditions of assign-
ment with the law governing the latter,101 the following 
Dutch case has been criticized in Germany :102 
A German in Germany made a loan to another German 
domiciled in Holland and assigned the claim to a Dutchman 
by correspondence. The debtor questioned that there was 
valid title, essential for the transfer under Dutch law. But 
the court held that the assignment was made in Germany 
where an assignment is valid by itself (as an "abstract" 
transaction) and it was immaterial, therefore, to inquire 
into the consideration. German writers object that if the 
loan was governed by Dutch law, the Dutch requirement of 
a cause was peremptory.103 
The decision was correct as to the classification. A debtor 
is not entitled to reject an assignee purchasing an entirely 
assignable claim under a foreign law. Whether the assignor 
or- the assignee is the true creditor, is an exclusive matter 
for the law governing their relationship. The American 
view is in full harmony with this conception, which has an 
analogue in the English rule: A debtor may not decline per-
formance to an assignee on the ground that there is no con-
sideration for the assignment as between assignee and 
assignor .104 
Effects. The underlying transaction between assignor and 
assignee determines what accessory rights, liens, securities 
or preferences ought to be transferred together with the 
101 Supra p. 399· 
102 Rb. Haarlem (Feb. 22, 1927) W. n664. 
103 LEWALD 272, followed by RAAPE, D. IPR. 277· 
104 In re Westerton [ 1919] 2 Ch. 104; Holt v. Heatherfield Trust, Ltd. 
fx942l 2 K. B. I; JENKS-WINFIELD § 287. 
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main object105 and whether the grantor enters into a war-
ranty for the existence of the debt, and possibly for the 
solvency of the debtor ;106 also what steps to enforce the 
debt must be taken by the assignee in case of legal or con-
tractual warranty of solvency; for what period a warranty 
is presumed to last, and what may be recovered on this or 
other grounds from the assignor.107 
The law governing the internal relationship also decides 
whether a person is entitled to have a chose in action trans-
ferred on the ground of such claims as may belong to a 
principal, a partner, a surety paying the debt, a codebtor 
paying, et cetera. 
6. The Transfer 
Formation. Assignment may be conceived as a unilateral 
declaration by the assignor, but in any reasonable view 
requires at least tacit acceptance. The consent must be 
serious, not simulated. 108 These requirements have nothing 
to do with the original debt. Likewise, essentials, such as 
notice, recording, and registration, pertain to the orbit of 
the transfer, but not of the debt. 
The same is true of the admission of a fiduciary assign-
105 This is usually confused with the question whether such collateral 
rights actually follow the assigned right without an express clause. 
1 06 Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 19, 1891) 2 Z.int.R. (1892) 370, Clunet 1893, 904; 
RG. (Dec. 3, 1891) 2 Z.int.R. (1902) 162, 164, Austrian debt. German sale 
of it, no warranty of solvency contrary to Austrian Allg. BGB. § 1397; 
See also RG. (May 25, 1928) JW. 1928, 2013, IPRspr. 1928 No. 13. The 
literature underlines this point specifically. 
107 Cf. Austria: C. C. §§ 1398, 1399; Swiss C. Obi. arts. 171 par. 2, 173; 
Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 1267; Cuba: C. C. art. 1530. 
In the decision of the Bavarian Supreme Court, supra n. 106, the assignor 
paid the assignee the deficiency, and after the debtor had come to fortune 
again, sued the assignee for recovery; also this incident was correctly 
subjected to the law of the sale. 
1os BG. (June 3, 1897) 23 BGE. II 818, 8 Z.int.R. (1898) 170 applied 
the law of the assignor, meant to be the law governing the act of transfer. 
But the same court (Nov. 24, 1906) 32 BGE. II 696 subjected the problem 
to the law of the debt, as also 2 FRANKENSTEIN 26 advocates. 
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ment for the purpose of collecting the debt/09 and the 
conditions of a security assignment. Also, if the law of the 
assignment were to recognize a unilateral act of the assignor 
as constituting the transfer, this ought to suffice even though 
unknown to the law of the debt.110 
This is contrary to the German and Swiss principle that 
a mode of transfer not permitted by the law governing the 
debt has no effect against the debtor; although the obli-
gatory contract may follow a different law, its fulfillment 
by assignment should be amenable to the law of the debt. 
This principle is a curious obstacle to the international 
negotiation of claims, subjecting without any justification 
cause and transfer necessarily to different laws.111 A doubt 
in this respect may arise in the case of future and con-
ditional debts. Thus, where a French real-estate broker 
assigned his Swiss-governed claim for a conditional fee in 
France under French law, the Swiss Federal Tribunal classi-
fied the problem whether this claim was assignable, without 
hesitation under the law of the debt; on this ground the 
court was able to affirm its jurisdiction which is restricted 
to revising the application of Swiss law.112 The American 
theory leads to the opposite result, since the law of the as-
signment is considered independent.113 The latter view is the 
109 Moore v. Robertson (1891) 17 N. Y. Supp. 554, assignment executed 
in England, but see infra n. 168. 
Contra: OLG. Hamburg (Dec. 31, 1924) 34 Z.int.R. (1925) 447, though 
stating that such a trust is known to both English and German law, applies 
German law as the "national law" of the debtor. {Recognition of fiduciary 
assignment as a full transfer is not yet a matter of course; in Switzerland, 
doubts have been dispersed only by BG. (June 12, 1945) 71 BGE. II 167). 
11o Contra: GuLDENER 25 f. 
111 On this point, GuLDENER 41, as the only Continental writer, has seen 
the right solution. 
112 BG. (Feb. 24, 1915) 41 BGE. II 132, 134. 
113 In Monarch Discount Co. v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. of Indiana 
( 1918) 285 Ill. 233, the assignability of future wages is determined under 
the law believed to govern the assignment, cf. supra n. 71. In the decision 
In re New York, New Haven and Hartford R. Co. (D. C. Conn. 1938) 
25 F. Supp. 874. 876, it is not certain for what reason the assignment of a 
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correct one, so far as classification is concerned and thereby 
the state competent to protect the assignor is indicated. 
The Dutch courts hold likewise.114 The objections against 
transfer of future or conditional debts are well known; 
they continue in a great number of countries and of Ameri-
can states to produce the requirement that the contract 
from which the debt should flow must exist at the time of 
the assignment.115 Historically, the reluctance to treat a 
half-completed chose in action as an object of disposition 
is quite comparable to the slow process by which a future 
crop was admitted as the res for a sale.116 In addition to 
remainders of this conceptual difficulty, there is always a 
suspicion of fraudulent acts to deprive creditors of an 
asset. 117 Surrender of future means of livelihood or of 
entire stocks of assets has been disapproved also in the 
manifest interest of the assignor.118 But no interest what-
ever of the original debtor is involved. His situation remains 
unchanged, since the debt can only be enforced when it is 
mature. 
Scope. Two cases may illustrate the question of the scope 
of an assignment: 
A seller of merchandise in Le Havre, France, drew a 
draft on his German buyer and discounted it at his local 
banker. Did he impliedly assign to the banker his right to 
recover the price on the ground of the sale? Under French 
law, indorsement in fact transfers the provision, the claim 
of the drawer against the drawee.119 The Reichsgericht 
abandoned the rigid observance of German concepts120 and 
partly conditional right as collateral security is determined under New 
York law; probably because this choice of law was not disputed. 
114 Hof Amsterdam (March 4, I936) N. ]. 1936, No. 746. 
115 Restatement of Contracts I 54; WILLISTON, 2 Contracts § 4I3, cf. 
§ I68I A. 
116 See in the Roman development, PAULUS, Dig. I8, I, 8. 
117 Thus, in Germany see ARNDT, supra n. I, 33 ff. 
118 2 WILLISTON II83 and 5 id. § I652. 
119 C. Com. art. u6. See infra Ch. 49, I, 2. 
l2o OLG. Hamburg (Dec. IS, I9oo) 56 Seuff. Arch. 260, Clunet I905, 669, 
had expounded these principles. 
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followed the French law, excusing this application by refer-
ence to French business practice. French law was not 
thought to be applicable because the debt was under German 
law, and notification therefore was declared unnecessary.121 
Without such prejudice, it would have been obvious that 
French law governed the scope of the transfer. This result 
is laid down at present in the Geneva Convention on the 
conflict of laws relating to bills of exchange (article 6) 
as incidental to the law creating the draft. 
Potter & Co. in Augusta, Georgia, drew a draft repre-
senting the price of fifty bales of cotton sold by them to a 
firm in Winterthur, Switzerland. The draft was successively 
endorsed to a broker, a firm in New York, and a banker 
in Paris who sent the paper for collection to a bank in 
Winterthur. The Paris banker sued the buyer exclusively 
on the basis of the sales contract. The assignments con-
ditioning his right were inferred by the Appeal Court from 
the special usages of the cotton trade, whereas the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal recognized that American law governed 
the original endorsements and assumed that the lower court 
could, without so stating, base its recognition of the usages 
upon American law. The claim for the price itself was 
considered governed by the Swiss law of the debt.122 
A last example may show the effect of an assignment as 
between the parties : 
An American case was decided upon the following as-
sumptions.123 Under the law of Louisiana, if the holder 
of a claim secured by a lien assigns part of this claim, the 
assignor loses his priority to the assignee insofar as the 
proceeds of the lien are insufficient to pay both assignor 
and assignee; under Mississippi law, assignor and assignee 
share the proceeds equally pro rata. The court rested its 
choice of law on the place of the assignment and could have 
supported this choice by the situs of the lands subject to 
the lien. 
121 RG. (March 19, 1907) 65 RGZ. 357, Clunet 1908, 531; 1910, 227; cf. 
KUHN, Comp. Com. 258; GULDENER 46. 
122 BG. (Sept. 17, 1892) Kindlimann v. Marcuard, Krauss & Cie., 18 BGE. 
516. 
123 Couret v. Conner (1918) uS Miss. 374· 
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IV. PROTECTION OF Goon FAITH 
I. Fundamental Distinction 
Since a debtor should not be harmed by a transfer of the 
claim to a new creditor without his consent, it is a universal 
principle that he may deal with his original creditor, or with 
an assignee, so long as he may in good faith believe him to 
be the owner of the claim. The older legal systems pre-
scribed, for this purpose, that notification to the debtor or 
his acceptance of the assignment should be an essential 
requisite of the transfer. Noncompliance with such pro-
visions prevents the completion of the assignment and cer-
tainly belongs to the law governing its formation (supra 
II, 6). 
By modern methods, mere agreement to transfer consti-
tutes assignment. Separate rules have to safeguard the 
interest of debtors, despite the validly completed transfer,-
rules forming a distinct complex closely connected with the 
debtor rather than with the parties to the transfer. 
From the situation of a bona fide debtor, however, we 
have thoroughly to distinguish the somewhat analogous 
problems occurring when the claims of several successive 
assignees conflict with each other, or an assignee comes into 
competition with an attaching creditor of the assignor or 
with his trustee in bankruptcy. Confusion with the first-
mentioned group of problems is facilitated by their twofold 
similarity: bona fide ignorance of a prior assignment may 
favor a later purchaser of a claim, and notification to the 
debtor often has been made a decisive factor also in acquisi-
tion of priority by an assignee or garnishor. In the older 
systems, best represented by the French Code, in fact, the 
same ((signification" to or acceptance by the debtor, decisive 
for the debtor's position, likewise determines the effects of 
assignment as to all other "third persons." In England "it 
is established, in the case of statutory and equitable assign-
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ments, that an assignee must give notice to the debtor in 
order to secure his title against later assignees."124 In fact, 
English and some American courts make no distinction 
between conflicts involving protection of the debtor and 
those which concern priority between successive assignees. 
The German courts do not even see the problem. French 
writers emphasize strongly that notification to the debtor 
serves as a general measure of publicity, guaranteeing the 
notifying assignee priority of rank over any other claim-
ant.125 Insofar as this argument reaches unity of criterion 
for the effect of all assignees and other claimants, it has 
great force. But the "publicity" resulting from knowledge 
by the debtor is not very impressive. There is no law any-
where constraining a debtor to impart his knowledge to 
someone else, except in actual garnishment proceedings. 
However, that there is a great difference of policy and 
purpose between protecting the debtor and marshalling 
priorities, becomes manifest in considering the modern form 
of assignment by formless agreement. Nothing can demon-
strate this better than the most recent American develop-
ment of the technique for ascertaining priority. From 1945, 
numerous new American statutes have established recording 
in public files or marking in the books of the assignor of 
accounts receivable as the method to secure priority of 
claims. These devices illustrate the fact that priority is a 
matter connected with the assignor rather than with the 
debtor. 
These statutes, however, have been necessitated by 
another confusion ensuing upon a mysterious amendment 
of 1938 to the Bankruptcy Act. Transfers by an insolvent 
debtor to one of his creditors, in preference to others of 
the same class, for an antecedent debt are vitiated by Sec-
tion 6o (a) of the Act if made within a certain period before 
124 CHESHIRE and FIFOOT, Law of Contracts (1945) 336. 
125 BARTIN, 3 Principes 33 f. § 374i NIBOYET, 4 Traite 672 f. 
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the petition for bankruptcy is filed. A transfer falls within 
the critical period if it is not "perfected" previously. The 
former Bankruptcy Act required for this purpose that re-
cording or registering should be done if it was required or 
even only permitted "by law."126 The amended test requires 
for perfection: 
"That no bona fide purchaser from the debtor127 and no 
creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the 
property so transferred superior to the rights of the trans-
feree therein." 
This formulation introduced a new test, the "hypothetical 
bona fide purchaser test," not defined in the Act. It is com-
mon opinion that even in the old version the federal pro-
vision referred to the state law applicable according to the 
rules of conflicts law, and this view is upheld upon the 
amended test. 128 
To the surprise of many lawyers and the finance institu-
tions concerned, the courts have applied the section to the 
assignment of book accounts for security, which are in most 
cases made without notice to the debtors. Such application 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Klauder 
Case129 was the more striking, because the section deals with 
preferences given to antecedent debts to the detriment of 
other creditors of the same class and in the case at bar the 
bank assignees of the debt, with consent of a consortium of 
creditors, furnished new capital to the now bankrupt assig-
nor. The assignment was held imperfect because under the 
then law of Pennsylvania the debtors in their various states 
126 Judicial construction seems to have distorted this provision by giving 
publication a retroactive effect. 
127 Debtor, here, of course, means the bankrupt, not the person of whom 
we speak as debtor in our context. 
128 Mr. Justice Jackson in Corn Exchange Nat' I Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Klauder (1942) 318 U.S. 434, 437 with citations; Judge Goodrich in In re 
Rosen (1946) 157 F. (2d) 997; McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co. (1944) 292 
N. Y. 347, 55 N. E. (2d) 192, aff'd ( 1945) 323 U. S. 365, 369, per Stone, C. J. 
129 The Klauder Case, supra n. 128. 
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should have been notified, and therefore a subsequent as-
signee in good faith could have acquired a right superior to 
the bank. 
This and other decisions, prejudicial to nonnotification 
financing of accounts receivable/30 have provoked the large 
series of new statutes assuring measures of publicity. Their 
confusing variety adds to the present difficulties of the 
courts in interstate cases.131 Thereby the conflicts problem, 
unsolved thus far, has become particularly acute, and it 
would seem time for agreement on an adequate rule. 
2. Protection of the Debtor 
(a) Municipal systems .132 The debtor obtains his most 
secure position in those jurisdictions where, according to 
the repeatedly mentioned French model, notification by 
either the assignor or the assignee is rigorously required for 
completion of the transfer.133 In English equity and in a 
number of codes, positive knowledge is equivalent to notifi-
cation ;134 in contrast, the French Court of Cassation allows 
130 See in particular, MALCOLM, "Explanation and Analysis of Massa-
chusetts House Bill No. 642 relative to Assignments of Accounts Receivable 
and other Choses in Action," 30 Mass. L. Q. (1945) No.2, 26; KUPFER and 
LIVINGSTON, "Corn Exchange National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder 
Revisited: The Aftermath of its Implications," 32 Va. L. Rev. (1946) 910; 
ALAN V. LowENSTEIN, "Assignments of Accounts Receivable and the Bank-
ruptcy Act," 1 Rutgers U. L. Rep. (I947) I. 
1 31 KoESSLER, "Assignment of Accounts Receivable," 33 Cal. L. Rev. (I945) 
46, 86; id., "New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing of 
Accounts Receivable," 44 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1946) 563 at 6oo, 604. See on recent 
proposals, Note, "Inventory and Account Financing," 62 Harv. L. Rev. (1948) 
588, 593 f. and n. I5. 
1 32 SCHUMANN, 2 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch at 37; ARNDT, supra, n. I, 
83 ff. 
133 See, e.g., England: Law of Property Act, I925, s. I36; Holt v. Heather· 
field Trust, Ltd. [ I942l 2 K. B. I clarifies that the decisive time is when 
the debtor receives the written notice. 
Italy: C. C. ( I942) art. 1264 par. r. 
Mexico: C. C. art. 2047. 
Portugal: C. C. arts. 789, 790. 
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. I67. 
134 E.g., Austria: Allg. BGB. § I395· 
Cuba: C. C. art. I527. 
Germany: BGB. § 407. 
Italy: C. C. (I942) art. I264 par. 2. 
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the debtor to resist an assignment of which no notice has 
been given, although known to him.135 In some laws, in-
cluding the United States, not even a debtor without knowl-
edge is protected, if he has reason to inquire at the time of 
payment to his original creditor.136 In Germany, the debtor 
is entitled to require presentation of a written assignment 
or a formal notice by the assignor.137 
The provisions vary greatly with respect to the form of 
notification. In the United States, it is immaterial who 
notifies and whether he does it orally or by writing. The 
French Civil Code demands a formal signification by the 
assignee employing a huissicr, the enforcement officer, or 
an acceptance of the assignment by the debtor in an acte 
authentique (article r 690). A written document of assign-
ment shown to the debtor is enough to be effective in the 
United States and Germany.138 
The French provision, however, following the Coutume 
de Paris, speaks only of the relation as between the debtor 
and third parties. A widespread theory contrasts the rela-
tion inter partes, between assignor and assignee, as inde-
pendent of notification.139 In the numerous countries follow-
ing the French lead, it is often said accordingly that notifica-
tion is not a requisite of validity of the assignment but a 
condition of its effect as to third persons.140 In similar 
135 After a long controversy, Cass. civ. (June 20, 1938) D. 1939.1.26; 
(Nov. 27, 1944) Gaz. Pal. 1945.1.13, strongly criticized as illogical and 
inequitable by BoiTARD, 43 Revue Trim. D. Civ. (1945) 119 f. 
136 Restatement of Contracts § 170; Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 167; Ger-
many: broad judicial construction of § 407 cit. 
137 BGB. § 410. 
138 Restatement of Contracts § 170, comment to sub sec. 2 and ill us. 6; 
BGB. § 410. 
139 Arg. C. C. art. 1138; see ALBERT WAHL, Note, S. 1898.1.113. Against 
this dominant opinion, PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite § 1128. 
140 See, e.g., for Argentina, C. C. arts. 1493 (1459), 1501 (1467); cf. 
I. HALPERIN, El contra to de seguro ( 1946) 522. 
Brazil: C. C. arts. 1067, 1069 distinguishes even three effects: before 
notification as between the parties; after notification as to the debtor; and 
with regard to various requirements of publicity, as to other interested 
persons. 
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formulas, the present English literature states that to per-
fect title as between assignor and assignee no notice to the 
debtor is necessary, but notice serves to prevent the debtor 
from paying the assignor.141 The Supreme Court of Tennes-
see having proclaimed the minority rule essentially requir-
ing notification, subsequently dispensed with it as between 
assignor and assignee.142 The meaning of these distinctions 
is not exactly the same everywhere and often doubtful.143 
But their mere existence helps to underline the dual relation-
ship, too often disregarded in conflicts law. 
In the United States, the prevailing system is closely 
analogous to the legal provisions of the German Code. As 
the Supreme Court expressed it, after one nonnotified as-
signment, a subsequent assignee takes nothing by his assign-
ment because the assignor has nothing to give.144 If Willis-
ton objects that according to the same decision an assignor 
retains the power to discharge the claim by settlement until 
notice is given to the debtor,145 this is only a means to 
protect the debtor. The transfer of a claim resembles that 
of a chattel, the possession of which, retained by the vendor, 
helps a bona fide purchaser to acquire title. Until the 
debtor's good faith is broken, he may pay the debt, or be 
released, or acquire defenses for value, irrespective of the 
transfer.146 
(b) Conflicts rules. Again, three systems are in dispute. 
(i) Law of the assignment. American courts, subjecting 
an assignment to the law of the place where it is made, could 
be expected to include the provisions concerning notifica-
141 England: PoLLOCK, Contracts ( ed. 12) 172; Gorringe v. Irwell India 
Rubber Works (1887) 34 Ch. D. 128. 
142 Peters v. Goetz (1916) 136 Tenn. 257, 188 S. W. II44; Naill & Naill 
v. Blackwell (1932) 164 Tenn. 615, 51 S. W. (2d) 835. 
143 ARNDT, supra n. 1, at 89 denies any real importance to the distinction in 
France. 
144 Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co. (1923) 264 U. S. 182, I97· 
145 WILLISTON, 2 Contracts 1258. 
146 WILLISTON, 2 Contracts § 433; Restatement of Contracts §§ 167, 170. 
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tion. This has been the method of dealing with general as-
signments for the benefit of creditors in the last century when 
such transactions were frequent. A general assignment, good 
where made, has been deemed to be good everywhere, irre-
spective of a requirement of notice in other states,141 al-
though with certain reservations for other local creditors.148 
Also ordinary assignments have been treated likewise in a 
few decisions, 149 and by Beale.150 
(ii) Law of the debt. Squarely opposed, the established 
German doctrine asserts that it depends on the law govern-
ing the original claim, not only what effect an unknown 
assignment has on the debtor's position but even whether 
its transfer is completed by the agreement or only by notifi-
cation. The literature has insisted upon this result with 
emphasis.151 As mentioned before, when a debt governed 
by French law is assigned in Germany, the solemnities of 
signification have been held indispensable/52 while assign-
ment in France of a German-governed debt is considered 
complete without any notification/53 Accordingly, the law 
of the debt decides the effect of a payment by the debtor to 
his original creditor ;154 the debtor is supposed to rely on 
147 Train v. Kendall ( 1884) 137 Mass. 366; First Nat'! Bank v. Walker 
(1891) 6r Conn. 154; Barnett v. Kinney (1893) 147 U.S. 476. 
148 Cf. STUMBERG 369 n. 6o. 
149 Vanbuskirk v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. {1842) 14 Conn. 582; Clark v. 
Connecticut Peat Co. ( r868) 35 Conn. 303; Hanna v. Lichtenhein ( 1918) 
182 Am. Dec. 94, 169 N. Y. Supp. s8o. 
To the same effect once in Germany, Oberapp. Ger. Liibeck (Nov. 29, 1855) 
cited by 2 BAR 81 n. 2 {at least where the lex loci was more favorable to 
the assignee) and in France, Trib. Seine (March 15, 1907) Clunet 1908, 
1118, Revue 1908, 182 {superseded). 
150 2 BEALE § 354.1, abandoning the position taken in Restatement §§ 353, 
354; see MALCOLM, letter printed by KUPFER and LIVINGSTON, supra n. 36, 
at 925. 
1512 BAR 82; GEBHARD, Materialien 162; 2 ZITELMANN 394; 2 FRANKEN-
STEIN 261; NEUMEYER, IPR. § 33; LEWALD 271 f.; NUSSBAUM 265; GUTZ· 
WILLER r6r6; M. WoLFF, IPR. 94; RAAPE, D. IPR. 277 I r. 
152 See supra n. 39· 
158 See supra n. 3 8. 
154 WALKER 487. 
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it.155 The Swiss courts follow this view, 156 which has been 
recommended also for England157 and France.158 
(iii) Law of the debtor's domicil. The French courts 
firmly apply the local law of the debtor's domicil/5 " allegedly 
as a general rule for assignments, but in fact dealing usually 
with the requisite of signification/50 More or less in the 
same application, this theory is shared by most French and 
Italian writers, 161 and has found favor also in England162 
and sometimes in the United States.163 Even the German 
Supreme Court has twice spoken of the debtor's domicil 
as if it were decisive by itself, instead of being only the 
presumptive place of performance of the debt ;164 and the 
Hanseatic Appeal Court has concluded that every debtor 
may rely on the protection afforded by such provisions as 
the Belgian Civil Code, article 1690, as well as the German 
Civil Code, § 410, according to the laws and usages in his 
country.165 
The same current of thought can be found in American 
decisions, sometimes influenced, as in France, by the con-
flict of assignment and garnishment. Thus, in 1 8 7 4, notice 
was declared necessary in Tennessee for the protection of 
its own citizens, even in the case of a foreign general assign-
155 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 29, 1906) 16 Z.int.R. (1906) 331. 
156 BG. (Oct. 8, 1935) 61 BGE. II 242; (Feb. 19, 1936) 62 BGE. II 108. 
157 FooTE 296; CHESHIRE 445; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 548 § 512. 
158 BATJFFOL 429, 432. 
159 Supra n. 42. 
160 BATIFFOL §§ 530, 531; cf. NmoYET, cited supra n. 48. 
161 See citations supra n. 45· 
Italy: Cass. Rome (Nov. 7, 1895) S. I895·4·I3; Clunet I895, 664 speaks 
of the national law of the debtor. 
162 In re Queensland etc. Co. [ I89I] I Ch. 536; [ 189:;:) I Ch. ZI9, C. A. 
In this connection, Kelly v. Selwyn [ I905] z Ch. 117, IZI f., requiring notifi-
cation, in contrast to New York law, makes sense, as it adopts English 
law, because an interest in an English trust is assigned. Cf. WESTLAKE I52· 
163 See PARMELE in 1 Wharton 796 and the cases collected infra ns. I66 ff. 
164 RG. (March 7, I907) 65 RGZ. 357 stressed the fact of the debtor's 
German domicil, and RG. (Nov. 5, 1932) IPRspr. I933 No. 20 subjects the 
requirements of assignment to American law because of the domicil of the 
debtor which was also deemed to be the place of performance. 
1 65 OLG. Hamburg (July 30, 1934) IPRspr. 1934 No. 15. 
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ment.166 In an 1883 case, the Minnesota court stated that 
the assignment was executed in Illinois and as far as the 
rights of assignor and assignees were concerned inter se, 
they were governed by Illinois law, that is, they were valid 
without notification, but in a garnishment suit affecting at-
taching creditors, Minnesota, the debtor's domicil, "cannot 
permit the laws of another state to be imported and over-
ride the settled policy of our own laws. In such a case comity 
must yield to policy, otherwise . . . a citizen of our own 
state who had been debtor to a nonresident would never 
be certain to whom he was liable, for his liability would 
be as uncertain and variable as might be the domicile of 
his creditor."167 A decision of a New York court held the 
collecting agent of English creditors, suing for tort, capable 
of standing in court as a fiduciary assignee, according to 
New York law.168 This holding was not based on local 
procedures/69 but on the argument that under New York 
· law the assignment was full and complete, although it was 
executed in England and under English law its validity 
required a written notice to the debtor. English law "cannot 
control the law of this state," of which the defendants (the 
debtors) are residents. A more recent New York case may 
be mentioned as a parallel, although exclusively dealing 
with the priority problem. It was recognized that despite 
the facts pointing to New York as the place where the 
assignment was to be localized, Missouri law applied in 
granting priority to the second assignee giving first notice 
to the debtor, an insurance company of that state, the in-
surance contract having been made there with a resident to 
166 Flickey v. Soney (1874) 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 169. 
1 67 Lewis v. Bush (1883) 30 Minn. 244 at 247. Only at the end the opinion 
verges to the qualification of Minnesota also as place of performance. 
168 Moore v. Robertson ( 1891) 17 N. Y. Supp. 554· 
169 Also the precedents cited for the capacity to sue of an assignee ap-
pointed for the purpose of collection use substantive reasoning: Church, 
C. ]., in Sheridan v. Mayor ( 1876) 68 N. Y. 30, 32; Ruger, C. ]., in Green-
wood v. Marvin (z888) III N.Y. 423, 440. 
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be performable there.170 These additional factors, of course, 
may also support the application of the law of the debt or 
of the place of performance. 
(iv) Lex loci solutionis. Finally, the Restatement inter-
venes on the ground of its theory that the place of per-
formance always determines the person to whom perform-
ance is due. Consequently, this law, that is, the law govern-
ing performance of the original debt, determines whether 
the debtor can effectively pay to the assignor ( § 3 54). 
Such fragmentary rules at least indicate a tendency to 
abandon the application of the law of the assignment to 
this problem. Others have reached the same approach on 
the general principle of lex loci solutionis,171 which is the 
normal judicial rule in Germany because this law would 
generally govern the debt and effects of the assignment on 
the debt. 
( v) Rationale. The problems regarding the protection 
of an innocent debtor are not solved adequately either by 
the Germans, indiscriminately applying the law governing 
the debt,172 or by Beale's ubiquitous law of the place of 
assignment. Take the simplest cases. Under the German 
approach, an American debtor does not effectively pay 
anywhere to any assignee without formal signification, if 
the debt is governed by Argentine law as in the case of a 
credit given by a bank in Buenos Aires. And according to 
Beale, a French debtor in Paris may effectively pay to an 
assignee if the latter purchased the claim in the United 
States, contrary to French law which would not recognize 
the payment. 
170 Wishnick v. Preserves & Honey (1934) 275 N. Y. Supp. 420; cf. 
CARNAHAN, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts (1942) 433· 
171 BATIFFOL 433 § 537; STUMBERG 235· 
172 When 8 LAURENT 198, 200 § 131 declared that he did not understand 
why the law of the debt should govern as to third persons, 2 BARSon. 1 (b) 
replied that Laurent stayed in the dark, because he assumed a statute real of 
a debt. But Bar and the other German writers have, in their turn, lumped 
too many things together under the law of the debt. 
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We should think, on the contrary, that existence of a 
debt is one thing, transfer of a claim as an asset is another 
thing, and sure identification of the actual creditor is some-
thing still different. The German provision that the debtor 
may require a written instrument stating the assignment 
is an example. From the Swiss requirement of written assign-
ment, it follows that a debtor domiciled in Switzerland must 
not pay without a written document or otherwise assuring 
guarantee. 
Certainly a debtor must know that the possibility of 
foreign assignments imposes on him the risk incurred by 
ignorance of foreign laws. But it is legitimate for his domi-
ciliary law to mitigate his difficulties. 
Forced by the conflicts situation, we may discover that 
the principal rules in discussion are no part of the effects 
of assignment with which the codes naturally associate them. 
Recently, Judge Goodrich found that the privilege, if any, 
of a second assignee having notified the debtor, "comes not 
from his status as bona fide purchaser, but from his activities 
following his belated assignment."173 The situation is 
changed after his assignment by a new event. We may say 
that the legal systems, each in its way, modify the result of 
their rules regulating assignment by a separate set of rules 
regulating the conditions and effects of an excused ignorance 
of these results by the debtor. It seems perfectly natural 
to think of the law at the debtor's domicil as competent 
to do so. 
If, instead, the place of payment should be urged, it 
is true that the question concerning the right of the debtor 
to deposit the sum due in court or with a public office, dif-
ferently treated by the laws, has the closest connection with 
the mode of payment.174 But the debtor may well have, in 
173 In re Rosen (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 157 F. (2d) 997 at 1001. 
174 For the law of the place of payment, WEISS, 4 Traite 398; DESPAGNET 
§ 311. For the Jaw of the debt, 2 ZITELMANN 399; WALKER 450. 
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addition, a special right of deposit in the case of a pre-
tended assignment, dependent on the law of his domicil. 
More important, we should not forget that payment is 
not the only subject of this class of rules, which includes 
release, deferment of the time of performance, acquisition 
of counterclaims against the assignor, the effect of judg-
ments, etc. Likewise, the debtor may be entitled to deal 
at any place with a pseudo assignee showing him a genuine 
token or written instrument of assignment, with effect 
against his true creditor.175 At the same time, it may be seen 
again, that all these are not incidents of the original contract 
or of the assignment, to which they run counter. 
It is true that the debtor may change his domicil whereas 
he cannot unilaterally change the place of performance. 
But the latter place is too often uncertain, 176 and has other 
well-known drawbacks. 
3· Priority of Assignees 
(a) Municipal systems. Two opposite solutions are pro-
vided in the French and the German laws. In the former, 
not until notification is the assignment perfected as against 
all "third" parties, including the creditors of the assignor 
and subsequent assignees from the assignor. Also the new 
Italian Code seems to give absolute preference to the as-
signment first notified to the debtor or first accepted by the 
latter by an act provided with a certain date. The German 
Code simply perfects the transfer through the contract of 
assignment; the assignee hence has a complete priority over 
175 Cf., for instance, Restatement of Contracts §§ 166, 167, 170, 173; Ger-
man Civil Code §§ 406-410. 
176 In an interesting section of his work on Spendthrift Trusts (ed. 2, 
1947) 114 § 113, GRISWOLD looks for a subsidiary conflicts rule for the appli-
cation of the statutes restraining the beneficiary of a trust in disposing of 
his interest in life insurance proceeds. He decides in favor of the place 
where the proceeds are payable, but concedes that when the policy gives 
no clear indication of this place, it is difficult to choose between the domicil 
of the insurance company and the domicil of the beneficiary. 
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all other pretenders. Consequently, if the debtor is dis-
charged in good faith by payment to a subsequent purchaser, 
really a pseudo assignee, the prior assignee is entitled to 
recovery from the second on the ground of unjust enrich-
ment.177 
In the United States, there has been for a long time an 
"irreconcilable conflict" on the question whether notifica-
tion is necessary for the priority of an assignment.178 The 
federal courts, for a time, operating a separate doctrine of 
"general law" in diverse citizenship cases did not require 
notification, but reserved undetermined equitable exceptions 
for a second assignee where notice was given only by the 
latter.179 At present, in the great majority of states, choses 
in action are transferred by the agreement between assignor 
and assignee, with full effect against all parties. Within this 
group, however, there are differences. In particular, the 
so-called "New York rule" agrees with the German con-
ception, whereas according to the "Massachusetts rule" a 
subsequent assignee may retain what he collects on the 
ground of his notification.180 The latter variant, adopted 
by the Restatement on contracts is usually explained by the 
assumption of negligence or estoppel on the part of the 
prior assignee, which, however, is nonexistent in nonnotifi-
cation financing. 
The more suitable new statutes have adopted the methods 
of filing in a public record, or notation in book accounts.181 
177 France: C. C. art. I69o; Germany: BGB. §§ 398, 408, 8r6 par. 2; 
Italy: C. C. (I942) art. I265. 
178 6 C. J. S. rr45, Assignment § 91. Cf. list for I923 in 264 U. S. I9I ns. 
3 and 5; and see the article by KOESSLER, supra n. I3I. 
1 79 Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturer's Finance Co. (C. C. A. Ist I922) 
280 Fed. 803; rev'd (I923) 264 U. S. I82. The decision is superseded by the 
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Case (I938) 304 U. S. 64, also n. 8 in 3I8 U. S. 
437; but has been mentioned more recently as representing the "federal 
rule" expressed in Judson v. Corcoran (I854) I7 How. 6I2, by Chief Justice 
Stone in McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co. (I945) 323 U.S. 365, 373· 
180 See the articles by KOESSLER, and that by KUPFER and LIVINGSTON, 
supra ns. I 30, I 3 I. 
181 Ibid. 
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(b) Conflicts law. In the jurisdictions directing priority 
among domestic claims by the test of notification, following 
some idea of publicity, the competition of foreign-governed 
claims is apparently subordinated to the same principle. 
On the other hand, in the German type of system if the law 
governing the first assignment recognizes its validity, the 
subsequent transfers are ineffective. Beyond these partial 
results, no certain conflicts rule is discoverable anywhere. 
In an English decision, the place of the debtor was pre-
ferred to all other local connections, without any convincing 
reason.182 Some examination of the problem involved has 
been occasioned by recent discussion in the United States 
on the following subject. 
(c) United States: Accounts receivable. The scarce au-
thority includes two cases in which the parties to a se-
curity transfer of accounts receivable stipulated for the 
law at the place of the financing bank, and in each case the 
court disregarded this stipulation. In the extravagent de-
cision by a federal district court in In re J7 ardaman Shoe 
Company/83 it was held that such a clause could not be 
opposed to the trustee in bankruptcy, he being "a stranger 
to the contract."184 The judge refers to the law of the 
assignor's place as the situs of the debt. In the remarkable 
decision in In re Rosen/85 Judge Goodrich eliminated the 
agreement which most clearly referred to Pennsylvania law 
for all rights of the parties, validity, construction, and 
enforcement and "in all respects," for the reason that this 
clause was part of the general arrangement of financing 
and assigning, while the claims and even the contracts pro-
182 In re Queensland Mercantile & Agency Co. [ I89I] I Ch. 536, aff'd 
[ I892] I Ch. 2I9· 
183 (I942) 52 F. Supp. 562, 565. 
184 See against this thesis, KUPFER and LIVINGSTON, supra n. 130, 32 Va. L. 
Rev. (1946) at 917. 
185 (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 157 F. (2d) 997, 999, aff'g (1946) 66 F. Supp. 174 
on other motives. 
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clueing them were not yet all in existence. This was con-
trasted with the actual transfer, not of the claims which 
did not take place, but of the money collected by the debtor 
bank. But it would seem that the court was moved rather 
by the striking fact that routine had led the Philadelphia 
bank to a stipulation for Pennsylvania law manifestly dis-
astrous to its own interests in view of the notification require-
ment, 186 which was in force in Pennsylvania at that time and 
was thereafter quickly repealed.187 The pleadings them-
selves referred to the law of New Jersey, where the assignor 
carried on his business and the debtors were domiciled. No 
general conclusion against party disposition of the applicable 
law should, hence, be inferred from either case. 
The same two decisions, however, in pointing to the 
assignor's place of business, provide us with a strong hint 
respecting the needed rule in the absence of stipulation for 
the applicable law. Thus far, every writer states that the 
courts are very inconsistent in this matter. A qualified 
observer has noted only with diffidence that the courts "con-
fine their attention to the laws of either the borrower's 
domicil or the lender's domicil."188 The immense increase 
of financing by assignment of existent and future business 
accounts should be bolstered by an absolutely sure and 
more adequate law. 
The place of the debtor has, indeed, been unanimously 
discarded in recent American legislation. "It is virtually 
impossible to base a course of conduct upon the laws of 
the states of domicile of the account-debtors because the 
mechanical problems arising from any such theory of opera-
tion would be so complex as to be prohibitive."189 This was 
said against the Supreme Court decision in the Klauder 
186 Id. at 998. 
187 Pennsylvania: 69 Purdon's Stat. ( 1941) § 561. 
188 MALCOLM, "Conflicts of Laws, Accounts Receivable," 30 Mass. L. Q. 
( 1945) 38, 41. 
189 MALCOLM, id. at 41. 
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Case190 and may likewise be objected to an old decision of 
the German Supreme Court.191 The place of the lending 
bank192 has no visible merits either. 
The only suitable contact of accounts receivable is with 
the business place where the books are conducted. Two 
American courts, long ago, understood this need.193 In the 
case of In re Rosen, the result reached was practically 
identical through the consideration that assignor and debtor 
made and had to perform their original contract in New 
Jersey and the actual assignment wa!i to be localized there.194 
In In re Vardaman, the judge emphasized that the situs of 
the debt was at the debtor's place of business, although he 
pointed out that the result would not be different under the 
law of the place where the assignment was executed.195 
The situation is finally clarified by the weight accorded 
to recording or "book-marking" in the statutes. If these 
publicity measures in the state of the assignor were merely 
regarded as territorial, they would exclusively operate by . 
public law within their jurisdiction. Such a theory would be 
irreconcilable with Section 6o (a) of the Bankruptcy Act. 
It is indispensable that these provisions should be respected 
everywhere. 
(d) Other assignments. The domicil of the assignor 
should be competent to determine priority in all cases. This 
is the true reason behind the situs doctrine. 
190 Supra p. 419 n. 128. 
1 91 RG. (March 23, 1897) 39 RGZ. 371, 374 f. 
192 Thus, Note, "What Law Governs the Assignment of a Bank Account," 
40 H arv. L. Rev. ( 1927) 989, 993 .. 
1 93 Trust Comp. v. Bulkeley Union (C. C. A. 6th 1906) 150 Fed. 510, and 
the result agrees with Engelhard v. Schroeder (1920) 92 N. J. Eq. 663: the 
parties resided in New Jersey, but the firm was in New York and New 
York law was applied as lex loci contractus, 
1 94 Supra n. 185. 
1 95 52 F. Supp. 562, 565 f., supra n. 183. 
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V. CoNTACTs 
The American doctrine overestimates the scope of the 
law that may govern the assignment, and is obscure on the 
scope of the law of the original debt. The German doctrine 
commits the opposite, and worse, mistake of extending the 
law of the debt, against reason, to the questions whether 
the transfer may be "abstract,"196 what its form should 
be,197 whether the transfer requires notification to the debtor 
or his knowledge,198 at what time it may take place/99 
whether future and conditional claims are assignable,200 
and connected problems. 201 
These two best developed systems, furthermore, contrast 
in emphasis; Americans stress the actual transfer of a 
chose in action, Germans, the underlying relationship caus-
ing the transfer. Without doubt, it is desirable to have one 
conflicts rule covering the entire relationship between assig-
nor and assignee, particularly in view of the theory pre-
vailing in the majority of systems that an assignment is 
not valid without a valid promise to assign. 
From these premises, we reach the following conclusions. 
Assignee-debtor. The law governing the debt (by no 
means necessarily the law of the place of contracting) deter-
mines the rights and obligations between assignee and 
debtor, excepting the provisions respecting a debtor ignor-
ing the assignment in good faith. 
Assignor-assignee. Where assignor and assignee are domi-
ciled in one jurisdiction and there enter into both the agree-
ment to assign and the assignment, this determines the law 
in every opinion. Judge Learned Hand's proposal to subject 
196 LEWALD 272; RAAPE 277. 
197 LEWALD 273; RAAPE 277. 
198 LEWALD 271. 
199 LEWALD 273 § 332. 
200 BG. (Feb. 24, 1915) 41 BGE. II 132. 
201 LEWALD §§ 333, 334· 
434 MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 
voluntary assignments to the formula lex loci contractus 
contemplated precisely this situation.202 
In the rare cases where promise and transfer occur at 
different places, the analogy to sales of chattels and also 
due regard to the interests of third persons in intangible 
things that have no visible situs, give prime consideration 
to the actual transfer. The American theory is right also on 
this point. 
Where assignor and assignee are domiciled in different 
jurisdictions, the old idea that the debt is located at the 
assignor's domicil furnishes the most convincing test for the 
relationship between the parties to the assignment. 203 
This same test has been in particular deduced above from 
the needs of a transfer of accounts receivable for security, 
and more generally as the most advisable criterion for 
determining the priority of successive assignments by the 
original creditor. 
Debtor's protection. With respect to the protection of a 
bona fide debtor, a third rule is desirable. The law of his 
domicil should determine the conditions and effects of his 
dealing with a person whom he is entitled to believe his 
creditor, although this person is not really his creditor. This 
contact, used by French and Dutch courts, is preferable to 
the law of the place of performance indicated in the Restate-
ment ( §§ 3 53, 3 54) , a place often uncertain or left to the 
option of the creditor. Above all, the statutes are more or 
less understood to intend the protection of their domi-
ciliaries and must be applied accordingly, if unnecessary 
conflicts are to be avoided. 
2o2 New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spence (C. C. A. 2d 1939) 
104 F. (2d) 665, 125 A. L. R. 1281, CHEATHAM, Cases 804. 
2oa With regard to the assignment of an insurance claim, the same opinion 
is suggested as a matter of course by BRUCK, Privatversich. R. ( 1930) 722. 
CHAPTER 50 
Other Transfers of Simple Debts 
I. TRANSFER OF CLAIMS BY LAw 
1. Subrogation by Law1 
SUBROGATION, the substitution by law of one who pays a debt in place of the creditor, is related to the 
voluntary assignment which a third party satisfying 
the creditor may be entitled to request instead of discharge. 
For instance, a surety paying the creditor may demand such 
assignment under Roman law (beneficium cedendarum 
actionum). In fact, the analogy between such compulsory 
"voluntary" assignment and immediate transfer by force 
of law (or judicial proceedings) is rather close. Subroga-
tion is merely a technical improvement in the interest of 
the payor securing his position, particularly in the case of 
the creditor's insolvency. Because of this functional simi-
larity, the modern codes declare the rules of assignment 
applicable by analogy to the legal transfer of claims.2 
Whether the effect of a subrogation is a clear succession 
to the title or the practical equivalent, e.g., acquisition of 
the right of collection, is of no concern for our purpose. 
It follows for the conflict of laws that subrogation is to 
be governed by the same law under which the payor might 
demand assignment of the debt. This is the law governing 
the contractual or legal relationship between the payor 
1 Comparative municipal law: WENGLER, "Surrogation," 6 Rechtsvergl. 
Handworterbuch (1938) 460, 483 ff. {subrogation of a person). 
Conflicts Jaw: GULDENER 125 ff. 
2 Germany: BGB. § 412. 
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 166. 
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and the creditor, not the law governing the principal debt. 
Courts have sensed this better than some writers. 
Illustration. Bales of Swedish cellulose, consigned to the 
Snia Viscosa Company in Milano, Italy, sank in Holland in 
fluvial transportation by a Swiss carrier. The buyer had 
insured the loss in Italy with Italian insurers and recovered 
from them. The insurers were allowed to take recourse 
against the Swiss carrier. Although the claim of the insured 
against the carrier was governed by Swiss law, this claim 
was transferred by subrogation to the insurer according to 
the Italian Commercial Code, then in force, article 438 para-
graph I. This provision did not restrict subrogation to tort 
actions as the Swiss law on insurance contracts, article 72, 
does. Swiss BG. (May 7, 1948) 74 BGE. II 81, 88. 
Where, for instance, a surety pays to the creditor, it is 
the task of the law governing suretyship, 3 and not of the 
law governing the principal debt, 4 to determine whether 
the surety has to demand assignment before paying, or 
acquires the claim by virtue of the payment. This law in-
cludes conditions and effects, although the transfer of 
accessory rights thereby involved, according to the situa-
tion, may require additional consultation of other laws.5 
Similarly, it has been held in Germany that a Belgian by 
paying customs duties to the Belgian state according to 
Belgian law, acquired the right of that state, effective in the 
German bankruptcy of the debtor. 6 
The law of the principal debt, of course, determines the 
transferability of the debt. 7 The tendency of the German 
and Swiss doctrine to enlarge the role of this law, incon-
sistent with what is plainly suitable here, has nevertheless 
3 See particularly German RG. (April 23, I903) 54 RGZ. 3II, 3I6; 
LETZGUS, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 849; BATIFFOL 425 n. 6 § 54I and Traite 62I 
§ 628; DoMKE, Clunet I938, 4I7; ARMIN JON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 485 § 293· 
4 Thus 2 ZITELMANN 394; NEUMEYER, lPR. 29. 
5 See PILLET, I Traite I76 for the problems; RILLING, supra Ch. 47 n. I, 
76•79· 
6 OLG. Hamm (April 27, I9I2) 23 Z.int.R. (I9I3) 358, Revue I9I41 460. 
7 I FIORE § 196; 2 ROLIN § 979· 
OTHER TRANSFERS OF SIMPLE DEBTS 437 
influenced a decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal8 and its 
commentators. 
A German engineer employed by the Swiss federal rail-
roads was injured in the Swiss service and awarded com-
pensation by the German board of accident insurance. 
According to the German law of social insurance, the tort 
claim against the Swiss railroads passed automatically 
to the German board. The Federal Tribunal acknowledged 
this effect of the law governing the relation between injured 
and payor, considering under Swiss law that the tort debt 
also was assignable and that although the debt was not 
ipso jure transferred to the social insurance office, the insti-
tution of subrogation was familiar. From this decision, 
writers have inferred the proviso that the law governing 
the transfer can operate only if the law of the debt recog-
nizes the transfer.9 
Even this restricted reference to the debtor's law is un-
necessary and confusing. It suffices that under the law 
governing the debt, it can be transferred to any other per-
son. If it is transferable, the debtor has no justifiable in-
terest in the form and the modalities of the transfer, and 
still less has the law of the debt any bearing. 
The wrong approach was followed by a Dutch decision 
in an analogous case. Two German postal officials serving on 
through trains were injured in accidents on Dutch territory 
and pensioned under the German social security scheme. 
The Appeals Court of Amsterdam rejected the recourse of 
the German board against the Dutch railroads, because 
Dutch law did not acknowledge subrogation in analogous 
cases and therefore the tort obligation was satisfied by the 
8 BG. (Feb. 28, 1913) 39 BGE. II 77, 2 Praxis 171. 
9 LEWALD 277 § 336, followed by RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. 278, 295 (the German 
law can only order the transfer and it was up to the Swiss law to carry 
it out) ; M. WoLFF, IPR. 95 and Priv. Int. Law 555 § 518. GuLDENER 139 
even criticizes the decision because it should have applied only Swiss law. 
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award of pensions granted by the board to discharge its 
own liability.10 
This naive reasoning overlooks the entire modern de-
velopment of concurrence of debts where the ultimate loss 
falls on one codebtor. In the conflicts field, it demonstrates 
the mistake of allowing the law of the debt to interfere. 
A different answer is contained in a French decision.11 
A Dutch car owner, insured against fire with an English 
company, lost the car in a fire at a French garage. The 
company paid the damage to the owner and recovered from 
the garage company. The insurance contract was deemed 
to be governed by Dutch law and produced legal subroga-
tion (Dutch C. Com. article 284) at the time of the pay-
ment. The French-governed obligation of the garage com-
pany was ascertained as soon as plaintiff showed himself 
to be regularly subrogated under Dutch law. This result 
conforms to our own conclusions, but the court based it on 
obscure reasoning and the alleged rule for "quasi contracts" 
that the law of the place of the generating fact, that is, of 
the payment, governs.12 
Likewise, in another case involving insurance against 
risks of carriage, a New Y ark insurance company was 
recognized as subrogated to the insured because it had paid 
the client in France and subrogation at that time had be-
come known to French law.13 If the lawyers concerned had 
cared to consult the law of New Y ark, they would probably 
have reasoned otherwise. 
Considering the great and ever-increasing importance of 
subrogation in modern relationships, its fate cannot be 
10 Hof Amsterdam (April 12, 1921) N. J. 1922, 8oi. 
11 App. Riom (Jan. 29, 1932) Gaz. Pal. 1932.1.707, Revue gen. des assur-
ances terrestres 1932, 295 with note by PERROULD. 
12 See PERROULD, ibid., and contra, supra p. 368. 
13 Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. z, I 935) Revue gen. des assurances terrestres 
1935, 346 and note by PERROULD, also approved by PICARD et BESSON, I Traite 
624 § 305. 
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reasonably made dependent on the accidental place of pay-
ment. Subrogation flows from the law governing the under-
lying obligation,14 which we have found also to influence 
the law granting recovery of unjust enrichment. Where, for 
instance, an injured driver of an automobile has released 
the tortfeaser but cashed the insurance money, he is bound 
to refund this money, according to American views.15 How 
could this rest on the law of the place of the payment? 
The relationship insurer-insured dominates the entire 
problem. 
In the case of accident insurance, we have found earlier 
that a direct action by the injured party against the insurer, 
when granted by the law of the place of the accident, ought 
to be allowed elsewhere.16 It is added here that if the insured 
has been satisfied by the insurer, their relationship deter-
mines the transfer of the tort action. 
This would also seem to furnish the right solution to the 
recent controversy whether an insurer against liability is 
subrogated in a claim based on the Federal Tort Claims 
Act of 1946,17 which assimilates the United States as wrong-
doer to private persons. The Act presupposes that an indi-
vidual in an identical case would be liable under the law 
of the place where the loss or damage occurred. It is entirely 
unjustified to require another federal law to extend the right 
to sue especially to a subrogee.18 At least one circuit court 
14 This should be true even in a system where subrogation, e.g., of the 
insurer, is merely based on the law plus the payment, in minimizing the 
(insurance) contract, as in the doctrine of the Italian courts on the ground 
of former C. Com. art. 438, see Cass. Ita!. (Feb. 19, 1937) 39 Dir. Marit. 
(1937) 80 and note by BERLINGIERI. 
15 See on this and related questions, BILLINGs, "The Significance of Sub-
rogation in Automobile Insurance Practice," Ins. L. J, 1948, 707. 
16 See Vol. II p. 263. 
17 6o Stat. 842 § 41o(a), 28 U.S. C.§ 931 (a). See BRENTON, "The Case 
for Subrogees under the Federal Tort Claims Act," Ins. L. J. 1948, z89. 
18 Thus, as claimed by the government and sustained in several decisions 
dismissing actions by insurers, Old Colony Ins. Co. v. United States (D. C. 
S. D. Ohio 1949) 74 F. Supp. 723; Cascade City, Mont. v. U. S. (D. C. 
440 MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 
has recognized the subrogation.19 Where a transferable 
claim arises from the tort according to the law of the place 
of wrong, its transfer to the insurer by operation of law 
depends simply on the law governing the insurance contract. 
One difficult problem should be briefly noted. Subroga-
tion as respects the same debt is often granted by statute 
to persons differing in their relationships to the debtor. 
For instance, it has been discussed in Germany that the Code 
entitles a surety paying the creditor to avail himself of a 
mortgage securing the debt, 20 but the Code also subrogates 
the owner of the mortgaged property if he is not the 
principal debtor to the creditor, apparently including the 
right against the surety. 21 Can such owner recover from 
the surety? Is this a question of who first manages to pay? 
Or is it a case of equal distribution? Prevailing German 
opinion has recognized that the surety's position is superior; 
he may recover from the owner but the latter cannot recover 
from him. 22 
Analogous delicate questions have been raised in the 
United States;23 some judicial decisions have been justifiably 
criticized. Thus, a tortfeasor without doubt is responsible 
to the subrogated insurer. Hence, in the better opinion, the 
insurer of one of two tortfeasors may recover from the 
other tortfeasor half of what he pays to the injured party. 2 ! 
An employer paying compensation to an employee ought to 
Mont. 1947) 75 F. Supp. 85o; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. U. S. (D. C. E. D. 
N.Y. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 333· 
19 Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9th 1948) 167 F. (2d) 655 
reversing Rusconi v. U. S. (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 669. 
20 BGB. §§ 774, 412, 401. 
21 BGB. §§ 1143, 1249, 412, 401. 
22 STROHAL, 61 Jherings Jahrb. (1912) 59 ff.; RG., 76 Seuff. Arch. 135. 
In Austria followed by 2 EHREN ZWEIG I § 293 and n. 3 6; 2 id. 2 § 3 II n. 20. 
23 LANGMAID, "Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of Surety-
ship and Insurance," 47 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1934) 976, also in Legal Essays in 
Tribute to Orrin Kip McMurray (1935) 245· 
24 LANGMAID, id. 998 (264) against decisions. 
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have recourse against the insurer of a workman's accident.25 
Other cases are more doubtful. 
In conflicts law, the difficulty is increased at least in the 
cases, probably infrequent, where the persons potentially 
entitled to subrogation enter into the connection indepen-
dently of each other. 
However, modern legal science ought to solve the mu-
nicipal problem in a uniform manner, establishing a grada-
tion of liabilities, preliminary to the rank of rights subject 
to subrogation. 
2. Other Transfers by Law 
"Provision." 26 The only topic ordinarily attracting atten-
tion in the Continental literature on this subject has been 
the transfer of the so-called "provision" to the successive 
endorsees of a bill of exchange under French law and those 
following the French doctrine. The rights to funds covering 
the draft and belonging to the drawer, including obligatory 
rights such as claims or credits due him by the drawee, are 
transferred to the payee by the negotiation of the bill and 
successively to the endorsees with every further endorse-
ment. 27 But this means only that the holder of the bill is 
entitled to such claims as the drawer may happen to have 
against the drawee at the time of maturity to the extent of 
the amount indicated in the bill. Text and construction make 
it clear that this is not an ordinary implied assignment; it 
does not necessarily have a present object and does not 
25 LANGMAID, id. 1007 (272) against decisions. 
26 Basic: ERNST E. HIRSCH, Der Rechtsbegriff Provision im franziisischen 
und internationalen Wechselrecht ( 1930) 146 If. 
27 France: C. Com. art. 116, as amended by Law of Feb. 8, 1922. 
Italy: Law No. 48 of Jan 15, 1934, art. 1. 
Scotland: British Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 53 (2). 
The problem was discussed formerly in American courts but has been 
liquidated by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, § 127, cf. 5 U. L. A. 
§ 127, and for the distinction of transactions to be observed, Guggenhime & 
Co. v. Lamantia (1929) 207 Cal. 96, 99, 276 Pac. 995· 
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prevent the drawer from disposing of the funds before 
maturity. Hence, it is a transfer created and peculiarly con-
ditioned by law. And this law is correctly and prevailingly 
identified with that governing the creation of the bill of 
exchange, which is, in the predominant opinion, rightly or 
wrongly, the law of the place of issue.28 That this law also 
should intervene in transferring the right of cover from one 
endorsee to the other, although the endorsement is gov-
erned by the law of its own place, has seemed impossible 
to some dissenters, 29 while the German courts look for 
circumstances suggesting a tacit assignment of the accessory 
right. 30 
The prevailing simple solution was inserted in the Geneva 
Convention of 1930,31 adopting the controversial rule that 
rights once acquired by the first endorsee pass to each 
successor, without regard to the respective rule of the place 
of endorsement, and that such rights correspondingly revert 
in the case of recourse for nonpayment. Of course, the 
drawee has his normal defenses against any transferee; 
this is no exception to the rule. 
2s HIRSCH, supra n. 26, at 162. 
France: Cass. civ. (Feb. 6, 1900) S. 1900.1.161, Clunet 1900, 6os; 4 LvoN-
CAEN et RENAULT§ 644. 
Italy: CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 373 ff. 
Germany: OLG. Kolmar, decisions cited by HIRSCH, supra n. 26, 168, 170. 
Contrarily, in Illinois cases, before the uniform law, the law of the place 
of payment has been applied. National Bank of America v. Indiana Banking 
Co. ( r885) II4 IJI. 483, 2 N. E. 401 concerning a check, in which case there 
are doubts on the correct localization, see HIRSCH, supra n. 26, at 154· Abt v. 
The American Trust & Savings Bank (1896) 159 Ill. 467, 42 N. E. 856 
(draft). 
29 DIENA, 3 Dir. Com. Int. §§ 217, 223; GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, "La 
cambiale nel diritto interna2ionale privato," 12 Studi di diritto interna-
zionale (Milano 1946) 238, arguing on the analogy of voluntary assign-
ment; see for other writings, GULDENER 50 f. 
30 RG. (March 19, 1907) 65 RGZ. 357, and other decisions, see HIRSCH, 
supra n. 26, at 168 ff. 
81 Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in connec-
tion with Bills of Exchange etc., art. 6: "The question whether there has 
been an assignment to the holder of the debt which has given rise to the 
issue of the instrument is determined by the Jaw of the place where the 
instrument was issued." HuosoN, 5 Int. Legislation 554· 
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The connection with the doctrine of negotiable instru· 
ments justifies this solution which, in itself, would be ex· 
orbitant. 
A General Rule? Some statutes, that of Texas being ap· 
parently the last left in this country, provide that the bene-
ficial interest of a spouse granted him in an insurance on the 
life of the other spouse automatically returns to the grantor 
in the event of divorce. In an older case, such effect of a 
Hawaiian divorce decree was disregarded in California in 
a matter of jurisdiction.82 In another case, it was held that 
the law governing the insurance determines whether the 
right of the beneficiary is lost by a divorce.33 But more 
recently, the Second Federal Circuit Court decided by a 
majority that the designation of the wife as beneficiary in 
an insurance contract made in New York state, giving an 
irrevocable right under New York law, was destroyed as 
an effect of divorce in Texas where the spouses had moved. 
Judge Learned Hand based this decision on a general rule; 
he held that there was no reason why a legal transfer should 
not be subject to the same conflicts rule as a voluntary 
assignment, and thus to the law of the place of assignment, 
which he assumed should govern. 34 That this rule should 
sanction the surprising effect of the exorbitant Texas rule 
on a right irrevocable under a New York insurance contract, 
has been convincingly criticized.35 In the rule itself, the 
reference to the mechanical law of the place of assignment 
should be eliminated. Apart from this, however, it may be 
contended that an expropriation of a debt does not depend 
32 McGrew v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. (1901) 132 Cal. 85, 64 Pac. 
103, criticized by 2 BEALE 1254 because the woman and the policy had been 
under the jurisdiction of the Hawaiian court from the beginning. 
33 Pendleton v. Great Southern L. I. Co. (1929) 135 Okla. 40, 273 Pac. 
1007; 2 BEALE 1212 n. 2. 
34 New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spence (C. C. A. 2d 1939) 104 F. 
(2d) 665. 
36 See Clark, J., dissenting opinion id. 668 If.; Note, 49 Yale L. J. (1939) 
335· 
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upon the permission of the law governing the debt, unless 
the right is personal. But the local contacts appropriate in 
this matter can scarcely be stated in terms of one simple con-
flicts rule. 36 
II. TRANSFER OF LIABILITY37 
The most important situations involving a change of 
debtor occur in connection with inheritance and transfer 
of an enterprise, 38 both of which belong primarily to the 
doctrines of property. 
By voluntary act of the debtor, an individual debt cannot 
be transferred to another debtor without the creditor's 
assent. He can, where his duty is not strictly personal, accept 
the promise of another person to perform the duty.39 Such 
assumption by agreement, taken as merely constituting a 
relation between the debtor and his substitute (the expro-
missor) participates in the law of the sale, lease, or other 
transaction in which it is included, or may be subject to an 
independent law. 
Modern laws, however, have brought forth various in-
stitutions resulting in the addition of a new debtor ( "cumu-
lative" assumption of liability), or the replacement of the 
old by the new debtor ("privative" assumption of liability). 
In the latter case, the idea that the new promisor succeeds 
in place of the old obligor without any other change of the 
substance of the obligation and its accessories, is more or 
less developed. Whereas the German Civil Code has estab-
36 LETZGUS, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 852; GULDENER III ff.; RILLING, supra 
Ch. 47 n. I, 71. 
37 BRINER, "Die Schuldiibernahme im Schweizerischen Internationalprivat-
recht," 127 N. F. Ziircher Beitrlige zur Rechtswissenschaft ( I947). 
38 RG. (March 27, I905) 15 Z.int.R. (I905) 306 does not contribute much: 
a German bought a business in England taking over all assets and liabilities; 
the obligations arising have been naturally subjected to English law. 
39 This is what is usually termed assignment of liability; 7 HALSBURY 
302 § 420; Restatement of Contracts § I6o (3); German BGB. § 329: "Er-
fiillungsiibernahme"; Swiss C. Obi. art. 175: usually termed "Interne Schuld-
iibernahme." 
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lished a fullfledged succession in the debt by agreement of 
the new promisor either with the creditor, or with the old 
debtor plus consent of the creditor,40 the French doctrine, in 
the absence of sufficient provisions of the Code, has ap-
proached the desired results by adjusting institutions like 
novation, delegation, third-party contracts. 41 In the United 
States, direct action by the creditor against the new debtor 
has been provided by using novation and reducing the new 
obligation to the conditions and amount of the original 
liability, 42 or by construing the creditor as the beneficiary 
of the assignment of liability, 43 or under certain conditions 
by operation of law.44 
Again, in the German doctrine, the law of the original 
debt has been applied to determine conditions and effects 
of the acts and agreements in question.45 
Illustration. Two women, domiciled nationals of Czecho-
slovakia, purchased in 1922 a house in Dresden, and by 
agreement assumed personal liability on a debt secured 
by a mortgage. Although they discharged it by payment in 
depreciated marks, they were held subject to the German 
law of revalorization, because the debt was governed by 
German law. Their domicil, important under other circum-
stances, was considered immateriaU6 
40 Germany: BGB. §§ 414, 415: "Schuldiibernahme"; Switzerland: C. Obi. 
art. 176; Mexico: C. C. ( 1928) art. 2051: cesi6n de deudas. 
41 PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique §§ 1142-1145; cf. in the Italian 
C. C. ( 1942) arts. 1272, 1273. 
42 Restatement of Contracts §§ 427, 428; WILLISTON, 3 Contracts § 1865. 
43 Restatement of Contracts §§ 13 5, 136; CaRBIN, "Contracts for the Benefit 
of Third Persons," 46 Law Q. Rev. ( 1930) 12. 
44 Restatement of Contracts § 164. See in particular, GRISMORE, "Is the 
Assignee of a Contract Liable for the Non-Performance of Delegated 
Duties?", 18 Mich. L. Rev. (1920) 284, 287 ff. 
45 Germany: RG. (June 13, 1932) JW. 1932, 3810; WALKER 494· 
Switzerland: 2 SCHNITZER 532. 
46 RG. (Oct. 17, 1932) IPRspr. 1932 No. 34· NusSBAUM, D. IPR. 267. The 
case of assumption of a mortgage debt on the occasion of purchase of land, 
specifically regulated in BGB. § 416, has been simply subjected to lex situs 
by RG. (March 22, 1928) JW. 1928, 1447, but the mortgage debt is not 
necessarily under lex situs, cf. 2 BEALE 946 and n. 7· 
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But, quite as a promise of suretyship and an assignment 
of right, any agreement introducing a new promisor of the 
original debt, has an independent existence. A proper law 
governing it may follow from a stipulation for the applicable 
law or be inferred from the circumstances. As in the other 
types of transactions mentioned, of course, the law gov-
erning the original debt is presumably the most closely con-
nected law.47 
To presume, to the contrary, that the new promise should 
be governed by the law of the domicil of the new promisor, 
as the Swiss Federal Tribunal has done, 48 is an instance of 
exaggerated emphasis on the debtor's domicil. 
The law governing the original debt, it is true, deter-
mines whether the original debtor is discharged. But even 
when the new promise is governed by another law, practical 
difficulties are improbable since discharge and new promise 
are essentially connected, by one or the other construction, 
m every legal system.49 
III. NovATION 
The problem may be illustrated by adding foreign ele-
ments to an American case :50 
Sharp had a contract with the baker Voight to deliver 
flour. Voight sold his bakery to Mansre and notified Sharp 
that he had to deal exclusively with the successor. Sharp 
acknowledged this letter and wrote Mansre insisting on 
47 This view was propounded by 2 ZITELMANN 3951 2 FRANKENSTEIN 268, 
although they postulated the personal laws of the two debtors and compli-
cated the problem by their formulations. 
In cases where the buyer of land has assumed the mortgage debt, the lex 
situs may reasonably apply; thus the German RG. (Jan. u, 1887) 4 Bolze 
No. 22, and the Austrian OGH. (June 26, 1930) JW. 1931, 635. 
48 Swiss BG. (Nov. n, 1941) 41 Bl. f. Ziirch. Rspr. 100 reported by 
BRINER, supra n. 37, 56, dealing with cumulative assumption of liability, 
but apparently applicable "a fortiori" to transactions freeing the original 
obligor, see BRINER, supra n. 37, at 68. 
49 See on these problems, M. WoLFF, IPR. 95; BRINER, supra n. 37, 44 f. 
5o Manfre v. Sharp (1930) 210 Cal. 479, 292 Pac. 465. 
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strict compliance with the contract terms. But later Sharp 
demanded cash payments and in their absence refused de-
livery. The court held that by his letters Sharp discharged 
the old contract totally and substituted a new contract of 
analogous content with Mansre. The court preferred the 
view that the old contract was rescinded to construing a 
novation as some courts would have done. 
If Sharp should be in state X and Voight in state Y and 
the laws of X and Y differ on the question of interpreting 
the intention of the parties or on a presumption of survival 
of the original debt, which law governs? The problem has 
come up in Europe in the case of the peculiar Swiss certifi-
cate of deficiency issued to a creditor who has not been 
satisfied because of the debtor's insolvency. This certificate 
creates a new title for enforcement, not subject to limitation 
of time. 51 A French court has termed this transformation 
a novation.52 In a Swiss case, the creditor of a French-gov-
erned debt claimed that the amount originally expressed 
in French francs was transformed by novation into Swiss 
francs as of the time when the certificate was issued. The 
French currency had declined afterwards. The Federal 
Tribunal, however, stated that the conversion of the sum 
had been made merely for the purpose of the first enforce-
ment. It was then asked whether the fact that the defendant 
had consented to the conversion at the time created a con-
tract of novation in favor of the amount in Swiss francs 
appearing in the certificate. The court denied this under 
Swiss law, held applicable either as that of the assumed place 
of contracting or as that intended by the parties.53 
The agreement, thus, was subjected to an independent 
law rather than to the (French) law governing the principal 
debt. But the problem concerned the interpretation of the 
51 Switzerland: A Federal Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act, art. 149 
par. 5; on the international force of the imprescriptibility, see infra p. 516. 
5 2 App. Colmar (May 31, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 468. 
53 BG. (June 3, 1947) 73 BGE. II 1oz, 105. 
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agreement of the parties, not the permissibility of novation. 
Since novation is known in practice to every system, the 
Swiss solution is obviously correct in the case at bar of an 
agreement between the two original parties to the obligation. 
More complicated cases may cause doubts. But it may 
be generally said that the extinguishing effect depends on 
the law of the debt, although the new obligation is governed 
by its own law, 54 that may or may not be identical with the 
first. It is important that we should treat all transactions 
modifying an obligation under analogous principles, since 
they are overlapping and varying in the different systems. 
IV. JURISDICTION FOR GARNISHMENT55 
Although enforcement of a claim is a topic of adjective 
law, forcible satisfaction of money obligations by resort to 
obligatory claims against third persons is frequently in-
cluded in treatises on conflicts law. Certain problems of 
jurisdiction present international interest and have influ-
enced other important subject matters, such as war seizures. 
Close historical and systematic connections with the tradi-
tional situs doctrines are evident. 
However, this exceptional discussion of a jurisdictional 
and procedural subject merely involves the transfer, for 
the purpose of execution, of a debt from the creditor to 
his own creditor. This includes seizure of the debt only so 
far as it is preparatory to this transfer. We are not dealing 
with attachment in any other function, such as founding 
54 PILLET, 2 Traite 214, generally followed. A similar contrast between 
the effect of discharging the old and creating a new obligation is made with 
respect to deeds and judgments, see M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 559 § 524, 
subjects not to be dealt with here. Private autonomy is recognized by ROLIN, 
2 Principes §§ 989 ff., DESPAGNET § 313; its limitation, 2 ARMIN JON § 156. 
55 BEALE, "The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a 
Debt" 27 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1913) 107; RHEIN STEIN, "Die inliindische Bedeu-
tung einer ausliindischen Zwangsvollstreckung in Geldforderungen," 8 Z.ausl. 
PR. ( 1934) 277; RABEL, "Situs Problems etc.," II Law and Cont. Probl. 
(1945) u8, 126, infra n. 79· 
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jurisdiction or as a conservatory measure, despite the his-
torical and practical connections between these institutions. 
Orderly garnishment procet::dings (as contrasted with 
interim proceedings for conservatory56 purposes) should 
consist in a desirable system of three phases. The garnishee 
would be (I) forbidden to pay his debt to his creditor, 
the original debtor; he would be ( 2) finally ordered to 
pay it to the garnishor; and (3) the original debtor would 
at least be duly notified of any measure that may affect his 
interests. 
If appropriate international co-operation existed, these 
three steps could be carried out conveniently even though 
two or three countries were involved. Such harmony, how-
ever, is far from being established, and not even within 
the United States is the justified postulate achieved, ex-
pressed by Stumberg, that the proceedings should be con-
ducted against both the creditor and the debtor in their 
respective jurisdictions.57 
I. Domicil of the Original Debtor 
As things stand, the old idea that a claim is situated at 
the domicil of the creditor and therefore must be attached 
there, is often recognized in domestic law but is rarely 
observed in taking jurisdiction for garnishment. Some states 
of the Union seem still exclusively to permit garnishment at 
the domicil of the original debtor.58 The Swiss courts, con-
sidering a debt situated at the place of the creditor's domicil, 
56 As to this latter, the older Continental tendency connected with the 
situs theory regarding the court at the creditor's domicil as the competent 
forum {see also Chirkasky v. Pride, 41 Harv. L. Rev. {1927) 924), has been 
given up. The forum makes its jurisdictional rules freely and largely, c/. 
ANZILOTTI, Rivista 1')08, 180. 
57 STUMBERG 104. 
58 Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Nash {1897) u8 Ala. 477, 23 So. 825; 
STUMBERG 102 n. 33 adds: "cf. apparently in accord, Beasley v. Lennox-
Haldeman Co. (1902) u6 Ga. 13, 42 S. E. 385; Bullard and Hoagland v. 
Chaffee (1900) 61 Neb. 83, 84 N. W. 6o4; cf. 38 C. J. S. 338 § 125. 
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take jurisdiction when the original debtor is domiciled in 
the forum/ 9 and also when he is domiciled abroad and the 
garnishee is domiciled in the forum ;60 but as a recent de-
cision has made clear, garnishment is ordered only under 
the condition that official notification to the debtor by letter 
rogatory is effected.61 
Most systems, at present, localize the debt in connection 
with the debtor's debtor rather than with the original debtor. 
They disagree, however, on the exact localization: whether 
the domicil of the garnishee or the place where he can per-
sonally be sued. 
2. The Garnishee's Domicil 
In the prevailing Continental doctrine, it is recognized 
by tradition from the statutists that the situs of a debt for 
the purpose of executive attachment is at the domicil of 
the debtor. 
France. This proposition has found its clearest expres-
sion in France.62 The reasoning rests on the old twofold 
ground that the court at the debtor's domicil has general 
jurisdiction over him (actor sequitur forum rei) and that 
his movable assets, the objects of enforcement, are deemed 
to be assembled there (mobilia ossibus inhaerent). Modern 
authors know that to speak of situs is figurative but add 
that the domicil is the most readily ascertainable of all 
places involved. 
The French Court of Cassation has rigorously carried 
59 BG. (Dec. 9, 1930) 56 BGE. III 228, 230 referring to 53 id. III 45 and 
citations. 
60 The older decisions of the Federal Tribunal on jurisdiction for attach-
ment, up to (March n, 1930) 56 BGE. III 49, so, recognizing this, have been 
interpreted as including garnishment; see 2 SCHNITZER 660 n. 71, but really 
deal with provisional attachment. 
61 BG. (Feb. 20, 1942) 68 BGE. III 10, 14. 
6 2 WEiss, 4 Traite 430; GLASSON, MoREL et TISSIER, 4 Traite de pro-
cedure civile (ed. 3, 1925-36) 1166; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 4) 443 
§ 357· 
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out this theory in international relations. On the subject of 
executive attachment and garnishment (saisie-arret and 
saisie-execution), it maintains that the court of the gar-
nishee's domicil has exclusive jurisdiction for seizing the 
debt. If the original debtor is domiciled in France but the 
garnishee is domiciled abroad, no French court has jurisdic-
tion, just as in the case of seizure of other property situated 
in a foreign country.63 In a part of the literature, the situs 
theory is even taken more literally and either explained 
by a statute real64 or anchored in the territorial nature of 
enforcement. 65 
Germany. Section 23 of the German Code of Civil Pro-
cedure on jurisdiction, construed by the courts as a general 
principle for the situs of debts, localizes debts at the 
debtor's domicil. On this basis, jurisdiction in attachment 
and garnishment66 is assumed when the garnishee has his 
domicil in the forum; this excludes recognition of foreign 
jurisdiction even at the domicil of the original debtor.67 
Correspondingly, a garnishment at the domicil of the gar-
nishee in a foreign country is recognized,68 when it is not 
in conflict with a domestic measure.69 
63 Cass. civ. {May u, 1931) S. 1932.1.137, D. 1933.1.60; Cour Paris (Dec. 
13, 1932) Clunet 1934, 1207. Consequently, courts in Alsace have assumed 
jurisdiction at the domicil of the garnishee, applying their own local civil 
procedure differing from the French; see App. Colmar (March 23, 1938) 
Koechlin v. Risacher, 19 Rev. Juridique d'Alsace et de Lorraine (1938) 587. 
On jurisdiction in the Netherlands, see PoLENAAR, Procesrecht (1937) 
273 ff., 83. 
64 See LEREBOURS-PIGEONNillRil § 357, criticizing this theory because local 
sovereignty, rather than the statute real, is respected. 
65 NIBOYET, Note, S. 1932.1.137· 
66 "Forderungspfiindung" and ""Oberweisung," the latter either as assign-
ment at the nominal sum in lieu of payment (an Zahlungsstatt) or for col-
lection ( zur Einziehung), ZPO. §§ 829, 83 5· 
67 REICHEL, "Internationale Forderungspfiindung," 131 Arch. Civ. Prax. 
(1929) 293· Cf. RG. (June 2, 1923) 107 RGZ. 44, 46 (on war seizures). 
68 RG. (Oct. 12, 1895) 36 RGZ. 355: the debt is situated not at the place 
of performance in Germany, but at the domicil of the {debtor's) debtor 
either in Rumania or in Vienna; RG. (June 18, 1907) 63 Seuff. Arch. 41 
No. 27: the debt is situated in Switzerland at the domicil of the debtor's 
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Where the garnishee is domiciled abroad but the original 
debtor has his domicil in the forum, in one opinion the 
forum on grounds of comity should not render a garnish-
ment order; this would even violate international law.70 
This opinion has been rejected. 71 In the prevailing view 
confirmed by the Reichsgericht, the order, notified to the 
original debtor, is valid within the forum if notice can be 
served on the garnishee within the forum or abroad.72 This 
service, however, is an essential part of the proceedings, 
the efficacy of which therefore normally depends upon the 
co-operation of the foreign state, which is not likely to be 
granted. 73 
The guaranties provided in the domestic sphere to safe-
guard the interests of all parties involved are deficient in 
the international field. Res judicata and the effects of notice 
of suit to a third party and of failure to give such notice 
usually are not effective beyond the borders of the state 
where garnishment is sought or, on the other hand, the 
debtor is in litigation with the garnishor or the garnishee.74 
This may or may not be in the interest of the various parties. 
Remarkably, in the United States, the emphasis on the 
domicil of the garnishee has had some following. 75 
debtor and subject to the local power of enforcement. RG. (May 16, 1933) 
140 RGZ. 340 restates energetically the principle. 
Austria: J urisdictionsnorm § 99 par. 2. 
69STEIN-}ONAS, ZPO. § 829 I 3· 
70 See HUGO KAUFMANN, JW. 1929, 416; KG. (April 5, 1929) JW. 1929, 
2360. 
71 JoNAS, JW. 1932, 668; STEIN-}ONAS, ZPO. § 829 I 3; RHEIN STEIN, supra 
n. 40, 282-284. 
72 RG. (May 16, 1933) 140 RGZ. 340. 
Similarly, Austria: OGH. (Aug. 12, 1927) 9 SZ. 516 No. 174· 
73 Austria and Czechoslovakia: Exekutionsordnung of May 27, 1896, 
RGBL. No. 79, § 294; WALKER 490; OGH. (Dec. 23, 1925) 7 SZ. 1006 No. 406. 
Germany (itself): STEIN-}ONAS, ZPO. § 829 I 3· 
Switzerland: 2 ScHNITZER 659. 
Other countries: I Z.ausi.PR. (1927) 407. 
74 See RG. (July 3, 1903) 55 RGZ. 236, 239; (Sept. 26, 1913) 83 RGZ. u6. 
75 MINOR 287 § 125. 
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3· Personal Jurisdiction over the Garnishee 
The common law doctrine seems also to derive from cer-
tain statutist teachings. A basic difference from the Conti-
nental variant is due to interpretation of the Roman rule, 
actor sequitur forum rei, as basing personal jurisdiction 
upon the presence or submission of the defendant rather 
than upon his domicil. When the English courts in garnish· 
ment proceedings abandoned the in rem theory of the 
custom of London76 and analyzed the situation of simple 
debts in terms of personal jurisdiction, they emphasized 
the place where the debt is "properly recoverable." It is 
not exact, however, that personal service on the garnishee 
is the only requirement. The courts consider, as it seems, 
all the circumstances. Thus, Lord Scrutton, in a leading 
case where the theory was applied to the war seizure of a 
deposit in a London bank, 77 pointed out that the debt arose 
in London and that the original debtor made an appearance 
in the lawsuit and submitted to the jurisdiction, obtaining 
a benefit thereby. Lord Scrutton thought that any foreign 
country would recognize such jurisdiction. In fact, in another 
case of war seizure concerning life insurance policies, Atkins, 
then L. J., states as a rule derived from the ecclesiastical 
authorities: 
"That in the case of an ordinary individual . . . for a 
long time the situation of a simple contract debt under 
ordinary circumstances has been held to be where the debtor 
resides; that being the place where under ordinary circum-
stances the debt is enforceable, because it is only by bringing 
suit against the debtor that the amount can be recovered." 78 
Hence, the mere fact that the third debtor, the New York 
Life Insurance Company, had a branch office in London 
76 BEALE, 27 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. 55, at 112; I BEALE 458. 
77 Swiss Bank Corp. v. Boehmische Industrial Bank [ I923] I K. B. 673, 
682. 
78 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Public Trustee [1924] 2 Ch. IOI, 119. 
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was not held sufficient to locate the debt because this was 
only one of several places of business, but something more 
was needed for the localization of the debt; in the instant 
case, this additional element was found in the promise in-
cluded in the policy to pay sterling in London. "That right 
is situate in this country, and only in this country." Uncer-
tain as the law in England remains, it seems that a mere 
temporary sojourn of the garnishee, in the absence of the 
original debtor, would not induce an English court to render 
a garnishment order. All judges in the last-mentioned case 
regretted that they had to decide without having the policy 
holders in court, who should have been necessary parties-
a point worth noting. 
United States.19 American courts, in the great majority, 
have construed the proceedings as directed against a debt 
located for jurisdiction purposes wherever the garnishee 
could validly be served with process. The debt is where the 
garnishee may be sued personally by his creditor. Under 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as the Supreme Court 
has stated in approving this view, any other state must 
recognize the double effect of the proceedings, divesting 
the original debtor and investing the garnishor.80 The courts, 
conformably, take jurisdiction wherever the garnishee is 
found and process is personally served on him within the 
state, although it is sometimes required in addition that his 
debt be payable there.81 
Normally, of course, a debtor is found at his domicil. 
Moreover, in several states domicil is sufficient for assuming 
jurisdiction even in the absence of the debtor; this ap-
79 When I wrote first on the matter ("Situs Problems in Enemy Property 
Measures," II Law and Cont. Probl. (1945) at IZ6), Professor SUNDERLAND 
aided me with enlightening remarks, which I am using again with gratitude. 
80 Harris v. Balk (1905) 198 U. S. 215; Louisville and Nashville R R. v. 
Deer (1906) 200 U. S. 176; Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Hostetter (1915) 
240 U. S. 62o; Restatement § 108. 
81 State ex rel. Fielder v. Kirkwood (1940) 345 Mo. 1089, 138 S. W. (2d) 
1009· 
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proaches the Continental reasoning. As explanation, It IS 
said that the domicil is the situs of the debt fixed by the 
legislature, or that it is the actual, as distinguished from the 
legal, situs, or that the debt is treated as a fund in the hands 
of the debtor at his domicil.B2 
But the fact that domicil does increasingly determine 
jurisdiction and that this seems to enjoy interstate effect 
if fair notice is given to the debtor,83 only increases the 
number of jurisdictions having power to dispose of the debt. 
The American writers84 have noted two defects of this 
mechanism, more serious than the Continental shortcomings 
because they apply primarily to the relation among sister 
states. 
The original debtor is not necessary to the essential 
judicial proceedings. It is generally desired that he should 
be notified of a garnishment proceeding. But not even this 
requirement of fair justice is rigorously observed in all 
courts. The Restatement is satisfied with a reasonable at-
tempt to give notice. If notice is given, he is supposed to 
appear at any place in the vastness of the United States 
where his alleged creditor happens to find and sue his 
alleged debtor. Federal interpleader85 may force him to 
similar sacrifices. If he is not made aware of the proceed-
ings, he will probably be able to defend against full faith 
and credit of the judgment, and ought to be able also to 
deny that it is res judicata against him.86 But not always is 
he certain of such protection. 
The risk imposed upon the garnishee, on the other hand, 
is the following. 
8 2 MINOR 287 ff. § 125; STUMBERG 102 with citations. 
83 See Mr. Justice Holmes in McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 U. S. 90 and 
comment by STUMBERG 75· 
84 BEALE, 27 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. 55, uo; GOODRICH § 68. 
85 See the interesting complications described by CHAFEE, "Federal Inter-
pleader," 49 Yale L. ]. (1940) 377, 423. 
86 GooDRICH 146 § 68; but cf. the restricted formula in 38 C. ]. S. § 577· 
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4· Double Payment of the Debt 
English and American courts have dealt with cases where 
a garnishee objected that he may be compelled to pay the 
same debt again if his creditor should sue him in a foreign 
country where the domestic garnishment is not recognized 
as res judicata. Where this danger was convincingly proved, 
the garnishment order has been denied. 87 When proceedings 
are pending in another state, American courts are anxious 
to protect the garnishee against double proceedings by diver-
gent methods, such as abatement of the action, stay pending 
foreign decision, or mere suspension of enforcement.88 
The German Supreme Court did not believe that it pos-
sessed such discretionary power. 
A German seller had a claim for the price of delivered 
locomotives against a Portuguese buyer and owed the com-
mission fee to the Portuguese broker. The claim of the 
broker against the seller was garnished in Germany by a 
German creditor of the broker. The court rejected the 
defense of the garnishee seller that in Portugal the broker 
had garnished the price owed by the buyer who was forced 
to pay.89 
In view of this situation, an authoritative German 
writer has contended that actual exercise of foreign jurisdic-
tion should be recognized, when under its compulsion a 
87 England: Martin v. Nadel [1906] 2 K. B. 26 and cit. 
Canada, C. App. Ontario: Richer v. Borden Farm Products Co. ( 1921) 
49 0. L. R. 172, 64 D. L. R. 70 and cit. 
Quebec: The Equitable Life Assur. Co. v. Perrault (1882) 26 L. C. ]. 
382, 385, 389; Harris v. Cordingley (1899) 16 Que. S. C. 501; Fraser v. 
The Beyers-Allen Lumber Co. etc. (1913) 45 Que. S. C. 42; 3 JoHNSON 
803 ff. 
United States: Parker, Peebles and Knox v. Nat'! Fire Ins. Co. of Hart-
ford (1930) 111 Conn. 383, 150 At!. 313; cf. Notes, 40 Yale L. ]. (1930) 
139; 69 A. L. R. (1930) 609. Weitzel v. Weitzel (1924) 27 Ariz. 117, 230 
Pac. uo6; Clark-Wilcox Co. v. Northwest Eng. Co. (1943) 314 Mass. 402, 
50 N. E. (zd) 53· 
88 Note, 91 A. L. R. 959, 964; 5 Am. Jur. 34 §§ 698 f. 
89 RG. (Nov. 3, 1911) 77 RGZ. 25o; cf. RHEINSTEIN, supra n. 55, 287 n. I; 
2 FRANKENSTEIN 265 who approves the decision. 
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debtor has paid either to his creditor despite a German at-
tachment or to the creditor of his creditor on the ground 
of foreign attachment.90 
5. Conclusion 
Evidently, no system has been found suitable to organize 
harmonious international proceedings. One difficulty is non-
recognition of foreign seizures, another the hardships for 
individual parties to appear in foreign jurisdictions. In both 
respects, however, improvements have been found in part 
and could be amplified. A common basis of recognition is 
afforded by the widespread idea that a debt may be seized 
at the domicil of the debtor. 91 It seems exaggerated that in 
the United States mere feasibility of service of process, 
whatever its merits as a foundation of personal jurisdiction, 
suffices to create rights to the detriment of out-of-state 
creditors. 
On the other hand, the methods by which the American 
courts are enabled to avoid the danger of double payment 
by the garnishee ought to be followed in the civil law courts. 
The promising development of federal interpleader is 
another progress mitigating the difficulties of the parties 
involved. 
Notification to the foreign original debtor should be 
required more distinctly and more forcefully. 
9o JoNAS, JW. 1932, 668 and STEIN-JoNAS, 2 ZPO. § 829 n. VI 3; VII 1 b. 
On the defenses based on unjust enrichment, see RHE!NSTEIN, 8 Z.ausi.PR., 
supra n. 55, at 288 and n. 1. 
91 See particularly RHE!NSTEIN, supra n. 55· 
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Setoff and Counterclaim (Compensation) 1 
"COMPENSAT/0 est debiti et crediti inter se contri-
butio,"2 is a definition from the end of the classical 
Roman period. At that time, as it seems, it had be-
come a general habit to allow a defendant in a lawsuit a 
defense by claiming against the plaintiff a debt due by the 
latter to the defendant.3 The history of this institution 
before and after this momentous stage has been agitated 
and has led in the modern codes to related but differentiated 
regulations, all parts of substantive private law. In Eng-
land, an entirely independent doctrine slowly emerging shows 
various parallels to the Roman development, but has re-
mained original and, in contrast to the Continental systems, 
confined within the framework of judicial procedure. 
In this matter, we must separate not only the two groups 
of municipal bodies of law but also their application in 
conflicts law. 
I. ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw 
1. Institutions Involved 
The English methods of setoff and counterclaim are 
clothed in terms of procedural remedies to be used by a 
1 SACERDOTI, "Des confiits des lois en matiere de compensation des obliga-
tions," Clunet 1896, 57; Tosi-BELLUCci, "La compensazione nel diritto inter-
nazionale privato," 84 Archivio giuridico ( 1910) 9; DoLLE, "Die Kompensa-
tion im internationalen Privatrecht," 13 Rheinische Z. f. Zivil- und Pro-
zessrecht ( 1924) 32, with illustrations; DE NovA, L'estinzione delle obbliga-
zioni convenzionali nel diritto internazionale privato (1931) 209. Compara-
tive municipal law: GERHARD KEGEL, Probleme der Aufrechnung: Gegen-
seitigkeit und Liquiditiit, rechtsvergleichend dargestellt, 13 Beitriige zum 
ausliind. und int. Privatrecht ( 1938). 
2 MODESTINUS, Dig. 16, 2, I. 
8 BoNFANTI!, Istituzioni di diritto romano (ed. 8) 401. 
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defendant against a plaintiff. A rich and differentiated de-
velopment from this origin in the United States has pro-
duced a variety of regulations of setoff, recoupment, and 
cross action, and of the so-called counterclaim in the "code 
states," comprising setoff and recoupment. The many statu-
tory changes, differences between state and federal jurisdic-
tions, and the influence of equity have resulted in a progres-
sive adjustment to practical needs. Perhaps for the same rea-
sons, however, the subject is so loaded with particularistic 
complications that no serious effort has ever been made to 
reconsider the entire matter from the viewpoint of sub-
stantive law. It still remains in the common opinion a topic 
of procedure, subject, as a matter of course, to the law of 
the forum. 
Following the language of the Restatement of the Law 
of Contracts, we shall speak of "setoff and counterclaim," 
or more briefly, according to English models, of "setoff," to 
cover the ground taken in civil law by compensatio. The 
exceptional rules on bankruptcy and judgment debts must 
be reserved. Mutual accounts by agreement are a separate 
topic to be discussed later. 
English and American lawyers are extremely firm in as-
serting that setoff and its associates are procedural institu-
tions. As a particularly impressing feature, there is no 
extrajudicial setoff, except in case of insolvency. A debtor: 
"Cannot, in the absence of agreement, apply a set-off in 
reduction of his debt, on a tender of the residue; but he 
may avail himself of such set-off by way of defence or 
counter-claim in an action by the creditor."4 
Undoubtedly, many a time thoughtful judges and writers 
have penetrated behind the procedural aspect into the situ-
ation of the parties. No one, in fact, denies that under the 
conditions of the law the parties have a right to a setoff. 
4 }ENKS-WINFIELD § 216. 
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The well-known dictum of Judge Mack (1923) may be 
remembered: 
"The right of a counterclaim and set-off having been 
first introduced as a part of our procedural law, halting 
recognition is just beginning to be given to the fact that 
the right as between litigants is something more than a 
procedural convenience and is really a requirement of sub-
stantive justice. That the right of set-off and counterclaim 
is regarded in our law today as affecting, in important as-
pects, the substantive relations between the parties, is clearly 
seen in the rules as to the assignment of choses in action 
being subject to existing set-offs or counterclaims."5 
The Contracts Restatement is the most eloquent testi-
mony to the substantive nature of the party relations in-
volved. Nevertheless, its classification as procedural seems 
unchallenged. 
2. Conflicts Principle 
In consistency with their general attitude in the municipal 
sphere, common law lawyers do not hesitate to state the 
simple rule that setoff and counterclaim follow the law of 
the forum. 6 To preclude excessive application, the meaning 
of this rule has been clarified by Minor : how the defense 
is pleaded and what effect the plea has is regulated by the 
procedural law of a court, but the validity and effect of 
each claim is measured according to the law governing ie 
Only on an express or implied agreement of the original 
5 The Gloria {D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1923) 286 Fed. 188, 192. Rosenberry, ]., 
in Shawano Oil Co. v. Citizens State Bank ( 1936) 223 Wis. IOo, 269 N. W. 
675: "A right of offset is more than a procedural matter. Under § 331.07 the 
plaintiff was entitled to set off ... upon the payment of its note." 
6 England: MacFarlane v. Norris {1862) 2 B. & S. 783; Meyer v. Dresser 
{1864) 16 C. B. (N. S.) 646, 664; WESTLAKE § 346; FOOTE 555; DICEY 857 
Rule 203. 
United States: STORY§ 575; WHARTON§ 788; MINOR§ 2II; 3 BEALE 1606 
§ 593.1, citing decisions from 1846 to 1932; GOODRICH 192. 
7 MINOR 525 § 211. 
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parties to an instrument, may setoff be considered an equity 
attaching to the instrument.8 
3· Foreign Compensation m Common Law Courts 
How should civil law compensation, a substantive in-
stitution, be treated in a common law court? Authority is 
scarce. But the oldest American decision relating to the 
matter recognized a setoff allowed in a sister state and 
expressly stated that the setoff "does not relate to the form 
of proceeding but goes to the merits of the case; and shews, 
that no recovery ought to be had. So far from relating to 
the form of the remedy, it shews there ought to be no 
remedy."9 This line of thinking seldom has been followed/0 
but may be regarded as allowing a common law court to 
admit an allegation that compensation has been achieved 
under the law of a civil law country.11 At least, the writers 
seem in agreement that foreign discharge of an obligation 
by compensation is recognizable/2 Moreover, if two debts 
face each other in compensable condition according to French 
law governing both debts, their extinction may be claimed 
by either party in an American court. It is immaterial where 
either debt arose. But if the two debts are governed by 
different laws, it may be doubtful which law, or whether 
8 MINOR 526; F ALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 325 n. ( q). 
9 Vermont State Bank v. Porter {1812) 5 Day (Conn.) 316 at 321; 5 Am. 
Dec. 157. 
10 United States: Fidelity Insurance, Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Mechanics' 
Savings Bank (C. C. A. 3d 1899) 97 Fed. 297, 56 L. R. A. 228: the statutory 
liability of a stockholder, resident of Pennsylvania, to the creditor of an 
insolvent Kansas corporation would have been extinguished by the claim 
of the stockholder against the corporation for the payment of bonds under 
Kansas law, governing both claims; this equitable defense is recognized. 
To interpret it as a defense at law, in order to serve in the federal court, 
has been disapproved. See Anglo-American Land, M. and A. Co. v. Lombard 
{C. C. A. 8th 1904) 132 Fed. 721, 733· 
11 England: Allen v. Kemble (1848) 6 Moo. P. C. C. 314, 321: discharge 
of a debt by compensation under Roman Dutch law was recognized, although 
the decision is inconclusive with respect to the conflicts rule, FALCONBRIDGE, 
Conflict of Laws 326. 
1 2 DICEY 679 and ill us. 3· 
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both simultaneously, should be applied. This is a problem 
very controversial in Europe, which we must consider later. 
On the other hand, it has been concluded that the law of 
the forum is free to authorize, by its judicial discretion, a 
setoff not permissible in the governing foreign law.13 
4· Application in Civil Law Courts 
The Continental literature, aware of the different charac-
terization of setoff and compensation in the unanimous 
Anglo-American view has responded by assuming that the 
English and American remedies are inapplicable in civil law 
courts. Generally, it seems to be felt that such a court has 
to apply the law of the forum, on an assumed renvoi from 
the governing law.14 
This solution has been challenged, however. In a thorough 
comparative study, conforming to the standards reaffirmed 
in the present work, Gerhard Kegel15 has examined the 
general function and two of the main conditions of com-
pensation and the common law remedies in question. As 
a result of his analysis, the author states that, under present 
concepts of analytical jurisprudence, counterclaim in Eng-
land, New Jersey, Arkansas, and Connecticut is in fact a 
strictly procedural defense, but English and American setoff 
and recoupment, and counterclaim in the code states, contain 
a mixture of substantive and procedural elements. He draws 
this conclusion from the common roots of setoff in judicial 
practice and in bankruptcy law which is a substantive in-
stitution, the analogous structure of setoff in bankruptcy 
and insolvency cases, the language of certain decisions, and 
the existence of extrajudicial setoff in installment sales and 
bank accounts. Despite some doubts, the author is inclined 
1s M. WoLFE, Priv. Int. Law 464 f. § 439· 
14 NEUNER, Privatrecht und Prozessrecht (1925) 59, 133; DoLLE, supra n. I, 
at 34· 
15 KEGEL, supra n. 1, esp. 41 ff. 
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to think that it should be possible to extract the substantive 
rules and apply them in a civil law court/6 For instance, 
conflicts law as understood on the Continent, may be able 
to observe the rules usual in a specific American court on 
the question whether the defendant may plead a debt which 
is owed by or owing to certain third persons.17 In contrast, 
the requirement of a liquidated sum, where it still exists, 
is so dominated by procedural convenience as to dissuade 
us from transplanting it to a foreign forum/8 This interest-
ing inquiry deserves to be extended to the remaining prob-
lems. Some day a common platform will be found. 
In the meantime, so long as no American court applies 
the rules of another state on this subject, it will be inadvis-
able for a civil law court to proceed differently. The difficulty 
of extracting the substantive rules or of ascertaining the 
actual law of an American state is very great.19 Any attempt 
to transform setoff and counterclaim into pure private law, 
seems premature. In the phase reached by these institutions 
up to the present time, foreign conflicts law ought to leave 
them totally unobserved. 
All European writers seem to agree, however, that in a 
case governed by English or American law compensation 
is not effective except if invoked as a defense or by cross-
action in court.20 In such cases, the court treats compensation 
as pleaded exclusively on the ground of a procedural party 
declaration, not on the ground of an extrajudicial act and, 
16 KEGEL, supra n. I, 48 f. 
17 Id. at 153. 
18 I d. at I74· 
19 As an example, it may be considered that in the United States, even 
where a claim barred by a statute of limitations may be used for pleading 
setoff, various theories exist concerning the effect of the plea. While the 
question whether a claim barred by limitation may be pleaded is substantive 
in the Continental view, the effect of a successful plea, in an American 
court, representing a claim exceeding the plaintiff's demand regards the ex-
tent of the bar procedurally conceived. For three different solutions of the 
latter problem, see WooD, I Limitations 307 ns. IS-I7. 
2o DoLLE, supra n. I, 42. 
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hence, applies its own procedural rules involving uncon-
ditional and conditional compensation,-the latter occur-
ring when the defendant avails himself of his counterclaim 
only on the condition that the plaintiff's claim is held 
effective. The private law of the forum serves to fill the 
gaps left by the procedural rules. 
II. CIVIL LAW 
1. Institutions Involved 
ucompensatio" of debts appears in various kinds, the 
most important of which are at present effectuated either 
by operation of law or by extrajudicial informal declaration 
of either party. "Legal compensation" stems from the un-
considered generalization, in the Corpus Juris, of a classical 
dictum, ((ipso iure compensatur," which had been said of a 
certain type of banker who was compelled by the Praetor, 
in suing customers, to restrict his petitions to the balance 
of current accounts. 21 This slogan, as finally adopted in 
the French and Austrian Civil Codes and many subsequent 
laws/2 means that the two debts extinguish each other at 
the first moment of their coexistence in compensable con-
dition. Although this construction still produces its conse-
quences if the compensation is considered "definitely" estab-
lished, its peculiar automatic working has been abandoned. 
The defendant in a lawsuit must invoke the fact of the 
compensation or be deemed to renounce it and revive the 
discharged debt. 23 
21 GAlUS IV §§ 64-68; LENEL, Edictum perpetuum § 100; Dig. 16, 2, 21; 
C. 4, 31, 14; PERNICE, Labeo, Vol. II, I, 279; LENEL, Palingenesia Paulus 
No. 1273. 
2 2 Argentina: C. C. art. 818. 
Austria: C. C. §§ 143 8 ff. 
Brazil: C. C. art. 1009. 
France: C. C. arts. 1290 ff. 
Italy: C. C. (1865) art. 1285; C. C. (1942) art. 1241 says even expressly: 
"i due debiti si estinguono." 
Portugal: C. C. art. 768. 
23 2 CoLIN et CAPITANT 123; PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique 623. 
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The modern type of compensation proclaimed by the 
German Civil Code4 rests upon a declaration of one party 
to the other, either extrajudicially or in pleading. When this 
is done, the effect is retroactive so that the debts are deemed 
extinguished as of the first moment of their simultaneous 
existence in the condition required for setoff. Thus, in both 
the French and German systems, for instance, the running 
of interests of any percentage is terminated on both sides 
from that time. 
The conditions in the civil law systems also are roughly 
the same, to the extent that two persons must be reciprocally 
and personally bound by obligations, existent and enforce-
able, to the payment of money or other fungible things of 
like nature. 
These parallels in operation and prerequisites have 
afforded a sufficient basis for the dominant conflicts doc-
trine in Europe, comprising all Continental laws in a joint 
conflicts rule concerning compensation.25 What the rule 
should prescribe, is another question. 
2. Conflicts Theories 
As usual, a variety of theories has been set forth. 26 At 
present, only three deserve mention and only two of these 
seriously compete for prevalence. 
As in common law, the law governing the debt will deter-
mine whether it is in existence, mature, liquid, and enforce-
able,27 if the law or laws controlling the compensation 
24 Germany: BGB. § 387. 
Japan: C. C. art. 505. 
Switzer( and: C. Obi. art. I20. 
25 Tosr-BELLUccr, supra n. I, 26-28, often cited. 
26 See the critical surveys by 2 ARMIN JON § I 55; DE NovA I8I ff. An indi-
vidual theory has also been hinted at by 2 PoNTES DE MIRANDA 234· 
27 E.g., RG. (July I, I89o) 26 RGZ. 66: French-Rhenish law is consulted 
for the question whether a legacy claim is exigible. It was wrong that OLG. 
Frankfurt (April 27, 1923) }W. I924, 7I5 applied German bankruptcy law to 
decide premature compensability of a debt in a Dutch bankruptcy. 
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require these conditions. We are interested only m what 
law or laws are in fact controlling. 
(a) Lex fori. The law of the forum has been postulated, 
sometimes invoking the common law, by a series of authors. 
Some have had in view lawsuits exclusively ;28 others have 
assumed that the connection with procedural rules should 
prevail, 29 or that the court ought to be able to decide accord-
ing to equity.80 These views have repeatedly been criticized 
and are commonly rejected. Characterization of compensa-
tion as a remedy or as procedural is regarded as a grave 
mistake.81 
(b) Laws of both debts cumulatively. Many French 
authors,82 supported by Zitelmann and other writers,33 have 
required that when claim and counterclaim are governed 
by different laws, compensation must be simultaneously 
authorized and made effective by each law. They argue that 
discharge of both debts requires consent of both laws. Al-
though the principal claim depends only on its own law, 
the counterclaim is not extinguished unless the law govern-
ing it so provides, and without such extinction not even the 
principal claim would be discharged. Against the objection 
that this method gives preference to the law according to 
which setoff is not effective,34 it has been replied that favor-
ing the less exacting law would harm the authority of the 
more severe law; either law has "equal authority." 35 
28 2 BAR 9I (with important qualifications); VALERY I008 § 700; and to 
some extent in an elaborate way, SACERDOTI, supra n. I, at 57· 
29 WALKER 5I5; see also VAREILLES-SOMMIERES §§ 4I5-4I8. 
30 ROLIN, 2 Principes 578 §§ 996-998. 
31 See especially Tosi-BELLUCCI, 84 Archivio giuridico ( I9IO) at 47 If.; 
DE NovA I47 ff. 
S2 SUR VILLE 380 § 267; PILLET, 2 Traite 2I5 § 502; 2 ARMIN JON § I 55; and 
others. 
33 2 ZITELMANN 397 ff.; KOSTERS 8I2; see for Brazil the citations by 
2 PoNTES DE MIRANDA 233, cf. ESPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 624 n. (b). DoLLE, 
supra n. I, 32; DE NovA 234 ff.; two German decisions cited by LEWALD 
§ 348 (b). 
34 CERETI, Obblig. I48. 
35 DE NovA I64 f. 
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The precise meaning of this theory seems to vary. In 
the most consistent variant, however, the entire problem 
whether compensation by unilateral act is effective in the 
individual situation, must be decided by both laws. The 
total facts are tested by both legal systems cumulatively.36 
We shall see what this means. 
(c) Law of the principal claim. A vigorous third theory, 
at present prevailing in the German and Swiss doctrine, is 
satisfied with the observance of the provisions which govern 
the claim against which compensation is declared. If the 
law governing the principal debt predicates that the debt 
is discharged, this is all that is needed.37 Or in terms of pro-
cedure, the law that governs the debt sought to be enforced 
and alleged to be discharged by setoff, is competent. 
The followers of this theory effectively refute the main 
argument of the adversaries, viz., that because of the nature 
of compensation both laws must agree in extinguishing both 
debts. The party claiming the setoff avails himself of a 
means of discharge by which a unilateral use of a counter-
claim is substituted for payment. This must be permissible 
under the law determining the modes of discharge. Insofar, 
however, as this party employs his own claim, he does so not 
by any forcible method of self-help, but by a voluntary 
disposition, to which he is entitled under the law governing 
his claim. It remains merely to ask whether this law frees 
the debtor; this will always be true, since the creditor has 
received satisfaction, except when setoff is not known to 
this law.38 
36 Thus expressly, DoLLE, supra n. 1, 40; and seemingly, 2 ARMIN JON 343; 
DE NOVA 240; BATIFFOL 450 § 567. 
37 BAR, Lehrbuch u8 j 2 BAR 91 j NEUMEYER, IPR. 29 (in principle) j 
M. WoLFF, IPR. 93· 
Germany: ROHG. (June 4, 1873) 10 ROHGE. 226; RG. (July 1, 1890) 
26 RGZ. 66; OLG. Augsburg (Nov. 6, 1917) 36 ROLG. 105. 
Danzig: OLG. (Feb. 28, 1934) 10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 107. 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 26, 1937) 63 BGE. 383, 384, and cit.; 2 MElLI 35 
§ 107; 0SER-SCHOENENBERGER, Allg. Einleitung No. Sr. 
88 LEWALD 283 f. 
17 
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3· Rationale 
The arguments used for the two antagonistic Continental 
opinions have not sufficed to convince either party. It would 
seem that these theories are too much dependent on the 
municipal doctrines, and moreover that they are framed 
in all too general terms. 
Where the axiom, ipso iure compensatur, is the basic con-
cept, as in France and Italy, it might be natural to assume 
that automatic termination of two debts by "law" pre-
supposes approval by both laws. This idea, however, should 
have been discarded when it was settled that one of the 
parties must act to set the mechanism of the double dis-
charge in motion. 
The modern German doctrine, on the other hand, may be 
inclined to consider the claim to be discharged by declara-
tion of the debtor as the main problem. Also some common 
law writers may think that, if any law other than the law 
of the forum is considered, it is the law governing the debt 
sued upon. But the matter is not so simple. 
In fact, the subject is so involved as to suggest future 
special investigation. Only some of the problems may be 
illustrated here. 
Although we surmise that the mode of operation by pro-
cedural defense or extrajudicial declaration is immaterial, 
and disregard the variety existing in the effects of compen-
sation, the conditions to be fulfilled are still not all sus-
ceptible of the same treatment. 
(a) The innumerable provisions by which compensation 
is excluded because of the nature of a debt may be divided 
into two classes : prohibitions to discharge a certain debt 
by compensation and prohibitions to use a certain debt as 
a means of compensation-thus concerning compensation 
against a debt and through a debt. But both groups defy 
the double-law theory. 
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On one side, certain claims are privileged so that they 
cannot be extinguished without consent of the creditor ex-
cept by actual payment or equivalent satisfaction. Thus, 
according to the various systems, a debtor may not be dis-
charged by setoff, for instance, from a debt grounded on 
tort (or intentional wrong, or unlawful possession) ; from 
a judgment debt; from restitution of a deposit (or a bank 
deposit); from an unattachable debt such as an obligation 
to pay wages may be, etc. The debtor may not set off against 
such a claim. It is not true, however, that the obligation 
in these cases is not "susceptible of compensation." The 
creditor of such an obligation based on tort, deposit, or 
wages is not prohibited, in principle, from extinguishing it 
by using a debt of his own; this is permitted by the law 
governing his privilege, and a fortiori by a law without 
such prohibition. 
An exception confirms the rule. Although the provisions 
concerning compensation merely state that there can be no 
unilateral compensation against an unattachable debt or 
a debt of certain wages, it has been inferred from other 
sources of law in Switzerland that a wage earner cannot 
dispose of his wages insofar as they represent his minimum 
living standard.39 
Even so, it is exclusively the law governing the employ-
ment which prevents the employer, and by exception the 
employee, from disposing of the claim for wages. 
Illustrations. (i) A, an employee of B, owes B repay-
ment of a loan. Under the law governing the employment, 
B is not entitled to satisfy his claim by withholding wages. 
A, under the law governing the loan, is entitled to com-
pensate it by setting off his wage claim, usually even in-
cluding future claims. But, by exception, the law governing 
the employment also precludes A from resorting to this 
right of compensation. 
39 v. TUHR, Allg. Teil Schweiz. Oblig. R. § 78 n. 76; I OsER-SCHOENEN-
BERGI!R 638 III. 
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(ii) A has deposited a sum of money with B. Under the 
French Civil Code, article r 293 n. 2, a depositary is not 
allowed to set off any claim of his own. French law, how-
ever, permits the depositor to set off his own claim. German 
law has no such prohibition. It has been deduced from the 
double-law theory that B cannot set off, even though the 
deposit be governed by German law, if B's counterclaim 
against A is under French law. This result has been advo-
cated, although in this case either law would permit the 
compensation. 40 
It seems logically and practically sufficient, however, 
that a prohibition by a law should apply to the case for 
which it is meant. 
On the other side, claims of a certain origin or affected 
by certain occurrences, are considered too weak to discharge 
a normal claim. Thus, a debtor may not compensate for 
his debt through a claim barred by limitation of action, or 
by an exception of fraud or informal release. Again, it 
appears that the law of the claim to be discharged, here the 
blameless claim, is alone material. 
Illustration. Jackson sued his employer for back salary 
and commissions; the defendant moved for setoff by cross-
action on a claim for conversion; this claim was not yet 
barred by limitation at the time of the action, but the period 
lapsed during the trial. Under such circumstances, two 
Texas decisions have held setoff accomplished by operation 
of law; two are of the contrary opinion.41 If there were 
equally different solutions in two civil law jurisdictions, 
the law under which the suit is brought alone could decide 
the time when limitation will bar counterclaim. 
Hence, prohibitions on compensation, either against or 
through a. claim of a certain nature, are determined in 
principle by the law of the principal claim. 
40 DoLLE, supra n. 1, 40. 
41 See Birk v. Jackson (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 75 S. W. (zd) 918 and Note, 
13 Tex. L. Rev. (1935) 540. 
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(b) This principle is not adequate for the requirement 
of reciprocity, that is, the condition that claim and counter-
claim should exist between the same parties or persons 
equivalent to them. 
Illustrations. ( i) Suppose the principal debt is governed 
by New York law, whereas the surety has bound himself 
under the law of Cuba. The former law prohibits,42 the 
latter allows, 43 the surety to use a counterclaim of the debtor 
against the suing creditor. We have found earlier that the 
relationship between the principal and the surety should 
be consulted, in addition to the law of the suretyship.44 
(ii) Under German law, a debtor may compensate against 
a subassignee such counterclaims as he acquired against the 
assignee before notice of the subassignment, even though 
he did not know of the assignment until he heard of the 
subassignment.45 He cannot do so if his debt is governed 
by English law and the subassignee was without notice of 
the counterclaim.46 
Should he be permitted to discharge his German-gov-
erned debt by an English-governed counterclaim against 
the assignee? It is repugnant to the common law that a 
creditor should free a debtor against his will. 
In all such cases where three parties are involved, mere 
observance of the law governing the principal debt is 
insufficient. 
(c) Exclusion of unliquidated debts from setoff, as pro-
vided in the Latin systems, under the influence of the Corpus 
Juris, has led to the following problem: 
Illustration. A has a German-governed claim against B 
who opposes an Italian-governed unliquidated counterclaim. 
42 Gillespie v. Torrance (1862) 25 N. Y. 306. 
43 Cuba: C. C. art. II97· 
44 Supra Ch. 47 ns. 48-51. 
45 Commentaries to BGB. § 406. 
Switzerland: v. TuHR, Allg. Teil Schweiz. Oblig. R. 752. 
See also Wyman v. Robbins (1894) 51 Ohio St. 98, 37 N. E. 264. 
46 In re Milan Tramways Co. ( 1884) 25 Ch. D. 587. 
United States: Restatement of Contracts§ 167 (3); x8 Minn. L. Rev. (1934) 
733-
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The latter is available for compensation under German law, 
though possibly needing special procedural treatment until 
verification; this would suffice under the theory invoking 
only the law of the debt to be discharged.47 Compensation 
has been declared excluded, however, under the two-laws 
theory, because Italian law is supposed to require "liquidity" 
in the interest of both parties.48 
Historically, the requirement of liquidity served the pur-
pose that plaintiffs should be protected from being exposed 
to vexatious delay of the suit by fictitious or unsubstantiated 
allegation of exceptions. More emphasis has been attributed 
in modern times in France to the idea that compensation is 
a means of abbreviated double payment-"paiement 
abrege." This theory excludes debts of uncertain existence 
or amount from the function of paying as well as being paid. 
But such an idea does not necessarily affect compensation 
against a debt governed by a law admitting illiquid debts. 
Since liquidity is generally regarded also in Latin laws 
as a substantive requirement for legal compensation, the 
one-law theory seems to suffice. 
A different aspect is presented by the Anglo-American 
requirement of liquidity excluding from setoff debts which 
must be assessed by a jury. As a matter of procedure, the 
common law requirement pertains to the law of the forum. 
And so does the French judicial compensation, which may 
intervene after the defendant's counterclaim has been ascer-
tained in the proceedings. 
Conclusion. In most respects, it would seem that the 
law of the principal debt should exclusively permit or pro-
hibit the use of compensation against the principal debt 
and determine the availability of the specific opposite claim 
for compensation. This theory is, however, not correct in 
all respects. More research is necessary to clarify this 
subject. 
47 RAAPE, D. IPR. 290. 
48 DE NovA 167 n. 2. 
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III. CoNTRACT OF CoMPENSATION 
Nothing in the above-discussed doctrines affects volun-
tary agreements providing for the compensation of either 
existing or future debts. They have not always been held 
licit/9 but are now everywhere permitted, and subject to 
their own law or that of the main contract to which they 
are ancillary. 
The Continental writers are almost unanimous in fol-
lowing the intention of the parties. 50 In England, the right 
of setoff has been recognized when based on an express 
term of the original contract but it is not settled whether 
it may subsequently be agreed.51 
The most prominent example is afforded by running 
accounts. The working of book accounts with periodical 
balances and acknowledgments is extremely controversial 
in theoretical construction, and certainly shows fundamental 
differences between common law and Continental practices. 52 
It would seem that these multiple differences ought not 
to affect the formation of a conflicts rule. But this is an 
unsolved problem,53 except for one important case. When 
a private individual keeps a running account with a bank, 
his relationship is covered as a whole by the law of the 
place where the bank office or branch involved is situated.54 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has clearly stated this solution 
with regard to the relation flowing from a current account. 55 
49 Crews v. Williams (1810) 2 Bibb (Ky.) 262 and other old decisions. 
50 DIENA, 2 Dir. Int. Com. 152 § 124; id., 2 Principi 263; DESPAGNET 921 
§ 316; Tosi-BELLUCCI, supra n. r, 73 n. 2; 2 MElLI 36 speaks of the con-
tractual exclusion of compensation. 
51 FOOTE 556; HIBBERT 189. 
52 See the excellent article by ULMER, "Kontokorrent," 5 Rechtsvergl. 
Handworterbuch 194, 216. 
53 2 BEALE § 322.1 argues exclusively from the viewpoint of lex loci 
contractus. 
54 Cf. supra Ch. 34 ns. 56 ff. and FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 
473 No. 4· 
55 BG. (Nov. 22, 1918) 44 BGE. II 489, 492; (Oct. 26, 1937) 63 id. II 383, 
385. 
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It was embarrassed, however, when both parties to the 
account were professionally engaged in banking; in the 
particular case, the court clung to the law of the forum 
invoked by both attorneys.56 
fie BG. (Oct. 26, 1937) 63 BGE. II 383, 386. 
CHAPTER 52 
Statutes of Limitation 
I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
I. The Problem 
T HE conflicts law with respect to limitation of action by lapse of time has been discussed since the thirteenth 
century, and in this long history, "all possible and 
also impossible ideas have found advocates."1 "Few argu-
ments have been so much discussed and have occasioned so 
many varied and disparate opinions as that concerning 
the law controlling limitation of action." 2 Although the 
truth of these statements is all too apparent to students of 
conflicts laws, only two main systems have stayed in compe-
tition. They correspond almost exactly with the division 
between common law and civil law. In British jurisdictions 
and in the United States, in principle "limitation of actions" 
is said to affect the "remedy" only and to belong to the 
procedural law of the forum; every court applies the do-
mestic statute of limitation, in principle excluding all foreign 
statutes. In the countries of the civil law, after long drawn-
out debates, it is at present uniformly recognized that limi-
tation of "action" is a misnomer and that it affects the 
substantive right; prevailingly, it is determined by the law 
governing the obligation. 
This contrast is notorious. Excellent surveys of the world 
literature in older and recent writings have tended to uni-
form conclusions in favor of the substantive classification.3 
1 I VAREILLES-SOMMIERES 26I; quoted by DE NoVA 96 § I7. 
2 DrENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 440. 
3 On the present doctrine in Continental literature, particular mention 
is due to }EAN MICHEL, La prescription liberatoire en droit international 
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At least one energetic article has come forth to vindicate 
the viewpoint of the common law. 4 The Institute of Inter-
national Law in 1926 reached a sensible proposal for uni-
formly applicable rules.5 Must we go again over all this 
territory? 
Unfortunately, it is still necessary to do so. Too much 
in the debates going on for so many centuries has been a 
strange mixture of obsolete legal terminology and con-
cealed policy considerations; the policies have been too 
often one-sided or confused; and the provincial lawyer's 
thinking has usurped undue privilege. The subject, thus, 
has become an outstanding illustration of the necessity for 
an unbiased and supernational discussion. 
Our inquiry, however, has to start with the municipal 
law. This exception from the habits of this present work 
does not include an inconsistency of methods. Although con-
flicts law ought to have its own standards and evaluations, 
analytical research serving the formation of uniform con-
flicts rules always requires investigation of similarities and 
dissimilarities of the various systems, and furnishes a par-
ticularly useful help when it reveals substantial analogies. 
In this matter, objective criticism discovers vital analogies 
despite different labels, concepts, and characterizations, 
which, together with their influence on practical solutions, 
must be questioned as a first step to a sound conflicts law. 
It is to be borne in mind that we are here concerned ex-
prive (These, Paris, I9II) (second edition, Paris, unavailable), the sub-
stance of which Michel has condensed in r Repert. 292 ff; DE NovA, L'estin-
zione della obbligazioni convenzionali (1931) 97-137; Batiffol §§ 575 ff., 586. 
Other (selected) special treatments: WUNDERLICH, Zur Lehre von der 
Verjiihrung nach internationalem Rechte, in Festschrift fiir Ernst Reinitz 
(Berlin 1926) 481-512; ScHOCH, Klagbarkeit, Prozessanspruch und Beweis 
im Lichte des internationalen Rechts ( 1934) 52 ff., no ff.; ScHLINK, "Die 
internationalprivatrechtliche Behandlung der Verjahrung in den Vereinigten 
Staaten," 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 418; PHILONENKO, "De Ia prescription extinctive 
en droit international prive," Clunet 1936, 259, 513. 
4 I am speaking of the impressive article by AILES, "Limitation of Actions 
and the Conflict of Laws," 31 Mich. L. Rev. (1933) 474-502. 
5 Viennese Meeting, 1924, 31 Annuaire (1924) 182. 
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elusively with the rules concerning ordinary obligations, and 
not claims flowing from property rights or obligations aris-
ing out of family relations or succession. 
2. Historical Note 
In order to gain an objective view of the problem, a few 
historical facts should be kept in mind. 
In the ancient Roman common law (ius civile), most 
actions were "perpetual," whereas the praetorian actions 
were often limited to a year ( annus utilis) .6 Greek practice 
developed a rebuttable presumption against the existence of 
a debt after a long time, 7 probably the model of a late 
Roman practice known to us by an imperial edict for Egypt. 8 
Theodosius II subjected the old perpetual actions to a 
praescriptio longi temporis, resulting in their "extinction" 
of the action and this prescription went over into Justinian's 
compilation. 9 Almost all features of the modern provisions 
on "limitation of actions"-the English term itself is bor-
rowed from Theodosius and Justinian-are contained in 
the Corpus Juris: commencement of the period when the 
action is born, causes and effects of suspension and inter-
ruption, revival, and so forth. 
An important modification, however, was worked out in 
England after the civil war10 and in secular disputes in civil 
law ;11 the effect of the lapse of time, originally operating 
6 See, e.g., BUCKLAND, A Textbook on Roman Law ( ed. 2, I932) 689. 
7 PARTSCH, Longi temporis praescriptio u8 f. 
8 Papyrus Flor. No. 6I, I, 45 (85 A. D.); for an application, see Papyrus 
Oxyrhynchos No. 68 (I3I A. D.). 
9 C. Theod. 4, I4, I, 3 (A. D. 424); C. Just. 7, 39, 3, 2: hae autem actiones 
annis triginta continuis extinguentur, quae perpetuae videbantur, non illae 
quae antiquitus fixis temporibus limitantur. 
10 See ANGELL 3IO § 285 on the development through Brown v. Hancock 
( I628) Cro. Car. II5, 79 Eng. Re. 70I; Tankersley v. Robinson ( I629) 
Cro. Car. I63, 79 Eng. Re. 742; Stile v. Finch (I634) Cro. Car. 38I, 79 Eng. 
Re. 932. 
11 In canonist procedure since the end of the fourteenth century, the court 
took notice ex officio. The German doctrine adopted the defense theory as 
late as the nineteenth century. See ERNST HEYMANN, Das Vorschiitzen der 
Verjiihrung (I895) and KIPP, 45 Z. Handelsr. (I896) 6o8. 
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automatically, was changed into a mere defense to be 
pleaded by the defendant at his pleasure. The influence of 
canon law and English equity jurisdiction may be neglected 
in a discussion restricted to obligations.12 
Byzantine, Continental, and English sources all speak of 
"action" as the object of limitation. The meaning of the 
word is indicated by the long and firm doctrinal tradition 
coming from classical Roman law and represented by the 
category of jus quod pertinet ad actiones,13 co-ordinate with 
the law of persons and the law of things. Roman and 
English professional legal practice started from a few 
formulas of procedure to be used in certain cases. The 
progress consisted in increasing the number and refining 
the use of these formulas until the procedure extra ordinem 
in one system and equity in the other became the means of 
new developments. But not withstanding the dissolution of 
formalism and the enrichment of the system, the ancient 
jurisconsults and the English jurists until the nineteenth 
century14 considered the decision of lawsuits as the object 
of all their efforts, and the question under what conditions 
a petition (action) could be judicially recognized and en-
forced as their central problem. 
Actio, hence, technically the acting of the plaintiff in 
introducing and pursuing his claim, in the classical texts 
covers both the procedural activity of the plaintiff and his 
right to win his cause. An actio in personam particularly is 
12 The comparatively few cases in which laches has been applied not to 
property claims but to suits for restitution, do not directly apply the statute 
of limitation, see Restatement of Restitution § 148. The recent judgemade 
German "V erwirkung" (see comments on § 242 BGB.) is analogous and 
clearly substantive. Whether also the equitable institution of laches is 
substantive-as I assume and a Note in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) 341 evi-
dently implies-and whether therefore it is to be applied by foreign judges, 
is an interesting question to be discussed under the general problem of 
broad judicial discretion exercised upon foreign authorization. 
13 GAlUS IV x ff.; Just. Inst. 4, 6 ff. 
14 PLUCKNEIT, A Concise History of the Common Law (ed. 4, 1948) 361 f. 
defines the process of separation of law and procedure since the eighteenth 
century and concludes: "Much experimentation is going on, both in England 
and America." 
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a formulary means of proceeding, but it is also an obli-
gatory right: ({Nihil aliud est actio quam ius quod sibi 
debeatur, iudicio persequendi." 15 
The pandectists, though slowly continuing the work 
of the Corpus Juris in the transformation of the system of 
actions into a system of rights, nevertheless retained the 
double-sided concept of action. In the nineteenth century, 
the "law of actions" was conceived as the borderland be-
tween private and procedural law, including the effects on 
the right in issue of the commencement of a suit and the 
judgment. The development of "action" in the English tech-
nical language seems obscure, but may have followed similar 
lines. A late testimony, however, is furnished by the English 
Sale of Goods Act and its American parallel. After having 
described in four parts the sales contract and its contents, 
these acts in a "Part V, Actions for Breach of the Contract" 
include the "remedies" of the seller and the buyer as to the 
price, recission, general damages, etc., but contain almost 
nothing referring to procedure. Breach of contract, just as 
commission of a tort, produces rights for the injured party. 
While these rights are referred to as actions and remedies, 
these terms consider the rights as objects, but not as means, 
of procedure. 
Holdsworth, it is true, thinks that it is reasonably clear 
from the words of James I's statute "that the statute 
affected not the right under a contract but the right to en-
force it."16 This can scarcely have been the idea. By pre-
scribing that the actions should be commenced and sued 
upon within six years, or otherwise its enforcement would 
be denied, the statute destroyed the only form in which the 
right appeared in the legal world. When later, in r 698, the 
court of the King's Bench said of a claim, "It is a debt 
though barrable by pleading of the statute, " 17 it meant only 
15 CELSUS, Dig. 44, 7, 51; Just. lnst. 4, 6 pr. 
16 8 HOLDSWORTH 65• 
17 Wainford v. Barker (1698) 1 Raym. (ed. 4, 1790) 232. 
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to save the claim for accounting in an administration pro-
ceeding before an ecclesiastical court. Subsequently, other 
effects of the debt were recognized. But the contrast be-
tween right and remedy was superimposed on the statute. 
The two elements of "action" were finally disjoined by 
the German Pandectist, Windscheid.18 He distinguished 
"Anspruch"-claim or pretense in precarious translations-
and right to sue or "Klagerecht." Klageverjahrung, limita-
tion of action, thenceforth was replaced by A nspruchsver-
j(ihrung, limitation of claim. The ensuing German and later 
the Italian scholars have devoted an enormous amount of 
thought to both of these basic concepts. The German Civil 
Code, precisely at the place where it indicates the object 
of limitation of action, defines the Anspruch as "the right 
to demand from another person an act or a forbearance." 
(§ 194). While this means, in application to property, that 
the various rights flowing from a violation of property 
right are barred in contrast to the ownership, mortgage, 
etc., which is not necessarily affected, in the better opinion 
an obligatory right is identical with an Anspruch and object 
of limitation. Recent literature leaves no doubt that in any 
case the object affected by limitation is the right and not the 
procedural power of a plaintiff. Rather, it has been empha-
sized that the attempt of Windscheid and the German Code 
to save the elements of the Roman actio by inserting the 
"claim" between the substantive right and the procedural 
right of enforcement, has failed; it would simply be the 
right that is affected by limitation.19 But this is immaterial 
for our purpose. 
What matters is that the law of limitation as well as the 
meaning of action have undergone important modifications, 
18 WINDSCHEID, Die Actio 1856. 
1 9 See CARNELUTII, "Appunti sulla prescrizione," 10 Riv. Dir. Proc. Civ. 
{1933) I 32; BErn, Diritto processuale civile italiano (1936) 166 f.§ 38. 
The literature on the procedural part of actio has produced an over-
whelming variety of opinions. 
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although the Anglo-American legal language has persisted. 
N a1ve students of the statutes of limitation are continuously 
misled by this terminology, although erudite jurists cer-
tainly should not need to be warned. 
It seems opportune to make one more general observa-
tion. American discussions have shown meritorious en-
deavors to clarify the relationship between substance and 
procedure. Through Walter Wheeler Cook's writings, it 
has been recognized that the line of delimitation between 
these two fields may vary according to the purposes of the 
rules of law to be subordinated. From this acknowledgment 
of the relativity of terms, seemingly some scholars have 
concluded that the concept of procedure is flexible to the 
degree that it does not possess any general meaning. A 
further inference may be that a domestic statute of limita-
tions is "procedural" in the meaning of conflicts law, al-
though a foreign statute may be substantive. All this is 
mistaken. There is no ground for contending that for the 
purpose of conflicts law-that is, for the question whether 
domestic or foreign law should apply-several concepts of 
procedure are necessary or useful. The main, and probably 
the exclusive reason for discussing the scope of procedure 
in this field is afforded by the universally recognized prin-
ciple that foreign private law is potentially applicable but 
foreign procedural law is not. The idea underlying this 
principle is simple and although it needs certain exceptions, 
it does not call for subtle conceptual distinctions. The idea 
is this: Every court wants to administer justice in the forms 
and methods regulated for proceedings at the forum. Court 
and parties are not to be disturbed in their observance of 
the legal rules prescribing the steps to be taken for insti-
tuting, pursuing, and terminating lawsuits. This includes, 
indeed, rules limiting the time in which a procedural act 
such as pleading, objection, offer of evidence, or appeal must 
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be made. 20 Whether it also includes the right of a defendant 
to withstand the exercise of a superannuated substantive 
right by opposing to the cause of action a counterright on 
the same plane-"A plea of limitation is an answer to the 
merits" 21-, is the problem of conflicts law to be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
II. MuNICIPAL CoNCEPT 
1. Main Features of Limitation 
The specialists of conflicts law sometimes seem to be 
entirely unaware of the fact that limitation of action has 
the same structure under all the statutes of the world. 
Whatever the influence which the Corpus Juris or the 
statutist doctrines may or may not have exercised on 
English courts, it is a strange mistake to attribute the rift 
in the conflicts rules to a substantial cause. There are local 
deviations from the over-all picture22 but, roughly, the 
institution is universally organized on the following lines. 
(a) Lapse of time. The period of limitation starts to 
run when the cause of action is completed (actio est nata). 
The march of time is suspended by infancy and other indi-
vidual incapacity to litigate. It is interrupted, in the lan-
guage of Justinian, when debtors "acknowledge the debt 
whether by payment or otherwise" (debitum agnoverint vel 
per solutionem vel per alios modos, C. J. 8, 39, 4). 
(b) Defensive remedy. Contrary to original ideas, the 
court takes notice of a completed limitation only if the de-
fendant avails himself of the bar, in the form prescribed 
20 Unanimous opinion, relating to the "peremption d'instance," see for 
France, 2 ARMIN JON 345, VALERY 1010; for Italy, DE NovA 120, 193 n. 1; 
for the Netherlands, MuLDER 232. In Louisiana, the term seems to be used 
as equivalent to a time period destroying the right, cf. Hollingsworth v. 
Schanland ( 1924) 155 La. 825, 99 So. 613, that is, "decheance" in the French 
language, below. 
21 Wooo, 1 Limitations 304 § 63a. 
22 For the United States, cf., e.g., Credit Manual of Commercial Laws 
( 1945) 267. 
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by the procedural law, such as a special plea. 23 The German 
Code, emphasizing the substantive character of this defense, 
expresses it in the terms of a private law "exception," that 
is, the debtor's right to refuse performance, 24 which oper-
ates outside judicial proceedings as well as in court. 
Even apart from extrajudicial acts employing the de-
fense, the procedural disposition of the effect of limitation 
is a most characteristic point of the law of limitation. Under 
the influence of moralistic and natural law conceptions, it 
has become traditional to explain that it must be left to 
the conscience of the debtor whether he will resort to a 
defense regarded as immoral by some social philosophers. 
However, barons returning from exile after the English 
civil war, probably had good reasons for acknowledging 
their old debts.25 Preserving credit, desire for a test, and 
other considerations looking to the future usually are active 
motives. 
With all statutes recognizing the defendant's right to 
dispose of the bar, 26 it is difficult to believe that the state 
claims a paramount interest in avoiding stale claims so as 
to insist on the application of its own statute of limitation. 
Certainly, courts are glad to be spared the difficult ascer-
tainment of old causes of action. But a public policy so 
stringent as has been vindicated in support of the Angl~­
American theory is scarcely reconcilable with the fact that 
the protection of the statute is in the discretion of the de-
fendant. As it is said in France: 
Prescription is not absolutely a means of public policy; it 
does not go beyond the sphere of the particular interests 
23 Woon, I Limitations (ed. 3) § 7· 
24 BGB. § 222 par. I. 
25 This is a suggestion by HESSEL E. YNTEMA. 
26 England: See POLLOCK, Contracts 638 f. 
United States: 53 C. J. S. 958 § 24 n. 49; 34 Am. J. 3I8 § 405 n. 9· 
Austria: Allg. BGB. § I 50 I. 
France: C. C. art. 2223; cf. DALLoz, Repert., Prescription Civile Nos. 47 ff. 
Germany: BGB. § 222: right to refuse performance. 
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of the creditor and debtor. Moreover, it involves an evalua-
tion of moral nature; certain consciences would not admit 
they were liberated without having paid, whatever the age 
of the debt. If, then, the debtor insists on paying, it would 
be wrong to consider that he contracts a new debt or that 
he makes a gift to the creditor .27 
(c) Waiver. This character of the bar by limitation is 
confirmed by the almost universal rules that a debtor is free 
to waive a completed limitation by agreement28 and the 
widely held opinion that parties may in advance agree on a 
shorter period than the statutory period. 29 Although the 
codes usually do not allow the parties to enlarge the period 
or to waive the bar before it is acquired, courts have often 
favored party autonomy.30 
(d) Effect. What is the effect of a judgment dismissing 
the claim on the ground of limitation? Fine considerations 
of this problem were expounded by Story in his personal 
remarks in Leroy v. Crowninshield. 31 But in his treatise, 
Story borrowed from Boullenois32 the idea that such judg-
ment merely abates the action, since it denies but the 
remedy.33 This was mistaken. The old scholars disputed the 
27 RADOUANT in Planiol et Ripert, 7 Traite Pratique 715 § 1380. 
2s Austria: AIIg. BGB. § 1502. 
France: PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique § 1387. 
Italy: C. C. ( 1942) art. 2937 par. I. 
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 141 par. I (a contrario). 
Anticipatory waiver of prescription is invalid. 
29 United States: Order of Travelers v. Wolfe (1947) 331 U.S. 586, 6o8 n. 
20 emphasizes the extraterritorial effect. 
France: Constant practice; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE et TISSIER § 96; "an 
astonishing permission," PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique § 1349· 
Germany: BGB. § 225 sent. 2. 
Italy: On the controversy, see DE NovA 98 n. 2. 
Switzerland: On the possibility of extinguishing the debt of contractual 
limitation, see 0SER-SCHOENENBERGER art. 129 n. I. 
3° For France, see PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique 683 § 1350. 
On evasion through choice of law, permitted by German courts, see infra 
p. 515 n. 103, cf. p. 503. 
31 (1820) 2 Mason I5I, Fed. Cas. No. 8269. 
32 BoULLENOIS, I Traite de Ia personnalite et de Ia realite des loix (1766) 
82 ch. 3 obs. 23 p. 530. 
33 STORY § 576. 
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question whether the defense of prescription belonged to the 
exceptiones ordinatoriae (procedural) or to the decisoriae 
(substantive). The first were objections to the court taking 
cognizance of the complaint because a prerequisite con-
dition of the proceeding was missing. The latter exceptions 
went to the merits. Some authors considered prescription 
as substantive for the reason that it was an exceptio per-
emptoria; this argument was correctly refuted by Boullenois, 
whom Story quoted comprehensively.34 But on the other 
hand, this exception was also not to be stamped as pro-
cedural because of its preliminary character, i.e., preventing 
the court from looking into the other merits.35 
Since Baldus, old and modern Italian and French authors 
have prevailingly categorized this exception among the 
decisoriae and the judgment as going to the merits.36 
Boullenois was part of a minority to which, it is true, Ulric 
Huber belongs.37 Story38 was perhaps misled by Pothier's 
remark39 that in France the judgment of dismissal took the 
form of ufin de nonrecevoir." The category of a nonreceiv-
able demand half-way between an action ((mal fondee" and 
an action udeboutee d'instance" corresponds with defenses 
various in nature, which were joined together by the French 
science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for cer-
tain procedural ends.40 It happens that this complex group 
34 STORY § 579 p. 720, giving a translation. 
35 Correctly, Wooo, r Limitation 304 § 63a. 
86 On Baldus, Salicetus, Paulus de Castro, Dumoulin, and the entire litera-
ture to the end of the r6th century, MICHEL 27-31; Burgundus, MICHEL 39; 
the great majority of successors of d' Argentre, id. 63 f.; the 19th century, 
id. 137-142. 
37 HUBER, De conflictu legum § 7 (Guthrie tr. Savigny 511). On VoET, 
father and son, see infra Ch. 52 ns. rz, 13. 
38 STORY § sSo and notes. 
89 PoTHIER, Prescriptions, Introduction, sect. II § 30 par. I ; Obligations 
§ 687. Pothier did say, however, that the creditor conserves his claim but 
has no action any more, a proposition that puzzled Bugnet; cf. PoTHIER's 
description of fins de non-recevoir, Procedure Civile, sect. I § 35· 
40 See the informative article by BEQUET, "Etude critique de Ia notion de 
fin de non-recevoir en droit prive," 47 Revue Trim. D. Civ. (1947) 133. 
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of defenses, affected by a procedural reform of 1935,41 has 
recently been the object of a new discussion and apparently 
approaches its dissolution. There is no doubt where in this 
new development prescription belongs. The Court of Cassa-
tion has expressly declared it to be "a means of defense on 
the merits" (uun moyen de defense au fond") .42 
This is the universal practice, including the United 
States.43 Only because in England and this country limita-
tion has territorial effect, this res judicata is said to be 
restricted to the forum. 44 Correspondingly, when an action 
is dismissed by a foreign court on the ground of limitation, 
the action may be brought again at the forum. 45 Evidently, 
this reasoning is wrong when the foreign court means to 
dismiss the suit with prejudice. 
Merely "procedural" obstacles to a favorable decision 
have no effect on the cause of action. With the traditional 
antithesis of remedy and debt or cause of action, there can 
be no doubt that a judgment on the merits affects more than 
the remedy. 
Perhaps, the question may be raised how a dismissal on 
the ground of failure of jurisdiction should be characterized. 
But thus far, this question seems outside discussion of our 
subject. 
(e) Natural obligation. Finally, in all systems the true 
kind of limitation leaves intact some important effects of 
the debt. There remains in the language of natural law and 
Lord Mansfield46 a "moral" obligation, usually designated 
41 Decret-Loi, Oct. 30, 1935, D. I935+42I; C. Civ. Proc. art. 192, amended. 
42 Cass. civ. (Feb. 23, 1944) S. I944.J.II7 at 120 with note by MoREL. 
43 United States: WooD, I Limitations 304 § 63a; FREEMAN, 2 Judgments 
1538 § 726. 
Civil law: MICHEL 144. 
44 Bank of United States v. Donnally (1834) 8 Pet. S. C. 361; Warner v. 
Buffalo Drydock Co. (C. C. A. zd 1933) 67 F. (2d) 540; CHEATHAM, Cases 
330· 
45 Harris v. Quine (1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 652; DICEY 856 No. 14. 
46 See 8 HOLDSWORTH 26. 
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by the Romanistic term a natural, or by some pandectists 
and Sir Frederic Pollock an imperfect, obligation. The 
debtor may still discharge the barred debt by payment, not 
as a gift; he cannot recover such payment at all or only 
under specified conditions. He can revive it to full effect 
by a new promise or an acknowledgment (at common law 
without new consideration) ;47 also, the debt may be secured 
by pledge, mortgage, suretyship, or insurance, etc. 
Anglo-American lawyers have assumed that these resi-
dual effects are due to the fact that the debt is intact and 
only the remedy is affected. American decisions have, for 
instance, concluded that the creditor may still claim fore-
closure of a mortgage as only the remedy is alleged to be 
eliminated.48 But the German Code which more than any 
other has accentuated that the debt itself is affected by the 
exception, fully recognizes this particular effect after the 
debt is barred.49 Legal effects cannot depend on how we 
describe the weakening of the creditor's right. "A statute 
transforming an enforceable debt into a natural obligation, 
is not a procedural rule. " 50 
2. Limitation and Preclusion 
Modern Continental laws have developed in contrast 
with limitation (prescription) a concept of preclusive 
periods of time ( decheance or delai fixe, Ausschlussfrist). 
Preclusion seems to me a good term to indicate this group. 
Its most typical characteristics are that the time runs with-
out suspension and interruption, as in the ancient actiones 
47 On the change of background in history, see HOLDSWORTH, 39 Law Q. 
Rev. (1923) 146 and 8 History 39· 
48 First Nat'l Bank of Madison v. Kolbeck (1945) 247 Wis. 462, 19 N. W. 
(zd) 908, Note, 161 A. L. R. (1946) 886. The concurring vote of Fowler, J., 
is significant: as long as there is no payment of the debt, there is no ex-
tinguishment of it; without a debt there can be no mortgage. 
49 BGB. § 223 par. I. 
50 DREYFUS, L'acte juridique en droit prive international (These 1904) 377· 
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perpetuae, and that judicial notice is taken of the preclusion 
of action, at least when the lapse of time is on the face of 
the pleadings. 51 Usually these periods are short and in-
tended to precipitate some act such as giving notice of 
defects, consent, or an overdue performance. Where the 
bringing of an action is conditioned by a time limitation, 
the distinction of this group from limitation is the more 
delicate as many transitory types exist in between. Suspen-
sion because of impossibility of suing, for instance, may be 
excluded in limitation cases and allowed in preclusion cases. 
Each single statute must be properly investigated.52 Con-
tinuous attempts, it is true, have been made in the common 
law countries, in conflicts law, to distinguish an operation 
of the law "extinguishing the right" from limitation as 
restricting the exercise of the right, a contrast that has 
retained a few followers also on the Continent.53 This served 
to establish the possibility for a period of time to affect the 
right. But the formula is wrong. 
What is more, conflicts law cannot establish any dis-
tinction between the varying shades of municipal institu-
tions. No satisfactory line can be drawn to determine which 
of the foreign statutes responds to the usual, domestic, type 
of limitation of "action" and which not. Carrying out such 
a distinction "would lead to incertitude and injustice."54 It 
is unnecessary if all limitations are classified into the scope 
of the law governing the contract. 55 
Evidently, the convenience of a simple comprehensive 
51 France: PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique 735 § 1402 f. 
Germany: ENNECCERUS, Vol. I, I § 2II III. 
Italy: C. C. (1942) arts. 2964 ff.; ENRICO GIUSINI, Decadenza e prescrizione 
(Univ. Torino, Memorie dell'lstituto Giuridico II No. 54) 63. 
52 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE et TISSIER §§ 36 ff.; PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite 
Pratique 737· VAN BRAKEL, I Nederl. Verbintnissenrecht ( 1942) 263. 
53 12 AUBRY et RAU 534, 535 n. 9; BAUDRY-LACANTINER!ll et T!SS!ER 35· 
Apparently also MoDicA, I Teoria della decadenza (1906) 178 (according 
to GrusiNI, supra n. 51, at n). 
54 BATIFFOL 455 § 578. 
55 MICHEL 150 ff.; DE NovA 192 (120). 
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rule has also motivated a provision of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles. Each state participating in a clearing of prewar 
debts was declared to be responsible for the payment of 
debts due by its nationals, except-among other cases-
"in a case where at the date of the outbreak of the war 
the debt was barred by the laws of prescription in force 
in the country of the debtor."56 This English draft, in-
tending to reproduce .the French version (ula dette hait 
prescrite"), included not only a "debt due" in the case of 
a limitation of action under English concepts but also all 
other time restrictions. 57 
In American law, limitation of action is sharply dis-
tinguished in theory from time periods for the exercise of 
a right, the lapse of which extinguishes the right. But in 
practice the difficulties of classification are certainly not less 
than in Europe. Where the distinction has become signifi-
cant in conflicts law the result is unhappy.58 
3· Right and Remedy 
Although customarily used by Anglo-American courts 
and noncritical lawyers, the antithesis of right and remedy 
was employed in the nineteenth century only by a few Con-
tinental advocates of the lex fori. 59 In fact, the entire idea is 
unique. Who would describe the debt of a minor as a right 
unimpaired by the fact that he cannot be sued on it? 
For a sound construction of the legal phenomenon pre-
sented in our case of an actionless debt, its two sides ought 
to be considered. A debt that can be enforced in court if the 
defense of limitation is not affirmatively pleaded, certainly 
56 Treaty of Versailles, Annex § 4 to art. 296 (b) ; Annex § 4 par. I. 
5 7 RABEL, Rechtsvergleichung vor den Gemischten Schiedsgerichtshofen 
( 1924) 55 f.; followed by WuNDERLICH, supra n. 3, 492. 
58 Cf. GooDRICH 203 on the difficulty of determining whether a limitation 
is on the right; and infra pp. 507-508. 
59 RADOUANT in Planiol et Ripert, 7 Traite Pratique 654 § 1325 remarks 
that this is a rather muddled idea. 
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survives the running of the period of time.60 But if it is 
awkward after the lapse of time to deny the existence of a 
right, it is still less reasonable to think it unaffected by the 
absence of the faculty of unconditional judicial enforce-
ment. The correct description of the situation is very simple. 
uLe droit du crediteur n' est pas iteint mais transforme."61 
The German and Swiss Codes express the same truth by 
stating that limitation of action affects the "claim."62 
A rapidly increasing number of leading Anglo-American 
scholars have professed their disapproval of the procedural 
or remedial theory. Lorenzen has expounded his criticism in 
an authoritative article. 63 Westlake was in opposition.64 
Falconbridge calls both right and remedy ambiguous and 
misleading terms. 65 Stumberg considers procedure to be the 
method of presenting the facts, whereas limitation concerns 
the legal effect of a fact upon a right.66 Cheshire67 and 
Beckett,68 as well as Goodrich69 and several judges70 have 
declared to the same effect. From Story in his first decision71 
so PoLLOCK, Contracts (ed. 12) 504. 
61 RADOUANT in Planiol et Ripert, 7 Traite Pratique 726 § I 393· 
62 BGB. § 194; cf. ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY § 212. 
Switzerland: See OsER-SCHOENENBERGER 640 f. 
63 LORENZEN, "The Statute of Limitation and the Conflict of Laws," 28 
Yale L. ]. (1918) 492, Selected Articles 352. 
64 WESTLAKE § 238. See also GuTHRIE in his translation of Savigny 267 ff. 
65 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 242. 
66 STUMBERG 141. 
67 CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 830: "English law is at the moment unfortunately 
committed" to this view. 
68 BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 66, criticized by MEN-
DELSSOHN BARTHOLDY, 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) at 31 n. 2, by 
arguments opposed in the present book. 
69 GooDRICH 201. 
70 Gilpin v. Plummer (C. C. D. C. 1812) Fed. Cas. No. 5451; Cochburn, 
C. ]., in Harris v. Quine ( 1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 652. See also Note, 9 U. of 
Chi. L. Rev. ( 1942) 723. 
71 LeRoy v. Crowninshield (1820) 2 Mason 151. 
A curious attempt to refute Story's doubts has been made by Mr. Justice 
Wayne in M'Eimoyle v. Cohen ( 1839) according to the report by ANGELL 
59, but the passage is not included in 13 Pet. S. C. 324, 327 (38 U. S. 169, 
172). Angell's praise of these polemics against the better informed Story 
seems unaccountable. 
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to Wharton72 and the just-mentioned writers, the rule has 
been upheld exclusively because it "is now too firmly settled 
to be shaken" (Wharton). But knowing the truth ought 
to have consequences. 
American doctrine has utilized this inveterate antithesis 
of right and remedy for various purposes, but quite un-
necessarily. Thus, the requirement that a time limit on the 
"remedy" must be pleaded specially, has not been extended 
to the defense of "extinction" of the right by lapse of time. 73 
In reality, the difference is that between an exception op-
posed to a correct cause of action and the denial of the 
cause of action. Both positions are taken in purely pro-
cedural manner. They might not have been distinguished 
at all if the historical special treatment of limitation of 
action had not been looked upon with disfavor. 
Also the fact that federal courts in diverse citizenship 
cases have now to follow the substantive law of the state 
courts but preserve their procedural rules, has nothing to 
do with the opposition of right and remedy. The proof is 
that the state statutes on limitation apply. 74 Even when a 
federal statute creates a liability without adding a time 
limitation, the general state statute is resorted to. 75 Federal 
law may incorporate state "remedies" as well as "substance." 
72 2 WHARTON 1271 § 545· 
73 Lewis v. Mo. Pacific R. Co. (1929) 324 Mo. 266, 23 S. W. (2d) 10o; 
and see 54 C. J. S. 491 § 357 n. 21. 
74 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York (1945) 326 U. S. 99, 105, 107, III; see 
cases cited by Goodrich, }., in Anderson v. Andrews (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 
156 F. (2d) 972; PUTMAN, 1945 Annual Survey 53, 1946 id. 62. 
75 Federal antitrust laws: Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil 
Co. of N. }. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 1018; federal liability of 
National Bank stockholders: Helmers v. Anderson (C. C. A. 6th 1946) 156 
F. (2d) 47; Anderson v. Andrews (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 156 F. (2d) 972; and 
see Holmberg v. Armbrecht ( 1946) 327 U. S. 392; cf. PUTMAN, 1946 Annual 
Survey 62. 
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4· Contrasting Legislative Policies 
It has been an easy temptation to explain the Anglo-
American doctrine by a peculiar conception of the purpose 
of limitation. Following other propositions of this kind, 
it has recently been said that in civil law an exception based 
on limitation flows from the obligation itself, but at common 
law a plea of limitation is made in the interest of justice.76 
This contrast begs the question of the conflicts law. The 
municipal regulations contain nothing to cause any differ-
ence in the relation between limitation statutes and con-
ceptions of justice. 
Another recent writer asserts that a deep-seated differ-
ence exists throughout French, English, and German laws 
between short and long periods of limitation; although short 
limitations are unmistakably a part of substantive law, the 
long periods, in his opinion, concern procedure.77 Again, 
no proof is afforded. 
Indeed, as usual, it is not true that different policies 
govern in the several jurisdictions or in the variants of the 
same institution. All municipal laws in this matter are 
guided by a complex of motives. It is in the public interest 
that peaceful situations should not be disturbed after a long 
time. A debtor should not be forced to answer claims of 
obscured origin. He should not have to preserve instru-
ments, receipts, and accounts for an unlimited time. Wit-
nesses and documents may disappear. The courts should not 
be troubled with difficult determinations of fact. The creditor 
may have been negligent in the enforcement or be deemed 
to have waived his claim. The debt may have been dis-
charged in fact without receipt. This mixture of considera-
76 MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY, "Delimitation of Right and Remedy," 16 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (1935) 20 at 31 n. 2. He adds another distinction, con-
trary to the facts found here. 
77 PHILONENKo, "De Ia prescription extinctive en droit international prive," 
Clunet 1936, 259, 513 at 527, 532, 545· 
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tions prevails everywhere without discernible variants.78 It 
also colors all particular statutes with only one known 
exception. 79 
5. Comparative Conclusion 
In municipal law, limitation of action always affects the 
right, and the degree of this effect is no suitable criterion 
for distinctions. In this domain of internal effect, statutes 
of limitation belong to substantive, as contrasted with 
adjective, law. If the common law theory as formulated by 
past undeveloped scholarship is to be justified, and not 
respected simply because it exists, the reasons must be found 
in the field of conflicts policy. 
On the side of the literature supporting the Continental 
theory, however, some unfounded views have been ex-
pressed. It has often been claimed that in contrast to Eng-
land, Continental limitation of action "extinguishes" the 
obligation80 and this term, as used in fact in the French 
Civil Code, has found much favor in other codes.81 But as 
we have seen, it can only be said in French law that the de-
fendant may avail himself of the bar and that the judgment 
dismissing the action is res judicata on the merits. There 
are little-noted problems in modern law concerning the time 
when the obligation finally becomes ineffective in and outside 
of court. Yet an obligation enforceable so long as the debtor 
does not react, or generating any of the effects of a natural 
obligation, is not dead. 
It has also been contended in supporting the Continental 
78 This is also the opinion of BATIFFOL 455 § 576. 
79 Infra Ch. 53 p. 502 on French C. C. art. 2275. 
80 E.g., DIENA, 1 Dir. Com. Int. 443; DE NovA 132. 
81 C. C. art. 1234: "Les obligations s'eteignent .... Et par Ia prescription, 
qui fera !'objet d'un titre particulier." 
The new Italian Code starts its provisions on "prescrizione e decadenza," 
saying "Every right is extinguished by prescription, when the holder does 
not exercise it during the time determined by law," art. 2934· 
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conflicts rules that the debt carries in itself from its be-
ginning the germ of its destruction through lapse of time.82 
This argument could correctly be denied from the American 
side; it is a "false premise that there is some immutable, 
preordained duration" of the effectiveness of a debt. 83 The 
proof is that the law governing limitation may change, 
which is an important point for the doctrine of conflicts. 
In view of the structure of this legal institution, there is 
also no reason in the arguments of Savigny that failure to 
incur the lapse of time is a condition of the validity of the 
obligation,84 or of Laine that limitation is a modality in-
herent in the obligation.85 
In fact, the right of a debtor to bar the action of his 
creditor, by invoking its limitation by lapse of time, is always 
a substantive right, even though the lapse of time does not 
extinguish the claim and is not inherent in the debt. 
82 E.g., I FRANKENSTEIN 595; DE NOVA 132 § 24. 
83 AILES, supra n. 4, 500. 
84 SAVIGNY § 574 at notes (t) ff.; his specified arguments, however, are 
still excellent. 
8 5 LAINE, 19 Bull. Soc. Legis!. Camp. (1889-90) 55· 
CHAPTER 53 
Statutes of Limitation: Comparative Conflicts 
Law 
I. THE CONFLICTS THEORIES 
I. Procedural Theory 
(a) Anglo-American principle. The English courts have 
laid down the principle generally followed in all common 
law jurisdictions as well as in Scotland.1 An English court 
applies exclusively the English statutes of limitation. An 
action barred by these is not allowed, even though the claim 
is governed by foreign law under which no bar is incurred ;2 
correspondingly, a claim barred only under the governing 
foreign law is admissible ;3 this even when the claim has been 
dismissed abroad on the ground of limitation of action 
there.4 The abundant American authority has unhesitatingly 
followed this model. 5 
(b) Former Continental following. The territorial con-
ception, which the English approach suggests, once induced 
numerous scholars and courts in France, Germany, and else-
1 DICEY, Rule 203 (3) and p. 856; GooDRICH 201 § 82. 
2 British Linen Co. v. Drummond {1830) 10 B. & C. 903; The Alliance 
Bank of Simla v. Carey (188o) 5 C. P. Div. 429· 
Scotland: Don v. Lippmann {1837) 5 Cl. & F. 1. 
Canada: Rutledge v. U. S. Savings & Loan Co. (1906) 37 S. C. R. 546; 
Quaker Oats Co. v. Denis (1915) 8 W. W. R. 877, 24 D. L. R. 226. 
3 Huber v. Steiner {1835) 2 Bing. N.C. 202. 
Scotland: Fergusson v. Fyffe {1846) 8 Cl. & F. 121. 
Canada: Bowes Co. v. American Ry. Express Co. (1924) 26 0. W. N. 290. 
4 Harris v. Quine {1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 652. 
5 WHARTON 1245 § 535 n. 4; MINOR§ 210; 3 BEALE 1620 § 603.1. On the 
early cases, see AILES, "Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws," 31 
Mich. L. Rev. ( 1933) 474 at 488; Restatement §§ 603, 604. 
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where, to profess a procedural doctrine.6 Their influence 
has practically disappeared. 7 
(c) Present following. It is difficult to ascertain in what 
countries the old theory, expressed in decisions and by 
writers, has been maintained to the present time. This has 
been reported for the Czechoslovakian in contrast to the 
Austrian construction of their identical codes, 8 and is prob-
ably the practically prevailing attitude in the Soviet Union. 9 
It has also been contended for Hungari0 and the Islamic 
states.11 
2. The Situs Theory 
It has been taken for granted since Story's writings that 
the Anglo-American conflicts theory in this matter continues 
the doctrine of the Dutch statutists. This is not entirely 
exact. And the true story seems to explain the strange atti-
tude preserved by the French courts. Paul Voet, discussing 
the standing question involving the case where the statutes 
of limitation at the domicils of the debtor and the creditor 
state different periods of time, gave this opinion: 
"Respondeo, quia actor sequitur forum rei, ideo extraneus 
petens a reo, quod sibi debetur, sequetur terminum statuti 
praescriptum actioni in foro rei. Et quia hoc statutum non 
6 See the list of writers and decisions in MICHEL III If.; WEiss, 4 Traite 
399 n. I; MICHEL, IO Repert. 296 Nos. 33, 34· The most influential of these 
writers was LABBE, Note, S. I869.1.49. 
7 Infra n. 30. The German courts, applying German common law, defied 
the procedural theory of the Prussian Supreme Court, FoRSTER-Eccxus, I 
Preussisches Privatrecht 67. 
8 LAUFKE, 7 Repert. 208 No. I76. 
9 MAKAROV, Precis 262 f.; and more simply, for interterritorial law, in 
7 Z.ausi.PR. (I933) I65. 
1° Kurie P. IV 464I/I933, II Z.ausi.PR. {1937) I73 No. 4, in a special 
case; and generally as reported in OLG. Miinchen (Feb. 2, I938) H. R. R. 
I938, I402. However, SzA.szy, Droit international prive compare (I940) 553 
mentions Hungary among countries following the law of the contract. 
11 2 ARMIN JON 350. 
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exserit vires extra territorium statuentis, ideo, etiam reo 
alibi convento, tale statutum objicere non poterit."12 
The first sentence says that the court at the debtor's 
domicil applies its own statute of limitation because it is the 
law of the place where the debtor must be sued. This is con-
firmed by Jan V oet: 
" ... spectandum videtur tempus, quod obtinet ex statuto 
loci, in quo reus commoratur,"13 
and explained by the latter through reference to his dis-
tinction between movable and immovable property.14 A 
personal action is a movable, hence deemed situated at the 
domicil of the creditor. However, for the purposes of bank-
ruptcy proceedings and limitation of action, the contrary 
position is preferable because the judge of the place where 
the creditor must sue the debtor, has the power to prevent 
the creditor from exacting the debt: 
"N am et debitum necdum exactum magis esse in potestate 
judicis, ubi debitor, quam ubi creditor domicilium fovet vel 
ex eo manifestum est, quod creditor forum competens et 
judicem debitoris sequi debeat." 
This discussion, couched in traditional terms of a standard 
problem, is not yet based on the procedural construction of 
limitation, but clearly on the doctrine placing immovables 
under the lex rei sitae, movable chattels under the lex domi-
cilii of the owner, and disputing whether personal actions 
belong to the latter group. In his second sentence, Paul Voet 
started to consider a case outside of the alternative of the 
creditor's and the debtor's domicils, where the debtor is 
sued at a place other than his domicil, but he contented him-
12 PAUL VoET, De statutis, s. IO, cap. un., § I, citing only GABRIEL, Commun. 
conclus., lib. 6, conclus. 11. 
13 }AN VoET, Comm. ad Pand., lib. I4, tit. 3, § I2. 
14 /d., lib. I, tit. 8, § 30. 
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self with the statement that the statute of the debtor has no 
application!5 
In theN etherlands, it was only Huber who on the strength 
of two Frisian decisions and contrasting the forum with the 
lex loci contractus rather than with the domicil of the 
creditor, acceded to the theory that ((praescriptio" like 
((executio" does not belong to the "validity" of the contract 
but to the time and mode of bringing an action.16 
In France, Boullenois, the chief authority relied upon by 
Story, argued on the lines of the situs theory, leaving it 
doubtful whether he recommended the lex fori or rather 
the law of the domicil of the debtor.17 With him, the two 
doctrinal currents, of situs and procedure, united in a mixed 
flow of ambiguous reasoning18 which persisted in some 
French writings throughout the nineteenth century and has 
prevailed in the French courts up to the present. Quite 
clearly, Pothier at one place follows the situs theory ;19 it 
should not be controversiaP0 that this passage means to 
apply the law of the creditor's domicil. 
In this literature, the principle that the debtor's ordinary 
forum is at his domicil has been kept in mind. 21 As in the 
doctrine of assignment, 22 however, the emphasis has shifted 
to the protection of the debtor; the defense of limitation 
is granted in his interest, and therefore is to be based on 
the law of his domiciJ.23 Some French courts24 and consis-
15 Contrarily, MICHEL 40 reads this passage as though it declared ex-
pressly the lex fori competent and indicated the basic theory of both Voets. 
16 HUBER, De conflictu legum § 7· 
17 MICHEL s6. 
18 "Au XIX• siecle !'equivoque persiste," MICHEL 91. 
19 PoTHIER, Prescriptions, Pt. II art. V § 251, cf. supra n. 1. 
20 See for the controversy, e.g., SURVILLE 384; VALERY 1010; 2 ARMIN JON 
346; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE et TISSIER 783 § 977· It is well known to historians 
that compilers are in danger of following divergent views according to the 
predecessors they have before their eyes. 
21 BROCHER, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1873) 142; 2 BROCHER 408. 
22 Supra pp. 391-392, 398, 420. 
23 For the French authors, see MICHEL 91 ff.; DE NovA 101, 103 § 19. In 
Germany, GRAWEIN, Verjiihrung und Befristung (188o) 56, 201; THoL, 
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tently the Court of Cassation, 25 repeating the same words, 
have sanctioned this view. When the question arose what 
time should be taken to ascertain the law, the debtor's 
domicil at the commencement of the suit, rather than that 
at the time of contracting, was held decisive. 26 No doubt, 
this doctrine approaches closely the application of the law 
of the forum. Criticism, therefore, points out the same 
defects as are charged to the lex fori theory: the rule inter-
feres with the natural scope of the law governing the obliga-
tion and allows the debtor arbitrarily to choose the ap-
plicable law. 27 Also, the effect of prescription is to liberate 
the debtor but not to protect him. 28 
At present, no theoretical follower of this rule seems to 
exist. The classification of limitation of action, in the mean-
ing of the French courts themselves, is very probably that 
it is a substantive institution and a protection of the debtor 
rather than an application of lex fori. 29 
3· Substantive Theory 
For decades the overwhelming authority of the European 
Continent and Latin America has considered limitation of 
action as a part of substantive law with extraterritorial 
applicability.80 Agreement is practically complete that the 
law of the contract governs. 
Einleitung in das deutsche Privatrecht (1850) § 85 n. 9· As an optional 
defense, 2 BAR 101. 
24 NIBOYET § 709 recognized four diverse judicial solutions, including those 
of the 19th century. 
25 Cass. civ. (Jan. 13, 1869) S. 1869.1.49; (July 28, 1884) D. r885.1.300; 
(Jan. 9, 1934) D. 1934.1.22, S. 1934·1.201, Revue Crit. 1934, 915, Clunet 
1934, 672; (July r, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 175, Clunet 1937, 302; Cour 
Paris (Jan. 13, 1947) Revue Crit. 1947, 297, and Note, BATIFFOL. 
26 Cour Paris (July 6, 1937) Clunet 1938, 78. 
27 See lastly, Note, BATIFFOL, to Cour Paris (Jan. 13, 1947) Revue Crit. 
1947, 297· The arguments go back to Hertzius, Wachter, and Savigny. See 
WALKER 325. 
28 2 ARMIN JON § 158 (2); see especially DIENA, 1 Dir. Com. Int. 441. 
29 See following note. 
3° Citations have been collected by MICHEL 137-142; LoRENZEN, 28 Yale 
18 
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(a) Antiquated theories. In the long history of this 
subject, various suggestions have been advanced in favor 
of some special laws. The sheer variety of all these theories 
aroused a false sense of superiority in some advocates of 
the lex fori, but they now belong to the past. As there have 
been frequent critical reviews of these opinions,31 a few 
words will suffice. 
L. J. ( 1919) 493, 496 n. 21; AILES, supra n. 5, 478. See in addition the cit a· 
tions for: 
Canada, Quebec: Wilson v. Demers (Montreal 1868) 12 L. C. ]. 222; 
see, however, on the provisions of Quebec C. C., "a complex hybrid," 3 
jOHNSON 596 n. I. 
Austria: WALKER 325; OGH. (Dec. 29, 1930) SZ. xu No. 315. 
Belgium: Inconsistent, see MICHEL 10, some courts following, with the 
French courts, the law of the debtor's domicil. 
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 225 No. 84, citing a Supreme 
Court decision (June 19, 1925). 
Estonia: App. Tallinn (Nov. 20, 1931) Clunet 1936, 665. 
France: Cass. civ. (July 1, 1936) Clunet 1937, 302, Revue Crit. 1937, 175; 
NIBOYET 824 § 706, Revue Crit. 1934, 915; BATIFFOL § 585 and Traite 543 
§ 541; the Notes (by PRUDHOMME?) in Clunet 1937, 302; 1938, 278 and 279; 
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 4) § 358. 
Germany: Cases from 14 ROHGE. 258 to (July 6, 1934) 145 RGZ. 121, 
Clunet 1935, 1190; (March 20, 1936) 151 RGZ. 201; I RGR. Kom., Vorbem. 
before § 194; RIEZLER in I Staudinger n. 9 before§ 194; LEWALD §§ 96-10o; 
RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. 273· 
Greece: Aeropag (1931) No. 21,42 Themis 194; (1934) No. 303,45 Themis 
794; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 131 n. II. 
Italy: Cass. (Jan. 29, 1936) Foro !tal. 1936 I 1033, Giur. Ital. 1936 I 202, 
Riv. Dir. Proc. Civ. 1936 II 100; (March 6, 1940) Riv. Dir. Pub. 1940 II 
467, cf. Note, BRUNELLI, id. 468. 
The Netherlands: App. den Haag (March 15, 1910) W. 8984, I VAN 
HASSELT 301; Rb. Rotterdam (Nov. I, 1917) N. J. 1918, 952, I VAN HASSELT 
302; Rb. Utrecht (April 4, 1928) W. 11895, MULDER 232; App. Amsterdam 
(Oct. 24, 1946) N.J. 1947, No. 229 (English law of the contracts). 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 580 No. 159; S. Ct. (June 12, 1928) 
NRt. 1928, 646, 7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) 946. 
Poland: S. Ct. (May 30, 1933) Clunet 1936, 702. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. 29, 1929) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1929, 1; 1930, 692 No. 198; 
see BAGGE in Festskrift tillagnad Erik Marks von Wiirtemberg (1931) 19 
(cf. 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 740, 7 id. (1933) 933 No.2). 
Switzerland: (Nov. 13, 1886) 12 BGE. 682; (Jan. 19, 1912) 38 id. II 36o; 
(Sept. 26, 1933) 59 BGE. II 355, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934) 825; (Dec. 5, 1940) 
66 id. II 234; (Dec. 3, 1946) 72 BGE. II 405, 414. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law (1889 and 1940) art. 51. 
C6digo Bustamante, arts. 229, 295. 
Brazil: PONTES DE MIRANDA, Recueil 1932 I 625. 
31 Notably, WILHELM MuLLER, Die Klageverjahrung im internationalen 
Privatrecht (Diss. Erlangen 1898); DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 439 If. (merely 
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Law of the debtor's domicil. In addition to the above-
mentioned French views regarding the significance of the 
debtor's domicil, it is worth remembering that during a cer-
tain period the Scotch courts "looked not to the debtor's 
domicil at the time of the action but rather to his domicil 
during the whole currency of the term of limitation."32 
Scandinavian courts, of course, include limitation of action 
in the law of the debtor's domicil33 because they consider 
this the law of the contract.34 
The nationality of the debtor was taken as a test by the 
special provision of the Peace Treaty of Versailles which 
puzzled us in the 192o's.35 The treaty excluded from gov-
ernment guaranty in clearing proceedings the debts "barred 
by the laws of prescription in force in the country of the 
debtor." Evidently it was felt necessary to establish a con-
flicts rule otherwise lacking in the international forum. Sig-
nificance of the debtor state's law for the liability of the 
same state may have seemed natural. 
Lex loci solutionis. The literature has amply dealt with 
the idea of Troplong that loss of action by limitation is a 
punishment to the negligent creditor and therefore depends 
on the law governing performance36 and other propositions 
to the same effect, that limitation rests upon the presumption 
that the payment has in fact been made at the place where 
it was due. 37 
repeated by MASSART, Della prescnz10ne estmtlva in dir. int. priv., Pisa 
1930) ; MICHEL and DE NovA, supra Ch. 52 n. 1. 
32 Lord Justice Clerk McQueen in Cheswell v. York Buildings Co. ( 1792) 
Bell Oct. 364, 377, Mor. Diet. 4528; GuTHRIE in Savigny tr. at z69. 
33 See, e.g., the Norwegian S. Ct. decision, supra n. 30; a Danish decision 
of 1932, 7 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1933) 923 No. 3· 
34 Vol. II p. 474 n. 178. 
35 DoLLE, Das materielle Ausgleichsrecht des Versailler Friedensvertrages 
(Berlin 1925) I38-140. 
36 TROPLONG, I Prescription § 38. Contra: the authors cited by MICHEL 
85 f.; DE NOVA 99· 
31 LEHR, 13 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1881) 516. Contra: DE NovA 101. 
The same result was based on the public interest by 8 LAURENT 334 § 234· 
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Such a presumption of a payment is at present a visible 
element only in certain short limitations, the model of which 
are the provisions of the French Civil Code (articles 227 I 
ff.) that teachers, innkeepers, physicians, attorneys, shop-
keepers, etc. must sue for their fees within six months to two 
years; the law assumes that in such cases payment is often 
made without receipt. 38 Not even these special provisions 
suggest a reason why the place of payment should control 
the termination of the debt. They raise another problem, 
though. The defense of limitation may be countered by the 
plaintiff's tendering an oath "on the question whether the 
thing has been really paid" (article 227 5). This procedural 
act cannot be produced in a court unfamiliar with the ancient 
deferment of oath,39 while its formalized effect cannot be 
entirely reached by ordinary means of evidence. Should, 
therefore, the forum substitute its domestic statute, which 
usually also prescribes short periods in similar cases ?40 
It would seem that rules of the forum on evidence for the 
rebuttal of a presumption de facto come nearer to the 
applicable provision than a domestic statute of limitation. 
Transition from the legal effects of the ancient procedure by 
party oath to modern rules of evidence is a well-known his-
torical development analogous to the suggested substitution. 
Lex loci contractus. Writers believing that the law of the 
place of contracting governs contracts either by natural 
law or by the presumable intention of the parties have advo-
cated this device especially for limitation of actions.41 
(b) Lex contractus. By overwhelming consent in most 
civil law countries, the law governing the contract as such 
controls limitation of action. However, doubts have been 
raised respecting the role of party autonomy. 
38 See RADOUANT in Planiol et Ripert, 7 Traite Pratique 726 § 1394. 
39 Contra: I FRANKENSTEIN 369 who would have the court use the foreign 
procedure. 
40 Thus, NEUNER, Der Sinn 124 f. 
41 See the citations in DE NovA § 23. 
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Choice of law by the parties. Two questions must be 
distinguished: 
If the parties agree on an applicable law for the contract, 
does it include limitation of action? This has been wrongly 
denied by some writers, even supporters of party autonomy 
in general, because of the allegedly imperative effect of the 
statutory period of time. Hence, the predestined law, pre-
ferably lex loci contractus, re-enters the picture.42 But im-
perative municipal law is far from being identical with 
stringent public policy.43 
Illustration. Willy and Roger de Perrot concluded in 
N eucha tel a contract with the company, Suchard S. A., 
giving them the exclusive right to manufacture and sell the 
Suchard products (chocolate, cocoa, and sweets) in the 
United States and Canada. The contract provided for the 
application of the usages and laws of the United States. 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, therefore, in a suit for breach 
of contract, applied American law, identified with the law 
of Pennsylvania, to the question of limitation of action, 
although the contract was made in Switzerland, the de-
fendant company was Swiss, and the plaintiff had returned 
to Switzerland seventeen years before. BG. (March 15, 
1949) 75 BGE. II 57, 65. 
May the parties stipulate specifically for a special law 
to prolong the period of limitation allowed by the law of 
the contract? This is a practically important question. 
American courts have raised various objections to any party 
agreement modifying legal limitations of time for bringing 
suits and are prone to override a clause backed by foreign 
42 DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 444-446; id., 2 Principi 264; MICHEL I 59; French 
decisions cited by I FRANKENSTEIN 597 n. I52 seem to join in this view. 
43 Infra pp. 5I3 If. Even the French Supreme Court has recognized the 
faculty of the parties to eliminate the alleged socially necessary protection 
of the debtor by his domiciliary law, by stipulating another law in the con-
tract, Cass. req. (March 5, I928) D. I928.I.8I, S. I929.I.2I7, cf. the refer-
ence to this decision by a French tribunal in Clunet I938, 281. 
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law but disapproved by local policy.44 However, such clauses 
have been upheld against the lex fori. 45 
We have to concentrate on the main subject.46 
II. CoMPROMISES 
(a) Basic Anglo-American exception. From 1726, English 
courts recognized in theory that foreign law could discharge 
a debt so as to make its enforcement at the forum impos-
sible. 47 The procedural principle, laid down in the leading 
cases for limitation, hence, was always accompanied by the 
exception that a foreign statute "extinguishing" the sub-
stantive right, or imposing "a condition upon the right" 
was to be recognized at the forum. 48 This might have re-
sulted in broad application of foreign limitations.49 But 
nothing of this sort developed. In fact, the courts seldom 
find foreign general statutes of limitation answering that 
description. The writers explain this by observing that 
English and American statutes scarcely ever expressly de-
clare the right extinguished,50 or that the courts are keen 
on discovering a reason for not making an exception.51 This 
tendency, we may add, is greatly aided by the formula of 
the exception. Genuine statutes of limitation never "ex-
44 See for the cases, Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. (1948) at qo f., speaking of a 
confused picture. 
45 See infra ns. 89, 131. 
46 For the same reason, no attention will be given to the "saving" and 
"tolling" statutes caused by the procedural theory. 
47 Burrows v. Jemino (1726) 2 Strange 733, 93 Eng. Re. 815; see for the 
subsequent decisions, AILES, supra n. 5, 491. 
48 Huber v. Steiner (1835) 2 Bing. N. C. 202, citing STORY who himself 
spoke of time limitation extinguishing claim and title, which, as well as his 
case material on the distinction between the title and the right of action, 
"belongs to property and not to obligation," WESTLAKE § 239· 
Scotland: Don v. Lippmann (1837) 5 Cl. & F. 1, 7 Eng. Re. 304. 
Canada: Bryson v. Graham (1848) 3 N. S. R. 271, and decisions supra 
n. 2. 
49 Optimistically so understood by DE NovA n6, construing a system of 
twofold characterization. 
50 AILES, supra n. 5, 493· 
51 STUMBERG 143· 
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tinguish" the right, even though they may use this expres-
sion. Thus the statute of Louisiana, identical with the 
French, has been construed as procedural according to the 
British model in Louisiana itself, 52 and in Missouri.53 The 
French Code was read in the same manner by Tindal, J., 
in Huber v. Steiner in 1835 54 and by Judge Learned Hand 
in 1930.55 Whether the New Jersey statute restricting to 
three months the time for recovering the amount of a de-
ficiency after foreclosure of a mortgage on New Jersey 
land, extinguishes the right, has been a riddle in the courts 
of New Jersey and New York for a long time. 56 
The general statutes of limitation of Wisconsin57 and 
the Maryland58 statute on bills, bonds, and judgments have 
been recognized as "extinguishing the right," but although 
the Wisconsin court seems to reject the British doctrine, 
in the Maryland case it was only stressed that the debt 
could not be revived by subsequent acknowledgment. Also, 
a Czarist Russian ten-year limitation has been applied as 
terminating the right. 59 
Special statutory liabilities. American courts feel more 
52 This seems proved by Erwin v. Lowry ( 1847) 2 La. Ann. 314; Newman 
v. Goza (1847) 2 La. Ann. 642, 646; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Haack 
(D. C. W. D. La. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 55, 64 f. 
53 McMerty v. Morrison (1876) 62 Mo. 140, 144. 
54 Tindal, C. }., in Huber v. Steiner, supra n. 3· MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY, 
46 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 31 n. 2 and AILES, supra n. 5, 499 
approve Tindal's construction of C. C. art. 1234 as "procedural." Cf. infra 
n. us. 
55 Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (C. C. A. 2d 
1930) 43 F. (2d) 941; HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases 282. 
56 Stumpf v. Hallahan ( 1905) 101 App. Piv. 383, 91 N. Y. Supp. 1062; 
Hutchinson v. Ward ( 1908) 192 N. Y. 375, 8S N. E. 390; Apfelberg v. Lax 
(193t) 2SS N.Y. 377, 174 N. E. 7S9; following these precedents, Paterno v. 
Eager (1943) 179 Misc. 966, 40 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 46s (substantive), re-
versed (1943) 180 Misc. 582, 45 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 22S because of the con-
trary construction of the statute by the highest local courts. 
57 Brown v. Parker (1871) 28 Wis. 21; Rathbone v. Coe (1888) 6 Dak. 
91, so N. W. 620. 
58 Baker v. Stonebraker (1865) 36 Mo. 338; see other cases in ArLES, 
supra n. s, 493 n. 110. 
59 In re Tonkonogoff's Estate (1941) 32 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 661. 
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secure ground when a special rather than a general foreign 
statute is in issue. Death statutes have been an example of 
provisions creating a substantive right not known at com-
mon law and simultaneously ending it within a specified 
period.60 Analogous cases have concerned the liability of 
trustees of a business trust or of stockholders in corpora-
tions61 and the Federal Employers' Liability Act.62 This 
recognition of applicable foreign limitations has been ex-
tended to statutes specifically qualifying a right created by 
another statute.63 
A characteristic controversy has developed around the 
effect of statutes of the forum creating a right similar to 
the foreign-governed claim in issue but limiting it to a 
period of duration shorter than the foreign statute. Logic 
seems to advise that the local prescription is restricted to 
the domestic-governed right; in this sense, some cases have 
admitted that nothing prevents the application of the foreign 
statute even if its period is longer than that of the forum. 64 
However, in a contrary view, the statute of the forum ex-
presses public policy barring all suits of the type in ques-
tion. 65 This division of opinion demonstrates the futility 
60 The Harrisburg (1886) 119 U. S. 199; for other cases, and particulars, 
see HANCOCK, Torts 134; AILES, supra n. 5, 495 f.; recently, e.g., Summar v. 
Besser Manufacturing Co. (1945) 310 Mich. 347, 352, 17 N. W. (2d) 209. 
61 Davis v. Mills ( 1904) 194 U. S. 451; Norman v. Baldwin ( 1929) 152 
Va. 8oo, 148 S. E. 831, 833. 
6 2 Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Burnette (1915) 239 U. S. 199; AILES, 
supra n. 5, n. 129. See also State ex rei. Winkle Terra Cotta Co. v. U. S. 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1931) 328 Mo. 295, 40 S. W. (2d) 1050 (con-
tractors' bonds) and cf. Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. (1948) at 139. 
63 Mr. Justice Holmes in Davis v. Mills ( 1904) 194 U. S. 451; Osborne 
v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1913) 87 Vt. 104, 88 Atl. 512. Restatement§ 605 
comment a. 
64Theroux v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (C. C. A. 8th 1894) 64 Fed. 84; 
Negaubauer v. Great Northern R. Co. (1904) 92 Minn. 184, 99 N. W. 62o; 
Keep v. Nat') Tube Co. (C. C. N. J. 1907) 154 Fed. 121; Cristilly v. Warner 
(1913) 87 Conn. 461, 88 Atl. 711; Maki v. George R. Cooke Co. (C. C. A. 
6th 1942) 124 F. (2d) 663, cf. Wilson v. Massengill (C. C. A. 6th 1942) 
id. 666, 669; see Note, 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1942) 727 n. 31. 
65PARMELE in 2 Wharton 1264 § 54ob; Hutchings v. Lamson (C. C. A. 
7th 1899) 96 Fed. 720; Tieffenbrun v. Flannery (1930) 198 N. C. 397, 151 
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of both approaches. Evidently, public policy may as well 
reside in genuine limitation as in preclusion by lex fori, and 
the decisions are visibly veering to the identification of 
both. 66 
In their embarrassment, the courts take it as a favorable 
indication when the foreign statute is called substantive in 
its own state. This self-characterization may occur for 
various purposes, such as in order to decide whether inter-
ruption of the running time by suing or revival through 
acknowledgment is possible ;67 whether the statute may act 
retroactively ;68 whether special pleading is necessary ;69 
whether a foreign judgment is enforceable despite domestic 
bar ;70 or a judgment is dead. 71 The inference for extra-
territorial applicability may be more or less convincing. 
Insecurity, however, is very natural with such nebulous 
criteria and the fundamental inadequacy of the distinction 
between "extinguishing the right" and only affecting the 
"remedy." The courts must be aware that they speak in a 
concerted language. What is their real impulse? Not only 
S. E. 857, seemingly approved by 3 BEALE 1629 § 605.1; Rosenzweig v. 
Heller (1931) 302 Pa. 279, 153 Atl. 346, noted, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) 
IIIZ; Broderick v. Pardue (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 102 s. w. (2d) 252; 
White v. Govatos (1939) 40 Del. 349, xo Atl. {2d) 524. 
66 In the Maki Case of 1942, supra n. 64, the foreign limitation of six 
years was contained in a Minnesota statute covering all actions commenced 
"upon a liability created by statute, other than those arising upon a penalty 
or forfeiture." The domestic (Michigan) restriction of three years to recovery 
of injuries to person or property is a clear limitation of action. Both pro-
visions thus appear to be genuine limitations of action, rather than "ex-
tinguishing" devices. 
67 Hollingsworth v. Schanland (1924) 155 La. 825, 99 So. 613 ("per-
emption"). 
6 8 McCracken County v. Mercantile Trust Co. (x886) 84 Ky. 344, I S. W. 
s8s. 
69 Cooper v. Lyons {1882) 9 Lea (Tenn.) 596; Wood & Selick v. Com-
pagnie Transatlantique {C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F. (2d) 941; HARPER and 
TAINTOR, Cases 282; Lewis v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. ( 1929) 324 Mo. 266, 23 
S. W. (2d) xoo; Carpenter v. United States (C. C. A. 2d 1932) 56 F. {zd) 
8z8. 
70 Brown v. Parker { 1871) z8 Wis. zx. 
11Angell v. Martin {x88o) 24 Kan. 334· 
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a European writer, 72 but also Mr. Justice Holmes73 has 
declared: 
"In cases where it has been possible to escape from that 
qualification (as procedural) by a reasonable distinction 
courts have been willing to treat limitations of time as 
standing like other limitations and cutting down the de-
fendant's liability wherever he is sued." 
It may be preferred to assume with Ailes that "statutes 
are often labelled 'substantive' or 'procedural' depending 
upon the result sought,"74 but this does not give a much 
different impression. Hancock points to the courts of North 
Carolina and Pennsylvania refusing to recognize the dis-
tinction between special statutory provisions and general 
statutes of limitations, because they are satisfied with the 
results of the procedural principle: 
"The distinction, though groundless, is probably symp-
tomatic of dissatisfaction with the general principle and of 
a desire to limit its sphere of operation." 75 
The above-mentioned controversy concerning foreign 
limitations that are longer than the domestic periods, led a 
federal circuit court in 1942 to reasoning which sounds like 
the end of the tortuous development of the procedural con-
struction: 
"Why should not this limitation accompany the new right 
created by the statute wherever enforcement of the right 
is sought, if the substantive law of a sister state is by comity 
to be recognized and enforced ?"76 
(b) Borrowing statutes. The application of the lex fori in-
deed has been finally cut down to half size by statutory 
72 MICHEL 157· 
73 Davis v. Mills ( 1904) 194 U S. 451, 454· 
74 AILES, supra n. 5, at 493 n. n6 in fine. 
75 HANCOCK, Torts 135· 
76 Martin, C. J., in Maki v. George R. Cooke Co., supra n. 64, at 666. 
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clauses, now adopted in a great majority of the states.77 
Their general intention is to protect the defendant against 
a plaintiff "shopping around" for a forum with a limitation 
long enough to allow suit. Therefore, they recognize under 
certain conditions foreign-limitation or extinction of a cause 
of action brought to the forum. 
Unfortunately, these statutes are of different types, and 
all of them are awkwardly drafted. Most of them identify 
the competent foreign statute by pointing to the law of the 
place where the cause of action "arose" or "occurred," a 
language adequate only for tort actions. Some recognize 
the statute of the state where the defendant resided when 
the action originated, irrespective of where this happened. 
In application to contractual and other nondelictual obli-
gations, the courts have assumed that the cause of action 
arises at the place of performance.78 What sort of reason-
ing is required thereby, has been illustrated by a recent con-
troversy necessitating a decision of the Supreme Court of 
the United States. A federal statute of 1913 obligated the 
stockholders of an insolvent national bank to make addi-
tional payments, without prescribing a time of limitation. 
The state statutes of limitation of the forum, including its 
borrowing statutes, had to supply the rules, but what sta-
tutes were to be borrowed, i.e., in what state did the cause 
of action arise? On the direction of the Comptroller in 
Washington, the receiver in Louisville, Kentucky, where 
the defunct bank had at all times actually carried on its 
transactions, issued the summons. The Sixth Federal Circuit 
Court declared that the cause of action was the failure to 
pay the amount at the receiver's place and therefore the 
Kentucky statute applied. 79 The Third Federal Circuit 
77 Note, 75 A. L. R. ( 193 r) 203; Restatement § 6o4 is thereby abrogated, 
YNTEMA, 36 Col. L. Rev. (1936) 183, 213. 
78 Cf. STUMBERG 142 n. 55· 
7 9 Miller, C. J., in Helmers v. Anderson (C. C. A. 6th 1946) 156 F. 
(2d) 47· 
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Court, however, held that the cause of action, created by a 
federal law and dependent on the act of federal authority 
did not arise in one particular state more than in another.80 
It resorted to the law of Pennsylvania as law of the forum. 
The Supreme Court approved the first opinion, agreeing 
with the prevailing construction of the place where the 
cause of action arises.81 However, it is never correct simply 
to localize a right flowing from a breach of contract or the 
violation of a legal obligation at the place where the per-
formance is due, rather than where the obligatory relation-
ship is centered. The supporting reason should have been 
what was incidentally mentioned, i.e., that the liability in 
virtue of the federal statute inhered in the membership in 
the former banking corporation and could have been better 
localized, under the circumstances, at the central office than 
in the charter state. 
The borrowing statutes, moreover, refer, in one or an-
other respect, to the (factual) residence of the defendant at 
the time of the origin of the cause of action; in part require 
that both parties resided in the same state during the full 
period; and establish more conditions of residence at the 
time of the action. The complications, doubts, and variety 
so accomplished are astonishing.82 
The New York statute distinguishes, like a few others, 
between residents and nonresidents of the forum, and in 
particular excludes from the bar such causes as originally 
accrue in favor of residents of New Y ork.83 Where how-
so Goodrich, C. ]., in Anderson v. Andrews (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 156 F. 
(2d) 972. The criticism in Notes, 6o Harv. L. Rev. ( 1946) 303 and 32 
Cornell L. Q. ( 1946) 276 fails to censure the technique of the borrowing 
statutes. 
81 Cope v. Anderson ( 1947) 331 U. S. 461. Approved by HARPER, "The 
Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws," 47 Col. L. Rev. ( 1947) 883, 
910-912. 
82 See the surveys, 75 A. L. R. (1930) 203-232; 149 A. L. R. (1944) 1224-
1238; 53 c.]. s. (1948) Q77 ff. 
83 New York: Civil Practice Acr § 13, as amended by law of April 15, 
1943· 
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ever, a nonresident sues a resident on a foreign cause of 
action, the shorter foreign limitation is observed.84 The Wis-
consin lawmakers exclude the application of a foreign limi-
tation if a claimant for personal injuries was a resident of 
the forum at the time of such injury.85 
As a whole, this broad exception to the procedural prin-
ciple is a half measure, the statutes, with the exception of 
that of Kentucky, 86 leaving intact all domestic bars in addi-
tion to those foreign. Such theories have been called irra-
tional, because a more incisive foreign statute is applied 
and a weaker one is refused effect.87 On the other hand, 
complaint has been raised against them as an unwarranted 
departure from the procedural principle.88 
In fact, the borrowing statutes are intended to protect 
the debtor against the obvious iniquity that, having once 
acquired repose, he should be again vulnerable to attack 
merely because he changed his residence. However, it is 
still less equitable that a creditor should lose his action 
simply because the debtor changes the place where he can 
be sued. 
(c) Continental proposals. Arguments on exactly the 
same topic have been much discussed in the European orbits. 
The authors following the procedural principle themselves 
felt the desire to restrict the hazards just mentioned. On 
the other hand, writers of the adversary school of thought 
sometimes conceded overriding considerations of the forum. 
All these compromises, however, have been more or less 
openly established on the ground of public policy which will 
be presently discussed. 
84 Dictum in Kahn v. Commercial Union of America Inc. (1929) 227 
App. Div. 82, 237 N. Y. Supp. 94, where a six-month limitation of New 
York is applied against a thirty-year period of French law, an application 
in itself understandable. See infra ns. 97, 100. 
85 Wisconsin: Stat. (1947) § 330.19 (5). 
86 Smith v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. (1914) 157 Ky. 113, 162 S. W. 564. 
87 BAR, Book Review on Wharton quoted in 2 WHARTON 1245 n. 3· 
88 AILES, supra n. 5, 501 in fine. 
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(d) Contractual and corporative limitations. The Su-
preme Court of the United States, in a recent majority 
opinion, enumerates the various modifications imposed on 
the general principle that lex fori governs limitation, and 
among them mentions contractual stipulations limiting the 
time for bringing an action, recognized in a long line of 
cases.89 The decision adds that limitation of time for suit 
by the constitution of a fraternal benefit association is pro-
tected by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.90 Among other 
possible implications, it is doubtful whether the argument 
is equally valid for all suits between a corporation and its 
members. 
(e) Federal characterization. Nothing is more indicative 
of the awareness, in the United States, of the true char-
acter of limitation of action than its recognition first in a 
hint, 91 then a straight decision, 92 by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. For the purpose of application of state 
statutes to lawsuits before federal courts in diverse citizen-
ship cases, the statutes of limitation are expressly termed 
substantive law, and this has even been extended to equity 
cases where an exception may have been expected.93 It should 
not be objected that characterization for this purpose may 
soundly be distinguished from conflicts characterization. 
The manner in which the opinion of the Supreme Court is 
motivated, 94 refutes any such distinction; indeed, there is 
89 Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe (1947) 
331 u. s. 586, 6o7, 6o8 n. 20. 
90 Id. 624. The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Black, by a kind of 
argumentum ad absurdum, extends the scope of the majority decision very 
far. His criticism is shared by HARPER, "The Supreme Court and the Con-
flict of Laws," 47 Col. L. Rev. ( 1947) 883, 895-900. 
On the special subject of the insurance companies, cf. supra pp. 324-325. 
91 Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. ( 1938) 304 U. S. 202. 
9 2 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York ( 1945) 326 U. S. 99· 
93 TUNKS, "Categorization and Federalism, etc.," 34 Ill. L. Rev. (1939) 271. 
94 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 326 U. S. 109: "And so the question is not 
whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of 'procedure' in some 
sense. The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner 
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no reason why the contrast of substance and procedure 
should not be exactly the same in both cases. 95 
III. THE RoLE OF PuBLIC PoLICY 
The Anglo-American conception of limitation survives in 
this country in a vastly reduced and amorphous shape. Its 
only real support is not procedural characterization but the 
British territorialism of former centuries which at present 
must take the appearance of public policy of the forum. 
This is probably the general opinion, although theoretical 
considerations are scarce and usually mix the points of view 
regarding remedy and policy. The former Continental lit-
erature, on its way from the same basic conception, took 
more opportunity for emphasizing, by arguments pro and 
contra, the role of local ordre public. 
Around the turn of the century, a considerable group of 
authors believed they had discovered a sound compromise 
between the law of the forum and that of the contract in 
reserving for the court its domestic statute when the period 
prescribed by it was shorter than that of the lex causae.96 
Some proposals restricted this concession to the longest 
period known to the forum, usually thirty years. Others have 
distinguished all "long" and all "short" periods. Finally, 
Rolin, reporter to the Institute of International Law, allo-
cated to the law of the forum also certain limitations such 
and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is 
enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in 
the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it signifi-
cantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law 
of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by 
the same parties in a State court?" 
Cf. ESTEP, Note, 44 Mich. L. Rev. (I945) 477· 
95 In the United States, constitutional control for the protection of foreign 
limitation statutes has only been exercised in a few special cases, on which 
see Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. ( I948) I36 at I42-I46. 
96 I AUBRY et RAU I65 and n. 69; DESPAGNET 925 § 3I7, citing cases; 
WEiss, 4 Traite 407; RoLIN, I Principes §§ 338 f.; VALERY IOI4 § 703; Bosco, 
Rivista I93I, 4I3. Also PHILONENKO, Clunet I936, 259, 5I3; }!TTA, Methode 
355· 
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as the French period of five years for rents (C. C., article 
2277), in contrast to the very short limitations which in 
French law rest on a presumption of payment made. 97 Bar, 
to protect the defendant, allowed him an option between 
the local statute and the law of the contract, if sued at his 
domicil.98 
Wherever in these suggestions the lex fori was main-
tained, its clear ground was the reaction of public policy 
against claims regarded at the forum as superannuated. 
This idea was directly formulated so as to form the 
only exception to the law of the contract, in the resolutions 
of the Institute of International Law: 
Liberatory prescription may also be deemed acquired by 
the courts seized of litigations by virtue of their own law 
of the forum, if the invoked limitation, according to this 
law, constitutes an institution of absolute public policy, pre-
venting the application of any foreign statute, even that 
normally competent to govern it as, for instance, in the 
interest of third persons, on consideration of humanity, etc.99 
This proposal was an attempt to include the common law · 
courts in a universal rule. However, in Europe itself all 
such far-reaching exceptions to the law properly governing 
the obligation are entirely and deservedly discarded.100 A 
public policy, not strong enough to be enforced by the court 
except when pleaded by the defendant should not be a 
reason to shield one who changes his abode arbitrarily to 
the forum, nor should it be a ground to remove limitation 
from many other important incidents of the governing law. 
True, statutes of limitation are usually "imperative" in 
municipal law so that the parties are not allowed to agree 
in advance to waive the statute or prolong its period of time. 
97 ROLIN, 31 Annuaire ( 1924) at 161. 
98 2 BAR 991 101, 
99 31 Annuaire (1924) 182 art. III. 
100 DE NovA § 130; 2 SCHNITZER 536. 
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But, as the Italian Supreme Court has put it, terminating 
a long-continued controversy in that country: 
Although it cannot be denied that limitation of action is 
founded also on considerations of public order (which are, 
however, joined by other, not less important, reasons), this 
does not mean that it belongs to the international public 
order. Therefore, limitation is not considered by the court 
without party request; it can be waived after the time has 
lapsed; and the time is suspended if impossibility to sue is 
proved.101 
The Italian Court still left open (in 1933) the question 
whether a foreign period of time longer than the domestic 
period may offend the public policy of the forum. 102 The 
better-elaborated German doctrine of courts and writers 
sharply rejects such inconsistency. Whether a period of 
limitation is longer103 or shorter104 than the local statute 
admits makes merely a technical, but not a moral, and cer-
tainly not a fundamental, difference.105 In France, the same 
view seems to prevail after the long controversy. 106 
The domain of stringent public policy, thus, shrinks to 
the extent of extreme cases: The Reichsgericht once held 
the Swiss rule that a deficiency certificate against an in-
101 Italy: Cass. (Nov. I3, I93I) Foro Ital. I932 I 2332, and (March 3, 
I933) Riv. Dir. Priv. I934 II 67, Clunet I936, 697. Accord, Cass. (Jan. 29, 
I936) Foro Ital. I936 I I033, 1040, applying an American statute. 
102 Cass. (March 3, I933) supra n. IOI. Such offense was contended by 
CERETI in Fedozzi 736, and repeatedly; DE NovA I96; App. Milano (March 
28, I9I6) Riv. Dir. Com. I9I6 II 896; App. Frenze (June 8, I927) Rivista 
I928, 245· 
103 RG. (July 8, I88z) 9 RGZ. 225; {Nov. 22, I9I2) Leipz. Z. I9I3, 550 
{Dutch thirty years instead of German two years); OLG. Hamburg (July I, 
I9I2) 25 ROLG. 2I8, 23 Z.int.R. {I9I3) 342 (English six years instead of 
German three years to six months). 
Switzerland: App. Bern (Nov. 3, I927) Bl. IPR. I928, 286. 
104 LEWALD 29 § 33· 
105 MICHEL 227, 239 j I FRANKENSTEIN 209, 597 j WUNDERLICH, supra Ch. 
52 n. 3, 486. 
Accord in Switzerland: z ScHNITZER 535 f. 
Brazil: ESPINOLA, Lei In trod. 628, citing MACHADO VILLELA, 0 Direito 
internacional privado no C6digo Civil brasileiro (I92I) 334· 
106 MICHEL, IO Repert. 305 Nos. 79-83, 307 No. 87; BATIFFOL 459 §§ 585 f. j 
with more reservations, NIBOYET § 708. 
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solvent debtor is not subject to limitation107 "contrary to 
the purpose of German legislation," because the statutes 
of limitation serve also the public welfare, viz., peace and 
security.108 But embarrassment followed as to the rule 
positively to apply, and it was not true that every debt must 
be prescriptible/09 Occasionally, it has been contended that 
a foreign period should not apply when it is unreasonably 
short,110 or, under reference to National Socialist intransig-
ence, that a Hungarian thirty-two year period was unac-
ceptable in face of a German two-year period.111 
Is it worth while to introduce an element of uncertainty 
for the sake of such rare discrepancies? Curiously enough, 
we may point to an American decision which did not hesitate 
to apply the Ohio borrowing statute in favor of the Penn-
sylvania statute ending in two years the right to sue for an 
injury committed in the latter state. Under Ohio law, the 
plaintiff, only 3i years old at the time of the injury, would 
have enjoyed suspension and could have sued after eighteen 
years.112 Consideration of domestic protection of citizens 
could have been expected to work in this case, if anywhere. 
But the court acted wisely in maintaining the rule. Do 
American courts, as it has been contended, really feel it 
unbearable that Continental general limitation periods 
usually are of thirty years ?113 If so, this would be the only 
understandable concession to public policy. 
1 07 Switzerland: Law on Enforcement and Bankruptcy, art. 149. 
108 RG. (Dec. 19, 1922) 106 RGZ. 82, Revue 1926, 278. In an analogous 
case, the French App. Colmar (Mar. 31, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934. 468, 2 Giur. 
Comp. DIP. (1937) 127 No. 85, held the Swiss provision not offensive 
to French public order, but stressed the fact that the French thirty-year 
limitation had not yet run out. 
109 WUNDERLICH, supra Ch. 52 n. 3, 481, 506. 
110 RAAPE 825. 
111 OLG. Miinchen (Feb. z, 1938) H. R. R. 1938, 1402. 
112 Hilliard v. Pa. R. Co. (C. C. A. 6th 1935) 73 F. (zd) 473, cert. denied, 
294 u. s. 721. 
113 Suggested by Note, 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1942) 724 at n. II. 
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 
The earliest attitude of Story and approval by most 
modern Anglo-American scholars have not prevented their 
acknowledgment of the existing principle, short of legisla-
tive reforms. On the Continent, conformingly, courts and 
authors have taken this procedural theory at its face value 
as the law of the Anglo-American countries, ignoring such 
important exceptions as the American and Canadian borrow-
ing statutes. The two groups, almost neatly divided on the 
lines of common law and civil law, thus face the problem 
how to treat the opposite conception of the statutes of 
limitation. Here, the three theories of characterization-
applying the conception of the forum; of the foreign law; 
and of analytical jurisprudence-demonstrate their most 
significant consequences. 114 
I. Characterization According to Lex Fori 
We have seen that the English courts remain fixed on 
the axiom that any foreign statute of limitation is in-
applicable, excepting conceivable but rarely recognized 
statutes "extinguishing the right." This distinction was 
applied to the French prescription, and it was found that 
it also did not "extinguish the right"115 and hence did not 
affect a French note. One hundred years later, an outstand-
ing American judge repeated this investigation and reached 
the same result.116 He ascertained in a perfectly correct 
statement that the French institution is of exactly the same 
nature as the American general statutes of limitation. But 
114 See 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 241, 278; Vol. I pp. 64, 65. On the occasion 
of a German decision of 1932, the three theories were advanced simul-
taneously in 1 Giur. Comp. DIP. ( 1932) x6o If. No. 40, the first being advo-
cated by the decision and the Note by SIEBERT, and the second with ill-placed 
vehemence by AGo, the third, my own, being explained by LuowiG RAISER. 
115 Tindal, C.]., in Huber v. Steiner (1835) 2 Bing. N. C. 202. 
116 Judge Learned Hand in Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Transatlantique 
(C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F. (2d) 941, HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases 282. 
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when, for this reason, he again classified French limitation 
as procedural and therefore inapplicable, he demonstrated 
the inherent vice of characterization according to the lex 
fori. Not only has a wrong municipal theory transgressed 
into conflicts law, so that the similarly constructed statutes 
of the sister states have become inapplicable, but this theory 
is extended to foreign limitations considered in their own 
countries as substantive. 
The same approach, however, has marked the entire 
German doctrine.117 It seemed to provide escape from other 
egregious blunders.118 Exactly like the English and Ameri-
can judges mentioned above examined the French Code, 
the courts investigated English law with the identical clear 
result that limitation of actions was subject essentially to 
the same rules as German Anspruchsverjahrung.119 The 
German courts and writers now unanimously state that what 
imports is only that in the German view limitation is sub-
stantive and for this reason the New York statute does 
operate in a German court. Also, in other countries this 
form of characterization has found favor. 120 
On the European side, it is true, the effect is reasonable. 
But the underlying theory is less admirable, as has been 
shown just above, on the common law side. So long as the 
117 ROHG. (June I5, I875) I5 ROHGE. I86; RG. (May 8, I88o) 2 RGZ. 
I3; OLG. Hamburg (July I, I9I2) 23 Z.int.R. {I9I3) 342; RG. (July 6, 
I934) I45 RGZ. I2I, IPRspr. I934 No. 29, Revue Crit. I935, 447; 6 Giur. 
Comp. DIP. No. I30. 
KAHN, I Abhandl. I03 ff., n9; 2 BAR 95 f.; LEWALD 73 § 98; ScHOCH, 
Klagbarkeit etc., supra Ch. 52 n. 3, I IO and n. 2. 
us Infra n. I22. 
119 OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 13, I932) IPRspr. I932 No. 28 at 59; RG. 
(July 6, I934) supra n. n7; cf. ECKSTEIN, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. I52. 
120 Denmark: S. Ct. (July I9, I925) 6 Repert. 2I5 No. Io. 
France: 2 ARMIN JON 346. 
Italy: FEDOZZI-CERETI 736. 
Sweden: Decision of the Swedish Supreme Court, and BAGGE, supra n. 30. 
Switzerland: {Semble) App. Tessino {Sept. 23, I929) and Bezirksgericht 
Zurich (Dec. 19, 1928) 5 Z.ausl.PR. ( 193I) 725; {probably) 2 SCHNITZER 
536, and definitely BG. (March I5, I949) 75 BGE. II 57, 66. 
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English and American courts believe in construing a Swedish 
statute by the method which they learned for the interpreta-
tion of the Statute of James I, we shall have no harmonious 
conflicts solution. And the reader should take a moment to 
consider the law of a world where an admittedly identical 
phenomenon is termed, classified, and treated in oppo-
site manners by the two chief legal groups of western 
civilization! 
2. Characterization According to Lex Causae (Secondary 
Characterization) 
Reputable authors advise a compromise to the effect that 
the forum should apply its domestic statute of limitation 
in principle to all cases decided at the forum, but recognize 
a foreign-governing law with the content given it in the 
foreign country. Characterization by lex causae and sec-
ondary characterization agree on this point.121 The Swedish 
statute is applicable since it is considered substantive in 
Sweden, and the Ontario statute is not applied because it 
is construed as procedural in Ontario. Thus, while theory 
( 1) provides the German courts with satisfactory decisions 
and leaves the American courts in the dark, theory ( 2) 
rescues the latter courts from their predicament. However, 
it immediately puts the Continental courts back in an in-
soluble puzzle. We are again where the Reichsgericht was 
in 1880.122 
At that time, the German Supreme Court hearing an action 
on a note issued in Tennessee, speculated that it could neither 
apply the Tennessee statute because it was procedural nor 
the German statute because it was intended only for a Ger-
man-governed contract. Hence, a Tennessee note could never 
121 AILES, supra n. 5, 482; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 74-75, 834; RoBERTSON, Char-
acterization 64, 248 ff.; PoNTES DE MIRANDA, Recueil 1932 I 625 § 7· 
122 RG. (Jan. 4, 1882) 7 RGZ. 21, 24; (May 18, 1889) 24 RGZ. 383, 393· 
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be prescribed as far as the German courts were concerned-
an outcome amazing even to the hardboiled specialists of 
conflicts law. Corrections have been attempted. Thus, it was 
assumed that American law refers the question of limitation 
to the domestic law of the forum exercising jurisdiction of 
the claim and this renvoi ought to be accepted.123 Also the 
Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, in a most involved 
reasoning, so argued.124 Another escape was discovered by 
scrapping the entire conflicts rule and reverting to the do-
mestic statute on the ground of public policy.125 Also this 
solution, curiously to say, was followed in a decision of the 
Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal on the basis of 
the German conflicts rule referring to Scotch law.126 
But how awkward is a treatment that requires such pre-
carious counteractions! Are we compelled to use in the two 
groups d~fferent approaches for reconciling divergent rules? 
The situation is not really similar to the conflict between 
domiciliary and nationality principles that calls for two 
methods of employing renvoi. The German doctrine has 
abandoned the entire approach,-a fact that should have 
given thought to the recent advocates of this artifice. 
123 OLG. Darmstadt (Nov. 2, 1906) cited by LEWALD 73 No. 98; 1 FRANK-
ENSTEIN 596; WUNDERLICH, supra Ch. 52 n. 3, 503, 506. PACCHIONI 331 rejects 
the renvoi but asserts that the lex fori enters into a gap of the foreign law. 
Contra: The Swedish Supreme Court, see BAGGE, supra n. 30. 
124 Weiser & Co. v. The Heirs of Ludwig Diirr, 6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 
632, 634: German conflicts law declared applicable refers to English law 
of contracts which excludes limitation of actions as procedural. Hence, 
nothing is left but to apply the German provisions on limitation. ScHOCH, 
Klagbarkeit etc., supra Ch. 52 n. 3, II6 n. 3, criticizes this decision because 
it looks at once to a conflicts law instead of asking the preliminary ques-
tion what is procedural and what substantive law. But how can this be 
done by a court not having a lex fori, if no characterization can be evalu-
ated as right or wrong, but only as inherent in a determinate system, as the 
same author contends (at 112 n. 3) ? The tribunal followed its course: 
(July 22 and Oct. 6, 1927) C. G. Baron et Salaman v. Hugo Schnetzer, 7 
Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 427; (June 12, 1929) C. A. Rebus v. Theodora 
Hennig, 9 id. 19. 
1 25 RG. (Dec. 19, 1922) 106 RGZ. 82, Revue 1926, 278. 
126 Cook v. Kutscher (May 31, 1926) Case No. 2263, 6 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes 540. 
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3· Characterization According to Comparative Analysis 
Although we have to recognize the existence of the terri-
torial Anglo-American rule, so far as it reaches and so long 
as it survives, we need not recognize any mistaken char-
acterization. We apply a foreign "law" in its entirety with-
out regard to its own categorizations.127 Once a court, 
whether American or European, knows that limitation is 
always a part of the substantive law, although it may not 
be applied in all courts in the same way as other parts are 
applied, there is no obstacle to the desired application. An 
American court has to apply Dutch or German statutes of 
limitation because they belong to the governing law, not 
only in the eyes of Dutch and German courts but also in 
correct American theory. Swiss or Argentine courts ought 
to apply the New York statute for the same reason. 
Of course, the force of this view is restricted by the 
positive Anglo-American law. That it should be reformed, 
is unquestionable. 
4· Conclusion 
In theory it should be frankly acknowledged by any 
court in this country and abroad that the effect of lapse of 
time on an obligation is an incident of the law governmg 
it. Foreign statutes of limitation are therefore applicable 
to a foreign contractual or legal obligation. 
This theory is for the time being restricted in British 
jurisdictions, and to an essentially lesser extent in the United 
States, through the age-old thesis that a court ought to 
apply its domestic statute of limitation. The resolutions of 
the Institute for International Law have recognized this 
phenomenon as an exception based on public policy,128 but 
127 Vol. I p. 66. 
128 31 Annuaire (1924) 182 art. III, quoted supra p. 514. 
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go so far as to perpetuate the excuse of common law courts 
for not applying statutes of civil law countries. At most, 
common law courts may reciprocate with other common law 
jurisdictions when the other statutes prescribe a longer 
period than the forum does. Even this is anachronistic. 
It would seem easy to enlarge the borrowing statutes in 
the field of obligations by replacing them through a very 
brief uniform rule. The uniform statute has simply to pro-
vide that an obligation governed by the law of a foreign 
state or country is exclusively subject to the effects of 
lapse of time, as imposed by that law on the rights of the 
creditor. This would end a.n overcomplicated and unjust 
legal situation. 
V. ScoPE OF THE RuLE 
Whether and when a cause of action arises, is naturally 
determined by the law governing the obligation, even in 
common law courts.129 The conditions of effective lapse of 
time depend, conforming to the respectively adopted prin-
ciples, in this country on the lex fori or the borrowed 
statute/30 and in Continental courts, except the French, on 
the law governing the obligation. This law determines also 
whether the parties are permitted to agree on a longer ot 
shorter period of time.131 
Illustration. A German buyer sued an Austrian seller for 
rescission on the ground of implied warranty and for dam-
ages on the ground of express warranty. According to the 
splitting method, the Appeal Court of Hamburg applied 
German law to the rescission and Austrian law to the dam-
ages. In consequence, the question whether the time of 
limitation was interrupted by a formal expert inspection 
1 29 Glenn v. Liggett (1890) 135 U.S. 533· 
130 With all preliminary questions, see 75 A. L. R. (1890) 203. 
131 1nst. of Int. Law, 31 Annuaire (1924) 182 art. II; DE NovA 170 n. 2; 
BATIFFOL 455 § 578. But see for the American decisions, supra pp. 504 n. 44, 
512 n. 89. 
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of the goods, was answered affirmatively as respects rescis-
sion, under the German BGB., § 477 par. 2, and negatively, 
with respect to the damages, 132 under the Austrian All g. 
BGB., § 1977, and an Austrian Supreme Court decision. 
With a better choice of law, only Austrian law would have 
been applicable; under the common law approach, only Ger-
man law. 
The Railway Convention of Bern,133 however, took the 
usual easy way out, by limiting action for total loss of 
goods to one year but referring the causes of interruption 
and suspension to the law of the country in which the action 
is brought.134 This example has been followed by other con-
ventions of unification.135 
German courts have repeatedly dealt with the case where 
a claim was sued upon in a foreign court; did this act inter-
rupt the period of limitation established by the law of the 
debt? The answer has been affirmative on the condition that 
a judgment following the action would be recognized in 
the forum. 136 This questionable solution, however, has been 
restricted to the case where German law governs the obliga-
tion,137 and is criticized in the literature where it has been 
recently suggested that the effects of foreign lawsuits on 
132 OLG. Hamburg (April 28, I92o) Hans. GZ. I92o, Hbl. 182 No. 9I. 
133 Of Oct. 23, I924, art. 45 § 4, HuDSON, 2 Int. Legislation I448, revised 
Nov. 23, I933, HUDSON, 6 id. 556, in force since Oct. I, I938. 
134 For an application of the then art. 45, see Trib. com. Seine {Nov. 
25, I905) Clunet I906, 837. 
135 E.g., Warsaw Convention on international air transportation, of I929, 
art. 29 {2) (HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation u4); Brussels Convention on collisions 
on the high seas, of I910, art. 7 par. 3 (BENEDICT, 6 American Admiralty 5); 
Geneva Convention on collisions in inland navigation, of Dec. 9, 1930, art. 
8 (3), not in force {HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation 8I8). The Uniform Laws on 
bills of exchange and on checks chose another more complicated method, 
see Annex II art. I7 and Annex II art. 26, respectively {HUDSON, 5 Int. 
Legislation 547 and 913). 
136 OLG. Hamburg (March 13, 1906) Hans. GZ. I906, Hbl. No. so; OLG. 
Celie (Dec. u, I907) I ROLG. 158; RG. {Sept. I8, 1925) I29 RGZ. 385, 
389, Clunet I926, 737· 
1 3 7 OLG. Breslau (Dec. I9, 1938) JW. 1939, 344, H. R. R. 1939, No. 375, 
approved by 2 ScHNITZER 538. 
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limitation of action should be subordinated to the rule, 
locus regit actum.138 
138 KATINSZKY, 9 Z.ausi.R. (1935) 855, cntiCizes confusion of substantive 
requirements for conflicts law and procedural requirements for recognition; 
an unjust and inconsistent result. On this basis, KALLMANN, "L'effet sur Ia 
prescnpt10n Jiberatoire des actes judiciaires intervenus en pays etranger," 
Revue Crit. I948, I ff., esp. 3 I, undertakes to formulate a theory. 
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Corrections to Volumes One and Two 
VOLUME ONE 
PAGE 
6I, paragraph 3: "invention". 
73, line 6: "court". 
75, line 16. 
75, line 23: "domicil. Under". 
79, (c), line 3. 
228, note I I4. 
226, note go. 
279, note I 55: "pp. 29 I ff." 
338, line I : "and". 
338, line 2. 
387, line 18. 
438, line 10. 
7 43: "Salviole". 
744: "Status unknown to the 
forum". 
Substitute: theory. 
Substitute: judge. 
Omit: "note 2I". 
Substitute: domicil.21 Under. 
Omit: "Argentine principle of." 
Add : C. C. art. I 7 I has been 
repealed by Law of March 10, 
1938. 
Omit: "France C. C. art. 151". 
Substitute: p. 280 n. I57· 
Substitute: and not as. 
Omit: "not". 
Omit: "Bolivia". 
Add: provided that in addition, 
to satisfy the lex fori. 
Substitute: Salvioli. 
Substitute: I75-I78, 558, 587, 
6so. 
VOLUME TWO 
PAGE 
55, paragraph 2, line 9: "no". 
124, note I: "Machen". 
248, note 83: "Poullett." 
289, line 5 from bottom, last 
word : "now". 
325, line 3: "an action". 
357, last line: "the Appellate Di-
. . ,, 
VISIOn • 
387, note I 18. 
423, paragraph 2, line I: "New 
York Court of Appeals has". 
593 
Substitute: its. 
Substitute: Machem. 
Substitute: Poullet. 
Substitute: not. 
Substitute: no action. 
Substitute: Judge Shientag . 
Add: reversed, H. R. (June 13, 
1924) cited infra p. 388 n. 120. 
Substitute: courts in New York 
have. 
594 CORRECTIONS 
PAGE 
440, note 3 I. 
458, last 3 lines, and 459, line I. 
463, note II9, line 4: "Chapter 
28 n. 45 and Chapter 29 n. 33". 
Add: Italy: Disp. Prel. C. C. 
( I942) art. 25. 
0 .. "§ " h h m1t. 312 . . . t roug 
"The same is true". 
Substitute: pp. 370-373 and p. 
40I n. 33· 
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workmen's compensation, 
Chapter 42. 
Accounts Receivable, 387, 419, 
43o-432. 
Actio and Action, 47S, 478-480. 
Actor Engaged for U. S., I 89 
n. 29. 
Adjustment, general average, 382. 
Administrator, power, ISO. 
Agency Contract, Chapter 41, 
181-184, 194-203. See also 
Agent. 
concept, 122, 123-129, 140. 
Agent. See also Authority, Rep-
resentation. 
concept, 181, cf. 122-129, 
140. 
acting on account, 129-130. 
acting on behalf, 129-130. 
attorney, I9S· 
authorized, 123-130 and Chap-
ter 40. 
broker, 198-203. 
commercial agents, I9S-I97· 
contract with principal, 194-
203. 
contract with third party, 132, 
14o-141. 
fiduciary relation, 140. 
general, 174. 
insurance, 173-174, 321, 33o-
333, 340. 
instructions, 140. 
occasional, 198. 
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permanent, IS6-IS7, 166, I9S-
I97· 
physician, I9S· 
public professions, I9S· 
real-estate broker, 202-203. 
of seller, S7-s8. 
soliciting, 176-178. 
traveling, IS8, 172, 187. 
types, 136, IS6-178. 
unauthorized, 141-142. 
Air Transportation, 302-307. 
death of passenger, 30S-307. 
international, 304. 
through carriage, 307-310. 
Warsaw Convention, 302-307. 
American Loans, 1920's, 9, I 1-
13, IS. 
A nspruch, 480. 
Apparent Authority, 128, 138-
139, 140, 171-174· 
Arbeitsvertrag, 182. 
Argentina. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
compensation of debts, 464 n. 
22. 
general average clause, 379· 
through carriage, 299 n. 3 7. 
Artist, rights, 74-7S· 
Assignment, Voluntary, of Sim-
ple Debts, Chapter 49· 
concept, 388-390. 
accounts receivable, 387, 419, 
43o-432. 
assignability, 387, 4o6-409. 
assignment of contract, 390. 
capacity, 386, 404-4os. 
cause, 412. 
classification of problems, 4oo-
416. 
INDEX 
Assignment (continued) 
conditional debts, 4I4-4I5. 
conflicts rules 
England, 393-394· 
France, 392, 398-399, 403, 
405, 424· 
Germany, 396-397, 423-
424, 433· 
Netherlands, 399, 4I2. 
New York, 404. 
United States, 407, 4I8-
420, 430--432. 
contacts 
assignor's place, 39I, 432-
434· 
contracting, 400, 4.05, 422-
433· 
debtor's place, 392, 394, 
424-426, 430, 434· 
law of original debt, 397, 
400, 423-424, 433· 
place of performance, 426. 
proper law, 426-428, 433-
434· 
situs, 39I-393· 
counterclaim, 409-410. 
creance, 390. 
debtor in good faith, 4I7, 420--
428, 434· 
debtor's defenses, 409-4IO. 
emptio venditio nominis, 388. 
equitable, 388. 
form, 40I-403. 
formality stipulated, 407. 
future debts, 4I4-4I5. 
gambling debts, 411 n. 99. 
insurable interest, 405, 411 n. 
100. 
interest in trust, 411 n. 97, 
428 n. I76. 
interests involved, 385, 4I 7-
4I8. 
legal restrictions, 4o6. 
lex Anastasiana, 408. 
life insurance, 394-395. 
municipal laws, 385-386, 420--
422, 428-429. 
nature, 388-390. 
notice to debtor, 387, 403, 42I-
428. 
partial, 408, 4I6. 
priority of assignees, 387, 4I8, 
428-432. 
procurator in rem suam, 388. 
promise to assign, 389, 400, 
4I0--4IJ. 
protection of good faith, 4I7-
4J2. 
provision, 4I 5· 
relationships involved, 39I, 
409-4I3, 434· 
retrait litigieux, 408. 
right to sue, 388. 
situs, 39I-393· 
subassignee, 4 7 I. 
subrogation, 413. 
to surety, 355· 
transfer, 4I3-416. 
formation, 4I3-4I5. 
scope, 4I5-4I6. 
U. S. Treasury bonds, 407-
408. 
validity, 4I I. 
wages, 407 ns. 8I, 82. 
warranty, 387, 389, 4IJ. 
wife beneficiary, 406 n. 78. 
Ausschlussfrist, 487. 
Austria. See also Table of Stat-
utes. 
warranty of solvency, 387, 4I3 
ns. 106, 107. 
Authority, Chapter 40. See also 
Agent, Representation. 
concept, 128-129, I39-I40, 
141. 
administrators, I 50. 
and agency, I23-IJO. 
apparent, 128, IJ8-I39, 140, 
17I-I74• 
capacity, I 70. 
conflicts rules 
England, I 53-I 54· 
France, I54· 
Germany, I56-158. 
Latin America, I 56. 
United States, I54-156. 
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Authority (continued) 
contacts, I29, I39-I40. 
place of agent, I44, I5I ff. 
determined, I62-I65. 
place of principal, I43, I5o-
I5I, I6I-I62. 
proposed, I 67. 
rationale, I5I-I52, I65-I68. 
contract with third party, I4I-
I42, I63, I65. 
death of principal, I 79· 
extent, I58-159· 
form, I41, I68-I70. 
history, I21, I23-I28. 
implied, 171-174. 
incident of main contract, 122-
123, I63, 165-I68, 170. 
independent concept, I 23, 126, 
130, 135· 
interest involved, 143-145, 
148, I5I. 
intrinsic requirements, I 7o-
171. 
lack of, 141. 
by law, 149. 
legal, I48-I50. 
officers of corporation, 149-
ISO. 
principal's intent to authorize, 
I6I-I62. 
procura, 149· 
ratification, I 74-I 78. 
requirements, 141, I68-I7I. 
. revocation I79-I8o. 
scope, I68-I8o. 
shipmaster, I46-I48. 
special, I4I. 
termination, I78-I8o. 
terminology, 129-I30. 
unauthorized, I4I-I42. 
unnamed principal, I30. 
undisclosed principal, I22 n. 2, 
126-I30, I35· 
voluntary private, I5I-I8o. 
Average 
general, 378-382. 
particular, 270. 
Banks 
current accounts, 473-474. 
deposits, I 6- I 7. 
Barcelona Convention and Stat-
ute on the Freedom of Tran-
sit, of April 14, 192I, 296. 
Bareboat Lease, 233-234· 
Beneficium cedendarum action-
urn, 355, 435· 
excussionis personalis, 353. 
Bern Conventions. See Table of 
Statutes. 
Bills of Lading, 235, 236. 
and transportation contract, 
238-239· 
endorsement, 274· 
forms, 247, 273· 
goods not shipped, 276-277. 
obligation to issue, 27I-272. 
person of debtor, 273-274. 
rights of holder, 273-279. 
through carriage, 285. 
Bondholder 
equality, I2-I3. 
rights, I 1-IS. 
Bonds, Io-15, 29, 33. 
U. S. Treasury, 407-408. 
Borrowing Statutes, 508-su, 
516. 
Branch of Insurer, 33o-333. 
Brazil. See also Table of Stat-
utes, Latin America. 
air law, 303. 
assignment, 421 n. 140. 
employment, 184 n. 14, 188 
n. 27. 
sale of immovables, I03 n. 10. 
workmen's compensation law, 
206 n. 2. 
Broker, 198-203. 
grain, I98-2oo. 
insurance, I 54· 
real estate, 202-203. 
ship, I63. 
stock exchange, 198-202. 
Brokerage Contract, 198-202. 
Bruck, Ernst, 330. 
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Brussels Conventions. See Table 
of Statutes. 
Burden of Proof, 354· 
Bustamante Code. See Table of 
Statutes. 
Canada. See also Table of Stat-
utes. 
employment, I88 n. 29. 
insurance, 32G-32I, 327. 
workmen's compensation, 206 
n. 2, 220. 
Capacity 
assignment, 386, 404-405. 
authorization, I 70. 
immovable, 102, !09. 
married women, I02, u6 n. 
60, I32, I34-I35, I52-I53· 
surety, 352 n. 43· 
Carriage, Maritime Transporta-
tion of Goods, Chapters 43-
44, Other Transportations, 
Chapter 45. See Maritime, 
Transportation. 
Carrier, 237-238. 
liability exemption, 239 n. 28. 
Causa, 78-85, 4Io-4I3. 
Cesser and Lien Clause, 273. 
Characterization 
agent, I36. 
employment, I8r. 
immovable, IOI. 
implied authority, I 7 I-I 72. 
limitation of action, 5 I7-522. 
common law, 505, 507, 5I7. 
comparative, 52 I. 
continental, 518, 5I9. 
federal, 5 I2, cf. 49!. 
lex causae, 519-520. 
lex fori, 517-520. 
secondary, 519-520. 
Charter Party, 234, Chapters 43 
and 44· See Maritime Trans-
portation of Goods. 
form important, 247, 251-252, 
254n. 104. 
Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine 
Telegraph Co., 128, I46, 
153, I54, 158, 162. 
C. I. F. Sales, 61-62. 
Classification 
agency and employment, I83. 
contract and title, 78-85. 
contract and workmen's com-
pensation, 2II-214. 
limitation and preclusion, 487-
489. 
private and public law, 19o-
193. 
problems of assignment, 391, 
40G-41 6, 434· 
property and risk, 88. 
three relationships in agency, 
I39-142. 
tort and workmen's compensa-
tion, 209-210, 228. 
Collective Bargaining, 191-192. 
Commissionaire, 237. 
Compensation, Chapter 5 I. See 
Setoff. 
contract of, 473-474· 
Concurrence of Actions 
contract and tort, 271 n. 56. 
workmen's compensation, 222-
228. 
Conditional Debts, 414-415. 
Conditional Sales, 82-85. 
forfeiture, 100. 
redemption, 83 n. 24. 
repossession, 83-84. 
Contacts. See Law. 
Contract and Transfer, 78-85, 
102-103, 389, 400, 41G-
413. 
Contract and Transfer of Title, 
76--77, 78-91, IIG-II7. 
Contrats d' adhesion 
affreightment, 262 n. 19. 
in general, ix-x. 
loan, 8-ro. 
Conversion of Foreign Money, 
25-29. 
date, 27, 28, 378. 
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Copyright, Sale of, 74-75. 
Corporation, powers of principal 
officers, I49-I50. 
Counterclaim 
assignment, 409-410. 
by surety, 354, 47I. 
Covenants for Title, no-117. 
Currency Restrictions, 48-50, 
357-359· 
Custody 
after transportation, 286-287. 
of rejected goods, 95. 
Damages, sales, 98 
Death 
of principal, I 79· 
statutes, 506. 
Debentures, 10. 
Debt 
discharge, Chapters 5o-53. 
transfer, Chapters 49 and 50. 
Debtor, protection, 391-392, 
398, 400, 434, 498-499· 
Decheance, 487. 
Deed, delivery, I04. 
Delivery 
of deeds, I04. 
of documents, 9o-9I, 96-97. 
of goods 
concept, 62-65. 
of insurance policy, 32I, 339· 
Demise, 233. 
Deposit, I6-17. 
Devaluation, r8 ff. 
Divorce, effect on insurance, 443-
444· 
Doctrine of Mandate, I22, 123-
130. 
Documents, In Sales 
tender, s6 n. 25, 9o-9I, 94· 
Doing Business, 321. 
Domicil, replaced by ordinary 
residence, 71. 
Employment Contract, Chapter 
4I, I8I-I93· 
concept, I81-183. 
for foreign country, 185, I87, 
I88-I89. 
occasional or temporary work, 
I86. 
private and public law, I9o-
I92. 
by state, 190 n. 34· 
traveling salesmen, I87 n. 23. 
working place, 186-r8g. 
Encumbrances, I 12, IIS. 
Enrichment, 366-379. See Un-
just Enrichment. 
Equitable 
assignment, 388. 
remedies, I07-I08. 
"Establishment," 7 I. 
Estoppel, IJ6. 
Exceptio rei venditae et tradi-
tae, II6-II7. 
Exchange 
order for, I98-202. 
sales on, 7 I. 
Exchange Restrictions, 48-so, 
357-359· 
Extracontractual Obligations, 
Chapter 48, 36I-382. 
Fair, sales on, 53 n. 12. 
Fair Labor Standards Act, 193. 
Fiction of Identity, 131-135. 
Fin de recevoir, 485-486. 
Fluvial Transportation, 296-298. 
F. 0. B. Sales, 6o-61, 81 n. 17, 
91-92. 
Foreign Money Debts, 25--29, 
41-42. 
Form 
assignment, 401-403, 407. 
authority, 141, 168-170. 
bill of lading, 273. 
charter party, 27 I. 
examination of goods, 94-95· 
sale of immovable, 108-109. 
suretyship, 352 n. 42. 
Forwarding Agent, 237-238, 
253· 
6oo INDEX 
France. See also Table of Stat-
utes. 
assignment, 3g2, 3g8-3gg. 
compensation, 464. 
employment, 18g n. 2g, IgO. 
garnishment, 45D-45I. 
insurance, 327, 330, 335-336. 
in foreign money, 26. 
international payment, 24-25, 
38-3g. 
lesion, I 18-120. 
limitation of action, 4g8-4gg. 
mandate, 122, 125-126, 127. 
privilege of seller, 85-87. 
tender of documents, go. 
transfer of property, 77. 
workmen's compensation, 210. 
"Francs," 43. 
Fraternal Benefit Associations, 
324-325, 512 n. gg. 
Freight 
after delivery, 28 I. 
distance freight, 280. 
Future Debts, 414-415. 
Gambling Debts, 411 n. gg. 
Garnishment, 448-457. 
Geiszler v. De Graaf, I 13. 
General Average, 378-382. 
foreign adjustment, 382. 
last port, 380. 
law of adjuster, 382. 
York-Antwerp Rules, 37g. 
General Maritime Law, 241-
242, 247· 
Geneva Conventions. See Table 
of Statutes. 
Germany. See also Table of Stat-
utes. 
affreightment, 25 I-253· 
assignment, 3g6-397. 
authorization, 156-158, 163-
164. 
bill of lading, 275-277. 
compensation system, 465. 
currency restrictions, 48-so, 
359-360. 
employment, 18g, 191. 
foreign money debts, 38, 42· 
garnishment, 451 f., 456-457. 
splitting the contract, 52, 8g-
go, 94 n. 78. 
stipulated place of perform-
ance, 61. 
tender of documents, go. 
title theory, 78, 82. 
workmen's insurance, 2o6, 
219-220, 437· 
Gold Clauses, 2o-25, 35-46. 
bullion clause, 23. 
coin clause, 2o-22. 
prohibitions, 24-46. 
value clause, 22. 
Grainbroker, 198-200. 
Great Britain. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
affreightment, 245-249. 
garnishment, 453-454· 
insurance, 328. 
tender of documents, go. 
workmen's compensation, 205-
206. 
Guaranty, 344· 
Hague Committee Drafts, 1g28, 
on Conflict of Laws (Sales), 
51 n. I. 
Hague Draft, 1931, on Conflict 
of Laws (Sales), 51 n. J, 
Handlungsagent, 183, 196 n. 59· 
Handlungsgehilfe, 183. 
Holmes, 102, 109, 131. 
Immoral Contract, II9 n. 75· 
Implied Authority, I7I-I74· 
Inhabitants, 339. 
Inspection of Goods, g4-95. 
Insurance, Chapter 46. 
accident, 2o6, 340. 
American Constitution, 322-
324, 325, 337 n. 95· 
American courts, 3II-3I7· 
assignment, 386. 
automobile, 326, 342. 
branch office, 33D-333· 
INDEX 001 
Insurance (continued) 
contacts 
branch office contracting, 
3II-3I6, 327. 
by correspondence, 341. 
party autonomy, 318, 337-
338. 
place of insured, 313, 318. 
place of insurer, 313, 329-
334, 339-341. 
proper law, 318. 
situation of risk, 326, 335-
336, 341-342. 
supervising state, 334-336. 
delivery, 321, 339· 
doing business, 321 and n. 30. 
double insurance, 336 n. 96. 
draft of Uniform Law, 325-
326, 340, 342 ns. 104, 105. 
fire insurance, 321 n. 35, 338, 
341-343· 
in foreign money, 26. 
fraternal benefit association, 
324-325. 
government control, 318-321, 
334-336. 
health insurance, 342. 
inhabitants, 339. 
immovables, 341-342. 
insurable interest, 405, 4I I n. 
100. 
interest of state, 323. 
license, 34o--341. 
life insurance, 3I4-316, 326, 
339-341, 394-395· 
local agent, 32o--32I, 340. 
marine insurance, 317, 327 n. 
56, 328-329. 
party autonomy, 318, 337-338. 
proper law, 3I8. 
property, 3I8, 321 n. 35, 326, 
335-336, 338, 341-342-
risk situation, 326, 335-336, 
341-342. 
standard policy, 3 1 g. 
statutes, 317-321. 
subrogation, 439· 
supervision, 318-321, 334-336. 
Uniform Law draft, 325-326, 
340, 342· 
workmen's compensation, 206, 
207, 219-220, 342-
Inter-American Convention on 
the Rights of the Author in 
Literary, Scientific, and Ar-
tistic Works, of July 22, 
1946, 75· 
Interest of a State, 226-228, 323. 
International Labour Code of 
1939, 207, 2I7, 221. 
Interpretation, affreightment, 
272-273, 285. 
Issue 
of bonds, I 3-I 4· 
of insurance policy, 32 I, 340· 
Italy. See also Table of Statutes. 
compensation of debts, 464 n. 
22. 
employment, 184 n. IO, 188 n. 
28, I9o n. 85. 
lapse of time, 488 n. 51, 493 
n. 81. 
law of the flag, 258-259. 
representation, I 2 7. 
sales of immovables, 103 n. ro. 
workmen's compensation, 211, 
220. 
Jason Clause, 248. 
Joint Resolution of Congress on 
Gold Clauses, I9, 23 n. I I, 
32, 36-4!, 44-45· 
Jurisdiction for Garnishment, 
448-457· 
Klauder Case, 419, 431. 
Laband, on authority, 125-126. 
Labor Courts, 208. 
Labor Law, Chapters 41 and 42. 
Land Transportation, 296-302. 
of baggage, 296. 
contract and tort, 302. 
free pass, 301-302. 
of goods, 298-301. 
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Land (continued) 
of persons, JOI-302. 
through carriage, 307-310. 
Latin America. See Table of Stat-
utes for individual countries. 
agency, I56. 
contracts of adhesion, ix, 255, 
299 n. 32, 327. 
extracontractual obligations, 
369 n. 30, 372. 
general averages, 380 ns. 74, 
76. 
insurance, 327. 
sale of immovables, 10I, 103. 
situs of debts, 392. 
transportation, 255-256, 270, 
292, 298-300, JOI n. 44· 
Law of the Agent 
authority, 144, I5I-I68. 
contract of agency, I95-202. 
determination of this place, 
I62-I65. 
rationale, I5I-I52, I65-I68. 
scope, r68-I8o. 
Law of the Buyer, 56, 59, 68. 
Law of the Country of Currency, 
32-33, 35· 
Law of Creditor's Domicil 
loan, 5, 10. 
suretyship, 348-349. 
Law of Debtor's Domicil 
borrower, 4-5. 
surety, 350 n. 32. 
Law of Financial Market, 1 I-IJ. 
Law of the Flag 
employment, Igo. 
maritime affreightment, 24o-
24I, 244 n. 47, 245-247, 
258. 
Law of the Insurance, 439· 
Law of the Insured, 3I3, 3I8. 
Law of the Insurer, 3I3, 329-
334, 339-34I. 
Law of Nationality Common to 
Parties, 189 n. 32, I90 n. 33, 
250, 252 n. 92, 254 n. 103, 
327. 
Law of a Party, 7o-7 I. 
Law of the Place of Contracting 
agency, I94· 
authority, I54-I55, I59, I77. 
conditional sales, 82 n. 22. 
employment, 184-I85. 
insurance, 3 1 I -3 I 6, 322, 324, 
327. 
loan, 4· 
maritime transportation 
baggage, 295. 
goods, 242-245, 248-256, 
263-264. 
persons, 291-292, 295. 
qualified by additional circum-
stances, 53, I06, I 15, I85, 
187, 338. 
sales, 51-52, 58, 103-I04, I 19 
n. 77· 
surety, 348. 
workmen's compensation, 21 I-
212. 
Law of the Place of Destination 
land, 300. 
maritime, 249 n. 78, 25I, 255, 
264, 274-276. 
Law of the Place of Dispatch, 
243 ff., 248, 25o-253, 265-
267, 276-279, 294, 295, 
298-299· 
Law of the Place of Employment 
authority, I57, I6o-I6I. 
master and servant, I87-I88. 
workmen's compensation, 2I4-
220. 
workmen's compensation insur-
ance, 342 and n. 106. 
Law of the Place of Loss, 206, 
244 n. 49, 257, 299. 
Law of the Place of Performance 
affreightment, 249 n. 78, 25I, 
255,264,274-276,283-286. 
currency restrictions, 50. 
insurance, 328 n. 6o. 
loan, s-6. 
sales, 52, 61 n. 44, 94, 105. 
subrogation, 438-439. 
INDEX 
Law of the Place of the Principal 
authority, 143, 150-151, 161-
162. 
employment, 186-189. 
Law of the Principal Debt, 349-
350, 436-437, 467. 
Law of Two Debts, 466-467. 
Law of the Seller, 54-56, 68. 
Law of the Shipowner, 261-263. 
Law of the Suretyship, 436. 
Legal Authority, q8- I so. 
Legal Tender, 25, 32, 33· 
Letter of Credit, 97-98. 
Lex Anastasiana, 408. 
Lex fori, 307, 46o, 466, 495, 
500. 
Lex loci delicti 
affreightment, 244 n. 49, 257· 
insurance, 206. 
workmen's compensation, 209, 
222. 
Lex pecuniae, 32, 35· 
Lex situs, 78. 
repossession, 84-85 
sale of immovable, 7. 
compulsory, 101-103, I 16. 
subsidiary, 104-107, I 15-
II7, 120. 
Liability 
bank, 16-17, 473-474· 
carrier, in general, 270-271, 
see Chapters 43-45. 
employer, Chapters 41 and 42. 
exemption clauses, 239 n. 28, 
270 n. 54· 
stockholder, so6 n. 6r, 509-
510. 
transfer of, 444-446. 
License 
insurance business, 3 I 7-321, 
334-336, 340. 
patent, sale of, 73. 
Limitation of Action, Chapters 
52 and 53. 
nature, 482. 
actio, 478-479. 
action, 475, 479-480. 
action arising, 522. 
affreightment, 289. 
Anglo-American principle, 
495· 
Anspruch, 480. 
Ausschlussfrist, 487. 
borrowing statutes, 508-5II, 
5I6. 
characterization, 5 I 7-522. 
characterization proposed, 
52I-522. 
concepts, municipal, 482-487. 
conflicts rules 
Anglo-American, 495-496. 
civil laws, 496-504. 
contacts, 500 ff. 
domicil of debtor, 498-499, 
50 I. 
forum, 495-496, 523 ns. 
134, I35· 
party autonomy, 503-504. 
death statutes, 506 n. 6o. 
dechfance, 487. 
defensive character, 477-478, 
482-4-84. 
effect, 484-486. 
exceptiones decisoriae, 485. 
extinguishing the debt, 488, 
490, 49I, 493, 504-508. 
federal law, 49I, 512. 
fin de recevoir, 485-486. 
fraternal benefit association, 
5I2 n. 99· 
French courts, 498-499. 
general statutes, 505. 
history, 477, 496-498. 
international problem, 5 I 7. 
interruption, 423, 524. 
Klageverjiihrung, 480. 
lapse of time, 482. 
liability of employer, Chapters 
41, 42. 
liability of stockholder, so6 n. 
6r. 
liability of stockholder of na-
tional bank, 509-510. 
main features, 482-487. 
INDEX 
Limitation (continued) 
mixed theories, 504 ff. 
municipal comparison, 493-
494· 
municipal theories, Chapter 52. 
natural obligation, 486-487. 
periods of time, short and long, 
492, 5I3-5I4. 
policies, 492-493. 
preclusion, 487-489. 
prescription, 483. 
presumption of payment, 501-
502. 
procedural exceptions, 504-
5I3. 
procedural theory, 475, 481, 
49 I, 49 5-496. 
procedure, concept, 481-482. 
protection of debtor, 498-499. 
public policy, 5 I3-5 I6. 
remedy, 475, 479, 487, 489-
491. 
res judicata, 484-486, 493· 
rescission, 522-523. 
scope, 522-524. 
situs theory, 496-499. 
special pleading, 49 I. 
special statutes, 505-507. 
statutes, borrowing, 508-5 I I, 
516. 
statutes, extinguishing 488, 
490, 49I, 493, 504-508. 
statutes, general, 505. 
statutes, special, 505-507. 
stipulated, 484 n. 30, 503-504, 
5I2, 522 n. I3I. 
stockholders, so6 n. 6r, 509-
510. 
Story, 484, 498. 
substantive theory, 485-486, 
493, 499-504. 
theories, 495-504. 
transforming effect, 489. 
treaties, 523. 
uniform statute suggested, 522. 
waiver, 484. 
Liquor Prohibition, 54 n. 18, 
I77. 
Literary Rights, 74-75· 
Lloyd v. Guibert, I05, I47, 173, 
240, 246, 247, 269, 380. 
Locatio conductio operarum, I82. 
Locatio conductio operis, 182, 
233 n. 2. 
Locatio conductio rei, 233 n. 2. 
Louisiana 
agency, merger of persons, I33· 
authority, concept, I22 n. 2. 
lesion, I I 7. 
seller's privilege, 86. 
statute of limitation, 505. 
warranty, 9I, 92 n. 68. 
workmen's compensation, 213. 
"Main Contract" of Agent, 141. 
Mandate, I23-I30. 
Maritime Assistance and Salvage, 
365-366. 
Maritime Transportation 
of baggage, 294-295. 
of goods (see Maritime Trans-
portation of Goods). 
of persons, 29I-294· 
Maritime Transportation of 
Goods, Chapters 43 and 44· 
affreightment, 234-236. 
ordinary, 268. 
bareboat lease, 233-234. 
carrier, 237-238. 
cesser and lien clause, 273. 
charter parties, 234-235, 268-
270. 
conflicts rules, 239-256. 
Codigo Bustamante, 255. 
France, 249-250. 
Germany, 251-253. 
Great Britain, 245-249. 
Netherlands, 253-254· 
United States, 24o-245. 
contacts 
accident, 244, 257. 
arrival, 272 n. 63. 
contracting, 263-264, 272 n. 
63. 
INDEX 6os 
Maritime (continued) 
contacts (continued) 
destination, 264, 274-276, 
283-286. 
dispatch, 265-267, 276-279. 
flag, 258-261. 
forum, 267. 
owner, 261-263. 
proposed, 268-270. 
consignee, rights, 287-289. 
custody, 286-287. 
demise, 233-234. 
distant freight, 280. 
form of bill of lading, 273. 
form of charter party, 271. 
forwarding agent, 237. 
freight, 280, 281. 
general maritime law, 241-
242, 257· 
general ship, 235-236. 
goods not shipped, 276-277. 
holder of bill, 273-279. 
interpretation, 272-273, 285. 
lease of vessel, 232-234. 
limitation of action, 289. 
notice of loss, 287-288. 
obligation to issue bill, 271-
272. 
party autonomy, 239-240, 243· 
person of debtor, 273-274. 
port regulations, 281-283. 
private carrier, 237 and n. 23. 
public policy, 255, 256, 267-
268, 277, 287, 28g. 
rights of consignee, 287-289. 
rights of holder, 273-279. 
scope of contracts rule, 270-
289. 
stipulation for time of claim, 
28g. 
through carriage, 285, 307-
JIO. 
time for claim, 289. 
types of contracts, 232-237. 
unification, 232. 
Market, sales on, 53 n. 11. 
Married Women, 102, II 6 n. 6o, 
132, 134-135, 152-153· 
Maryland, statute of limitation, 
505. 
Master and Servant, 127, 131, 
181-182, 184-193· 
contacts 
contracting, 184-185. 
master's domicil, 186-187. 
servant's working place, 
187-189. 
public law, 190-193. 
public policy, 192-193· 
Metallistic Theory, 19-20. 
Michigan, statute of limitation, 
507 n. 66. 
Milliken v. Pratt, 132, 134-135, 
152, 155, 353· 
Minnesota 
statute of limitation, 51 7 n. 66. 
workmen's compensation, 215-
216. 
Missouri, In re, 247. 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals 
title transfer, 81-82. 
unjust enrichment, 376-377. 
voluntary agency, 365-366. 
Mode of Performance, money 
debts, 33, 39, 41-43. 
Money of Account, 34· 
Money Deposits, 16-17. 
Money Loans, Chapter 34· 
bonds, 10-15. 
borrower's duties, 4· 
contacts, 4-7. 
damages, J. 
finance agency, g. 
individual loans, 7. 
lender's duties, 4, 10. 
mass loans, 8. 
rationale, 7-10. 
state as debtor, 10, 14-15. 
state structure, J. 
Money Obligations, Chapter 35. 
contacts, 32 ff. 
conversion, 26-29. 
judicial, 27-29. 
currency of debt, 33. 
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Money (continued) 
default, 34· 
devaluation, I8-20. 
exchange restrictions, 48-50, 
357-359· 
foreign money debts, 25-29. 
French doctrine, 24-25, 38-39. 
gold clauses, 35-4I. 
bullion, 23. 
coin, 2o-22. 
prohibition, 24-25, 36-45. 
value, 22, 35-45· 
inflation, I9. 
international bonds, 29-32. 
international payment, 24-25, 
38-39· 
Joint Resolution of Congress 
(gold clauses), 19, 23 n. II, 
32, 36-4I, 44-45· 
lex pecuniae, 32-33. 
modalities of payment, 4I-43· 
money of account, 33-34· 
money loans, 3-I 7. 
municipal laws, 18-32. 
nominalism, I 8-20. 
option of collection, 31-32, 
4G-4I. 
option of currency, 3o-3r, 43-
46. 
public policy, 4o-4r. 
revalorization, 34-35. 
stipulations for protection, 2o-
24· 
Montevideo Conventions. See 
Table of Statutes. 
Moratorium, 46-48. 
Multiple Currency Clauses, 
30 ff. 
Nationality Common to Parties, 
I89 n. 32, 190 n. 33, 250. 
Natural Obligation, 486-487. 
Negotiorum gestio, 361-366. 
The Netherlands. See also Table 
of Statutes. 
assignment, 399, 412. 
employment, I84 n. 12, I88 n. 
28, 190 n. 35· 
mant1me law, 236, 253-254, 
258, 299· 
seller's privilege, 87. 
New York. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
workmen's compensation, 189 
n. 3I, 2I5, 2I7, 218 n. 5I. 
Njegos, The, 239, 246-248, 26I, 
278-279· 
Nominalism, I 8. 
Notice 
of defect, 93-95· 
of loss, 287-288. 
Novation, 446-448. 
Ocean Bill of Lading, 307-310. 
Ohio, borrowing statute, 5I6. 
Option of Collection, 3I-32, 33, 
40. 
Option of Currency, 3o-3r, 33, 
43· 
Ownership, Transfer of, 78-82. 
between the parties, 78. 
confused with contract, 77, 79, 
82. 
Paris Peace Treaty between Italy 
and the Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers, of February 
10, 1947, 332. 
Party Autonomy, vii. 
affreightment, 239-240, 243, 
247. 251, 254. 289. 
air transportation, 303-304. 
insurance, 328, 337-338. 
sales of goods, 8r, roo. 
sales of immovables, 105, II5. 
workmen's compensation, 212, 
213 n. 27. 
Patent Rights, sales of, 73-74· 
Patterson Committee on Conflicts 
Rules for Insurance, 325-
326, 340, 342. 
Pennsylvania, law of the place of 
damage, 244 n. 49. 
Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, Brazilian and 
Serbian loans, I 4 n. 46, 2 I, 
31 n. 49, 40, 46. 
INDEX 
"Place" of a Party, 7o-7 1. 
Polson v. Stewart, 102, 10g n. 41. 
Possession vaut titre, 77. 
"Pound Sterling," 43. 
Power of Attorney. See Author-
ity, Authorization. 
Preclusion, 487-48g. 
Principal 
and agent, 127, 140. 
authorization (see Authoriza-
tion). 
death, 17g. 
intention to authorize, I6I-
I62. 
revocation of authority, I7g-
z8o. 
Principal and Agent, 127, Chap-
ter 41. 
Priority of Assignees, 378, 387, 
418, 428-432. 
Privilege of Seller, 85-87. 
Procedure, concept, 48I-482. 
Promise of Transfer, 78 ff., 82. 
Protective Stipulations against 
Devaluation, 2o-24, 36-45. 
"Provision," 4I5-4I6, 44I-443· 
Public Policy 
affreightment, 253-254, 255-
256. 
bonds, 4o-41. 
currency restrictions, 4g-50. 
employment, Ig2-Ig3. 
limitation of action, 5I3-5I6. 
sales, 87 n. 47, IOO. 
Quasi Contracts, 361. 
Ratification, I74-I78. 
Registration, ships, 72. 
Repossession by Seller, 83-84. 
Representation, Chapter 3g. See 
also Agent, Authority. 
concept, I26, I30, I35· 
and agency, I23-I30. 
common law, 128-I2g, I35· 
external relationship, I35, I4G-
I4I. 
fiction of identity, I3I-I35· 
history, I2I, 123, 135. 
internal relationship, 135, J4G-
I4I. 
municipal theories, I2I-I37· 
theory of mandate, I22, I23-
I27. 
unauthorized, 141-I42. 
Repurchase, gg-100. 
Res judicata, 484-486, 4g3. 
Rescission, 83-84, 376-377, 522-
523. 
Restatement of the Law of Agen-
cy, 128-I30, 138, I40, 15g, 
161, Ig4. 
Restatement of the Law of Con-
flict of Laws §§ 257-258,79, 
So; id. § 340, 102 n. 8; id. 
§ 34I, III; id. § 342, 138, 
I94 n. 53; id. § 343, I44, 
159, 160, I6I; id. § 344, 
144, I5g, I6o, I64, 172; id. 
§ 345, I30 n. 26, I45, I59-
I6o, I6I, I64, I66; id. 
§§ 348 ff., 389, 3go n. 13, 
3g6; id. § 3g8, 20g; id. 
§ 3gg, 20g, 2I I; id. § 400, 
2I6 n. 45, 218. 
Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts § 14g, 38g; id. §§ I66 
ff., 428 n. 175. 
Restatement of the Law of Se-
curity §§ 82-83, 345; id. 
§ I33, 354· 
Retribution, 356-357. 
Revalorization, 34-35. 
Revocation of Authority, I7g-
I8o. 
Right to Sue 
assignee, 388. 
subrogee, 43g. 
undisclosed principal, I35-136, 
I4I. 
Risk of Loss, 87-gi. 
Roman Law 
Codex Just. 4·44·2, II8 n. 68; 
id. 7.3g.3.2, 477 n. g. 
Codex Theod. 4·I4.I.3, 477 
n. g. 
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Digesta 6.r.23.3, 374 n. 56; 
id. I2.I.Ig.I, 375 n. 57; id. 
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IV.64-68, 464 n. 21. 
Inst. Just. 2.1.34, 374 n. 56; 
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covenants for title, 110-117. 
form, 108-Iog. 
laesio enormis, 117-120. 
warranty of title, IIQ-117. 
Sale of Movables, Chapters 35 
and 36. 
by agent, 57-58, 156-I58. 
on approval, 99-100. 
c. i. f., 61-62. 
conditional, 82-85, 100. 
contacts, 51-71. 
buyer's place, s6-sg, 68. 
contracting, 51-53. 
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custody, 95. 
damages, g8. 
delivery, 62-67. 
on exchange, 71. 
on fair, 53 n. 12. 
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notice of defect, 93-94, 95· 
party autonomy, 100. 
of patent, 73-74· 
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and title, 78-85. 
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464. 
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462. 
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467. 
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liquidity, 471-472. 
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procedural application in civil 
law courts, 462-464. 
procedural theory, 459-464. 
prohibitions, 468-470. 
rationale, 468-472. 
reciprocity, 47 I. 
surety, 354-355, 409-410. 
Shipmaster, authority, 146-148, 
246, 248 n. 68, 273-274. 
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n. 35· 
Shipment to Carrier, 62-67, 68. 
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265, 266, 267, 271, 293 n. 
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Status of Employment, 2I5. 
Statute of Frauds, 54 n. I 7. 
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of insurer, 413, 439. 
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482. 
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concept, 344-345· 
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beneficium cedendarum action-
urn, 355· 
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nalis, 353. 
burden of proof, 354· 
capacity, 352 n. 43· 
contacts 
contracting, 348. 
creditor's place, 348-349. 
law of principal debt, 349-
350. 
proposal, 352. 
surety's place, 350 n. 32. 
surety's place of payment, 
350 n. 33, 351. 
cosureties, 357-359. 
counterclaim, 354, 471. 
currency restrictions, 359-
360. 
defenses, 354· 
diligence, 353-354. 
exoneration, 356-357, 378. 
extent, 346-347, 353-355. 
form, 352 n. 42. 
guaranty, 344· 
independent law, 345· 
negotiorum gestio, 357. 
plurality, 357-359· 
retribution, 356-357. 
scope, 352-360. 
setoff, 354-355. 
subrogation, 355. 
sureties, several, 357-359. 
termination, 356. 
terminology, 344-345. 
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sale of immovables, 103 n. 10. 
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360. 
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299, 307-3 10, 
Third Party Contract with 
Agent, I41, 143. 
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Time for Claim. See Limitation 
of Action. 
affreightment, 289. 
limitation of action, 503-504, 
5I2, 522 n. I3I. 
Time for Notice 
affreightment, 289. 
sale, 95· 
Title and Contract 
conditional sales, 82-85. 
sales, 78-85, I02-103. 
Tort Actions 
liability of shipowner, 271. 
workmen's compensation, 204, 
207' 222-224. 
Traditio, system of, 76, 78, 8I, 
82. 
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Transfer of Claims by Law, 
435-444· 
accident insurance, 439. 
beneficium cedendarum action-
urn, 435· 
bill of exchange, endorsement, 
44I. 
contacts, 436-439. 
divorce, effect, 443-444· 
insurer subrogee, 4I3, 439· 
provision, 44I-443· 
rank of subrogees, 440-441. 
right to sue, 439. 
subrogation, 435 ff. 
surety, 355, 436. 
Transfer and Contract, 78-85, 
102-103, 389, 400, 410-413. 
Transfer of Liability, 443-446. 
Transfer of Simple Debts 
of claims, by law, 435-444· 
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of liability, 444-446. 
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of baggage, 294-295, 296. 
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land, 296-302. 
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I26-I30, 135· 
contrast to civil law, 135-136. 
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136, 141. 
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surance Conflicts Law, 325-
326, 340. 
Unilateral Contracts, 5, 350 and 
n. 35· 
United States. See also Table of 
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agency, Chapters 39-4I. 
authority, 122-123, 154-156. 
conditional sales, 82-85. 
contract and title, 79, I02. 
divorce effect, 443· 
foreign money conversion, 28-
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garnishment, 454-457. 
gold clause stipulation, I9, 20. 
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right to sue, 439. 
sale of immovables, 10I-106. 
subrogation effect, 440. 
suretyship, 348-350. 
workmen's compensation stat-
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theories, 209, 2I2, 2I4-220. 
Constitution, 225-229. 
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236 n. 14. 
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conflicts rules, 368-372. 
contacts, 368-372. 
enriching act, 368-369. 
other contacts, 369-370. 
relationship causing, 370-
372. 
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legacy invalid, 376. 
municipal laws, 366-367. 
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surety, 378-379. 
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setoff, 469-470. 
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Warranty of Title, 104. 
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229. 
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municipal systems, 204-206. 
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temporary work, 216-217,220. 
tort action, 222-224. 
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